I ultimately agree with Popper about metaphysics. — norm

I would have thought you’d prefer Kuhn to Popper. There just aren’t enough Kuhnians on this forum. Popper is too much of a realist for me. Let me ask you this: who would you side with in the following debate?

“While Rorty claims that his view is "almost, but not quite, the same as Putnam's" internalist conception of philosophy" , Putnam is uncomfortable with this association. Putnam claims to be preserving the realist spirit but he takes Rorty to be "rejecting the intuitions that underlie every kind of realism (and not just metaphysical realism)" . Putnam views Rorty's pragmatism as a self-refuting relativism driven by a deep irrationalism that casts doubt on the very possibility of thought. Yet in the paper Putnam cites to support his charge Rorty insists that he shares Putnam's desire for a middle ground between metaphysical realism and relativism and that his pragmatism fills the bill. Putnam does not concur.”

I like Kuhn too. I just meant that I liked Popper's appreciation of what's good about metaphysics. (I actually have come to dislike the word metaphysics. Maybe because it's pompous? Or because there's such a thing as physics? Or because I think of metaphysicks ?)

metaphysics in its most general sense is just the formalist gesture in thinking. Derrida recognized that there is no escaping this gesture , even for atheists and those who reject classical metaphysics. That’s why he dubbed his position ‘quasi-transcendental’, because it acknowledges the inseparable relation between the formal and empirical moment in every experience.

formalist gesture in thinking — Joshs

I don't understand what you mean here?

There's a period there.

No, that's something anyone who is realistic about the problems in knowledge would say.

So unpack that statement for me. Do you believe you're a physical animal with a brain that produces consciousness?

No, I'm a spirit soul that has a divine consciousness, that's inhabiting an animal body, a machine.

But, anyway, I hope you see the point. The fact that rationlism says that we have certain knowledge of mathematical truths arising from pure thought, actually conflicts with 'an understanding of human beings as physical creatures whose capacities for learning are exhausted by our physical bodies.' But rather than throw out the belief in the fact that 'we're physical creatures', Quine et al go into an intricate argument that we must 'save' or 'respect' maths anyway, whilst still not preparted to acknowlege the fact that we have such faculties throws into doubt our station as 'purely physical beings'. The dogma must be maintained at all costs!

That just says so much about the current state of philosophy, in my view. As you're a bit of a math whiz yourself, and one of the all-around best read people on the site, thought I'd run it by you. — Wayfarer

I'm with you in criticisms of the 'physical' and physicalism. I don't know what to make of 'purely physical beings.' It's all just fuzz and attitude. I can't help but suspect that what we are really dealing with is a clash of religious and secular attitudes. Some people don't believe in gods and ghosts and miracles. A subset of these people feel the need to dress that up with ambiguous metaphysical baggage. The word 'physical' has no context-free meaning. All the grand talk about the 'physical' is parasitic upon an unformalizable know-how (this critique applies to 'mental' too.) I'd describe my position as that of one who has been smacked by certain thinkers into an awareness of the rampant ambiguity of language. It mostly works fine in practical life, probably because we are trained in a context of serious practical consequences (getting crushed by machinery, ostracized, punched, cheated...) Our fancy talk is like a flower in the soil of everyday language, and the higher we climb the less we know what we are talking about (which doesn't mean we shouldn't bother, but only notice.)

Anyway, the soft version of 'we're physical creatures' doesn't interest people much. We have bodies. Too obvious! We also clearly have something like a 'space of reasons.' Denying either is absurd. Denying the second is perhaps even more absurd, because that denial occurs within the space of reasons. But it's an absurdity one can get away with, because it's understood as part of a goofy low-stakes game. As I see it, this 'dogma that must be maintained' is still only held by a minority of people without much power. This is not to deny that a secular attitude dominates our age.

Ok

I see it, this 'dogma that must be maintained' is still only held by a minority of people without much power. This is not to deny that a secular attitude dominates our age. — norm

:roll:

metaphysics in its most general sense is just the formalist gesture in thinking. Derrida recognized that there is no escaping this gesture , even for atheists and those who reject classical metaphysics. That’s why he dubbed his position ‘quasi-transcendental’, because it acknowledges the inseparable relation between the formal and empirical moment in every experience. — Joshs

I think I agree with you, but I still dislike the word. The old problem is...if everything is metaphysics, then nothing is metaphysics. Any sentence that just hangs there is vulnerable. It was often chosen for a particular person in a particular moment. I know you know this. I know atheists have a system of beliefs and desires, etc. The goal is least misleading word for the moment. It's impossible to say everything at once.

I love Derrida & Heidegger & many others. I think of thinkers like Derrida as the system trying to climb out of itself. Oh to be unthrown! Oh to awake from the nightmare of history, that nightmare that ... I am ! But there shall be no final word. We'll just keep stacking them.

Well, the question, it seems to me, is whether you ultimately just hate the secular attitude.

I'm an atheist who respects and learns from Christian texts. Is that not enough?

I trust science for practical purposes, without adopting some complicated metaphysics to explain that trust.

Is the problem really not physicalism but atheism? Do you object to the practical prestige of science?

No, that's something anyone who is realistic about the problems in knowledge would say. — Dharmi

Indeed, and that's what your 'sophists' and 'obscurantists' say. Is that not even the point of so much recent philosophy? The sociality and therefore the 'historicality' of reason itself? We inherited this language, English, as is. Our most secret thoughts are arrangements of marks and noises we did not choose. Our rebellions only make sense against a background that makes them intelligible. It's terribly difficult to not end up a cliche. And even the project of avoid being one is a inherited project, something we were taught to strive toward, a scripted rebellion. The role of the uncorrupted, unseduced reactionary is old hat, as is the in-on-the-new-thing joker.

Well, the question, it seems to me, is whether you ultimately just hate the secular attitude.

I'm an atheist who respects and learns from Christian texts. Is that not enough?

I trust science for practical purposes, without adopting some complicated metaphysics to explain that trust. — norm

It's not hate. It's the sense that there's a pervasive misunderstanding or 'urban myth' - something which 'everyone knows to be true', but which is mistaken. I think this specific issue, regarding the reality of number, makes this clear - the fact that mathematics, which is at the basis of so much of the success of science, has to be defended because it can't be accomodated naturalistically. I've noticed chatter on the internet about the 'war on math'.

Decades ago - so long I've forgotten the details - I read about the notion of there being an heirarchy of understanding which was fundamental to Western philoosphy, in particular. First there was sensory knowledge - now subsumed under empiricism; then there was knowledge of mathematical and logical truths; and finally there was a form of higher knowledge, something like noesis, I guess. But that vertical dimension, the sense in which there is a qualitative heirarchy, is what has been lost. And I question whether what remains actually qualifies as 'philosophy'.

OK, thanks for the direct answer! I do indeed think that you are in the underdog position. As a first approximation, someone might describe you as some kind of neoplatonist. It's an awkward position out there in no-man's-land.

It's fair to say that Wittgenstein (who's just a nice example here) is a very different beast than Plotinus (same).

My own view involves something like a continuum. There is 'higher knowledge' but no tiered system. For me all the great books just add up. There's no exact goal, but the usual virtues are involved.

Possibly the most elegant summary of the situation I've yet read. — Tom Storm

Thank you!

I get that people like to feel part of a special group of initiated outliers who challenge the mainstream and embrace a numinous reality outside of conventional lifestyles and the ostensible limitations of crass science. I get the attractions of wanting to be one with a higher consciousness through the contemplative life.

What I don't get is the lack of joy in the communication of these ideas. It seems most of what I read is a thick soup of quotes, name dropping and terminology, with the requisite 'my reality is better than theirs' powerplay. I expect that from some atheists. There's almost nothing explaining the benefits or bliss found through the spiritual path and what it actually achieves. Is there somewhere here where this comes up or do we never get past the pissing competition? — Tom Storm

That's quite elegant and to the point! The pissing contest is seriously one of the things I think most about. I'm going to name drop (which we'll get to) and say that I love Kojeve for pointing out how essentially human it is to fight for prestige. 'I am part of the elite' is the fundamental hope and the fundamental message. That's it. The rest is details. (That's not all there is to life. We are also 'just animals' with all that entails, including a mammalian affection for our cubs and our allies, etc. And I don't embrace Kojeve's itself-borrowed theory 100%.)

On name dropping: sometimes it's about advertising one's education or leaning on the authority of fame, granted. That's the vanity and superstition part. But it can also be modest and generous. 'I didn't come up with this, and there's this cool thinker you can look up if you like the sound of it.' It's probably usually a little of both. (Maybe some of the vanity is because we're here among the few others who give a flying shit about Plato and Wittgenstein. The world outside yawns. )

I very much agree about the joy issue. The utopian vision of this place is something like us all sharing good discoveries modestly. On the other hand, we love to fight. We just can't help ourselves. There is no elite without the excluded. Maybe the supremely confident don't even show up, scorning our base minds. Or maybe the real world gives the self-anointed no fit stage. On top of that, philosophy is creative, which means its infected with the cult of the individual genius. (I can't deny the hope of scratching some good graffiti on the wall that only I could scratch on it.)

Numbers are simple stuff? I disagree. — norm

Octopuses and cuttlefish can count. I guess they would agree with me that numbers aren't that complicated. To each his capacity for abstraction. I suppose any annal analytic philosopher could spend three hundred pages trying to clarify the number 2, but that is philosophy for computers, and only fools care for that.

they're just as likely to have got there themselves — Isaac

That's speculative. Most scientists don't try and think too hard, in my experience. Glorified lab technicians. A lot of them have no clue why they do what they do. They just go along with the motion and get the paycheck.

Most scientists don't try and think too hard, in my experience. Glorified lab technicians. A lot of them have no clue why they do what they do. They just go along with the motion and get the paycheck. — Olivier5

Whatever.

<nevermind>

Sure, keep fantasizing that you too could have written Critique of Pure Reason. I could have painted like Picasso too but I went into accounting instead.

You think scientists are the only ones entitled to facile comtemp of other folks?

As a first approximation, someone might describe you as some kind of neoplatonist. It's an awkward position out there in no-man's-land. — norm

Insightful.

Do you object to the practical prestige of science? — norm

I have this mischeivious idea that science is unwittingly demonstrating the ancient notion that the physical world is unintelligible. Supporting evidence: the 4% universe. Battles about multiverses. That 97% of the gene is 'junk DNA’. Maybe it’s not all converging on ‘knowing the mind of God’ at all.

Octopuses and cuttlefish can count. — Olivier5

Or, respond to stimuli in accordance with what we categorise as numerical. Ask ‘em what a prime number is. :-)

That we're not not programmed with the means to do so? Why would assume we are? We're just animals evolved to behave in a certain way. Why would you assume our programming just maps 1-to-1 onto the way the world "is"?

We have the means to directly observe and interact with the world. There is no veil between me and the rest. With such a vast plane of interactivity at my disposal no assumptions are even required here.

I have this mischeivious idea that science is unwittingly demonstrating the ancient notion that the physical world is unintelligible. Supporting evidence: the 4% universe. Battles about multiverses. That 97% of the gene is 'junk DNA’. Maybe it’s not all converging on ‘knowing the mind of God’ at all. — Wayfarer

The whole 'TOE' thing does look questionable. Sometimes I see what I think is folks trying to wring spirituality out of science (including metaphysical baggage.) Push it out the door and sometimes it crawls in through the window.

What can't be denied is technological advance. I'm not saying it's all good for us. But to me that's the actual payload. Prediction and control. I'm not surprised that there are anomalies at the fringes. That's even to be expected.

But I can't relate to a religious feeling toward science. I'm a literary guy at heart. I render science its due, but that's all.

What can't be denied is technological advance. I'm not saying it's all good for us. But to me that's the actual payload. Prediction and control. — norm

Couldn’t argue with that. Although sometimes, when I’m pushing my trolley around our exquisitely-merchandised supermarkets, I hear a voice as if from some celestial PA, intoning ‘Sorry, but your civilisation has just been cancelled. It has been found to be too expensive to maintain.’

Then I proceed to the checkout.

Insightful. — Wayfarer

I can understand the allure of something like a neoplatonist position (for instance, through my love of math.) I've even had some intense 'spiritual' experiences. But they always made me want to reach for metaphors.

The moment I had the epiphany about the nature of number was very, very simple. Suddenly the thought occurred to me that numbers don’t come into, or go out of, existence, and they’re not composed of parts. (Later I realised the second only applies to primes, but never mind.) Whereas all existing things, all phenomenal objects, come into and go out of existence, and are compound. And I thought, ‘hey, that’s why the ancients esteemed mathematics as being ‘above’ the sensory domain - its objects are eternal and non-temporal, nearer ‘the unmade’. That is 100% Platonism. It seemed blandly obvious to me when I realised it, something I thought ought to be uncontested but I was surprised to learn that not only was it contested, it was controversial.

The most frequent objection is the ‘ghostly realm’ objection: where is this ‘ghostly realm’ of abstract objects and ideas? That is simply based on the inherent naturalism which can only conceive of what exists and is locatable in terms of space and time as being real. But notice, in the indispensability argument for mathematics, the presumption that only what exists in the space-time continuum can be considered real. This is the basis that the reality of abstract objects is contested. It is the one thing that ‘naturalist epistemology’ can never endorse, as it undermines the whole naturalist project.

I take solace from the fact that many great mathematical intellects, including Sir Roger Penrose and Kurt Godel, are or were mathematical Platonists (even while acknowledging that I can’t understand their mathematical work).

The one textbook reference I have found that I frequently refer to is a passage in the Cambridge Companion to Augustine on the nature of intelligible objects.

Note this passage:

By focussing on objects perceptible to the mind alone and by observing their nature, in particular their externality and their immutability, Augustine came to see that certain things that clearly exist, namely, the objects of the intelligible realm, cannot be corporeal

The crucial question then becomes, in what sense do intelligible objects exist? My claim is that ‘existence’ is the wrong predicate for such things as number. They are real, but as they can only be grasped by a rational mind, they’re not existent in the sense that phenomena are. The whole of metaphysics hinges on understanding this point in my view, because it introduces, or rather restores, the idea of ‘modes of being’, which was lost in the transition to modernity.

So, the idea is, numbers (etc) are those objects which can only be grasped by a mind, but which are not the product of your or my mind. That I take to be the basis of objective idealism, which is the philosophical understanding I aspire to. I think it has a long and venerable lineage in the Western tradition of philosophy (and that C S Pierce was one of it’s last exponents).

.

And I thought, ‘hey, that’s why the ancients esteemed mathematics as being ‘above’ the sensory domain - they’re eternal and non-temporal, nearer ‘the unmade’. — Wayfarer

Timelessness seems like the key point to me. Early thinkers were also fascinated by the stars. What is t that endures as all else is born and dies? And why do humans love the timeless so much? One theory is that endurance is the test of the real. That which is persistently present is the most real. The laws of physics are like that and they are expressed mathematically. (What I learned later is that these are projected models on messy data. It's far messier than I expected.)

The most frequent objection is the ‘ghostly realm’ objection: where is this ‘ghostly realm’ of abstract objects and ideas? That is simply based on the inherent naturalism which can only conceive of what exists and is locatable in terms of space and time as being real. — Wayfarer

I still hold that only really bad philosophers deny something like a 'space of reasons.' A good scientist could be a bad philosopher. Give people prediction and control, and they don't care what spin you put on it as a non-scientist. Some of the good OLP stuff addresses the complexity of a word like 'real.' What do people even mean? Outside of all practical contexts, it's just not clear.

The crucial question then becomes, in what sense to intelligible objects exist? My claim is that ‘existence’ is the wrong predicate for such things as number. They are real, but as they can only be grasped by a rational mind, they’re not existent in the sense that phenomena are. The whole of metaphysics hinges on understanding this point in my view. — Wayfarer

I think there's a fuzzier version of that that most people would assent to. We see colors with the eye and 'grasp' concepts with our reason. It's fine to invent a terminology, but I don't know if this solves the issue. It's my impression that most people grant some kind of intuitive experience of number. They don't agree about whether they are 'seeing' something extra-human or whether such intuitions are just built-in. I don't see how we could see around our cognition. But I also have concerns about the intelligibility of these issues. I think you said you weren't moved much by the beetle-in-the-box argument, but I think it (and the cloud of ideas around it) are revolutionary. It's also extremely relevant to the thread so I'll include it here:

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — W

The idea is that all the secret beetles don't matter. As long as people emit the right words when appropriate, everything runs smoothly. So for me there's no exact meaning of 'mental' or 'physical.' It's more like learning to ride a bike. Wittgenstein asks when children learn that physical objects exist. This is one the strange, mind-opening lines in On Certainty .
We just keep living and talking and finding ourselves better able to fit in, engage in patterns we did not create, and sometimes weave new patterns in among the old. (One could project something like this insight on the real Socrates (who wrote no books). He grilled the experts to try to claw through the fuzz and eventually perhaps to reveal the fuzz. Might be mostly a projection, but the whole 'what is x, really?' game eventually leads to thinking about how language works. What are concepts, really? What is mind? Is it about some kind of radical immediacy? Some absolute presence? It's right there, infinitely intimate. Are things so simple?

Early thinkers were also fascinated by the stars. What is t that endures as all else is born and dies? And why do humans love the timeless so much? — norm

That's something that Paul the Octopus never considered (not to our knowledge, anyway.)

But more seriously, being human presents a predicament. Animals don't wonder 'how the f**ck did I end up in this situation?' (not to our knowledge, anyway.) In the ancient world, philosophy was said to be an amelioration for that; but for it, said one ancient worthy, 'man would be the most unfortunate of animals'.

I think there's a fuzzier version of that that most people would assent to. We see colors with the eye and 'grasp' concepts with our reason. It's fine to invent a terminology, but I don't know if this solves the issue. It's my impression that most people grant some kind of intuitive experience of number. They don't agree about whether they are 'seeing' something extra-human or whether such intuitions are just built-in. I don't see how we could see around our cognition. But I also have concerns about the intelligibility of these issues. — norm

I beg to differ. There's a philosophical issue at stake here, which is not fuzzy or vague. The fact is, through the languages of mathematics, we convey facts that are true for all observers, and perhaps even true in possible worlds. What people don't agree on, is what this means. Naturalism wants to be able to 'explain' human faculties in terms of biological adaptation. The article I pointed to talks about the project of 'naturalised epistemology'. That is the attempt by Quine and his ilk to uncouple mathematics from the sky-hooks of platonist idealism. The idea that the intellect can perceive inherent truths - the basic contention of rationalist philosophy - is denied by them. That has lead to arguments like fictionalism and so on. So instead of facing what mathematical insight suggests, it has to be demoted to a natural faculty, such as possessed by Paul the Octopus. Otherwise you fall foul of the empiricist dogma, and our station as evolved hominids.

Check out this Feser blog post (if you do read it, you will notice that this is where I got the 'chilliagon'.)

What are concepts, really? What is mind? — norm

I'm of the view that there is a traditional philosophical framework within which these terms really do have reasonably clear meanings, but that this has been forgotten or obscured by modernity. The key term that has been forgotten is the Greek term 'nous', and the way in which it was used.

we call it a "beetle". — W

Nothing to do with the issue in my view. But, again, thanks a heap for your feedback and interest, deeply appreciated.