All your questions on this thread have been answered. — Gregory
You really can't figure out that your logic is calling you to Christianity? Jezz
I've already been down your road — Gregory
I didn't go back. — Gregory
I read multiple sources, and most of them indicate Spinoza was a panpsychist. In this OP, many argued he wasn't. Therefore, what's the fundamental difference between panpsychism and his metaphysics? — Eugen
Proof.—Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def. vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.
- I understand the sentence grammatically and it seems identical to saying that God thinks, but it seems to me that it contradicts the idea of an impersonal and unwilling God. If we assume that God is the same as the universe, does that mean the universe is thinking? Can the universe have a thought like "I am the universe"?Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing. — fdrake
- here it seems to me that you say that in fact, the universe does not think as a person, but that it possesses the capacity to involuntarily create certain conditions for "thinking things", and one of those conditions is the human form. But if that's the case, I don't see how one might not fall into materialism or panpsychism - that is, one form / combination may think and feel, and another may not. On what criteria is the transition from an object that does not think, such as a stone, to one that thinks? What is the fundamental difference between the two in S's vision?Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God
- this is a type of sentence that I can't even understand with google translate. Possibly also due to the lack of philosophical language as well. Fortunately, I think I understand the main idea, which is that nature is thinking. Again, I don't understand exactly what that means. Does the universe have thoughts? If so, then why do we consider it impersonal? I understand that we could consider that it does not have an ego, but is it correct to resemble the universe with a giant / infinitely living organism that thinks? If so, wouldn't that mean idealism?God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.
Thanks for the effort to explain, I really appreciate it. My problem is that English is not my native language, and complicated sentences can confuse me. That is why, very often, the answers on this forum are confusing to me. Some interpret my insistence as an attempt to criticize an ideology, but in fact, I am only interested in better understanding a phenomenon. Unfortunately, I may not have understood much of the last answer you wrote to me, so feel free to call me an idiot, but I give you my word that I don't want to be malicious of Spinoza. — Eugen
Can the universe have a thought like "I am the universe"? — Eugen
So my question still remains. How come some modes have thoughts and others don't? — Eugen
Note.—Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above—namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes—that is, the same things following in either case.
I said that God is the cause of an idea—for instance, of the idea of a circle,—in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly. — Spinoza, Ethics
What's the fundamental difference between a human being and a rock in Spinoza's view?
Could Spinoza's idea survive if the hard problem or the combination problem were true? What do you think, ↪fdrake ? — Eugen
Bluntly, I think for Spinoza "they just do" — fdrake
It is like one would ask a dualist ''How come matter and soul interact?" and the dualist would reply with: ''They just do". Right? — Eugen
If I asked S. ''How come you have the attribute of mind in the first place?'' and ''How come some combinations of matter (modes) have consciousness and others don't", he would give me the same answer as a dualist would give me when asked about the interaction issue, namely ''They just do". So in both cases, it is a primary assumption with no other grounds. Am I right? — Eugen
PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.
Proof.—Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def. vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D. — "Spinoza,
PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.
Proof.—The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore (II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D. — Spinoza Ethics Part II
DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing. — Spinoza, Ethics Part II
PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.
Proof. — "
The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.
Proof. — Spinoza Ethics Part II
Eugen Neither. If my (@fdrake's) summary sketched are not clear enough for you, then I suggest you give up on Spinoza (assuming you've closely read and reread sections I & II of the Ethics – his treatise and an interlocking system of mutually supporting concepts and statements that cannot be adequately understood out-of-context, which almost all of your questions attempt to do). IMO, it's not language difficulties you're have, Eugen, is that you're reading of Spinoza is, in unfortunately typical "student" fashion, quite shallow. — 180 Proof
A. Is a "complex mode" (human) a combination of other modes - the extension/body is composed of smaller extensions and the human mind (consciousness) is composed of other minds? — Eugen
Ideas lead to and combine with ideas, bodies lead to and combine with bodies — fdrake
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