You really can't figure out that your logic is calling you to Christianity? Jezz
I've already been down your road

All your questions on this thread have been answered. — Gregory

You did, and some others did it as well. I admit that. I just wanted to know clear answer, like a YES or NO. And then you came back. Why?!?!?

You really can't figure out that your logic is calling you to Christianity? Jezz
I've already been down your road — Gregory

So now you're a magical Christian? :rofl:

I didn't go back. You keep asking questions you already had the answer to. I am no longer a Christian BTW. Im a materialist atheist, as I've already said. And I wouldnt want to be in your head

But a materialist believes only in weak emergence, so you'd probably have to endorse the Identity Theory or Functionalism. It seems to me you like strong emergence/magic.

I didn't go back. — Gregory

That was exactly what you did. You answered my question, I thanked you, and then I asked another guy a question. And you came back, watch the thread.

I am not going to get into details with you because you can't think philosophically yet. Go read a Bible instead, bc that's were you mental bent leads to

I am not going to get into details with you because you can't think philosophically yet. — Gregory

You can't think yet. Period.

Go read a Bible — Gregory

If reading the Bible made you the way you are now, then no, thanks!

I read multiple sources, and most of them indicate Spinoza was a panpsychist. In this OP, many argued he wasn't. Therefore, what's the fundamental difference between panpsychism and his metaphysics?

I read multiple sources, and most of them indicate Spinoza was a panpsychist. In this OP, many argued he wasn't. Therefore, what's the fundamental difference between panpsychism and his metaphysics? — Eugen

Panpsychism has everything being conscious or exhibiting consciousness to some degree. Spinoza's metaphysics does not have everything being conscious or exhibiting consciousness, exhibiting the attribute of mind; being grasped ideally; isn't the same thing as exhibiting a degree of consciousness; having a degree of awareness like an individual agent.

So when Spinoza says: "PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing." He proves it with:

Proof.—Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def. vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D.

The movement is:
(1) Particular thoughts (in a conditioned way) express the nature of God.
(2) (1) Implies that God therefore possesses the attribute of thought.
(3) that attribute then facilitates the apprehension of the chain of inference from (1) to (2) - from expression to possession, God as the simultaneous generator and sine qua non of that attribute.

tl;dr: a mode expressing the attribute of thought doesn't imply that it exhibits any degree consciousness. A particular thought, like my enjoyment of last night's Scotch bonnet chillis, exemplifies the attribute of mind/thought but is not itself conscious.

Thanks for the effort to explain, I really appreciate it. My problem is that English is not my native language, and complicated sentences can confuse me. That is why, very often, the answers on this forum are confusing to me. Some interpret my insistence as an attempt to criticize an ideology, but in fact, I am only interested in better understanding a phenomenon. Unfortunately, I may not have understood much of the last answer you wrote to me, so feel free to call me an idiot, but I give you my word that I don't want to be malicious of Spinoza.
I want to see if his vision can be framed in materialism, idealism, etc. or in any metaphysics of the mind, or if it is somehow something truly original and which does not suffer from any fundamental problem of the mind.

I.

Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing. — fdrake

- I understand the sentence grammatically and it seems identical to saying that God thinks, but it seems to me that it contradicts the idea of ​​an impersonal and unwilling God. If we assume that God is the same as the universe, does that mean the universe is thinking? Can the universe have a thought like "I am the universe"?

II.

Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God

- here it seems to me that you say that in fact, the universe does not think as a person, but that it possesses the capacity to involuntarily create certain conditions for "thinking things", and one of those conditions is the human form. But if that's the case, I don't see how one might not fall into materialism or panpsychism - that is, one form / combination may think and feel, and another may not. On what criteria is the transition from an object that does not think, such as a stone, to one that thinks? What is the fundamental difference between the two in S's vision?

III.

God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby.

- this is a type of sentence that I can't even understand with google translate. Possibly also due to the lack of philosophical language as well. Fortunately, I think I understand the main idea, which is that nature is thinking. Again, I don't understand exactly what that means. Does the universe have thoughts? If so, then why do we consider it impersonal? I understand that we could consider that it does not have an ego, but is it correct to resemble the universe with a giant / infinitely living organism that thinks? If so, wouldn't that mean idealism?

I sense that I and III are misinterpretations of mine and that II is closer to what you meant. That is, it is a universe that does not know that it exists, does not feel, does not suffer, does not want, but somehow has the potential to, under certain conditions, give rise to things that possess all that is mentioned, due to its attributes. But I still don't see how anyone could give an explanation for the difference between a stone without qualia and an animal with qualia without resorting to an explanation either: materialist, panpsychist or idealist. Do you think that Spinoza can get rid of these ideologies when it comes to the mind? If not, what do you think his vision is closer to?

What is your native language?

Romanian

Thanks for the effort to explain, I really appreciate it. My problem is that English is not my native language, and complicated sentences can confuse me. That is why, very often, the answers on this forum are confusing to me. Some interpret my insistence as an attempt to criticize an ideology, but in fact, I am only interested in better understanding a phenomenon. Unfortunately, I may not have understood much of the last answer you wrote to me, so feel free to call me an idiot, but I give you my word that I don't want to be malicious of Spinoza. — Eugen

It's not really your fault that you're being misinterpreted, people have a habit of "not understanding" something as a means of criticising it. Expressing lack of comprehension is an effective way of disavowing something and belittling it. And I can't understand how anyone would think otherwise. :wink:

Can the universe have a thought like "I am the universe"? — Eugen

The universe "has" thoughts like the thought I just had about dinner.

It isn't the universe that thinks like a human being, the universe has the attribute of mind which is conceived through us. This goes back to the first comment I made to you regarding Spinoza's attributes and Spinoza's modes, to say that substance "has" the attribute of thought is to say that thought's part of the essence of universe, it's not to say that substance has thoughts like "omg I can't wait for the next season of Witcher on Netflix" as a whole being, which would be a mode of thought - a particular thought.

Spinoza says no to: "I want eggs tonight" the universe thought.
Spinoza says yes to: ("I want eggs tonight" I thought) is something the universe did.

So, the universe can "have" thoughts if the thought of an agent like me is considered as one of its modes, like my thought "omg I can't wait for the next season of the Witcher on Netflix" is still part of the universe. The universe thinks as thinking beings, the thoughts of thinking beings occur as part of it. Those thoughts express the attribute of mind.

:up:

OK, so you're basically saying what I said in II. It is like the universe ''thinks'', but only through its modes - us. Hope I finally got it right.

So my question still remains. How come some modes have thoughts and others don't? What's the fundamental difference between a human being and a rock in Spinoza's view?

Could Spinoza's idea survive if the hard problem or the combination problem were true? What do you think, ?

So my question still remains. How come some modes have thoughts and others don't? — Eugen

Bluntly, I think for Spinoza "they just do", thought is part of the essence of God, rather than a derivative property coming from the combination of finite modes (like neurons and tissues in our bodies).

I also think it's the case that "how do finite modes combine together in order to express the attribute of mind" would be seen as a category error in Spinoza's terms, things of one attribute (extension) don't interact together to produce another (thought). Things (modes) with both aspects can interact, but the extension of one doesn't cause the thought of another, so to speak. Contrast a doctrine like emergence, which says that if you get enough of the right kind of matter doing the right kind of thing, you get consciousness. In emergence you get the aggregate interaction of bodies causing thought. In Spinoza, that would make the attributes productively interact, so that logic of non-delimitation would come into play.

I think, much more tentatively here than before:

Spinoza says no to: Stuff interacts in a human body alone to produce thought.
Spinoza says yes to: Stuff interacts in a human mode during the production of thoughts.

Why no to the first and yes to the second? A human considered as a mode is both a thinking thing and an extended thing, the human body with the mind truncated out of it - a mass of interacting tissues and electrochemical signals - isn't a thinking thing, it's the body of a thinking thing.

Note.—Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above—namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes—that is, the same things following in either case.

I said that God is the cause of an idea—for instance, of the idea of a circle,—in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attributes of extension only; and so on, in the case of the other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly. — Spinoza, Ethics

What's the fundamental difference between a human being and a rock in Spinoza's view?

Doubtlessly you will find this answer unsatisfying, but the human being is a thinking thing and the rock isn't.

I don't know if you're going to find "bodies interacting to produce thoughts" in Spinoza, to my mind his metaphysics is in part a clever attempt to neuter that issue!

Could Spinoza's idea survive if the hard problem or the combination problem were true? What do you think, ↪fdrake ? — Eugen

I don't think the hard problem or combination problem are particularly relevant to Spinoza's thought. The claims that "bodies can interact to produce thoughts", or "thoughts are only derivatives of the motion of unthinking substance", or "little conscious things interact to produce big ones" are already in contention with his system. If you take his system at face value, neither the combination problem nor the hard problem could be articulated without a category error. If you take the hard problem and the combination problem as genuine problems, you're already thinking in a manner opposed to Spinoza's philosophy.

Bluntly, I think for Spinoza "they just do" — fdrake

That was my intuition at the beginning.
So he didn't have a different explanation for mind, he just assumed that this is how things were.


It is like one would ask a dualist ''How come matter and soul interact?" and the dualist would reply with: ''They just do". Right?

It is like one would ask a dualist ''How come matter and soul interact?" and the dualist would reply with: ''They just do". Right? — Eugen

Well, there's an argument for why they can't interact causally at the start of Spinoza's Ethics. It's not as axiomatic as I stated it to you, but it is "close" to the axioms so to speak.

I didn't want to mix Spinoza with the interaction problem. I just wanted to make a parallel.

If I asked S. ''How come you have the attribute of mind in the first place?'' and ''How come some combinations of matter (modes) have consciousness and others don't", he would give me the same answer as a dualist would give me when asked about the interaction issue, namely ''They just do". So in both cases, it is a primary assumption with no other grounds. Am I right?

If I asked S. ''How come you have the attribute of mind in the first place?'' and ''How come some combinations of matter (modes) have consciousness and others don't", he would give me the same answer as a dualist would give me when asked about the interaction issue, namely ''They just do". So in both cases, it is a primary assumption with no other grounds. Am I right? — Eugen

If you asked Spinoza "how come God has the attribute of mind?" he'd respond like he does in the Ethics:

PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

Proof.—Particular thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which, in a certain conditioned manner, express the nature of God (Pt. i., Prop. xxv., Coroll.). God therefore possesses the attribute (Pt. i., Def. v.) of which the concept is involved in all particular thoughts, which latter are conceived thereby. Thought, therefore, is one of the infinite attributes of God, which express God's eternal and infinite essence (Pt. i., Def. vi.). In other words, God is a thinking thing. Q.E.D. — "Spinoza,

That's a much different question from "why is this particular being conscious and that being is not?". For Spinoza:

PROP. XV. The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.

Proof.—The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body (II. xiii.), which (Post. i.) is composed of a great number of complex individual parts. But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed (II. viii. Coroll.); therefore (II. vii.), the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts. Q.E.D. — Spinoza Ethics Part II

Pace @180 Proof, you're gonna get some kind of appeal to "sufficient functional complexity", or the "compound(ing) of a great number of ideas" being constitutive of the mind (mind = idea of the body), for an account of the nature of our (human) agent-hood/mindedness, but if you really wanted to zoom in on "are those individual ideas conscious? If they're not, how do they combine to produce a conscious agent?", you're probably running orthogonal to Spinoza's concerns; he's got some "bunch of ideas interact to produce a mind" thing going on, but not "bunch of particles interact to produce a mind" thing going on, nor a "bunch of little tiny conscious/pre-conscious things interacting to produce a conscious thing" going on. Imputing those latter two goings on to Spinoza misinterprets him. Minds are ideas interacting, but those ideas are not thinking things, they're the product of thinking things per definition III in Part II:

DEFINITION III. By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing. — Spinoza, Ethics Part II

PROP. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

Proof. — "

So he's basically saying that God has thoughts because humans have thoughts and humans are part of God, right?

The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.

Proof. — Spinoza Ethics Part II

Why does complexity give rise to consciousness and thoughts? If I asked him this question, he would answer ''It just does", right?

I don't think I've stated anything different than this in expounding on Spinoza (regardless of my own orthoganal diversions). If so, point me to the posted err of my ways.

:up:

I didn't intend to give the impression that I was criticising your exegesis, I think we agree on "Spinoza 101" things! My intention was to reference your posts to provide a kind of "united front" for @Eugen here to engage with.

:cool:

Thanks for the reply.

When I say I don't understand something, I don't mean I don't understand it because that thing is stupid, but because I don't really understand it. I am not a native, and although my English is decent, my philosophical language often causes me problems. Sometimes I have to read something several times to understand it (this does not guarantee success either) even when it comes to the text I read in my mother tongue. I do not intend to discredit a certain vision or convince anyone even if it comes with counter-arguments. So I have no intention of convincing anyone of anything and I would gain absolutely nothing if I convinced someone of something. So as I said, feel free to call me an idiot, but not a cheat.

From your last posts, I understand that the appearance of consciousness (qalia, thoughts, etc.) is due to complexity. That is, one mode (an atom) is not conscious, but another mode (consisting of a "complex" combination of atoms) is conscious.

Which statement is correct?

A. Is a "complex mode" (human) a combination of other modes - the extension/body is composed of smaller extensions and the human mind (consciousness) is composed of other minds?
If this is true, then is it correct to say that consciousness arises from a complex combination of unconscious / according to Spinoza, is consciousness reducible to parts without consciousness?


B. Human body or mind are not composed of other modes, and they are irreducible.

Neither. If my (& @fdrake's) summary sketches are not clear enough for you, then I suggest you give up on Spinoza (assuming you've closely read and reread sections I & II of the Ethics – his treatise and an interlocking system of mutually supporting concepts and statements that cannot be adequately understood out-of-context, which almost all of your questions attempt to do). IMO, it's not language difficulties you're have, Eugen, is that you're reading of Spinoza is, in unfortunately typical "student" fashion, quite shallow.

Eugen Neither. If my (@fdrake's) summary sketched are not clear enough for you, then I suggest you give up on Spinoza (assuming you've closely read and reread sections I & II of the Ethics – his treatise and an interlocking system of mutually supporting concepts and statements that cannot be adequately understood out-of-context, which almost all of your questions attempt to do). IMO, it's not language difficulties you're have, Eugen, is that you're reading of Spinoza is, in unfortunately typical "student" fashion, quite shallow. — 180 Proof

Thank you. Yes, I'm trying to keep it simple, I have to admit I don't have enough patience and philosophical language to read Spinoza, so I'm asking simple questions and I'm looking for simple answers.

The problem is that ''neither'' kind of breaks the limits of my logic. For me, asking if a body is reducible or not to its components comprises 100% of possibilities, and it is a simple yes or no question. It is pretty hard to conceive how come, in a story that contains bodies, or modes, how could one say ''neither'' when asked if a mode is a sum of other modes or not.

Conclusion: I regret my lack of capacity in understanding Spinoza from your perspective. On the other hand, I can't hide the fact that I believe you're making things complicated for me on purpose. The reason is that I think you want to defend his view. I mean I'm not the type of guy arguing that Wikipedia or other very popular sources are the truth, but I have the capacity to understand that it is generally accepted that he was a panpsychist. On the other hand, that last ''neither'' simply makes no sense to me. Don't take it personally, I may be wrong, but this is how I feel.

Thank you!

I would love to hear your answers on my last questions. Thank you!

I've given you a brief critique of Spinozism already (re: this thread, p.1, my first post – bottom paragraph) so I don't know why you'd assume I'm merely trying to (uncritically) defend Spinoza's position. What seems complicated to you, the limits of my expository skills notwithstanding, probably indicates that you're in the deep end of the philosophical pool way over your head. No offense intended, Eugen.

A. Is a "complex mode" (human) a combination of other modes - the extension/body is composed of smaller extensions and the human mind (consciousness) is composed of other minds? — Eugen

I think the difficulty you're having is trying to understand Spinoza's perspective without shifting your own frame of interpretation. When people interpret things, they interpret within a context they bring to the interpretation. There's an art to shifting one's way of thinking to productively engage with a text or body of ideas.

EG, if someone says "Abortion is wrong because it's murder", the contextual information that the fetus is a human being that ought to be considered to have the legal rights of the person is doing all the work. But someone could equally say "Abortion has nothing to do with the womb or the baby, it has to do with bodily control" as a retort. That retort would attack the framing of the abortion issue by shifting it. Those two people could argues cross purposes forever and never understand the other's view.

In a similar fashion, the frame you're bringing to interpreting Spinoza, trying to see "where he stands" on those two problems (hard problem, combination problem), is in the context of his thought reframing a few of his key ideas in the attempt to apply his thought to those problems

(1) You seem to be imagining that something material must "produce" thoughts, feelings, perceptions etc, like a stimulus response chain, physical -> mental, that's something Spinoza rejects early on in the Ethics. Ideas lead to and combine with ideas, bodies lead to and combine with bodies.
(2) You seem to be imagining that ideas are "protoconscious", like they're little bits of consciousness that somehow combine into a bit consciousness, or alternatively that "inert matter" somehow combines into a conscious being - those operations, of making a conscious aggregate from little. In Spinoza's terms, none of those little ideas or interacting particles are "thinking things". He is quite quiet (IIRC) on the specific "amount of functional complexity" (so to speak) required for ideas to aggregate into a thinking thing, but it's really a non problem for him because man is already a thinking thing due to how its body works. The problems he cares about "start" at a different point, so to speak.

And it might not necessarily be you that thinks these things, it might be that the perspective you're getting from looking at Spinoza in the context of these two problems you really like is distorting him. What I'd recommend is trying to study his original work in some form - primary and secondary philosophy literature, rather than infotainment summaries. Try to get a feel for what he cares about, rather than these two problems you won't find dealt with in his work.

I recommend that because studying Spinoza's work is an exhilarating shift in perspective (life changing IMO), and you're selling yourself short by being sufficiently curious to engage with us like this and seemingly not to read the original text (or reputable secondary literature guides)!

Ideas lead to and combine with ideas, bodies lead to and combine with bodies — fdrake

This is what Spinoza agree or disagree with?

If he agrees, it is correct to say that combinations of ideas represent conscious thoughts?

I don't know if I'm sufficiently evolved to understand him, I have a problem with reading complicated alambicated stuff. But I will try to find more answers.