Crudely, contemporary metaethics seems to be dominated by three main kinds of theory: naturalism, non-naturalism and expressivism. Each one is very stupid. I mean, just obviously false. But they're approximately equally stupid, which means that there is a lot of debate over who has the most stupid view. But, like I say, they're all stupid. The naturalists and expressivists will agree that non-naturalism is bonkers. The naturalists and non-naturalists will agree that expressivism is bonkers. And the non-naturalists and the expressivists will agree that naturalism is bonkers. So my view that all three views are bonkers is very well supported by contemporary metaethicists!

I will now explain why each one is painfully obviously false, starting with naturalism. The naturalist believes that the moral properties of rightness and wrongness and goodness and badness can be identified with objective natural properties. I say 'objective' because no contemporary metaethicist would defend individual subjectivism about morality (because it's really, really stupid).

This view is stupid because it amounts to the view that the lifeless natural world can issue directives to us. That's literally mad. If I thought the door wants me to close it, I'm a nutter, right? Well, nothing changes if instead of thinking a door wants me to close it, I think certain complex bundles of natural features want me to act in certain ways. So naturalism is literally insane. The objective natural world doesn't want us to do anything or be anything. Thus, as morality is about what we ought to do and what we ought to be, morality cannot be identified with any objective natural features of the world.

The non-naturalist would heartily agree with what I've just said. But to 'overcome' this problem - the problem of accommodating the normativity of morality - they posit non-natural properties. Now, exactly what one of those is is something non-naturalists are wont to spill a lot of ink arguing about. If you suggest that they are positing platonic forms, they normally insist they're not, but typically won't tell you exactly what they're on about, as they don't really know. It's just they try and turn not really having a clue what they're on about into a virtue. Anyway, whatever a non-natural property is, the simple fact is it is going to be every bit as insane to think that one of them can issue a prescription as it was to think that a natural property could. So, where the naturalist says "morality is a piece of cheese", the non-naturalist says "don't be silly, cheese can't issue directives - morality is an abstract monolith". But an abstract monolith is no more in the prescribing business than cheese is. The debate between naturalists and non-naturalists is, then, a bit like a debate between two lunatics, one of whom thinks he is Napoleon nd the other of whom disagrees and insists he is not Napoleon, but Jesus.

Naturalists and non-naturalists are typically united in their utter bewilderment, bordering on contempt, for expressivist views. And the feeling is mutual. The expressivists think that naturalists and non-naturalists are making a category error in thinking of morality as an aspect of reality that needs to be accommodated by our ontology. They insist that morality is an activity - it is something we 'do', not something we 'perceive'. Our way of talking about morality simply misleads us into thinking we're describing, when in fact we're expressing.

Naturalists and non-naturalists find this bewildering because it is just so obviously false. As false as insisting that something that is obviously an activity - such as walking - is in fact an exercise in description. It is noteworthy - though no-one seems to have noticed it - that most expressivists find the naturalists and non-naturalists constant appeal to moral intuitions puzzling. They often admit that they do not know what a moral intuition is. Well, that explains it. Just as there are people who have sight but are colour blind, there are also those who possess reason, but are not prey to moral intuitions. If you are not prey to moral intuitions, then you simply do not perceive the moral aspect to reality. And it stands to reason that you will then give an expressivist interpretation of morality. I mean, it is stupid and self-indulgent - for clearly the bulk of moral philosophers do get moral intuitions and so do get the impression of an external moral aspect to morality, for the bulk of moral philosophers are not expressivists and think the view is patently obviously false right from the get go - but it is understandable why one would think morality is just a name for an activity rather than a feature of reality if one gets no impression of that feature. Just as, if one has never walked or seen walking, one might think that when people talk about 'walking' and 'going for a walk' they might be talking, slightly eccentrically admittedly, about a place, not an activity. Note too that those who do not perceive morality may nevertheless come to be fascinated by what others are talking about, precisely because they do not know. And thus we can predict that a disproportionate number of moral philosophers may in fact be unable to perceive morality (and thus may also be disposed to be expressivists). Just as, for instance, a lot of psychologists seem to be mad, so too many metaethicists are morally blind.

Anyway, there you go: those are the three main kinds of metaethical theory that metaethicists dispute the truth of. And they're all extremely silly. Which, like I say, is actually something most metaethicts would agree about, for each one has approximately the same number of defenders, and their defenders agree that the alternatives are silly. Discuss. Or just say something totally unrelated to the OP, as per usual.