There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. — frank
in Neo-Platonist times, interpreters of the dialogues took the dramatic form very seriously.
there was a tradition of taking seriously the dramatic form of the dialogue. It began in Germany in the 18th century with people like Schleiermacher. And that tradition extends through the 19th century, and you see it in scholars like Friedländer and in philosophical interpreters like Gadamer.
within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue
within the last ten years, even the analysts have began talking about the dramatic form of the dialogue — Fooloso4
Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects — where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and non-mental. Platonism in this sense is a contemporary view.
It is obviously related to the views of Plato in important ways, but it is not entirely clear that Plato endorsed this view, as it is defined here.
In order to remain neutral on this question, the term ‘platonism’ is spelled with a lower-case ‘p’. (See entry on Plato.)
The most important figure in the development of modern platonism is Gottlob Frege (1884, 1892, 1893–1903, 1919). The view has also been endorsed by many others, including Kurt Gödel (1964), Bertrand Russell (1912), and W.V.O. Quine (1948, 1951). — SEP article on Platonism
But the non-philosophers are reluctant to ground their lives on logic and arguments. They have to be persuaded. One means of persuasion is myth. Myth inculcates beliefs. It is efficient in making the less philosophically inclined, as well as children (cf. Republic 377a ff.), believe noble things....
For Plato we should live according to what reason is able to deduce from what we regard as reliable evidence. This is what real philosophers, like Socrates, do.
It is something that I have been attempting to show — Fooloso4
It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere. — Fooloso4
Yes, I have. I think Eckhart's teachings come very close to the mysticism within the Platonic tradition. — Apollodorus
It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere. — Fooloso4
Such an open-ended type of interpretation has its representatives among two radically different groups: among philosophical interpreters, for whom it makes Plato a philosopher much like them—more interested in, or expecting more from, arguments than in or from conclusions;
and among literary interpreters, who insist on the literary and dramatic form of Plato’s works and argue that we can no more read off his intentions from what he puts in the mouths of his characters than we can infer what an Aeschylus thought from what he has his Clytemnestra or Cassandra say.
But one problem faced by both of these approaches, as by the skeptics of the New Academy, is that of explaining why, if they are right, certain ideas keep recurring in the corpus...
...Platonic metaphysics, that backbone of historical Platonism, also looks comfortably at home in an ethical context, insofar as it places a reconfigured goodness, beauty, and justice within the very structure of things—however it may be that Plato thought that trick could be pulled. Indeed, without that context (and without its inventive elaboration and re-elaboration by successions of Platonists and idealists), it can look as unmotivated as it appeared to an unsympathetic Aristotle.
— Christopher Rowe
The purpose of the text is to stimulate the reader to think, and it does that by being an intricate construction with many implications, some of which are indeterminate in the sense that you can’t be sure of what Plato meant and what Socrates meant, but they are intended to make you, the interpreter, do your thinking for yourself ... I think that it would be better to emphasize that the dialogue has as its primary function the task of stimulating the reader to think for himself, not to find the teaching worked-out for him.
Such an open-ended type of interpretation has its representatives among two radically different groups: among philosophical interpreters, for whom it makes Plato a philosopher much like them —more interested in, or expecting more from, arguments than in or from conclusions — Christopher Rowe
Platonic metaphysics, that backbone of historical Platonism, also looks comfortably at home in an ethical context, insofar as it places a reconfigured goodness, beauty, and justice within the very structure of things—however it may be that Plato thought that trick could be pulled. Indeed, without that context (and without its inventive elaboration and re-elaboration by successions of Platonists and idealists), it can look as unmotivated as it appeared to an unsympathetic Aristotle — Amity
It is significant that those who have opposed my interpretation have not said anything about the details of what Socrates says in the dialogue about myths. Instead they point elsewhere. — Fooloso4
In the Republic hypothesis is used to get free of hypothesis, back to the beginning of the whole. Here, however, Cebes and Simmias are told to go from hypothesis to hypothesis, but they do not free themselves from hypothesis. They are told not to discuss the beginning, but, of course, they can’t because they have not arrived at the beginning. They have not arrived at the forms. At best they have arrived at what seems to them best. The philosopher, if Cebes and Simmias are philosophers, does not have knowledge of the whole either through dialectic or recollection. — Fooloso4
I appreciate that even with his level of expertise, it is not only a challenge to decipher the dialogue but to present and discuss any understanding....with the dialogues we need to look not only at what is said but at what is done. — Fooloso4
A second problem with both the Neoplatonist and the analytical approach is that their choice of contexts and issues, and indeed of dialogues, to privilege over others is too obviously dictated by their own preoccupations...
Neoplatonizing accounts catch something of the larger picture in which this critique is framed while either missing the critique itself altogether or representing it one-sidedly in terms of oppositions between soul and body, human and divine, descent and ascent.
Such oppositions clearly are Platonic, but they are at one end of a spectrum that also includes, and more frequently, a carefully reasoned, hand-to-hand engagement with people and their ideas: an engagement that presents alternatives that look to this life as much as to anything beyond it.
For their part, analytical interpreters may end up failing even more spectacularly to capture the passionate tone of the Platonic dialogues, by reducing them—at least by implication—to a locus for quasi-academic 26 argument and counterargument. — Christopher Rowe
The last section has implicitly proposed a compromise on another of the dividing lines between interpreters of Plato.
On the one hand there are those who think he believes in another world, over and above this world of ours, inhabited as it were by the ideal forms and by gods and other purified souls, to which it is our business to make our own way, even in this life, by (as Socrates puts it in the Phaedo) “practising for death.” Such a reading 27 accompanies a literal interpretation of the eschatological myths, which are there, on this view, to terrify us into changing our ways if we cannot be persuaded by argument.
But there is also another view of Plato’s position, namely that the talk of another world is at bottom metaphorical and that the myths in question are chiefly allegories of this life. What is clear is that there are grounds, in Plato’s texts, for both readings; the problem for the interpreter is to know how to make room for both. — Christopher Rowe
This story in particular has inspired generations to pursue philosophy. And, as Nietzsche nicely sums it up, Christianity becomes Platonism for the people. — Fooloso4
The approach taken by Fooloso4 is analytical — Amity
Historically important modes of interpretation, like the Neoplatonic, and their modern counterparts—“unitarian,” “developmentalist,” analytical, esoteric, and Straussian
By contrast Leo Strauss and his followers specifically start from the multiplicity of the dialogues and the characters, situations, and conversations in them. At least in its original form, “Straussianism” is probably—at least in principle—the most sensitive of all approaches to the Platonic corpus (other than the most exclusively literary) to its dramatic aspects. Its methodology is hard to summarize but can perhaps fairly be said to consist in trying to see how the choice of characters, their setting, and their interactions affect the apparent outcomes of the argument.
There has been an important reappraisal in the way the dialogues are read. Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen, Thomas Pangle, and Seth Benardete, and their students, including Charles Griswold, Rhonna Burger, David Roochnik, Laurence Lampert , and many others. — Fooloso4
For Strauss, there were three levels of the text: the surface; the intermediate depth, which I think he did think is worked out; and the third and deepest level, which is a whole series of open or finally unresolvable problems. Strauss tended to emphasize the first and the second. I wouldn’t say he didn’t mention the third, whereas I concentrate on the third. — Fooloso4
Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation? — frank
I thought as much.my approach would be "Straussian": — Fooloso4
Influential figures are Jacob Klein and Leo Strauss, and his students including Alan Bloom, Stanley Rosen...
— Fooloso4
These are the people I read and whom I have learned the most from. — Fooloso4
One of the central features of such an approach is its deployment of the concept of (Socratic) irony. It appears that one can never take anything anyone says in a dialogue at face value; to see what we are to make of any statement or proposal, an interpreter has to stand back and ask how it relates to everything else that is said or done in that particular dialogue.
That looks fine, up to a point, and especially as a corrective to overliteral interpretations of the texts that refuse to take notice of context, dramatic or otherwise. The trouble is that this way of proceeding lends itself too easily to abuse. Thus what began in Strauss himself as an interesting method with the potential for plausible readings, not least of the Republic, has hardened, in the hands of some of his epigoni, into the treatment of Plato as an advocate for a conservative politics: — Christopher Rowe
...An overarching question of the dialogue is about teaching and learning. Socrates teaches him how to solve the problem and yet claims it was recollection. This is not the place to get into it, but the difference between Meno’s problem, teaching virtue to someone like Meno who is lacking in virtue and teaching someone geometry is very different — Fooloso4
And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.'
'That shall certainly be done,' said Cebes; '
Between this and Rowe's criticism it is clear how far apart those who look at the dialogue as a whole with attention to parts are from those who say:
Have you thought of just drawing out the significant ideas instead of providing your interpretation?
— frank — Fooloso4
Thus what began in Strauss himself as an interesting method with the potential for plausible readings, not least of the Republic, has hardened, in the hands of some of his epigoni, into the treatment of Plato as an advocate for a conservative politics: — Christopher Rowe
But when it comes to comedy - listening to the audio really brings it out.
The request to be reminded of the Recollection proof: 'Not sure that I remember the doctrine !'. — Amity
Socrates gives some counselling:
There are plenty of 'charmers' in Greece - incantations to reduce fear.
However, I think the final words at 78b say it best:
And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.'
'That shall certainly be done,' said Cebes; ' — Amity
And to be clear, Socrates is talking about myths and those involved in the cults of mystical rites. Some here are advocating that we pay attention to them but ignore what Socrates says about them. If they are to be looked at, it should be from this perspective if looking at them is intended to shed light on the dialogue — Fooloso4
How would you package your view? — frank
"What has been said" by whom? Are you taking us for a ride or something? — Apollodorus
this thread is an earnest attempt to engage with the text of Plato's Phaedo, if you are unable or unwilling to do so, take it elsewhere. I invite people to flag posts in this thread that they believe are not strictly on topic and I (or someone else) will moderate them accordingly. — fdrake
Now it seems to me that not only Bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the same time, but also that the bigness in us will never admit the small or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the Small, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. (102 d-e)
"By the gods, did we not agree earlier in our discussion to the very opposite of what is now being said, namely, that the larger came from the smaller and the smaller from the larger, and that this simply was how opposites came to be, from their opposites, but now think we are saying that this would never happen?" (103a)
… you do not understand the difference between what is said now and what was said then, which was that an opposite thing came from an opposite thing; now we say that the
opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking of things that have opposite qualities and naming these after them, but now we say that these opposites themselves, from the presence of which in them things get their name, never can tolerate the coming to be from one another." At the same time he looked to Cebes and said: "Does anything of what this man says also disturb you?" (103b-c)
Tell me again from the beginning and do not answer in the words of the question, but do as do. I say that beyond that safe answer, which I spoke of first, I see another safe answer. If you should ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. Nor, if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness, and so with other things. (105b-c)
Answer me then, he said, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?
Cebes: A soul. (105c)
Now the soul does not admit death?—No.
So the soul is deathless?—It is.
Very well, he said. Shall we say that this has been demonstrated, do you think?
Very sufficiently demonstrated indeed, Socrates. (105e)
Well now, Cebes, he said, if the uneven were of necessity indestructible, surely three would be indestructible?—Of course.
And if the non-hot were of necessity indestructible, then whenever anyone brought heat to snow, the snow would retreat safe and unthawed, for it could not be destroyed, nor again could it stand its ground and admit the heat?—What you say is true. (106a)
Socrates is now doing exactly what he criticized the unnamed man for doing, mixing things and Forms of things. The Form Uneven can never become even, but three things are not indestructible. When the Hot is brought to snow it does not retreat safe and unthawed, it melts. The Form Cold, however, if the Forms are indestructible, would not be destroyed when the snow is.
Must then the same not be said of the deathless? If the deathless is also indestructible, it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed when death comes upon it. (106b)
So the Soul will never admit the opposite of that which it brings along, as we agree from what has been said? (105d)
Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his deathless part goes away safe and indestructible, yielding the place to death. (106e)
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