Yes, that's one possible interpretation.

Yes, that's one possible interpretation. — John

Well I take it to be a response to:

In modern academic and popular culture circles, and I swim in none of those. — Agustino

Since that's where I am mentioning swimming, hence the idea of a pond in your response. If so, then what other meanings could it have given this context?

Yeah, I'm aware of the refutation. But it's not a refutation of Berkeley, even if Kant thought he was. — The Great Whatever

Berkeley's idealism is utterly incoherent without God. Kant differentiated his philosophy from Berkeley's by attempting to show that God cannot be rationally demonstrated. If God cannot be rationally demonstrated, then Berkeley's idealist philosophy is refuted.

As we find ourselves experiencing – but this 'finding ourselves' – the faculties we happen to have, for no discernible reason, are still potentially contingent, and Kant admits we can't even sensibly answer questions about what things would be like otherwise. This doesn't mean that he's showed such a necessity, only that he is committed to claiming we can't answer (or possibly even understand) certain questions.

Note that it's always necessary that given something is the way it actually is, it actually is that way. — The Great Whatever

True, but that we cannot even possibly understand how it could be otherwise is an indication that we have no reason to think it could be otherwise.

Are you wording this from the text itself? My memory of the unity of apperception has to do with the fact that it's only intelligible to have a thought insofar as one can at least in principle intuit that it is 'mine.' This is roughly the move made in the cogito as Descartes qualifies it. — The Great Whatever

Why did he call it synthetic unity of apperception then? I remember as being that which makes the self and the world possible.

The God thing is irrelevant. Kant was simply mistaken that his epistemological position, and his position regarding the empirical reality versus transcendental ideality of the world, differed from Berkeley's.

It's interesting to note that, under that interpretation, reason can be seen as either a larger ocean or a smaller pond. When the whole tradition is seen dialectically, as Hegel saw it, then it is certainly a larger pond.

Since that's where I am mentioning swimming, hence the idea of a pond in your response. If so, then what other meanings could it have given this context? — Agustino

However, I suppose you being the smartass you so often are actually meant that as a way to mock my lack of knowledge with regards to Chomsky and my lack of desire to learn or study him :-* O:) :P

True, but that we cannot even possibly understand how it could be otherwise is an indication that we have no reason to think it could be otherwise. — Agustino

And so no proof of necessity has been given. Note that the Humean Pyrrhonist can say the same thing.

Why did he call it synthetic unity of apperception then? I remember as being that which makes the self and the world possible. — Agustino

I haven't read that section of the Critique in years. But the two are, as I recall, deeply related. The unity of the world is related to the unity of the self. That's all in tune with the general solipsistic tendencies of the time.

And so no proof of necessity has been given. Note that the Humean Pyrrhonist can say the same thing. — The Great Whatever

No he can't. A Pyrrhonist doesn't doubt in the absence of reason(s). He must have reason for that doubt, the mere logical possibility of it isn't a reason for doubting, because it's equally a reason for believing (and Kant has provided positive reasons in addition to that for believing it)

But the two are, as I recall, deeply related. The unity of the world is related to the unity of the self. — The Great Whatever

Sure, I can agree with this. But again - this has nothing to do with Descartes unfortunately... if it had, then Descartes would indeed have been worthy of the name genius ;)

It's interesting to note that, under that interpretation, reason can be seen as either a larger ocean or a smaller pond. When the whole tradition is seen dialectically, as Hegel saw it, then it is certainly a larger pond. — John

But philosophical history ended with Hegel, so then Chomsky is irrelevant. Not worth studying, according to Hegel himself. So to study him would indeed be to stick to the smaller pond :-O

For Berkeley transcendental ideality consists in the mind of God. Kant believed this could not be demonstrated by pure reason, but should be understood to be an article of faith. The real situation for us is that we don't know in any propositional sense that there is a God; it is neither rationally demonstrable nor empirically verifiable.

What Hegel actually meant about "the end of history" is by no means uncontroversial. I don't believe he was stupid enough to think that no one would produce any significant philosophy after him. He opened the way for the phenomenologists, after all, with his own Phenomenology.

Sure, but you yourself educated me what he meant by that. Shall I remind you by searching for a quote? >:)

That's the paranoid interpretation.

>:O you're not the first to tell me that

Actually I wouldn't mock you for having little interest in Chomsky; I have little interest in him myself. Although I did listen to a podcast featuring him, while I was hard at work maintaining a garden a while ago. Sometimes i don't listen too closely when I am working physically, so I don't remember exactly what he was talking about, but I do remember thinking it was quite interesting at the time. I'll have to go back and listen again.

http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/philosopherszone/noam-chomsky-on-the-hard-stuff/7974448

But read him? I don't think so.

Sure, if it's not too much trouble, I am curious as to what you are referring to.

Although I did listen to a podcast featuring him, while I was hard at work maintaining a garden a while ago — John

How can you do that? :s I can never listen to philosophy while I do work - if I do that, then I don't understand anything of it. Is your work in the garden mostly planning work, or is it actual work in setting it up, or is it management work? If it's actual physical work, then maybe I can see how one can listen and understand something and do physical work at the same time. But for me, I tried many times to listen to philosophy lectures while writing, working, thinking, designing, and I end up not understanding anything of what I listened to afterwards >:O

Sure, if it's not too much trouble, I am curious as to what you are referring to. — John

I remember us having a talk with regards to Hegel and the end of history, and you telling me (after you told me I don't understand Hegel >:O ) that the end of history doesn't refer to an actual end of history, but rather to the completion of the revelation of Spirit in thought and in the world or something of that sort. But I may be wrong as well.

'Unlike them?' I'm sorry, this is just totally ludicrous. This is the kind of ahistorical nonsense I'm talking about. — The Great Whatever

When argument fails, resort to hyperbole.

It's not 'laughable' that philosophers before Kant didn't deeply analyse the processes of reason. You simply don't find the kind of critical analysis of the inter-dependency of reason, intuition, perception, sensation and judgement that Kant undertook in the Critique, in earlier authors.

Again, epistemology is ancient. — The Great Whatever

In actual fact, the word itself was coined in 1856. Of course all philosophy has been concerned with the nature of knowledge, justified true belief, and so on, but it was Kant who methodically and critically assessed the question.

it's not a refutation of Berkeley, — The Great Whatever

Says you.

You're giving the distinct impression of not knowing what you're talking about.

It's not 'laughable' that philosophers before Kant didn't deeply analyse the processes of reason. — Wayfarer

Yes, it is.

My retort wasn't hyperbole; it was a response to yours. I mean, look at this:

it was Kant who methodically and critically assessed the question. — Wayfarer

Kant was just one man. The whole discipline preceded him, and none of the questions he addressed were new. This is absurd.

You're giving the distinct impression of not knowing what you're talking about. — Wayfarer

I'm really not going to stand for this, man. Peddle elsewhere.

A Rationalist claim limited to intelligibly is actually right.

To say causality is a precondition treats it like an empirical state. Supposedly, before the world came to exist, this distinction of causality was present, which is what makes the world possible. Kant effectively claims causality predates the world. He is applying finite terms to the infinite of causality. Ironically, Kant is actually taking understanding away from causality as necessary and a priori.

Causality is not a precondition. It doesn't predate the world. Rather it is necessary to any part of the world. Pick any moment of the world and it's part of causality. Without the world, no states which are cause and effect, causality is incohrent. Causality necessary for the world to be intelligible, but it is not a precondition of the world. It's an expression of the world.

One cannot find the world without causality, but it's also true one cannot find causality without the world.

Yeah, it's just physical work. I often listen to lectures on various philosophical and religious topics when I'm doing repetitive physical work, trimming hedges, mowing lawns, weeding, when I'm laying bricks, cutting stone, planting shrubs; but not when I'm building, for example timber structures and detailed measurement and calculation is involved.

I think your memory is pretty good. That sounds like something I would have said. Perhaps the end of history can be equated with the completion of the dialectic. Steiner claims that this is the completion of rationality, but not of what he calls "extra-mental" understanding; in fact it sets the stage for the latter. Of course, Hegel would not have agreed with this, since he thought the "Rational is the Real".

There may be a sense in which philosophy since Hegel has consisted mostly in recapitulations of Kant's and his own philosophies. They have certainly been the biggest influences, along with Nietzsche, on French philosophy, and Hegel is resurging today in analytic philosophy. The advent of the extreme influence of science on philosophy is something else and I think it is arguably the beginning of the end of philosophy.

One cannot find the world without causality, but it's also true one cannot find causality without the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Actually one cannot fail to find the world at all; to find anything at all is to find the world, or at least can be defined as such; at least in our current condition.

Indeed, it is necessary. In that case, we are talking about us and the world in which we live.

No pre-dated causality required, nothing is needed to enable the possibility of the world. It's necessary. Clearly, it cannot be impossible.

Kant is just trying to account for things that are already accounted for in themselves.

I'm really not going to stand for this, man. — The Great Whatever

You've given no reasons for anything you've said in this thread, beyond bald assertions, starting with:

He's generally credited for innovations that aren't his, and he was fundamentally a reactionary force against the subtler and more exciting British empiricsts. — The Great Whatever

Which is what I think ought to be considered 'laughable'.

You've shown no insight into why Kant is even discussed, when challenged, you resort to derision then go off in a huff.

I would say you are simply wrong if you think Kant thinks the idea of causality applies beyond the empirical world. He specifically denies that it can make any sense to speak of causality outside of that ambit.

The idea that a Descartes or a Kant can be dismissed with a couple of facile slogans is beyond laughable.

Here's a really nice one-pager on the continuing signficance of Kant.

Hume doesn't think of causality, in the "aprioi"sense, is emprical. What he does is make the distinction between the states that cause (emprical) and the logic of causality (necessary). His point is the former is not dependent on the latter. States of the world are intelligible themselves, rather than being an inevitable outcome of a logical expression.What he destroys is the idea the necessity of causality determines the intelligibility of states that are caused.

You've given no reasons for anything you've said in this thread, beyond bald assertions, starting with: — Wayfarer

You haven't read the thread, because if you did, you'd realize this was false. As well as how absurd it was to point out the existence of the Refutation when I led off by explicitly mentioning it.

You've shown no insight into why Kant is even discussed, when challenged, you resort to derision then go off in a huff. — Wayfarer

Read. the. thread. I'm not here to hold your hand for you.

Before you respond, read. the. thread.

I'm not here to hold your hand for you. — The Great Whatever

Just as well for me.