Oh, okay. You draw distinctions without presenting any differences they make? I guess I'll just have to do without and ignore your posts, sir.I shouldn't have to explain that. — Wayfarer
No. This "dichotomy" you're pinning on me is the strawman, Wayf. No worries though, you're entitled to your inconsistencies (& woo); I won't trouble your dogmatic slumber again.Straw man. You're trapped in the 'mind versus matter' dichotomy.
Anyway, as I tried to say before, it's Saturday morning here, my other half is annoyed with me playing with my invisible friends, so have to sign out for a while. Bye. — Wayfarer
Ok the subject determines the ontology of the object. This isn't very revolutionary since QM. — khaled
I think that's a disingenuous claim. — Janus
But that observation [that there's no light inside the skull] according to your own argument, is derived from what is empirically given and hence must be (according to you) unreliable as a guide to what is real, and also does not, according to the standard definition, qualify as an a priori argument. — Janus
What does it mean to be an empirical realist if not to say that the phenomena we collectively experience are independent of any mind? From my readings of Kant and his expositors I think that is what he thought. — Janus
As to his transcendental idealism, I take that to mean that we can only speculate what things are "in themselves", or what anything even the mind itself is "in itself" via ideas, and that those ideas can never constitute knowledge. — Janus
That is why Kant is understood to have undermined traditional metaphysics which had always been based on the idea that we have a faculty of intellectual intuition which was taken to yield knowledge of the real.
I guess I'll just have to do without and ignore your posts, sir. — 180 Proof
Phenomenology argues that the subject is not separate from the object. — Joshs
I suppose you can say that, but we can have certain knowledge of mathematical proofs, and so on. — Wayfarer
What wayfarer’s move does is turn the subject into a kind of object. — Joshs
Phenomenology doesn’t begin from a subject looking at an object. Rather, it begins from indissociable interaction wherein each moment of experience is an intentional act composed of a subjective and objective pole. Neither exists by itself and each reciprocally determines the other. — Joshs
What wayfarer’s move does is turn the subject into a kind of object. — Joshs
My problem is when people say that the observation, and observers, are different kinds of things from the things getting observed. — khaled
So you would say that when a biologist observes lions in the wild, that the biologist is a lion? — Wayfarer
I think it's a priori. The skull is not transparent. The cornea is, and light strikes the receptors in the retina, but those stimuli are then interpreted - which is the point at issue. — Wayfarer
Kant argues against Berkeley's idealism in which he agrees that there is indeed something beyond ideas themselves. But as I have already said, I don't agree that idealism means that 'the world is all in the mind'. What I'm arguing is that all knowledge of the world has an inextricably subjective component, which is not apparent in experience (as per Kant and Husserl) but without which knowledge is not possible.
Materialism and physicalism both overlook or ignore the irreducibly subjective nature of knowledge in that sense. — Wayfarer
“Knowledge is taken to consist in a faithful mirroring of a mind-independent reality. It is taken to be of a reality which exists independently of that knowledge, and indeed independently of any thought and experience (Williams 2005, 48). If we want to know true reality, we should aim at describing the way the world is, not just independently of its being believed to be that way, but independently of all the ways in which it happens to present itself to us human beings. An absolute conception would be a dehumanized conception, a conception from which all traces of ourselves had been removed. Nothing would remain that would indicate whose conception it is, how those who form or possess that conception experience the world, and when or where they find themselves in it. It would be as impersonal, impartial, and objective a picture of the world as we could possibly achieve (Stroud 2000, 30). How are we supposed to reach this conception? Metaphysical realism assumes that everyday experience combines subjective and objective features and that we can reach an objective picture of what the world is really like by stripping away the subjective. It consequently argues that there is a clear distinction to be drawn between the properties things have “in themselves” and the properties which are “projected by us”. Whereas the world of appearance, the world as it is for us in daily life, combines subjective and objective features, science captures the objective world, the world as it is in itself. But to think that science can provide us with an absolute description of reality, that is, a description from a view from nowhere; to think that science is the only road to metaphysical truth, and that science simply mirrors the way in which Nature classifies itself, is – according to Putnam – illusory. — Joshs
The eliminative materialists (for example, Chruchlands) say that consciousness and experience is not what we intuitively take it to be. — Janus
If you're happy with the notion that everything is just stuff, then probably, don't waste your time on philosophy. — Wayfarer
I don't think your thinking is precise enough to appreciate the distinctions that being made. — Wayfarer
it is trivially true that all knowledge of the world has an inextricably subjective component,
— Janus
It is contested by all those who advocate physicalism. — Wayfarer
I don't think any of the idealist philosophers seriously contemplate that mind is an objective constituent of things. — Wayfarer
But they're still trying to eliminate something. What, pray tell? — Wayfarer
Knowledge is taken to consist in a faithful mirroring of a mind-independent reality. — Joshs
But they're still trying to eliminate something. What, pray tell? — Wayfarer
I’m trying to tease out the contribution of the subject not just to the appearance of the object but to the essense of the object. — Joshs
They are trying to eliminate the intuitive notions we have of consciousness and experience and subjectivity. — Janus
No. They are saying that everything there is to know about the mind, can be known by way of the objective sciences. And that's all I have to say at this point, thanks for your responses. — Wayfarer
Yes. I said "When did we add the purpose sauce" sarcastically to imply that there is no "purpose sauce". That there is no "guiding force" over and above the things that are moving. — khaled
As to the natural arising part: If mater, or the physical, is that which is natural, and if this is in itself purposeful, then you are just expressing that purposeful given X arose from purposeful given Y. So there's no add-on of purpose involved — javra
Yes. That was the point of the sarcastic comment. — khaled
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