Hi and welcome.
I haven't delved in to the various 'pragmatist schools' and only have a superficial understanding.
I think I took a peek once because I thought 'Pragmatism' would fit my fairly practical attitude to life.
But came away, thinking, ''Nah...not for me''.

So, your OP brings a bit of re-view, to think again, thanks.

Even if James probably derive this theory of truth from the maxim, i don't think it make justice to pragmatism potiential to characterize it as mere instrumentalism. Still, Dewey theory of truth is interesting from a instrumental or naturalistic perspective. — Nzomigni

Haven't looked at the SEP article yet.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/

However, I listened to Hilary Putnam on James, Dewey and Pragmatism (5:39)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uEev1OnbaYA

This is followed by an 'Introduction to American Pragmatism' (41:26)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HmbyCybs_QI

In this BBC episode of In Our Time, Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss American Pragmatism. According to William James, the pragmatist "turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power". William James, along with Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, were the founders of the American philosophical movement which flowered during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century and the first twenty years of the 20th century. It took knowledge to be meaningful only when coupled with action. The function of thought was taken not to represent or "mirror" the world, but instead was considered an instrument or tool for prediction, problem-solving, and action. In this way, it was a philosophy deeply embedded in the reality of life, concerned firstly with the individual's direct experience of the world they inhabit. How did pragmatism harness the huge scientific leap forward that had come with Charles Darwin's ideas on evolution? And how did this dynamic new philosophy challenge the doubts expressed by the skeptics about the nature and extent of knowledge? Did pragmatism influence the economic and political ascendancy of America in the early 20th century? And how does it relate to relativism and post-modernism? Melvyn Bragg discusses some of these questions regarding pragmatism with A. C. Grayling, Julian Baggini, and Miranda Fricker.

This is from the BBC radio program In Our Time. For a more in-depth discussion of pragmatism, check out: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjNyp...​

I look forward to hearing more about this...what difference does it make to hold a position of Pragmatism...what or who did it influence; how is it applied ?

I meant to ask re the heading:
'Is Dewey's pragmatism misunderstood ?'

Why is this important to you ?
What is your own understanding of what it means ?

Dewey theory of truth is interesting from a instrumental or naturalistic perspective. — Nzomigni

Explain more, please - unpack this a little, my underlines ?
I can read this * at my leisure - but just wondering what it means to/for you, ta.

* https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-pragmatic/

I may have misunderstood pragmaticism myself. The core idea pragmatism is that the object of an idea equates the sensible effects that the object might have. This idea come fron C.S Pierce paper " How to make our idea clear ". He thinks having clear idea is important build sound reasoning. Clear idea are idea that we easiliy recognize and manipulate. He argues that some ideas may seems clear to a person but may not be really clear. To avoid such situation, he definite stage of clearness to reach. The first stage of the apprehension of a concept is to be able have a unreflective grasp of it in everyday experience. The second stage is to be able to define it. The final and third stage is to apply the maxim.

For example, what does a car mean ? I have a unreflective grasp of what is a car. I could define it as a ground vehicule suited to roads that can carry from 2 to 5 passengers. Now to apply the maxim, i gonna think what effect the object of my concept of a "car" might have. I could state as such, " if a is car, then i can drive a to go to work." The process of applying the maxim is to build testable hypothese on the concept. The meaning of the concept would be theses testables hypotheses and nothing more.

The argument of Pierce is that this is absurd to think the object of your concept have effects that don't have pratical bearing as the whole purpose of thought is to create new habits of action. The object of a concept if only something that have pratical bearing. If it didnt have effects on the pratical, it might as well mean nothing. When you understand what Pierce mean, we could say that he see inquiry as a whole in purely scientific term.
He use the maxim to demarcate to what he considers to be useless metaphysics from what he considers useful.
I thought this maxim to be interesting as a useful heuristic. Thought is for action, if the object of one your idea don't have any effects that have pratical bearings, it might aswell be meaningless. Using this maxim ground your thoughts on the pratical, on the problem-solving and prediction etc.

If you want to have a better explanation, i advise you to read this secondary source (https://iep.utm.edu/peircepr/#H2) and the primary source, the paper " How to make our idea clear " (https://courses.media.mit.edu/2004spring/mas966/Peirce%201878%20Make%20Ideas%20Clear.pdf)

I would like to state that the maxim isn't the mere equivalent of verificationism. You could clarify quite abstract concept with it.
And when i stated that Dewey theory was interesting from a naturalistic perspective, i misunderstood it. One of the similarities in the "pragmatist" schools are that they don't consider the metaphysics, they are more similar to a very strong empiricism than a metaphysical naturalism.

Synthesis :

The pragmatic maxim is used in the process to make concept clearer in relating to the pratical. If the object of an concept don't relate to the pratical anyhow, it's meaningless as the goal of thought is to create habit of action.

Although I generally don't characterize my philosophical leanings, it would be silly for me not to acknowledge that the term "pragmatism" fits me like a glove. As they say, if the glove fits, you must admit it. I liked the BBC text that @Amity quoted, in particular:

It took knowledge to be meaningful only when coupled with action. The function of thought was taken not to represent or "mirror" the world, but instead was considered an instrument or tool for prediction, problem-solving, and action. In this way, it was a philosophy deeply embedded in the reality of life, concerned firstly with the individual's direct experience of the world they inhabit.

I often look at this from a slightly different direction when I think about "truth." "What is true" is not the real question of philosophy and all other human concern. The real question is "what do I do now?" Truth is just a tool we use to figure that out. I guess you can't get any more pragmatic than that.

By the way, Libravox (Libravox.com) has a reading of James' "Pragmatism" that I really like. It's free. Libravox uses volunteer readers. The one for "Pragmatism" has a really good voice if you can get past the fact that he is not a native speaker and has some odd pronunciations.

Pierce came up with more than one version of the pragmatic maxim, and he wasn't all that pleased by James' version of pragmatism. He famously began to call his philosophy "pragmaticism" to distinguish it from what James had made of it. But Pierce was a rather crotchety soul, and it took him some time to warm up even to Dewey, who understood him better than James.

Pierce was a logician, mathematician and chemist, and while all he wrote was interesting his focus was on logic, language and signs. James was, I think, first and foremost a psychologist. He was a great teacher, lecturer and writer, made a number of interesting observations and popularized pragmatism, but he wasn't the most precise and exacting thinker and so came up with statements like the one you quoted. Dewey had to defend him against attacks from such as Bertrand Russell, who attacked Dewey as well through a succession of straw man arguments based primarily on the assumption that what is true is whatever "works." I think Russell no more understood Dewey than he understood Wittgenstein.

For me, the maxim is usefully employed whenever we encounter a concept that is so vague and suggestive that it is subject to misuse. It's been a long time since I read that essay you mentioned, so I can't recall if he had particular concepts in mind.

Dewey thought that "true" carried so much baggage with it that it was best avoided. So, he took to using (in his writings, anyhow) "warranted assertibility." Dewey rejected the "spectator" or correspondance view of knowledge, and instead claimed that what we know results from our interaction with the rest of the world. Ideally, that would be the result of inquiry, through the employment of the scientific method in some cases, but could be the result of trial and error, solving problems, and seeing what "works" in particular circumstances. With enough evidence obtained through inquiry, we may be warranted in asserting that something is the case, and may act upon it in the future. "Truth" is better applied to judgments than propositions as a result. As a result what we consider "true" or what we think we "know" may change, as new evidence is received. Truth isn't static, therefore.

In response to the title of your thread, I would say yes--Dewey's pragmatism is misunderstood. That's in part because of his writing style but also I think because people don't like to accept his reliance on method in making judgments--the fact, in other words, that knowledge, truth, morality are contingent. This is confused with relativism.

That's my two cents, anyway.

Thought is for action, if the object of one your idea don't have any effects that have pratical bearings, it might aswell be meaningless. Using this maxim ground your thoughts on the pratical, on the problem-solving and prediction etc. — Nzomigni

This is a good expression of what "pragmatism" means to me.

One of the similarities in the "pragmatist" schools are that they don't consider the metaphysics, — Nzomigni

I don't think this is right. The pragmatic view of truth and meaning is metaphysics.

I'm glad you started this discussion of pragmatism. I haven't read Dewey. I'll go find some.

Appreciate all the input; the background information most interesting and the links I will follow up.
At some point... :sparkle:

Dewey thought that "true" carried so much baggage with it that it was best avoided. So, he took to using (in his writings, anyhow) "warranted assertibility." Dewey rejected the "spectator" or correspondance view of knowledge, and instead claimed that what we know results from our interaction with the rest of the world. Ideally, that would be the result of inquiry, through the employment of the scientific method in some cases, but could be the result of trial and error, solving problems, and seeing what "works" in particular circumstances. With enough evidence obtained through inquiry, we may be warranted in asserting that something is the case, and may act upon it in the future. "Truth" is better applied to judgments than propositions as a result. As a result what we consider "true" or what we think we "know" may change, as new evidence is received. Truth isn't static, therefore. — Ciceronianus the White

I am with Dewey in not being overfond of certain uses of the word 'true'. Acting on warranted assertion - or a confidently held fact - following inquiry as described - that makes sense to me.
It is true that what we consider 'true' or what we think we 'know' may change.

I liked the BBC text that Amity quoted, in particular:

It took knowledge to be meaningful only when coupled with action. The function of thought was taken not to represent or "mirror" the world, but instead was considered an instrument or tool for prediction, problem-solving, and action. In this way, it was a philosophy deeply embedded in the reality of life, concerned firstly with the individual's direct experience of the world they inhabit. — T Clark

Yes. I also liked but query this one:

According to William James, the pragmatist "turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power".

I see thought or thinking as a tool but not just for practical decision-making but also leaning 'towards power' or creativity or energy. It includes imagination...which is not particularly 'concrete'. But I think know I am being too lazy and superficial at the moment - just plain wrong to look at snippets :yikes:
More in-depth stuff required...like actually following up on and listening to my own links:

This is followed by an 'Introduction to American Pragmatism' (41:26)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HmbyCybs_QI — Amity

The pragmatic maxim is used in the process to make concept clearer in relating to the pratical. If the object of an concept don't relate to the pratical anyhow, it's meaningless as the goal of thought is to create habit of action. — Nzomigni

Well so far, I think much of this makes sense. Thinking geared towards practical implications and action.
However, I take issue with the idea that 'the goal of thought is to create habit of action'.
Where do you find this ?

I am with Dewey in not being overfond of certain uses of the word 'true'. Acting on warranted assertion - or a confidently held fact - following inquiry as described - that makes sense to me.

It is true that what we consider 'true' or what we think we 'know' may change. — Amity

You've given me an opening to use, yet again, my favorite quote from one of my favorite authors, Stephen J. Gould. I think this is the perfect pragmatic view of truth.

In science, 'fact' can only mean 'confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.' I suppose that apples might start to rise tomorrow, but the possibility does not merit equal time in physics classrooms.

I see thought or thinking as a tool but not just for practical decision-making but also leaning 'towards power' or creativity or energy. It includes imagination...which is not particularly 'concrete'. — Amity

Quick response - power, creativity, energy, imagination - all in service of "what do I do now." More thoughtful response - Let me think about this. I'll see if I can back that up or come up with more.

By the way, Libravox (Libravox.com) has a reading of James' "Pragmatism" that I really like. — T Clark

A bit late but followed it up after conversation and recommendations from @Ciceronianus the White here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/556071

Unfortunately, your earlier link didn't work for me.
[Edit: got it - https://librivox.org/pragmatism-by-william-james/ ]

I could only find this:

Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education

An important, controversial, and often cited work on public education. Dewey discusses the role of public education in a democracy and the different methods for achieving quality in education. After its initial publication, this book began a revolution in educational thinking; one that emphasized growth, experience, and activity as key elements in promoting democratic qualities in students and educators alike. — Librivox - Democracy and Education by John Dewey

https://librivox.org/democracy-and-education-by-john-dewey/

Edit - even more Dewey,18 hits:
https://librivox.org/author/1977?primary_key=1977&search_category=author&search_page=1&search_form=get_results

Help! Life's too short.
@Ciceronianus the White or anybody who knows - which book would you pick for starters ?

Ciceronianus the White or anybody who knows - which book would you pick for starters ? — Amity

Of books by Dewey? Probably Reconstruction in Philosophy or The Quest for Certainty are the most readable.

Of books by Dewey? Probably Reconstruction in Philosophy or The Quest for Certainty are the most readable. — Ciceronianus the White

Thank you.

Experience and Nature and Art as Experience are also excellent.

Experience and Nature and Art as Experience are also excellent — 180 Proof

Thank you.

I will be following up all suggestions but also used TPF Searchbox to find this:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1924/pragmatism-and-wittgenstein

A fascinating discussion with 2 excellent links to articles:
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From @apokrisis - 4yrs ago
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/100696
Yep. See https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/download/2946/2607

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Also this:

...I would say the historical situation is that Peirce formed an absolutely coherent view of pragmatism/semiotics. But then because of social forces, that never broke out the way it should have at the time. What came through into the public was the diluted Jamesian understanding of pragmatism (stripped of its semiotic backbone), or the Deweyian version (stripped of the metaphysical ambition).

...And then there are a host of non-philosophical reasons why Peirce's impact was only as a whisper in the ear of AP. And why Pragmatism is viewed shallowly in terms of the metaphysically and logically unambitious retellings by James and Dewey. — apokrisis

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And @Shawn - 2yrs ago
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/249641

I just found this article really elucidating on the magnitude of Ramsey's pragmatic approach to philosophical issues having influenced Wittgenstein's transition and later period. Hope someone enjoys it:
https://aeon.co/essays/what-is-truth-on-ramsey-wittgenstein-and-the-vienna-circle — Shawn

A most informative and an enjoyable read. Found this a bit tragic:

...Wittgenstein was stung by this onslaught. In 1930, he wrote: ‘Ramsey’s mind repulsed me’; he had no capacity for ‘genuine reverence’; he had an ‘ugly mind’; and ‘his criticism didn’t help along but held back and sobered’. He told his friends that Ramsey was a ‘materialist’. Ramsey thought that Wittgenstein’s philosophy needed sobering up, and needed to pay attention to human beliefs, rather than independently existing propositions.

And here their debate breaks off, for Ramsey died on 19 January 1930, aged just 26. But years later, Wittgenstein would come around to Ramsey’s side.

When he did, he stopped saying nasty things about his friend, and instead thanked him in the preface to his second great treatise, Philosophical Investigations, which charted a very different course than the Tractatus:

since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, 16 years ago, I could not but recognise grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book. I was helped to realise these mistakes – to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate – by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life. — Cheryl Misak

Good for Wittgenstein - giving recognition to Ramsey's ideas. Pity about the nastiness that can develop between philosophers...
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https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/100726

Ciceronius stated that the pragmatists, for the most part, ignored what Wittgenstein had to say about meaning and use or utility. Why is that?
— Posty McPostface

I think it's more accurate to say that the Classical Pragmatists were unaware of Wittgenstein. Peirce died in 1914, James in 1910. There would be no reason for them to know Wittgenstein; the Tractatus didn't come out until after the First World War. As for Dewey, I don't know whether he knew of Wittgenstein or his work. Wittgenstein isn't mentioned in any of the works of Dewey I've read, (I haven't read them all, of course) and I think their interests differed for the most part. From what I've read, Wittgenstein was fond of James' Varieties of Religious Experience. It's the "neo-pragmatists" who have championed the view that Wittgenstein was a kind of pragmatist, so far as I know. — Ciceronianus the White

Curious now.
@Ciceronianus the White - what did you think of @apokrisis:
'...What came through into the public was the diluted Jamesian understanding of pragmatism (stripped of its semiotic backbone), or the Deweyian version (stripped of the metaphysical ambition) ?

That was standard view of pragmatism in the late 20th century, which seems to be changing. I've never been much of a fan of Pierce's Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and his Triadism, though, if that's what's intended by pragmatism's "metaphysical ambition."

I wonder whether there's something about metaphysics that sends those who indulge in it into Never-Never Land. I don't think Dewey avoided it entirely, however. He just was a naturalist.

Very interesting comments of pragmatism by the way. I was re-reading Peirce after not having read him for quite a while, and I have to say that I entirely agree with you regarding his triadic ontology. It doesn't make sense to me, he's either adding a step or complicating perception. The thing is, it permeates a lot of his writing concerning mind and logic. Unfortunate, really.

I wonder whether there's something about metaphysics that sends those who indulge in it into Never-Never Land. I don't think Dewey avoided it entirely, however. He just was a naturalist. — Ciceronianus the White

It's intoxication, which I totally share. Susan Haack's "innocent realism" is quite approachable so far as pragmatist metaphysics go.

Curious now.
@Ciceronianus the White - what did you think of apokrisis: — Amity

I've never been much of a fan of Pierce's Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and his Triadism, though, — Ciceronianus the White

It might help to separate pragmatism as a triadic epistemology from semiosis as a triadic ontology.

So both are metaphysical projects in concerning how we can know and what then may be. But Peircean pragmatism became uncontroversial as it was easily assimilated to the general mainstream notion of science as practical reasoning, while Peircean semiotics remains a radical challenge to the reductionist presumptions of that same scientistic community of thought.

So where Peirce was "right", it was obvious. And in fact, folk preferred the simplest telling of the story - the Jamesian caricature.

Then where Peirce was "weird" was where he laid out the argument that reality itself involves an irreducibly triadic holism and so could never be actually broken down into the beloved monistic caricature of circa-1800s reductionism - the ontology built on atomism, mechanicalism, locality, determinism, etc.

So every right minded rationalist who believes in the wisdom of the scientific method and analytic philosophy is going to have the same received view of how to react to Peirce.

They will read his pragmatism as a ringing endorsement of the best reductionist tendencies of the scientific method - while utterly missing the triadic holism of the psychological model.

And they will run with horror from the triadic holism of the ontology, even though 20th Century physics already delivered the holistic shocks of quantum theory, relativity, and even showed how Boltzmann-era thermodynamics was merely another Newtonian "special case". :razz:

I think that Pierce is sometimes very difficult to read (as is Dewey). I read Charles Pierce's Guess at the Riddle by John Sheriff, and found that helpful. I should read it again.

The core idea pragmatism is that the object of an idea equates the sensible effects that the object might have. — Nzomigni

This is a common misconception, or at best an incomplete definition. For Peirce, pragmatism is a theory of meaning, not a theory of truth. The core idea is that the ultimate meaning of a concept consists in the general mental habits and resulting deliberate conduct of its interpreters, not the law-governed behavior of its object.

Pierce came up with more than one version of the pragmatic maxim ... — Ciceronianus the White

This is an important point, although Peirce himself never calls it "the pragmatic maxim"--it is occasionally either "the pragmatistic maxim" or "the pragmaticistic maxim," and much more often either "the maxim of pragmatism" or "the maxim of pragmaticism." His original formulation appeared in 1878, but there are at least 13 variants and 47 restatements or clarifications in Peirce's writings after James began popularizing pragmatism 20 years later, which I present and discuss in a recently published paper.

It's been a long time since I read that essay you mentioned, so I can't recall if he had particular concepts in mind. — Ciceronianus the White

Peirce did not clarify until 1907 that he specifically had intellectual concepts in mind, "those upon the structure of which arguments concerning objective fact may hinge," such as hard vs. soft but not red vs. blue. That year, about the same time that James published his book called Pragmatism, Peirce drafted an article with the same title intended to introduce his version of it to a broad audience. He ended up drafting over 500 handwritten pages, and we can only wonder how the course of philosophy in general and pragmatism in particular would have been different had either The Nation or The Atlantic Monthly published one of the finished texts that he submitted to their editors.

I've never been much of a fan of Pierce's Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and his Triadism, though, if that's what's intended by pragmatism's "metaphysical ambition." — Ciceronianus the White

It is another common misconception that Peirce's three universal categories are fundamentally metaphysical. On the contrary, they are primarily phenomenological in a sense that is distinct from that of Hegel or Husserl--1ns as quality, 2ns as reaction, and 3ns as mediation are the irreducible elements of whatever is or could be present to the mind in any way. As for pragmatism, Peirce is adamant that it "is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to determine any truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts."

It might help to separate pragmatism as a triadic epistemology from semiosis as a triadic ontology. — apokrisis

Peirce's classification of the sciences is grounded in the idea that the more concrete fields depend on the more abstract fields for their principles. Accordingly, metaphysics as the study of reality depends on logic as the normative science of how we ought to think if our aim is having stable beliefs/habits, which he generalized to semeiotic, the study of all signs and semiosis. Pragmatism falls within its third branch, speculative rhetoric or methodeutic, and thus depends on its second branch, critical logic or logic proper, which in turn depends on its first branch, speculative grammar--loosely aligned with what is commonly (and in Peirce's view mistakenly) called epistemology. Again, his categories come from phenomenology, which is the most basic of the "positive sciences" and depends only on mathematics, the discipline that draws necessary conclusions about strictly hypothetical states of things.

I read Charles Pierce's Guess at the Riddle by John Sheriff, and found that helpful. — Ciceronianus the White

Yes, that is an excellent short introduction. For a more detailed overview, I recommend The Continuity of Peirce's Thought by Kelly A. Parker.

es, that is an excellent short introduction. For a more detailed overview, I recommend The Continuity of Peirce's Thought by Kelly A. Parker. — aletheist

Thanks for the reference.

He ended up drafting over 500 handwritten pages, and we can only wonder how the course of philosophy in general and pragmatism in particular would have been different had either The Nation or The Atlantic Monthly published one of the finished texts that he submitted to their editors. — aletheist

That's quite interesting to speculate about. Is that article available somewhere? What about your article?

For quite some time, I've been somewhat fascinated with Pierce's A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God and his concept of "musement." I find the traditional arguments unpersuasive and tend to think argument on the question is futile, but there's something about that article that makes me wonder--which I suppose is a part of "musement."

Is that article available somewhere? — Ciceronianus the White

Richard Robin catalogued Peirce's 500-plus handwritten pages of multiple drafts for "Pragmatism" under manuscript numbers 317-322 and 324. The five major variants that came chronologically last and have their first nine pages in common are all under 318, as diagrammed by Priscila Borges for the Peirce Edition Project. He abandoned the second and fourth without finishing them, while the third and fifth appear in Volume 2 of The Essential Peirce (pages 398-433). Surprisingly, the first has never been published, even though it seems likely to be the one that he initially submitted to The Nation because it bears his signature at the end. Fortunately, that is about to change--I have prepared my own annotated transcription, which has been accepted by an online journal and will hopefully appear there soon.

What about your article? — Ciceronianus the White

I provided this link in my previous post.

For quite some time, I've been somewhat fascinated with Pierce's A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God and his concept of "musement." — Ciceronianus the White

I share your fascination with that article, and likewise wrote a paper about it. It is important to recognize the distinction that Peirce makes between an argument as "any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief" and an argumentation as "an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses." His "Neglected Argument" is the former, not the latter, and it is retroductive (or abductive) rather than deductive or inductive--careful contemplation of the universe ("musement") prompts the hypothesis of God's reality (not existence, another important distinction for Peirce) as a plausible explanation of its origin and nature, not a certain or even probable conclusion drawn from specific premisses or evidence.

Again, his categories come from phenomenology, which is the most basic of the "positive sciences" and depends only on mathematics, the discipline that draws necessary conclusions about strictly hypothetical states of things. — aletheist

Yep. As I said, there is the triadic epistemology that is a model of psychological processes of reasoning. That ain't troublesome to any Popperian view of scientific method.

Then there is the challenging insight that as the mind goes, so does nature. The Cosmos could be understood the growth of universal reasonableness - an ontological strength application of the trichotomy.

Thanks again for the references.

As I understand "musement" it is, at first at least, a process by which our observations suggest that something is the case, but not as part of an inquiry on our part. That something occurs to us as a possibility, but not as a revelation or inspiration the source of which cannot be described or determined. It's arises from observable "facts" but is evoked, as it were. More traditional forms of reasoning may come into play after that takes place. Dewey believed that we only truly "think" when confronted with problems (broadly defined, as part of his theory of inquiry), but felt our experience as living organisms included much more than purposive thinking to resolve questions or circumstances. Maybe what Pierce called "musement" is part of what we do apart from purposive conduct.

This "musement" (and other aspects of Pragmatism) I think may hint at a connection between Pragmatism and Stoicism (John Lach's book Stoic Pragmatism notes some similarities. I wonder if the Stoic conception of an immanent deity began with musement, from time to time.

As I said, there is the triadic epistemology that is a model of psychological processes of reasoning. — apokrisis

Except that for Peirce, reasoning (semiosis) as studied within the normative science of logic (semeiotic) is emphatically not a psychological process. Rather, psychology is a special science that studies the actual thinking of individual embodied human minds. In other words, psychology depends on logic (and metaphysics), not the other way around.

The Cosmos could be understood the growth of universal reasonableness - an ontological strength application of the trichotomy. — apokrisis

Except that for Peirce, the growth of concrete reasonableness is discovered within the normative science of esthetics (not metaphysics) as the only aim that is admirable in itself. Ethics depends on it for this principle in ascertaining what constitutes good conduct, and logic depends on both esthetics and ethics in ascertaining what constitutes good reasoning--again, regardless of any facts of psychology.

As I understand "musement" it is, at first at first at least, a process by which our observations suggest that something is the case, but not as part of an inquiry on our part. — Ciceronianus the White

Right, although it can also serve as the very first stage of scientific inquiry, just pondering the phenomena as they present themselves and relying on instinct to supply plausible explanatory hypotheses about them.

More traditional forms of reasoning may come into play after that takes place. — Ciceronianus the White

Indeed, Peirce lays out the entire process of scientific inquiry in the article--formulating a hypothesis (retroduction) is followed by explicating what would follow from it if it were true (deduction) and then examining whether those predictions are borne out (induction).

Except that for Peirce, reasoning (semiosis) as studied within the normative science of logic (semeiotic) is emphatically not a psychological process. Rather, psychology is a special science that studies the actual thinking of individual embodied human minds. In other words, psychology depends on logic (and metaphysics), not the other way around. — aletheist

It starts with an examination of our psychological processes - the habits of epistemology - and becomes a claim about logic as an ontological reality.

Of course, reasoning being abductive, there isn't a strict arrow from one side of the argument to the other. The whole has to be grasped at least vaguely from the outset.

But this is the deep point of Peirce's philosophy.

The usual view (once you have got beyond naive realism to Kantian modelling) is that the connection between our psychological models of the world and the reality - the thing in itself - is dangerously arbitrary. So there is our mind, and there is the world. Two different kinds of thing.

But Peirce argues instead that the trichotomy is simply a logically necessary Platonic-strength form. It is the natural and inevitable shape of any causal structure, any kind of organised set of relations.

Hence both mind, as an epistemic system, and world, as an ontic system, share the one semiotic logic, the one natural and inevitable order.

It is something we can suspect from discovering it as the shape of our own rational process of inquiry - our best reasoning method. And it is something we can observe from the fruits of that same process of inquiry as our best explanation for the order of the Cosmos.

Of course, Peirce's actual efforts at a pan-semiotic ontology were limited by what was known scientifically in his day. And they were also confused with theistic tendencies.

But we now know enough about biology and neurology to say how semiotic these natural processes indeed are. And also enough about cosmology, thermodynamics and quantum physics to see how a triadic holism is a necessary perspective, while not going overboard and calling it actual semiosis.

Semiosis as a natural process is really the view from somewhere - the somewhere that is an organism modelling its environment. The Universe is only pan-semiotic in the sense that it is kind of the view from nowhere. It is its own model in terms of its information or boundary conditions.

Except that for Peirce, the growth of concrete reasonableness is discovered within the normative science of esthetics (not metaphysics) as the only aim that is admirable in itself. — aletheist

I'm familiar with his archetectonic. But I'm not interested in contributing to some historical retelling of Peirce as an eccentric loner obsessed with fitting everything into ever more recursively complex triadic categorisations. No wonder people get switched off!

I am talking about him as a key figure in the long organic tradition that is finally informing current science, especially in biology. And the key thing is the holism with which he shows that the triadic semiotic relation mediates all reality - epistemic and ontic.

The Cosmos could be understood the growth of universal reasonableness - an ontological strength application of the trichotomy. — apokrisis

Can the Universe Learn?

The universe could be teaching itself how to evolve into a better, more stable, cosmos. That's the far-out idea proposed by a team of scientists who say they are reimagining the universe.

Peirce always said that what we see as scientific laws are simply habits of nature.

Peirce's actual efforts at a pan-semiotic ontology were limited by what was known scientifically in his day. And they were also confused with theistic tendencies. — apokrisis

That's the fly in the naturalist ointment, ain't it. ;-)

Peirce always said that what we see as scientific laws are simply habits of nature. — Wayfarer

Yep. That link is exactly the kind of thing I am talking about.

Even before relativity was discovered, Peirce was already proposing experiments to check if space was always necessarily flat, or had just evolved towards this generalised Euclidean geometry.

So his metaphysics spoke to a developmental model of the Cosmos. And science will get around to treating this as a routine insight rather than the weirdest thought anyone ever had.

That's the fly in the naturalist ointment, ain't it. — Wayfarer

Well you know that I have no time for metaphysical monism or dualism. Only the irreducible complexity of a triadic metaphysics - a principled and rational holism - could make sense of nature.