I would add "introspection" as a major one. There are others (e.g. the sense of balance). — Olivier5
One city, one name: New York. This unique name (aka concept) can be written down in an infinite number of different ways. — Olivier5
Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.
This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something. — Bertrand Russell, Universals
If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name? — Janus
That seeming contradiction did not bother you that much when you explained at length why it is possible to have multiple, slightly different As. So you are ready to be a bit charitable with your concept of A but not with your concept of universal. — Olivier5
I believe we can do far better than nominalism. — Olivier5
The goal of my comment wasn't to defend the universality of certain ideas, but the existence of ideas. A largely similar idea of "New York" exists. And that idea is not material. Though not a separate substance either. — khaled
It's not a seeming contradiction. There definitely are multiple, slightly different 'A's. Hopefully no one is mad enough to dispute that. Here's one A, and here's another A, looking the same, but in a different location and microscopically different on your screen. There's also, categorically, multiple, slightly different concepts of A, some people might have different criteria to others and even for themselves in different contexts at different times in their life.
None of the above applies to universals, which are a posited philosophical entity which may or may not exist. — Isaac
So, this 'hidden states model' is not applicable to scientific reasoning? By what criterion do you distinguish scientiific judgements from the ordinary neural activities which you say comprise mental life, and are based on a model of the mind's hidden states? — Wayfarer
Any examples of what these additional senses are, over and above the five we're taught at school? — Wayfarer
But are these sensory? 'of or relating to sensation or to the senses sensory stimulation. 2 : conveying nerve impulses from the sense organs to the nerve centers : afferent sensory neurons.' I suppose I can see how they are sensory in the broadest sense, but I would have thought those abilities were basically autonomic reactions, are they not?
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. — Wayfarer
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. — Wayfarer
If a poorly drawn A is good enough for you to consider it as a practical A, why should a not-absolutely-universal concept not to be regarded as a practical example of what a universal could be? — Olivier5
they do need a degree of universality in order to function. — Olivier5
it is sufficiently similar to all other As — Isaac
If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name? — Janus
The point was that "New York" written in seven different fonts is NOT seven different names of the city. They are just one name. — Olivier5
Scientific judgements are a sub category of such inferences which can be supported in a particular way (mainly testable empirical evidence). — Isaac
The 'traditional' distinction in philosophy is the matter under scrutiny. Being 'traditional in philosophy' confers no inherent truth to a proposition. — Isaac
Reason implies a self-conscious, agency-driven (purposeful) use of logic, comparison, memory, imagination etc. So reason is not sensation, indeed, but it does require the sense of introspection, as it does require all the other senses in order to have grain to mill. — Olivier5
I see those seven differently type-faced examples of 'New York' as sharing a common recognizable pattern, and hence being identifiable as signifying the same thing, not as representing some changeless disembodied name. — Janus
What would that be? The idea that scientific theories exist?Why not simply scientific realism? — DrOlsnesLea
I now come to the discussion of my central problem. Are world 3 objects, such as Newton’s or Einstein’s theories of gravitation, real objects? Or are they mere fictions, as both the materialist monist and the dualist assert? Are these theories themselves unreal, and only their embodiments real, as the materialist monist would say; including, of course, their embodiments in our brains, and in our verbal behaviour? Or are, as the dualist would say, not only these embodiments real, but also our thought experiences; our thoughts, directed towards these fictitious world 3 objects, but not these world 3 objects themselves?
My answer to this problem -- and, indeed, the central thesis of my talk -- is that world 3 objects are real; real in a sense very much like the sense in which the physicalist would call physical forces, and fields of forces, real, or really existing. However, this realist answer of mine has to be defended, by rational arguments.
There is perhaps a danger here that my central problem, the reality or existence of world 3 objects, may degenerate into a verbal issue. After all, we can call whatever we like ‘real’ or ‘existent.’ I think that we can get rid of this danger, by starting from the most primitive idea of reality, and by adopting the physicalist’s own method of generalizing this idea, and, ultimately, of replacing it altogether.
I suggest that all of us are most certain of the existence or reality of physical bodies of medium size: of a size such that we can easily handle them, turn them round, and drop them. Such things are ‘real’ in the most primitive sense of the word. I conjecture that a baby learns to distinguish such things; and I suppose that those things are most convincingly real to the baby that he or she can handle and drop, and can put into his or her mouth. Resistance to touch also seems to be important; and some degree of temporal persistence.
Starting from a primitive idea of real things like this, the
physicalist extends the idea by generalizing it. I suggest that the materialist’s or physicalist’s idea of real physical existence is obtained by including very big things and very small things, and things that do not persist through any length of time; and also by including whatever can causally act upon things, such as magnetic and electrical attraction and repulsion, and fields of forces; and radiation, for example X-rays, because they can causally act upon bodies, say, upon photographic plates.
We are thus led to the following idea: what is real or what exists is whatever may, directly or indirectly, have a causal effect upon physical things, and especially upon those primitive physical things that can be easily handled.
Thus we may replace our central problem of whether abstract world 3 objects such as Newton’s or Einstein’s theories of gravitation have a real existence, by the following problem: can scientific conjectures or theories exert, in a direct or indirect way, a causal effect upon the physical things of world 1? My reply to this question will be: yes, they can indeed.
My fundamental argument in support of world 3 [ideas] realism is very simple. We all know that we live in a physical world 1 which has been greatly changed by making use of science; that is to say, by using world 3 conjectures or theories as instruments of change. Therefore, scientific conjectures or theories can exert a causal or an instrumental effect upon physical things; far more so than, say, screwdrivers or scissors.
This discussion was created with comments split from Substance Dualism Versus Property Dualism Debate Discussion Thread — Hanover
It could have been any city, or indeed any word. The point is, that although the representations all differ, they all mean the same. — Wayfarer
The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. Many animals have far superior sensory abilities to humans, but none of them can speak, or reason, as far as we can tell (leaving aside Caledonian crows and Paul the Octopus[/u,]). — Wayfarer
This species is known for using plant material to create stick and leaf tools to capture prey hiding in cracks and crevices. — Wikipedia
The New Caledonian crow is the only non-primate species for which there is evidence of cumulative cultural evolution in tool manufacture. That is, this species appear to have invented new tools by modifying existing ones, then passing these innovations to other individuals in the cultural group. — Wikipedia
Meta-tool use is using one tool on another tool to achieve the objective of the task. It is generally considered to be a behaviour requiring more complex cognitive ability than the use of just a single tool. Studies show that New Caledonian crows are capable of meta-tool use, at a level rivalling the best performances seen in primates. — Wikipedia
New Caledonian crows have shown they are able to process information from mirrors, a cognitive ability possessed by only a small number of species. By using a mirror, wild-caught New Caledonian crows are able to find objects they cannot see with a direct line of sight. However, the crows were unable to recognise themselves in the mirror - other corvids have tested positive for this capability. — Wikipedia
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