I would add "introspection" as a major one. There are others (e.g. the sense of balance). — Olivier5

But are these sensory? 'of or relating to sensation or to the senses sensory stimulation. 2 : conveying nerve impulses from the sense organs to the nerve centers : afferent sensory neurons.' I suppose I can see how they are sensory in the broadest sense, but I would have thought those abilities were basically autonomic reactions, are they not?

The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. Many animals have far superior sensory abilities to humans, but none of them can speak, or reason, as far as we can tell (leaving aside Caledonian crows and Paul the Octopus).

One city, one name: New York. This unique name (aka concept) can be written down in an infinite number of different ways. — Olivier5

If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name?

&

https://www.livescience.com/60752-human-senses.html

I think a particular city is a poor example of what is meant by 'universals'. Bertrand Russell's example of 'the relation of Edinburgh and London' is a much better example.

Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.

(I would say that the relation 'is north of' depends on perspective - it pertains to the relation between those two particulars, which neither of them possess in their own right. Perspective is what an observer brings to the picture. He goes on:)

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something. — Bertrand Russell, Universals

Thanks, but failing to see how that is germane to the attempt to explain reason in terms of sensation.

Any examples of what these additional senses are, over and above the five we're taught at school? — Wayfarer

*gives essay about more than five senses*

Thanks, but failing to see how that is germane to the attempt to explain reason in terms of sensation. — Wayfarer

:meh:

If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name? — Janus

The point was that "New York" written in seven different fonts is NOT seven different names of the city. They are just one name.

That seeming contradiction did not bother you that much when you explained at length why it is possible to have multiple, slightly different As. So you are ready to be a bit charitable with your concept of A but not with your concept of universal. — Olivier5

It's not a seeming contradiction. There definitely are multiple, slightly different 'A's. Hopefully no one is mad enough to dispute that. Here's one A, and here's another A, looking the same, but in a different location and microscopically different on your screen. There's also, categorically, multiple, slightly different concepts of A, some people might have different criteria to others and even for themselves in different contexts at different times in their life.

None of the above applies to universals, which are a posited philosophical entity which may or may not exist.

I believe we can do far better than nominalism. — Olivier5

What does it fail at?

The goal of my comment wasn't to defend the universality of certain ideas, but the existence of ideas. A largely similar idea of "New York" exists. And that idea is not material. Though not a separate substance either. — khaled

I see, now it makes sense. There's been a lot of confusion about what's at issue. In order to necessitate a separate existence (substance or property dualism), universals have to be an entity, which, according to the law of identity, has to be identical with itself. So to make the argument work (and I'm claiming it doesn't work), the concept needs to be completely identical in every way because it is an indivisible unity, an identity according to the law of identity.

Since we can identify no single self-identical unity which is 'the concept of New York', or 'the letter A', we must reject the argument. How close the myriad individual concepts are to each other is immaterial, though it helps to explain why we feel as though there might be a single universal concept.

It's not a seeming contradiction. There definitely are multiple, slightly different 'A's. Hopefully no one is mad enough to dispute that. Here's one A, and here's another A, looking the same, but in a different location and microscopically different on your screen. There's also, categorically, multiple, slightly different concepts of A, some people might have different criteria to others and even for themselves in different contexts at different times in their life.

None of the above applies to universals, which are a posited philosophical entity which may or may not exist. — Isaac

It does apply. The letter A can be posited a philosophical entity which may or may not exist. You say there exist practical examples of As. I say there are practical examples of universals, in concepts that function as near-universal, such as (precisely) the letter A, or the number Pi.

If a poorly drawn A is good enough for you to consider it as a practical A, why should a not-absolutely-universal concept not to be regarded as a practical example of what a universal could be?

A's can be good enough for you, but absolutes can't be good enough?

So, this 'hidden states model' is not applicable to scientific reasoning? By what criterion do you distinguish scientiific judgements from the ordinary neural activities which you say comprise mental life, and are based on a model of the mind's hidden states? — Wayfarer

I don't. Scientific judgements are a sub category of such inferences which can be supported in a particular way (mainly testable empirical evidence). Science is a kind of public rehersal of the process of inference we have a priori. The publicness of it enhances the process by allowing more models to compete for quality of prediction, increasing the quantity of sensory data to input, speeding up the filtering process etc.

Any examples of what these additional senses are, over and above the five we're taught at school? — Wayfarer

Can't really beat what @Pfhorrest, @Olivier5 and @Kenosha Kid have already posted.

But are these sensory? 'of or relating to sensation or to the senses sensory stimulation. 2 : conveying nerve impulses from the sense organs to the nerve centers : afferent sensory neurons.' I suppose I can see how they are sensory in the broadest sense, but I would have thought those abilities were basically autonomic reactions, are they not?

The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. — Wayfarer

You're begging the question. The 'traditional' distinction in philosophy is the matter under scrutiny. Being 'traditional in philosophy' confers no inherent truth to a proposition.

If you want to make a distinction between a cortex receiving a signal from a neighbouring network whose terminal dendrite is under your skin from one whose terminal dendrite is in your skull, you'll have to make the case as to why they are different. Sensory neurons are simply those with relatively long dendrites compared to their axons. Any signal derived from a sensory neuron is a sense. Often, long dendritic chains are included in the definition of 'sensory' if they replicate the activities of typical sensory neurons.

The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. — Wayfarer

I have no idea what the philosophical implications are, but I would identify self-consciousness with the sense of introspection. We can 'sense' our own thoughts and feel our feelings and access our memories. At least some of them.

Reason implies a self-conscious, agency-driven (purposeful) use of logic, comparison, memory, imagination etc. So reason is not sensation, indeed, but it does require the sense of introspection, as it does require all the other senses in order to have grain to mill.

If a poorly drawn A is good enough for you to consider it as a practical A, why should a not-absolutely-universal concept not to be regarded as a practical example of what a universal could be? — Olivier5

Because, without begging the question, the definition of an A could be that it is sufficiently similar to all other As. The definition of a universal cannot be that it is just sufficiently similar to other examples. That's the definition on nominalism, the opposite of universalism.

But that 'definition' is not a definition; it is a tautology... "Any A must look like a A". Sure, but where's the definition?

Letters and words are symbols, they are more than just drawings that look like other drawings. They are made to be understood, to carry meaning from one mind to the next. And therefore they do need a degree of universality in order to function.

they do need a degree of universality in order to function. — Olivier5

it is sufficiently similar to all other As — Isaac

We're going round in pointless circles as you keep conceding points and then raising them again a few posts later as if nothing had been said on the matter. I shan't continue this nonsense.

A's look like A's.

Mmmokay... If that's the sum total of nominalism, we certainly can do better.


Horse noun
\ ˈhȯrs \
plural horses also horse
Definition:
1a: Anything that looks sufficiently like a horse.

1b: Any other thing that may in one way or another look sufficiently like a horse.

Horse noun
\ ˈhȯrs \
plural horses also horse
Definition:
1a: Anything that looks sufficiently like a horse. — Olivier5

For those wondering what "look" and "sufficiently" mean in the above definition, they denote whatever resembles "looking", and "sufficiently", respectively.

If there can be one city that is never the same from moment to moment why can a number not be the same, in the sense of not being changeless, while being perfectly capable of being referred to by a name? — Janus


The point was that "New York" written in seven different fonts is NOT seven different names of the city. They are just one name. — Olivier5

I thought you were arguing that the fact that there is one name of the city, just as there is one city, entails that the name is changeless.

I see those seven differently type-faced examples of 'New York' as sharing a common recognizable pattern, and hence being identifiable as signifying the same thing, not as representing some changeless disembodied name.

Scientific judgements are a sub category of such inferences which can be supported in a particular way (mainly testable empirical evidence). — Isaac

Positivism! Who'd have thought?

The 'traditional' distinction in philosophy is the matter under scrutiny. Being 'traditional in philosophy' confers no inherent truth to a proposition. — Isaac

The distinction between sensation and reason doesn't belong only to philosophy, it's also a matter of common sense, and you haven't addressed it at all. Even empiricists have to use reason, and reason is something for which there need be no neurobiological explanation.

Reason implies a self-conscious, agency-driven (purposeful) use of logic, comparison, memory, imagination etc. So reason is not sensation, indeed, but it does require the sense of introspection, as it does require all the other senses in order to have grain to mill. — Olivier5

It also requires the ability to abstract, to understand symbolic meaning, as you keep pointing out. There's a book by Chomsky and Berwick on the genetic roots of language on my must read list. https://g.co/kgs/t2stKT

Why not simply scientific realism? Science comes down to objective description no matter what that's being studied!

This is a philosophy site. There are plenty of science sites to contribute to. I ask the occasional question on Physics Forum myself.

I see those seven differently type-faced examples of 'New York' as sharing a common recognizable pattern, and hence being identifiable as signifying the same thing, not as representing some changeless disembodied name. — Janus

They are all identifiable as saying the same words: 'New York', even by one who never heard of the city. Are words embodied?

Why not simply scientific realism? — DrOlsnesLea

What would that be? The idea that scientific theories exist?

From a lecture Karl Popper gave on the subject:

I now come to the discussion of my central problem. Are world 3 objects, such as Newton’s or Einstein’s theories of gravitation, real objects? Or are they mere fictions, as both the materialist monist and the dualist assert? Are these theories themselves unreal, and only their embodiments real, as the materialist monist would say; including, of course, their embodiments in our brains, and in our verbal behaviour? Or are, as the dualist would say, not only these embodiments real, but also our thought experiences; our thoughts, directed towards these fictitious world 3 objects, but not these world 3 objects themselves?

My answer to this problem -- and, indeed, the central thesis of my talk -- is that world 3 objects are real; real in a sense very much like the sense in which the physicalist would call physical forces, and fields of forces, real, or really existing. However, this realist answer of mine has to be defended, by rational arguments.

There is perhaps a danger here that my central problem, the reality or existence of world 3 objects, may degenerate into a verbal issue. After all, we can call whatever we like ‘real’ or ‘existent.’ I think that we can get rid of this danger, by starting from the most primitive idea of reality, and by adopting the physicalist’s own method of generalizing this idea, and, ultimately, of replacing it altogether.

I suggest that all of us are most certain of the existence or reality of physical bodies of medium size: of a size such that we can easily handle them, turn them round, and drop them. Such things are ‘real’ in the most primitive sense of the word. I conjecture that a baby learns to distinguish such things; and I suppose that those things are most convincingly real to the baby that he or she can handle and drop, and can put into his or her mouth. Resistance to touch also seems to be important; and some degree of temporal persistence.

Starting from a primitive idea of real things like this, the
physicalist extends the idea by generalizing it. I suggest that the materialist’s or physicalist’s idea of real physical existence is obtained by including very big things and very small things, and things that do not persist through any length of time; and also by including whatever can causally act upon things, such as magnetic and electrical attraction and repulsion, and fields of forces; and radiation, for example X-rays, because they can causally act upon bodies, say, upon photographic plates.

We are thus led to the following idea: what is real or what exists is whatever may, directly or indirectly, have a causal effect upon physical things, and especially upon those primitive physical things that can be easily handled.

Thus we may replace our central problem of whether abstract world 3 objects such as Newton’s or Einstein’s theories of gravitation have a real existence, by the following problem: can scientific conjectures or theories exert, in a direct or indirect way, a causal effect upon the physical things of world 1? My reply to this question will be: yes, they can indeed.

My fundamental argument in support of world 3 [ideas] realism is very simple. We all know that we live in a physical world 1 which has been greatly changed by making use of science; that is to say, by using world 3 conjectures or theories as instruments of change. Therefore, scientific conjectures or theories can exert a causal or an instrumental effect upon physical things; far more so than, say, screwdrivers or scissors.

https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/p/popper80.pdf

It also requires the ability to abstract, to understand symbolic meaning, as you keep pointing out. — Wayfarer

Also the capacity to "change one's mind", to adopt new points of view, to commit to a new idea.

This discussion was created with comments split from Substance Dualism Versus Property Dualism Debate Discussion Thread — Hanover

Thanks for this; that old debate discussion thread was a bit of a zombie indeed.

For the title, i would like to suggest:

New York, New York: Misery of Nominalism

And of course, the thread soundtrack would be:

They are all identifiable as saying the same words: 'New York', even by one who never heard of the city. Are words embodied? — Olivier5

Do you think the name 'New York' exists apart from it's visual and auditory embodiments?

I took the import of your poster of the name New York printed in different typefaces, not to be about anything to do with New York whatever. It could have been any city, or indeed any word. The point is, that although the representations all differ, they all mean the same. That's the point I thought you were making. Was I wrong about that?

Do you think the name 'New York' exists apart from it's visual and auditory embodiments? — Janus

Yes, I believe the concept exists as well. Signs are meaningful, they are not just what they seem.

It could have been any city, or indeed any word. The point is, that although the representations all differ, they all mean the same. — Wayfarer

Yes. The point was to show that there is a difference between the name or concept of "New York" and any of its many possible materializations in print or drawing. Hence there is an degree of independence between the name and the material prints of the name.

As the article you posted indicates, this seems to apply to smells as written down on neurons as well.

The traditional distinction in philosophy is between reason and sensation - both central to knowledge, but separate faculties. Many animals have far superior sensory abilities to humans, but none of them can speak, or reason, as far as we can tell (leaving aside Caledonian crows and Paul the Octopus[/u,]). — Wayfarer

You're well-read and also well-informed. How do you find the time? Frankly, my mind is blown.

Paul The Octopus made headlines for accurate predictions in the 2010 Soccer World Cup.

New Caledonian Crow

This species is known for using plant material to create stick and leaf tools to capture prey hiding in cracks and crevices. — Wikipedia

The New Caledonian crow is the only non-primate species for which there is evidence of cumulative cultural evolution in tool manufacture. That is, this species appear to have invented new tools by modifying existing ones, then passing these innovations to other individuals in the cultural group. — Wikipedia

No language? How'd they do that?!

Meta-tool use is using one tool on another tool to achieve the objective of the task. It is generally considered to be a behaviour requiring more complex cognitive ability than the use of just a single tool. Studies show that New Caledonian crows are capable of meta-tool use, at a level rivalling the best performances seen in primates. — Wikipedia

Bird-brained? Go to New Caledonia!

However, it isn't all good news:

New Caledonian crows have shown they are able to process information from mirrors, a cognitive ability possessed by only a small number of species. By using a mirror, wild-caught New Caledonian crows are able to find objects they cannot see with a direct line of sight. However, the crows were unable to recognise themselves in the mirror - other corvids have tested positive for this capability. — Wikipedia

There seems to be cognitive gap between ability to use/manufacture tools (engineers) and self-awareness (philosophers). Makes sense in a vague way - roughly speaking, engineering is about what's outside and philosophizing is about what's inside.

The question is, why aren't blue whales with their humongous brains more intelligent than humans?

Yes, I believe the concept exists as well. Signs are meaningful, they are not just what they seem. — Olivier5

So, does the concept exist apart from the instances of it being thought?