Presuppositions

tim wood

The following, courtesy - ty! - of 180, caught my eye:

To my mind, a philosophical expression amounts to a supposition – 'Suppose X, then possibly Y' – that is, a proposal for reflective consideration (e.g. dialectics, gedankenexperiment, daily (fitness / therapeutic) praxis, etc) tested only by its comparatively rational adequacy for some reflective task, and not a proposition asserting what is or not a fact of the matter. — 180 Proof

I should like to distinguish between suppositions and presuppositions. And I'll offer this as a question with two layers. A question that in part I find ferociously difficult to figure out and answer even just for myself.

I take a supposition, in the sense of the above, to be a kind of more-or-less deliberate act of creative thinking to the end of starting down a path of thinking. In finished form a product of a mix of content with the use of tools. In science of course this would be a hypothesis and creating good hypotheses worth "four dollars a minute." (Said when four dollars was real money.)

Aristotle's Rhetoric could easily be said to be all about finding, creating suppositions, or in this sense arguments. In one section (Bk. II - Chap. 23) he lists outright 28 topoi, topics, lines of argument - tools - that can be used both to create and then prove the arguments of suppositions.

But every supposition arises from a "constellation" of presuppositions. I suppose I want a peanut butter sandwich - not high on the list of intellectual or gustatory accomplishments. But for that to be a reasonable supposition, and for me reasonably to act on that supposition requires more presuppositions than I care to count at the moment, and all of them themselves reasonable. E.g., I better have bread and some peanut butter. It would seem then that every supposition "makes a demand" on that that it presupposes. In a sense a question. Do I have PB and bread? Do I have to go to the store? Will they have the kind - the only kind - I'll buy (Teddy's, for NE US consumers). Will my car work? Is the store open? And so on. And much of this resolved in next to no time.

Push these presuppositions back far enough, and they're not reasonable as questions anymore, and not just because far-fetched or lacking immediate relevance. These suppositions don't make demands, they do not in themselves ever become questions within the thinking that presupposes them. They are instead representations of the ground the thinking in itself arises from. Among them in our example might be, "I suppose there is such a thing as PB, and bread." "I suppose stores exist." "And my car, and roads,,,". And so forth.

So here are the questions. 1) What are some of your more all-encompassing absolute presuppositions - because these latter are called absolute presuppositions (APs - I think also aka hinge propositions)? And 2) do you happen to know of any relatively simple or brief way to identify your own APs or anyone else's?

A simple way for mine might be to chase the presuppositions back until I hit a wtf moment. But that will merely yield very particular APs (or is that the only way). And, that won't work for the APs of others. because at least how would we know what their wtf boundary would be?

180 Proof

Aristotle's Rhetoric could easily be said to be all about finding, creating suppositions, or in this sense arguments. In one section (Bk. II - Chap. 23) he lists outright 28 topoi, topics, lines of argument - tools - that can be used both to create and then prove the arguments of suppositions. — tim wood

No doubt. I'm not sure I ever read this text and it would've been in the 1980s if i had ... Good reference though – thanks.

For me, suppositions – philosophical statements – have implicit, sometimes explicit, assumptions, and it's these assumptions which require presuppositions to give the assumptions sense, or relevance, as commitments to either an ontology or some other discursive domain. Likewise, the implications of such suppositions (or assumptions too) extend or expand the scope of presuppositions further. They are not, however, "absolute" in Collingwood's sense (IIRC, what he calls "absolute presuppositions" pertain to entire cultures or historical eras and only thereby to discourses practiced therein), but are necessary in the sense of being implicit 'conditionals'.

That said, tim, I think we're on the same page concerning the (reflective) usage of suppositions. Philosophy makes proposals – supposes ideas/concepts, even arguments – rather than propositions (e.g. theories), and pays careful attention to their assumptions and the presuppositions which grounds assumptions contextually. Agreed? (Am I reading you correctly?) This is a methodological priority of mine which I've learned mostly from Peirce, Dewey and Witty (re: forms-of-life, world as totality of the facts, certainty as lacking grounds for doubt, meaning as usage), then later on clearly recognizing this in the scrupulous care with lines of thought or arguments made by Benny, Humester, Schop, Freddy Zarathustra, Bertie, Popper, et al. As someone else has already said on this thread or another, philosophy is more art than science – which is much more obvious to those of us who (struggle to) philosophize instead of just go on rambling about philosophies.

god must be atheist

My absolute presupposition would be "my sensations reflect truth (reality)."

This of course is only in retrospect. When my suppositions and presuppositions formed, this was not an issue. But even at that time -- as a baby, or newborn, I tasted my mothers milk and found it was palatable, and it was pleasant, and it took away my hunger -- I sensed that some things over and over again take away the pain of hunger and replace it with the pleasure of fulness. This established for me the presupposition in a non-philosophical, but empirical, experiential way.

god must be atheist

In the previous post, my presupposition may not be true... but it works for me. I don't need any more supporting levels of presupposition; I don't need a basis for that presupposition. It is the gestalt, the "is", the "est".

god must be atheist

conversely, what works for others? I daresay the same thing. Of course their opinions may be different from mine: their presupposition may be the existence of the Christian god and its influence in the person's life. From where I sit, their presupposition is false, and it can be replaced with mine for better effect.

Tom Storm

↪180 Proof

Interesting. Do the 'laws' of logic count as presuppositions? I'd be interested to see examples of some common presuppositions versus suppositions as they might operate in someone's belief system.

For instance, Is a presupposition or a supposition of science the notion that reality is understandable? Or is this scientism? Is the idea of 'reality' itself a supposition?

Are there examples of presuppositions that we can't really do without (the afore mentioned laws of logic, perhaps)?

180 Proof

Do the 'laws' of logic count as presuppositions? — Tom Storm

No. They count as a formal system of transformational rules. Keep in mind, I'm referring to nothing but philosophical statements in my previous post.

Are there examples of presuppositions that we can't really do without (the afore mentioned laws of logic, perhaps)? — Tom Storm

If you're referring to my take on presuppositions in philosophy, then that depends on which suppositions – philosophical statements – and their assumptions you think we philosophers cannot do without. Something stated by Socrates or Plato, Aristotle or Sextus Empiricus, Descartes or Kant? First principle/s of a philosophical school, tradition or movement perhaps? :chin:

Tom Storm

↪180 Proof

:up:

god must be atheist

Doesn't anybody FUCKING read my fucking posts?????!!!!!

*&*&^%$$#^!!!!

180 Proof

↪god must be atheist

NO. :sweat: (Welcome to the club!)

baker

And 2) do you happen to know of any relatively simple or brief way to identify your own APs or anyone else's? — tim wood

That's easy. Try to talk to someone who thinks differently than oneself. This quickly brings to the surface one's hinge propositions. The moment in the interaction when you want to call the other person crazy, evil, deranged, and such, is the moment where the hinge proposition surfaces and can be recognized.

anyone else's? — tim wood

That depends on how much goodwil and time one is willing to invest in the interaction, and whether one is willing to make the first step.

baker

↪180 Proof

It's lonely at the top, innit ... :halo:

god must be atheist

↪180 Proof

:razz:

god must be atheist

NO. :sweat: (Welcome to the club!) — 180 Proof

I'm weirded out of course because of my ego. Then I'm weirded out because I don't know that people don't argue with me because they ignore me, i.e. I'm totally ignorable, or because my points are so very right on that there is nothing to argue about.

But what really worries me is that I'll get weirded out to the max the moment people start to respond to me. What if I get responses? I won't know what to do with them. I am not used to them. I don't have experience with the "responded to my points" paradigm. In a way I'm like a dog that chases cars, and then one day he catches one. Then what??

180 Proof

↪god must be atheist

:rofl:

Olivier5

Do the 'laws' of logic count as presuppositions?
— Tom Storm
No. They count as a formal system of transformational rules. — 180 Proof

However, the supposition that "logic dependably works", that one can trust logic, is an absolute one. You cannot prove that logic is true or efficacious because you would need logic to do so.

Olivier5

My absolute presupposition would be "my sensations reflect truth (reality)." — god must be atheist

Indeed, this is another one. I would say express it as "my senses don't lie, most of times". "Most of times" is to allow for (rare) observation errors and hallucinations.

Olivier5

There are also APs about space and time. Eg "the arrow of time flies one way only".

god must be atheist

However, the supposition that "logic dependably works", that one can trust logic, is an absolute one. You cannot prove that logic is true or efficacious because you would need logic to do so. — Olivier5

This is a good one, but I would file the acceptance that "logic is logical" under sense-sensation. Our entire intuitive world, including language and understanding language, is based on the reliable relationship between sensation and stimulus.

I agree with time and space, though, that was right on. With a caveat as below.

------------------------

That said, there is a tendency among modern logicians that postulates that logic as used by humans is a product of evolution, and it has some, but not all to do with reality. In microphysics, i.e. in quantum space, an effect can occur before its cause; it needs the cause, but the cause will happen sometime later than the effect gets born. Also, there are a lot of other difficulties to conventional reason that QM presents: a volume of space contains more energy the smaller it is. In our logical world, if you add two things, their sum is bigger than either of the additives. But in quantum world the sum is smaller than the additives individually. ETC. Therefore MODERN LOGICIANS have divided the world of logic into two segments: human-intuitive, that is, evolutionarily ingrained logic, the one that corresponds to our senses and the logic of the language; this is called LOGIC 1. LOGIC 2 is non-intuitive logic, something that is part of reality, but it baffles every human the first time we learn about it.

180 Proof

↪Olivier5

"Logic dependably works", I think, is an assumption (re: logic is dependable), which in turn presupposes that some things work and some things do not work.

Olivier5

↪180 Proof

Which in turn presupposes that some things exist, I guess.

tim wood

For me, suppositions – philosophical statements – have implicit, sometimes explicit, assumptions, and it's these assumptions which require presuppositions to give the assumptions sense, or relevance, as commitments to either an ontology or some other discursive domain. — 180 Proof

There seems a pretty clear distinction to be made explicit, here. The supposition is a proposition, even if shaped as a question or hypothetical. It says in some sense something about something. As such may be regarded both as a what-it-is and as a what-it's-for. You've got what-it's-for covered. That leaves what it is.

Per Collingwood (RGC), every proposition is an answer to at least one and usually many questions. "The cat is on the mat" telling where the cat is. And in order for sense all of cat, mat, place, juxtaposition, and being must be meaningful and presupposed. The initial proposition, then, implying in this case at least five propositions. Eg., there is a cat. In RGC's terminology, these being relative presuppositions because of their "efficacy" in giving rise to further presuppositions. Thus in turn, is there such a thing as a cat? But the proposition as to a cat seems not to lead to any meaningful underlying question, meaningful within the thinking in which it arises. And that because the existence of cats is absolutely presupposed in the original proposition in this thinking.

Presupposing, then, a part of thinking, implying the existence of absolute presuppositions (APs), and these latter the from-which of thinking, and not the by-which. That is, within the thinking, never giving rise to their own presuppositions. And as foundational, rarely or never made explicit. Thus every person and every entity and enterprise has its own set of absolute presuppositions, and in communities many shared.

While this-all is not too difficult to see, RGC's point was that all thinking is grounded in APs, including scientific thinking. And this not-so-easy to see - although one gets used to the idea. And APs change, although usually slowly. Slowly because usually a change in APs means disruption and even complete changes in entire systems of thinking.

"Logic dependably works", I think, is an assumption (re: logic is dependable), which in turn presupposes that some things work and some things do not work. — 180 Proof

Which in turn presupposes that some things exist, I guess — Olivier5

These seem along the right lines. And interesting because within a system of thinking some proposition can express an a priori truth. - universal and necessary. But that in itself no truth at all. Gravity as a force, now gravity as description of the free movement of objects in space-time along geodesics - no force at all.

My absolute presupposition would be "my sensations reflect truth (reality)."....In the previous post, my presupposition may not be true... but it works for me. — god must be atheist

This gets tricky. APs underlie issues of truth or falsity. They are the grounds upon which relative presuppositions are reckoned true or false. Or perhaps yours a relative proposition that leads back to "sensations reflect reality." You might question whether yours do, but whether sensations in general do a whole other question.

180 Proof

↪tim wood

I only refer to philosophical statements as 'suppositions' which are not truth-apt, and not other kinds of statements which may or may not be truth-apt. "What it is" pertaining to an abstraction itself (concept of X) may be descriptive or definitional.

Presupposing, then, a part of thinking, implying the existence of absolute presuppositions (APs)

I read RGC as saying the cultures, or historical eras, consist in absolute presuppositions and, implied, that thinking only presupposes culture, or a historical era, which is not absolute (like e.g. Witty's language games presuppose forms-of-life). Maybe I'm misremembering him; however, I stand with Witty's presupposing.

Ciceronianus

To my mind, a philosophical expression amounts to a supposition – 'Suppose X, then possibly Y' – that is, a proposal for reflective consideration (e.g. dialectics, gedankenexperiment, daily (fitness / therapeutic) praxis, etc) tested only by its comparatively rational adequacy for some reflective task, and not a proposition asserting what is or not a fact of the matter.
— 180 Proof — tim wood

That's quite Deweyian (Deweyish?) I think. For him, judgments which are the outcome of controlled inquiry for a purpose, not propositions, indicate what may be asserted as "true" (or warranted).

god must be atheist

These seem along the right lines. And interesting because within a system of thinking some proposition can express an a priori truth. - universal and necessary. But that in itself no truth at all. Gravity as a force, now gravity as description of the free movement of objects in space-time along geodesics - no force at all.
My absolute presupposition would be "my sensations reflect truth (reality)."....In the previous post, my presupposition may not be true... but it works for me.
— god must be atheist
This gets tricky. APs underlie issues of truth or falsity. They are the grounds upon which relative presuppositions are reckoned true or false. Or perhaps yours a relative proposition that leads back to "sensations reflect reality." You might question whether yours do, but whether sensations in general do a whole other question. — tim wood

You can't get away from the presupposition that your rely on your senses. What else are you going to rely on? Very basically.
A priori knowledge? They are truisms, they don't reveal any knowledge outside of themselves.
If you don't rely on evidence, and you can't rely on pure reason, then you got to rely on something. There is no other "something". So you have to choose between your senses and a priori truth. A priori may not lead you to anything, in fact, it does not. Experiential evidence may be correct or may be totally false, but take it or leave it, there is nothing else. A priori is certain to not be helpful as a most basic presupposition. Experience has at least a chance to be revealing the truth (from your point of view), so you bet on the horse that has a chance, not on the one that has no chance at all, when you are restricted to bet on one horse and only on one of the two.

Olivier5

Which in turn presupposes that some things exist, I guess
— Olivier5

These seem along the right lines. — tim wood

Ok. Then in ECG fashion we should ask what is the question that this supposition answers. And that would be: is there something? But this question is self-answered in the positive, since the question itself: "Is there something?", this question exists as soon as it is asked. So the answer is always: "yes, there exist something, at least the question "is there something?".

Not sure where that leaves us.

tim wood

Not sure where that leaves us. — Olivier5

Where it leaves me is understanding that no claim is absolute - whatever that might mean - but is rather founded in and on what is believed and how it is believed. Within that system it may well be absolute, but the system itself is also always in question. RGC called the the activity of finding out what are the APs of a given group metaphysical analysis, an historical science, and that described as finding out what people did by examining and interpreting evidence all for the sake of 'human self-knowledge." (The Idea of History, pp. 10-11.)

When I attempt such an analysis on my own thinking and beliefs I end up with the completely unremarkable set of beliefs I take automatically for granted - because they're obviously so! And a big part of this follows from my ordinary acquaintance with science. So it is "reasonable" for me to acknowledge the possibility of other sets or patterns of fundamental beliefs, but only if those others are ignorant in some way or sense. In general, then, I know best.

But what will the verdict be in 100 years? 300? 500? 1000? It implies to me an importance in remembering that it's not just what I may know, but the system and framework within which it is known, which itself could have been either or both otherwise and wrong. It's an understanding and revelation of sorts that sits in plain sight but is hard to see, and that most people don't see.

TheMadFool

To my mind, a philosophical expression amounts to a supposition – 'Suppose X, then possibly Y' – that is, a proposal for reflective consideration (e.g. dialectics, gedankenexperiment, daily (fitness / therapeutic) praxis, etc) tested only by its comparatively rational adequacy for some reflective task, and not a proposition asserting what is or not a fact of the matter — 180 Proof

Spoken like a true skeptic! Pyrrho would be proud!

I did some reading up on presuppositions and suppositions and here's what I found out:

1. Suppositions: Explicit propositions that could be true/false that one wants to work with to discover their implications e.g. suppose physicalism is true, what follows?

2. Presuppositions: Implicit propositions that are necessarily true for suppositions to make sense e.g. with regard to "suppose physicalism is true", presuppositions would be that the methodology used to conduct the analysis of what follows (logic) is adequate, that language is powerful enough to handle the situation, so on and so forth.

180 Proof

↪TheMadFool

And your point?

TheMadFool

And your point? — 180 Proof

Presuppositions form the enviroment of ideas, conceptual schema, methodological systems, etc. in which suppositions are studied.

180 Proof

↪TheMadFool

What?

Presuppositions

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