Well, let's speak of snakes and trains, as does Hoffman in The Atlantic.. According to Hoffman, our snakes and trains are "mental representations" or "symbols" of some kind. Now, he seems to acknowledge (rather grudgingly, it seems) that our snake "mental representation" may bite us and our train "mental representation" my run us over if we step in front of it. I speculate he would even admit, if pressed, that our snake "mental representation" and our train "mental representation" will look like and act like a snake and a train, respectively, and that we will very appropriately treat them as if there really is a snake and a train in our interactions with them.

So a simple fellow like me may be inclined to ask what, if that's the case, they "really" are if they're not a snake and a train, and what the difference is between the snake and the train (or what we only "think" are the snake and the train) and what the snake and train "really" are. If there is a difference, how does that difference affect what we do with what seem to be snakes and trains?

Well, let's speak of snakes and trains, as does Hoffman in The Atlantic.. According to Hoffman, our snakes and trains are "mental representations" or "symbols" of some kind. Now, he seems to acknowledge (rather grudgingly, it seems) that our snake "mental representation" may bite us and our train "mental representation" my run us over if we step in front of it. I speculate he would even admit, if pressed, that our snake "mental representation" and our train "mental representation" will look like and act like a snake and a train, respectively, and that we will very appropriately treat them as if there really is a snake and a train in our interactions with them.

So a simple fellow like me may be inclined to ask what, if that's the case, they "really" are if they're not a snake and a train, and what the difference is between the snake and the train (or what we only "think" are the snake and the train) and what the snake and train "really" are. If there is a difference, how does that difference affect what we do with what seem to be snakes and trains?

So a simple fellow like me may be inclined to ask what, if that's the case, they "really" are if they're not a snake and a train, and what the difference is between the snake and the train (or what we only "think" are the snake and the train) and what the snake and train "really" are. If there is a difference, how does that difference affect what we do with what seem to be snakes and trains? — Ciceronianus the White

I'll try. The things in questions are what you think they are, because in thinking them you think them and having been thought by you, cannot by you be thought otherwise. I think of this as practical knowledge. But as has been noted in these threads times past counting, what you know is assembled by you. What it is before you assemble it, that is, before it can be known, cannot be known. This can be developed a bunch of different ways, but that's the core of it.

It strikes me that if the "real snake" (or whatever it may be) cannot be known, the mental representation snake is what is of significance to us. It doesn't matter what the "real snake" is, nor does it matter if our snake is a mental representation.
,

So a simple fellow like me may be inclined to ask what, if that's the case, they "really" are if they're not a snake and a train, and what the difference is between the snake and the train (or what we only "think" are the snake and the train) and what the snake and train "really" are. If there is a difference, how does that difference affect what we do with what seem to be snakes and trains? — Ciceronianus the White

I haven't seen the article, but I have read the book. So, I'd say that the difference that makes a difference, between imaginary snakes and real snakes, is the practical distinction between Concrete and Abstract. Concrete things have physical properties, such as poison, that can have physical effects, such as death-by-snake-bite. But Abstract things, have their physical properties abstracted (pulled out), so what remains are ethereal meta-physical qualities (MPQ). MPQ are not inherent in snakes, but attributed by the observer. And one of the MPQ of both snakes-in-the-flesh and snakes-in-the-mind is that they can cause the real physical responses we call "fear". You may mistake a garden hose for a snake, but the fear-response will be the same. And some people have dropped dead from fear --- yet the cause was not bio-chemical toxin, but bio-mental shock.

If the mere idea of a snake can kill you, it's not due to what-is, but to what-seems. And what "seems to be" is important to humans, because we are motivated by feelings. Moreover, some of those feelings are pre-suppositions (beliefs) about what's real and/or important. Some of those suppositions are innate (learned by evolution), or empirical (learned by experience), but others may be superstitions (learned by education). But the emotional effect on the believer is real, whether triggered by "what-is" or by "what-seems" (physical or metaphysical). Yet, some of us belittle Meta-physics as not-real, even when such ideas have real-world consequences. For example, world-wars have killed millions for the sake of abstract ideas (Communism vs Capitalism), that are only indirectly connected to the real world. However, going to war over mere ideas may sound silly, so those who want to justify the physical effects of war (carnage) typically look for some real-world event to blame. Even when the "real" motivating reason is an abstraction like "honor", or "freedom", or "country".

The abstract difference that makes a difference is Subjective Meaning. :smile:



https://www.britannica.com/story/can-you-really-be-scared-to-death

It strikes me that if the "real snake" (or whatever it may be) cannot be known, the mental representation snake is what is of significance to us. It doesn't matter what the "real snake" is, nor does it matter if our snake is a mental representation. — Ciceronianus the White

Something like this from an old post - these topics like an old ball we take out of a closet and kick around again for a while.

Some people stand on a mountain-top and together watch a sunset. 1) They don't really see anything. Light is incident on their eyes, lensed-down to the retina, generating a signal to the optic nerve, transmitted to the brain, there assembled into an image. 2) No two of them see the same thing. Parallax at least.

So when they talk about "the sunset," we can and do agree that we all including them know what they're talking about, but in fact just what exactly are they talking about? And this question being understood, there is no need to try to reply to it.

:up:

It strikes me that if the "real snake" (or whatever it may be) cannot be known, the mental representation snake is what is of significance to us. It doesn't matter what the "real snake" is, nor does it matter if our snake is a mental representation. — Ciceronianus the White

That description may be true of many people, who accept what they think they see as what is real. But to skeptical scientists and philosophers, and some poets, it does make a difference to know what is real and what is illusion. A major feature of wisdom is to know what you don't know.

That's the philosophical point behind the kick-*ss cover-story of the Matrix movie. Each of us must choose between the red pill of bitter truth, and the comfortable illusion of fake reality. :cool:


Late Lament :
Cold-hearted orb that rules the night
Removes the colours from our sight
Red is grey is yellow white
But we decide which is right
And which is an illusion
___Moody Blues

Well, if you can't know the real, which it appears you, Hoffman and others claim, you can't know what is real, can you? The skeptical scientists and philosophers you refer to thus believe in the existence of a something which, it's maintained, we can for all intents and purposes treat as it seem to us, but is unknowable. I wouldn't describe the belief that only the unknowable is real as wisdom.

I wouldn't describe the belief that only the unknowable is real as wisdom. — Ciceronianus the White

Who said it was? What I said was, "A major feature of wisdom is to know what you don't know." Do you disagree with that assertion? The point of wisdom is to be aware of the potential for Black Swans in any risky endeavor. :smile:


Fitch's paradox of knowability is one of the fundamental puzzles of epistemic logic. It provides a challenge to the knowability thesis, which states that every truth is, in principle, knowable. The paradox is that this assumption implies the omniscience principle, which asserts that every truth is known. Essentially, Fitch's paradox asserts that the existence of an unknown truth is unknowable. So if all truths were knowable, it would follow that all truths are in fact known.

The paradox is of concern for verificationist or anti-realist accounts of truth, for which the knowability thesis is very plausible,[1] but the omniscience principle is very implausible.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fitch%27s_paradox_of_knowability

Unknown unknowns are risks that come from situations that are so unexpected that they would not be considered.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_are_known_knowns

The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable :
the book discusses what can be done regarding “epistemic arrogance”, which occurs whenever people begin to think they know more than they actually do.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Black_Swan:_The_Impact_of_the_Highly_Improbable

Black Swan Wisdom :
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2010/12/02/black-swan-wisdom.html

Who said it was? What I said was, "A major feature of wisdom is to know what you don't know." Do you disagree with that assertion? — Gnomon

You also said this, which is what I responded to:

But to skeptical scientists and philosophers, and some poets, it does make a difference to know what is real and what is illusion. — Gnomon

My response was that my understanding of the claim being made is that we can't know what's real. If that's a misstatement of your position, let me know.

Regardless, though, to answer your question, I wouldn't we say a major feature of wisdom is to know what we don't know; I'd say it is to know that we don't know what is the case, or something or other. Knowledge is a matter of context. We can't know what we don't know, we simply know we don't know it. We can't know what cannot be known, however, which you seem to think is the real. It seems a very futile view of the world, to me.

One of the problems with this position--that we can't know what the real world is--is that it perpetuates the view reality is "out there." It treats us, or at least our minds, as something apart from and observing the world rather than as a part of the world and in constant interaction with its other constituents.

No two of them see the same thing. — tim wood

But they do, you know. They see exactly what they should see--the sunset. The fact that their position may make their view of it somewhat different than that of their neighbor is a matter of position. The fact that one of them is color blind and sees the sunset differently is a matter of the problem of color blindness. The fact the stars we see look like small points of light although they're huge, bright, burning spheres is a matter of distance. The fact we see as we do is a matter of being human as opposed to, for example, a murder hornet. There's nothing remarkable or mysterious about these things. But all is a part of the same reality.

But they do, you know. They see exactly what they should see--the sunset. — Ciceronianus the White

And of course there is no such thing as a sunset. I'll presume you're talking about the experience. If that, no argument, beyond observing what you observe, that the experiences themselves are all different and only by processes of abstraction and agreement is the phenomenon processed as an experience, and further shared as one.

But what is a sunset to the sun, or the horizon, or to the processes themselves that create it? Nothing more than a judgment of sorts attached to a cognitive asterism of unrelated objects.

And of course there is no such thing as a sunset. I'll presume you're talking about the experience. If that, no argument, beyond observing what you observe, that the experiences themselves are all different and only by processes of abstraction and agreement is the phenomenon processed as an experience, and further shared as one.

But what is a sunset to the sun, or the horizon, or to the processes themselves that create it? Nothing more than a judgment of sorts attached to a cognitive asterism of unrelated objects. — tim wood

I don't think we have within us a "thing" which is an experience of a sunset which has a separate existence, cutting us off from the rest of the world. Nor do I think experience is a result of abstraction or agreement. But if you're willing to say that when what we call the sun, through the earth's rotation, "sinks" below the horizon we experience a sunset, that's fine with me. If you mean to say that there is no sun, no earth, no horizon--or that what they "really" are is unknowable, then I believe we're at odds.

But to skeptical scientists and philosophers, and some poets, it does make a difference to know what is real and what is illusion. — Gnomon
My response was that my understanding of the claim being made is that we can't know what's real. If that's a misstatement of your position, let me know. — Ciceronianus the White

Do you really know what's real? My position is similar to that of Kant : our senses are probing the presumed reality outside our heads, but the picture we construct from those bits of data is a mind-made (subjective) representation (symbol), not the ultimate (objective) thing, as known to omniscience.

Hoffman is making a similar point, but using the metaphor of symbolic icons on a computer screen (interface). The philosophical problem here is to distinguish between Perception (one person's incomplete view of the world) and Conception (the seemingly complete model of reality constructed from incomplete information).

I am not confident that my world-model is an accurate depiction of Reality. That's one reason I dialog with people on this forum : to compare my subjective model with the variety of models held by other observers of Reality, in order to fill-in the gaps of my worldview. Some think that Matter is the ultimate Reality, while others think it's the immaterial Relations (invisible interconnections -- patterns) between things. "Which is real, and which illusion?" :nerd:

Ding an sich :
(in Kant's philosophy) a thing as it is in itself, not mediated through perception by the senses or conceptualization, and therefore unknowable.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself

Interface theory of perception :
Now, cognitive scientist Hoffman has produced an updated version of Kant’s controversial Occult Ontology. He uses the modern metaphor of computers that we “interface” (interact) with, as-if the symbolic Icons on the display screen are the actual things we want to act upon. For example, by clicking on a pixelated folder symbol, we emulate the physical act of locating and opening a manila folder with important documents. For our practical needs, such short-cuts are sufficient to get the job done. It’s not necessary for us to be aware of all the intricate details of internal computer processes. From his studies, he has concluded that our sensory perceptions have “almost surely evolved to hide reality. They just report fitness”. Even so, humans have also evolved another form of “perception” that we call “conception”. And that’s where the philosophical debates divide. Via conception, we can imagine things we can’t see, and we sometimes find those subjective “ideals” to be more important than the objectively real objects of the physical realm. That sometimes leads to Faith, in which we “believe in things unseen”.
http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page21.html

Example of incomplete model of reality : people had been seeing real ponds for thousands of years, but Leeuwenhoek's microscope revealed a formerly unseen miniature reality in a drop of pond water. Now, a few centuries later, our microscopes and particle smashers have revealed the almost unreal foundations of reality, in quantum models, not of atoms or sub-atomic particles, but of mathematical "fields" of Virtual or Potential particles. So, when you speak of reality, are you speaking from knowledge of the totality of Reality, or from your own custom-tailored representation of the Universe?


Thirty spokes share the wheel's hub; It is the center hole that makes it useful.
___Lao Tzu
Is the hole real?

One of the problems with this position--that we can't know what the real world is--is that it perpetuates the view reality is "out there." It treats us, or at least our minds, as something apart from and observing the world rather than as a part of the world and in constant interaction with its other constituents. — Ciceronianus the White

:up:

Do you really know what's real? My position is similar to that of Kant : our senses are probing the presumed reality outside our heads, but the picture we construct from those bits of data is a mind-made (subjective) representation (symbol), not the ultimate (objective) thing, as known to omniscience. — Gnomon

I think all knowledge is provisional, i.e. though based on the best evidence available, subject to revision as new evidence is discovered or obtained. Regarding the subject matter we're addressing, I think the best evidence is that we're living organisms which are part of a world, universe, environment--whatever you wish to call it. As such we interact with the world and our fellow creatures all the time. We're not outside the world looking in. What we think, what we experience, what we do or don't do, all take place in the world.

We don't know everything about the world of which we're a part. I think we have much to learn about it. But in our interaction with the rest of the world (or that portion of it we've encountered thus far) we've not merely seen, heard, touched its other constituents, we've measured them, we've eaten them, we've built with them, experimented on/with them; we have, in other words, tested and employed them, suffered from them, benefited from them, in various ways and what takes place when we do so is repeated time and again. To that extent, we know their qualities and characteristics. We have no reason to doubt that our cats and dogs or lawns or cars, etc., are in any significant sense different from what we believe them to be. We know quite well they are cats, dogs, etc., and not something "unknowable" or the product of an evil demon or a group of mischievous sprites or something else. When we have reason to doubt what we see, then we investigate, and learn.

Now one can say that we know only to the extent we can know as human beings. But that's a mere truism. Let's wait until we have a reason to believe a cat isn't a cat to ponder what it "really" is or whether we can know that it's not "really" some kind of thing or creature that merely appears to us to be a cat, doing what cats do.

I think all knowledge is provisional, — Ciceronianus the White

We know quite well they are cats, dogs, etc., and not something "unknowable" — Ciceronianus the White

The point is not whether you know what you know, but how it's grounded, or more exactly what grounds it. If nothing, then no knowledge. If something, then knowledge. So, what is the something?

Subject to correction, I believe Hume asked but couldn't answer, and Kant answered. If I may be permitted a paraphrase, if Kant denied knowledge to make room for faith, then we might also say (which to my knowledge he never said) that he denied the world to make room for knowledge. And again, it's not that it works or how it works, but what makes it work.

The pre-Kantian view, roughly, was that if nature is a product of mind, then the world itself is never known. If on the other hand, we directly apprehend the world, then all we have is its habits, but never its laws, being in this latter case like your cat who notes that your presence in the kitchen can result in food, but has no knowledge of the how or why of it, just the habit of it.

Kant of course made room for reason, with which the mind assembles the world. But that is the mind/reason-assembled world, about which the claim of knowledge is grounded in reason. But at the same time obviously not grounded knowledge of the world itself at all. For that I will allow we have "practical" knowledge - the knowledge of cats and dogs - based in memory of things that happen habitually. Claim and believe what you like, can you improve on Kant?

We're not outside the world looking in. What we think, what we experience, what we do or don't do, all take place in the world. — Ciceronianus the White

I think you are over-reacting to presumed implications of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, which was not a denial of a real world, or affirmation of a heavenly realm, but a critique of the limits of human Reason. And his Idealism is not necessarily supporting traditional Religious or Spiritualist worldviews, Descartes also seemed to acknowledge our ability to deceive ourselves -- or to be deceived by a hypothetical demon -- about reality, in his "cogito ergo sum" expression : all I know for sure is the contents of my own mind. In that sense, Reality transcends my abbreviated and subjective world model. You may not go so far as Plato, to imagine an Ideal world from which our reasoning abstracts it's own version of Reality. But for scientific purposes, it's necessary to accept the limitations on our ability to know and to model Reality. :cool:

Kant’s Transcendental Idealism :
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that space and time are merely formal features of how we perceive objects, not things in themselves that exist independently of us, or properties or relations among them. Objects in space and time are said to be “appearances”, and he argues that we know nothing of substance about the things in themselves of which they are appearances. Kant calls this doctrine (or set of doctrines) “transcendental idealism”, and ever since the publication of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, Kant’s readers have wondered, and debated, what exactly transcendental idealism is, and have developed quite different interpretations. Some, including many of Kant’s contemporaries, interpret transcendental idealism as essentially a form of phenomenalism, similar in some respects to that of Berkeley, while others think that it is not a metaphysical or ontological theory at all. There is probably no major interpretive question in Kant’s philosophy on which there is so little consensus
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental-idealism/

Kant’s Philosophy of Religion :
Kant has long been seen as hostile to religion. Many of his contemporaries, ranging from his students to the Prussian authorities, saw his Critical project as inimical to traditional Christianity.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/

Kant’s Philosophy of Religion :
Kant has long been seen as hostile to religion. Many of his contemporaries, ranging from his students to the Prussian authorities, saw his Critical project as inimical to traditional Christianity.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/ — Gnomon

And just here a mini-lesson in the dangers of reading and relying on secondary sources, and even more on quoting excerpts.

This a partial remedy, form the same reference:
"Within Kant’s Critical period, not only do we find powerful defenses of religious belief in all three Critiques {1781, 1788, 1790}, but a considerable share of Kant’s work in the 1790s is also devoted to the positive side of his philosophy of religion. This includes his 1791 “Theodicy” essay, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), “The End of All Things” (1794), and the Conflict of the Faculties (1798). Moreover, his lectures on logic, Reflexionen and the Jäsche Logic present a robust account of the nature of religious belief/faith [Glaube]. So, while Kant does deny the possibility of religious knowledge (as well as opinion), he characterizes this denial as necessary to safeguard faith, which he endorses as the proper mode of religious assent. One must, therefore, understand the negative elements in his philosophy of religion, such as his infamous objections to the traditional proofs for God’s existence, in this context. As stated in the B-Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, a central goal of the Critical project is to establish the limits to knowledge “in order to make room for faith”"

Claim and believe what you like, can you improve on Kant? — tim wood

I can ask what the "cat-in-itself" in this case is supposed to be, and if the only answer given is that it's something different from the cat but cannot be known or described, I can ask why it is that I should accept as "real" that which cannot be known or described. I can also wonder whether the "thing in itself" is a thing at all, and what it adds to our view of the world.

but a critique of the limits of human Reason. — Gnomon

There certainly are limits to human reason, but to claim the real is forever beyond our knowledge seems, to me, excessive, and unjustified.

All right. How do you know its a cat?

How do you know its a cat? — tim wood

Are you going to say something about our senses deceiving us, or being unreliable? If so, then if I say I've known many cats over the years, and know generally how they behave, that the cat has all the characteristics of Felis Catus, that he's been my cat for about 17 years, etc., uses the litter box, purs, meows, chirps, yowls, wakes me at odd hours by tapping my nose or knocking things off the nightstand or dresser, sleeps a great deal, it won't matter, I assume.

C'mon, you're a wicked smaht guy. You have got to know better than this. Senses deceiving us, being unreliable? When in the history of planet earth did that ever happen? And the question, again, not if it's a cat, but the how of the knowing it. Or, that is, in the way of scientific inquiry, what grounds your claim of knowledge?

Ultimately, reason tells us it's so. Which reason could not do, unless itself used. But if reason a constituting part of knowledge, then without reason, no knowledge. And I'm just repeating myself. If you can give an account of knowledge without use of reason, go for it. I myself can illustrate my own point with examples, but an insult to your intelligence, imo, to use them. And this has nothing whatever to do with any beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, the which, were it knowledge, would need neither.

:up:

Claim and believe what you like, can you improve on Kant? — tim wood

I think so: e.g. Schopenhauer ... Peirce-Dewey ... Wittgenstein ... Popper ... Meillassoux-Brassier ... Spinoza.

I don't understand, sorry. Is reasoning or scientific inquiry required to understand how I know that what's before me is a cat? I confess I've never before been called upon to describe the process involved.

The fact is, like Dewey, I don't think we reason, or engage in scientific inquiry, or even think unless we encounter a problem or experience doubt which we want to resolve. A cat presents no such problem or reason to doubt. There's no reflective process involved. There doesn't have to be.

I don't think we reason (...) unless we encounter a problem (...). — Ciceronianus the White

Then what would inform us there isn’t? What would encountering a problem be compared to?

Our cat sitting on the floor presents no problems to solve, creates no doubts that plague us, no needs to be satisfied, no questions to answer, no reason to think.

,

Tinker to Evers to Chance? Spahn and Sain and pray for rain? Combs Koenig Ruth Gehrig Meussel Lazzeri? Matthew Mark Luke John?

Be good enough to pick one of yours and in a sentence or however many as necessary show the improvement on Kant. All of mine are better than Kant, but not any improvement on him.