I cannot tell who you are shadow boxing with.
Gonzales saying: "the form cannot be expressed in language" does not appear to support Socrates' effort to distinguish the dialectic from mere argument:

[454A] “Oh Glaucon,” I said, “what a noble power the debater’s art has.” “Why in particular?” “Because many people even seem to me to fall into it unwillingly,” I said, “and imagine they’re not being contentious but having a conversation, because they’re not able to examine something that’s being said by making distinctions according to forms, but pounce on the contradiction in what’s been said according to a mere word, subjecting one another to contention and not conversation.”
“That is exactly the experience of many people,” he said, “but that surely doesn’t apply to us in the present circumstance, does it?” [454B] “It does absolutely,” I said. “At any rate, we’re running the risk of engaging in debate unintentionally.” — Plato, Republic 454a, translated by Joe Sachs

Gonzales also appears to be no friend of Plotinus who links the generation of creatures to contemplation through forms:

Generation is a contemplation. It results from the longing of pregnancy to produce a multiplicity of forms and objects of contemplation. Begetting means to produce some form; and this means to spread contemplation everywhere. All the faults met with in the begotten things or in actions are due to the fact that one did stray from the object of one's contemplation. The poor workman resembles the producer of bad forms. Also lovers must be counted as those who contemplate and pursue forms. — Plotinus, Ennead III, viii, translated by Joseph Katz

I cannot tell who you are shadow boxing with. — Valentinus

“Shadow boxing”? I wasn’t aware that there was anyone to shadow box with. Perhaps you know more than I do.

Gonzales saying: "the form cannot be expressed in language" does not appear to support Socrates' effort to distinguish the dialectic from mere argument — Valentinus

I think what Gonzales says with regard to Forms and Aristotle’s interpretation of them is quite clear. And if Socrates says that it would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse to tell what the form of the soul is, and he describes it only by comparing it with a charioteer and winged horses then, presumably, the Forms are even more difficult to describe. Moreover, the point is that the Forms are to be “seen” or “grasped with the eye of the soul”. Language can at the most stimulate the soul’s recollection of the Forms.

Gonzales also appears to be no friend of Plotinus who links the generation of creatures to contemplation through forms — Valentinus

Well, it appears to me that people have the right to be or not to be friend of Plotinus. I don’t agree with everything that Plotinus says either.

I think that what you are getting at in the first part is two-fold. One, do not make the all to common mistake of thinking that argument and philosophy are the same. Second, and this becomes clear when considering the passage from the Phaedrus where Socrates admits he cannot give an account of what the soul really is. Socrates regarded the inability to give an account as an indication that one lacks knowledge, as can be seen for example when he interrogates the poets in the Apology. His main contention with the poets in several of the dialogues is their inability to distinguish a likeness from what it is a likeness of. Any yet here in the Phaedo, instead of saying what the soul is, he presents a likeness. How are we to know that it is a true likeness without knowledge of the thing itself? We are left with a dispute of words.

If what is being talked about is indescribable then the only sensible thing to do is to remain silent. Ironically, those who proclaim indescribable truths are those who have the most to say, although they do become silent when asked how they know about such things as the immortality of the soul and Forms, thinks that cannot be said but only seen. The contradict themselves by retreating and quoting things that are said.

Socrates himself prior to admitting that he cannot give an account of the soul presents an argument for the immortality of the soul:

First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows: Every soul is immortal.(245c)

.

He cannot say what the soul is but argues that the truth is it is immortal. It is a physical argument based on motion. He goes on to say that a living being, compounded of soul and body is mortal. (246c) We are mortal beings. Some may believe stories about things we have no knowledge of, but they are for us images that we cannot measure against a purported reality. Where Plato points to the limits of our knowledge some mistakenly think he is pointing beyond them.

“Shadow boxing”? I wasn’t aware that there was anyone to shadow box with. Perhaps you know more than I do. — Apollodorus

I was the referring to the indefinite identities of the following:

The problem tends to be compounded by some readers’ attempt to interpret Plato through Aristotle who erroneously interprets Plato’s Forms, for example, through his own categories. Thus “scholars” conclude that Plato’s statements are “ambiguous”, “unclear”, “contradictory” or “confused”. — Apollodorus

And then there are the committed anti-Platonists who deliberately use Aristotle to demonstrate the “inconsistency” and “incoherence” of a “Theory of Forms” that they choose to attribute to Plato but that simply does not exist in the dialogues in the form they claim it does .... — Apollodorus

I think what Gonzales says with regard to Forms and Aristotle’s interpretation of them is quite clear. — Apollodorus

I am not having trouble understanding the statement. I don't know who he is boxing with either so I am not in a position to evaluate his argument in the context it was given. But the problem of describing the forms as they really are is one thing. Having that be the reason "that Plato must shift back and forth between treating Forms "as a universal and treating it as an instance" is another. I brought up examples that do not fit with the idea of keeping the two activities in separate places.

Perhaps you can present his argument with more definition.

You choose the idea and opinions out of the suite of those culturally available to you that seem to fit best with your lived experience. — Janus

What a strange idea of "thinking for yourself".

I think "thinking for yourself" is about epistemic autonomy, ie. being autonomous in how one knows/believes one knows things. Like I said already, it's epistemic autonomy that is questionable.

Relative novelty of one's ideas isn't the measure of "thinking for yourself" (although this is how it is often understood in popular discourse).

Nope, Apollodorus does not say that "acknowledgement of doubt and uncertainty can lead to schizoaffective disorder". It is not the acknowledgment but giving in to doubt and uncertainty, especially when coupled with Straussian esotericism, that can open the trapdoor leading to schizoaffective or delusional disorder. Two totally different things IMO. — Apollodorus

Thank you for the correction.

The problem is that those external points of reference are often hostile to us, and we have to find a way to rely on and trust people who, at the very least, don't care if we live or die.
— baker

Sure. This is what we have intelligence, wisdom, and discernment for.

That's just it: In order to become religious/spiritual, one has to kick one's intelligence, wisdom, and discernment to the curb, on account that they are inferior, not suitable for religion/spirituality.

What do you consider a classical education and at what age? — Tom Storm

A thorough awareness of European cultural history from primary education on and upwards.
Literature used to be taught in a temporal linear manner starting with the ancient Greeks. By college, one is supposed to understand various references to Homer, Ovidius, etc. Also, being at least fluent in Latin and some Greek.

This is made easier when one lives in a place where it takes a short drive and one arrives at an ancient archeological site. I myself live in a town where I have a 5' drive to the remains of an ancient Roman settlement. The locals perform dress-ups and do reenactments of ancient living. Granted, this now is more of a tourist attraction aimed at making money; still, it's built on a tradition of knowing things about the past that took place on this territory.

Perhaps you can present his argument with more definition. — Valentinus

My post was in response to @Wayfarer's comment regarding Nirvana not being "navigated, understood, comprehended, by conceptual means."

The same is true of metaphysical realities such as Plato's Forms referred to by Gonzales:

It is precisely because a form is neither a subject nor a predicate that we cannot speak of it as simply one or the other but must, if we are to speak at all, treat it as both. it is thus our very language that leads us to regard beauty both as a property and as something that has this property. Many scholars see Plato as not always, or even ever, clearly distinguishing between being a property and having a property

In other words, language has obvious limitations when it comes to metaphysical realities that are supposed to be experienced, not talked about. This is why Socrates emphasizes the fact that those higher realities are "like the soul" and can be experienced only when the soul dissociates itself from the physical body and perception-based thought and contemplates the realities "alone by itself." This is the point where the mind's contemplative faculty, the nous, takes over from language and discursive thought, and leads the philosopher to a direct experience of the realities in question.

:up:

I think that what you are getting at in the first part is two-fold. One, do not make the all to common mistake of thinking that argument and philosophy are the same. — Fooloso4

People who know, do not need the Dialectic. Socrates' rebuke of Glaucon, observing that we can leave that process "unintentionally" and become mere debaters, recognizes a vigilance that each must maintain for themselves. The perception of the sincere desire to know in the interlocutor is impossible unless the quality is alive for oneself. But the ways to check oneself and others is not only a matter of goodwill. Each conversation has its own life. The need to work through issues as they are raised requires different distinctions at different times. We can move closer to the truth by proceeding this way even if we are still ignorant by the measure of what is sought.

Where Plato points to the limits of our knowledge some mistakenly think he is pointing beyond them. — Fooloso4

I think of the different readings of Plato in a smaller circle of comparison. Either the various and quite different approaches seen in the Dialogues were necessary in view of what Plato was attempting or they were episodes of pretense. If he could have written it all down like a system in the fashion of Proclus, the whole process of the Dialogues is a sham.

That view is echoed in Plotinus regarding the contemplation of the One.
He also used the same theory to explain the creation of the physical world in the fashion of the Timaeus.
I don't think he was offering the items à la carte.

Philosophy in antiquity was not learned from books, but from a living teacher. There were philosophy schools and groups formed around a teacher, that were accessible to anyone with an interest, especially in the Greek-speaking parts of Europe and the Mid East.

The way I see it, Plato's works provide a number of general guidelines, not a system of water-tight theories, for the simple reason that any unclear matters would have been clarified in conversation with the teacher of your particular school. It was a living tradition based on personal practice and experience, not an academic endeavor in the modern sense.

In any case, as pointed out by Gonzales and others, Plato must be read within his own framework. If we apply Aristotelian categories and ontology to Plato, then we are reading not Plato but Aristotle's interpretation of him. Even if do take some material from Aristotle, as later Platonists sometimes do, it has to be consistent with Plato's own framework.

Where am I applying Aristotle's categories to Plato? My previous efforts on this thread were attempts to see them differently.

When you say: "Plato must be read within his own framework," is Plotinus excluded from that condition?

It was a living tradition based on personal practice and experience, not an academic endeavor in the modern sense. — Apollodorus

Socrates was killed for talking in public about his ideas.
Maybe there was a tradition of training involved that was kept secret. If so, the secret is still hidden from view.
Plato formed an academy, in the ancient sense, if you will.
I don't recognize any of my comments in your reply. Perhaps you are talking to someone else.

What a strange idea of "thinking for yourself".

I think "thinking for yourself" is about epistemic autonomy, ie. being autonomous in how one knows/believes one knows things. Like I said already, it's epistemic autonomy that is questionable.

Relative novelty of one's ideas isn't the measure of "thinking for yourself" (although this is how it is often understood in popular discourse). — baker

I'd say this is far stranger. Firstly what could being autonomous in how one knows/ believes one knows things even mean? Are you suggesting the enlightened sage is or could be epistemically autonomous? You seem to have been disagreeing with my arguments that the enlightened person cannot rationally know that she knows whatever she thinks she knows, no matter how convinced she may be that she does, and yet here you say that epistemic autonomy is questionable. So, I can only guess you must mean something else.

I haven't said that relative novelty of one's ideas is the measure of "thinking for yourself" although having novel ideas might be an example of thinking for oneself.

As I said before in my view thinking for yourself is just thinking what seems to be in best accordance with and evidenced by your own experience, understanding and rational assessment rather than thinking something because some authority told you it was so without providing any empirical evidence or rational argument to back up their assertion.

So, if the purportedly enlightened sage tells you that there is an afterlife, and you say how do you know that and they say 'I just know', or 'I remember my past lives', you would be warranted in being skeptical about such a claim. That would be thinking for yourself. If you accepted the claim, and henceforth believed it yourself because you believed the person was enlightened and must know the truth, that would not be thinking for yourself.

I'd say this is far stranger. Firstly what could being autonomous in how one knows/ believes one knows things even mean? — Janus

Believing one is epistemically independent of other people.

You seem to have been disagreeing with my arguments that the enlightened person cannot rationally know that she knows whatever she thinks she knows, no matter how convinced she may be that she does, and yet here you say that epistemic autonomy is questionable. So, I can only guess you must mean something else.

Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy

Epistemic Dependence

As I said before in my view thinking for yourself is just thinking what seems to be in best accordance with and evidenced by your own experience, understanding and rational assessment

Okay for now.

rather than thinking something because some authority told you it was so without providing any empirical evidence or rational argument to back up their assertion.

I seriously doubt anyone ever believes things the way you describe here. That's a caricature.

I think that when people believe experts and authorities, this has more to do with social dynamics and, to some extent, belief economy, rather than some "blind trust" or "not thinking for yourself".

So, if the purportedly enlightened sage tells you that there is an afterlife, and you say how do you know that and they say 'I just know', or 'I remember my past lives', you would be warranted in being skeptical about such a claim. That would be thinking for yourself. If you accepted the claim, and henceforth believed it yourself because you believed the person was enlightened and must know the truth, that would not be thinking for yourself.

Except that I would not ask the sage "How do you know?" anymore. There was a time in the past when I would, but not anymore. And no, this doesn't mean that I now accept their claims. It's that I contextualize the whole matter entirely differently. Namely, I don't see the declarations of a "sage" as being some kind of opening for a discussion and dialogue.

Maybe there was a tradition of training involved that was kept secret. If so, the secret is still hidden from view. — Valentinus

I think there must have been some form of training as this was the whole purpose of a school.

I am talking about what we find in the dialogues.

People who know, do not need the Dialectic. — Valentinus

Some think that dialectic is a method that leads to knowledge of the Forms. But how can someone know this unless they have completed the journey? That it does is something we are told not something we have experienced. It is a matter of opinion. Dialectic leads to knowledge of our ignorance. It leads us to see that philosophical inquiry leads to aporia.

There is a tension in Plato where he both points beyond us and points in the opposite direction to us, to self-knowledge as fundamental. The risk of the former is the neglect of the latter. The former is an activity of the imagination, the latter of truth about oneself. The flights of the former do not encounter resistance, the work of the latter must overcome self-resistance.

I think of the different readings of Plato in a smaller circle of comparison. Either the various and quite different approaches seen in the Dialogues were necessary in view of what Plato was attempting or they were episodes of pretense. If he could have written it all down like a system in the fashion of Proclus, the whole process of the Dialogues is a sham. — Valentinus

This raises several issues. If the whole is singular it seems reasonable to think there should be a single logos. But we do find these different approaches in the dialogues that address different aspects of the whole. Each, by bringing something to light occludes issues that come to light in another. None, however, either separately or all together, are comprehensive. Any speech of the whole must include us, the speaker. Our inability, the inability of the part, to give a comprehensive account of the whole says something not only about us but about the whole of which we are a part.

Some think that dialectic is a method that leads to knowledge of the Forms. But how can someone know this unless they have completed the journey? That it does is something we are told not something we have experienced. It is a matter of opinion. — Fooloso4

The problem of learning what you do not know is discussed in the Meno. I remember a class from long ago when the dialectic was argued by some to be a method of knowledge of the Forms themselves. The wily old professor said: "Well, Parmenides went to great lengths to question the existence of the Forms but, after all that, decided that we have to use them, despite those problems, in order to distinguish this from this and that from that." It doesn't sound like we will be getting tans outside the cave any time soon.

Dialectic leads to knowledge of our ignorance. It leads us to see that philosophical inquiry leads to aporia. — Fooloso4

The inquiry does lead to aporia. That doesn't mean we must start from zero every time. Debates are like wrestling matches. Whatever worked as a technique in one match is not a starting place for another. The desire for victory is stronger than the love of knowledge. Returning to a conversation that has undergone the rigors of the dialectic in order to form better opinions can be a starting place for a new conversation.

This raises several issues. If the whole is singular it seems reasonable to think there should be a single logos. But we do find these different approaches in the dialogues that address different aspects of the whole. Each, by bringing something to light occludes issues that come to light in another. None, however, either separately or all together, are comprehensive. Any speech of the whole must include us, the speaker. Our inability, the inability of the part, to give a comprehensive account of the whole says something not only about us but about the whole of which we are a part. — Fooloso4

I agree with that approach wholeheartedly.
So much so that I am uncertain about what counts as divine or not within it. Thus my previous concerns about comparing different models.

It doesn't sound like we will be getting tans outside the cave any time soon. — Valentinus

It is very often the case that readers mistake the images Plato creates on the cave wall for their escape from the cave.

Returning to a conversation that has undergone the rigors of the dialectic in order to form better opinions can be a starting place for a new conversation. — Valentinus

Good point. Dialectic is mutually beneficial. Sooner or later, however, we have to address the claim that we can use hypothesis to free ourselves from hypothesis.

So much so that I am uncertain about what counts as divine or not within it. Thus my previous concerns about comparing different models. — Valentinus

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)

In addition to the question of what counts as divine with it there is the question of whether there is anything divine outside of the whole. Or if the whole is itself divine.

I think that when people believe experts and authorities, this has more to do with social dynamics and, to some extent, belief economy, rather than some "blind trust" or "not thinking for yourself". — baker

When people believe experts and authorities in various fields it is because they trust that those expert's expertise has been rigorously tested and demonstrated, and could be retested and redemonstrated if needs be. The same does not apply with sages and gurus. There is no way to rigorously and without bias test their purported expertise, even in principle, let alone practice.

Except that I would not ask the sage "How do you know?" anymore. There was a time in the past when I would, but not anymore. And no, this doesn't mean that I now accept their claims. It's that I contextualize the whole matter entirely differently. Namely, I don't see the declarations of a "sage" as being some kind of opening for a discussion and dialogue. — baker

I actually agree with this. The declarations of a self-styled sage are meant to be followed devotedly by aspirants without question.There is no room for discussion and dialogue in such institutions. I know this because I have participated in several in the past.In one way there's a good reason for this; you are not there to have a philosophical discussion; you are there to learn how to change your consciousness, and I have no argument with that aim at all as such.

But I know what kinds of cultures of gullible mythologizing actually arise around cult leaders and gurus of all kinds; the same kinds of lamentable human dynamics play out everywhere. People happily relinquishing their capacities to think for themselves; listening to the oracular voice of the "master" and believing every word; it's just sad in my view.

the human is a way in which the Universe comes to realise its own nature. — Wayfarer

:up: Resonates with me at a deep level although I don't fancy myself as capable of contributing to the effort. I hope someone in my lifetime, what's left of it, has that Eureka moment ASAP and then...

:grin: :up:

When people believe experts and authorities in various fields it is because they trust that those expert's expertise has been rigorously tested and demonstrated, and could be retested and redemonstrated if needs be. — Janus

It's not clear this is the case. Ideally, it should be the case, but I don't think it is, or only rarely. It seems that most people who believe experts and authorities in various fields don't even have a concept of "rigorously testing and demonstrating". Instead, their believing the experts and authorities is, essentially, a fallacious argumentum ab auctoritate.

The same does not apply with sages and gurus. There is no way to rigorously and without bias test their purported expertise, even in principle, let alone practice.

You cannot "rigorously and without bias test the purported expertise" of scientists either. You don't have the resources, you don't have the data, you don't have the access, and they sure as hell aren't going to do it for you.

But I know what kinds of cultures of gullible mythologizing actually arise around cult leaders and gurus of all kinds; the same kinds of lamentable human dynamics play out everywhere. People happily relinquishing their capacities to think for themselves; listening to the oracular voice of the "master" and believing every word; it's just sad in my view.

There's no guarantee that "thinking for yourself" will make you happy and successful either.

Resonates with me at a deep level although I don't fancy myself as capable of contributing to the effort. I hope someone in my lifetime, what's left of it, has that Eureka moment ASAP and then... — TheMadFool

We're contributing to the average. Wisdom is simply an awareness of ones own ignorance. Chances are fairly good plenty of eureka moments have come and gone with no one noticing. I just hope to recognize a good idea when I hear one.

It's not clear this is the case. Ideally, it should be the case, but I don't think it is, or only rarely. It seems that most people who believe experts and authorities in various fields don't even have a concept of "rigorously testing and demonstrating". Instead, their believing the experts and authorities is, essentially, a fallacious argumentum ab auctoritate. — baker

Sure many people simply believe what they read. The point was that people who think for themselves, and are honest enough to realize their own inadequate expertise to make experientially and intellectually informed judgements in specialized fields realize that the best place to put trust is on those whose expertise is demonstrable due to having been rigorously testing during their education and ongoing work in the field. Doesn't mean they are infallible, but expert consensus is the best we have.

You cannot "rigorously and without bias test the purported expertise" of scientists either. You don't have the resources, you don't have the data, you don't have the access, and they sure as hell aren't going to do it for you. — baker

I can't personally do it, obviously. But that is what the peer review system is for. The science community as a whole can be trusted on judgements that they have arrived at a broad consensus on. We can trust them, because within the community of expertise errors should be exposed, at least over time. We should trust the experts, simply because we have nothing else to go on when it comes to making judgements in fields where we have little or no expertise.

What's the alternative? Trust no one?

There's no guarantee that "thinking for yourself" will make you happy and successful either. — baker

Did I ever say it was? Did I say that we all ought to think for ourselves because that will make us happy and successful? All along I've acknowledged that some people don't have the capacity or the desire to think for themselves. They are probably happier and less troubled if they don't.

Such people should keep away from philosophy, because studying that would only lead them to question everything, that is would only lead them to think for themselves; which would make them unhappy if they don't want to do that. On the other hand if someone wants to question everything and think for themselves, they will be obviously happier if they do that, no?

Such people should keep away from philosophy, because studying that would only lead them to question everything, that is would only lead them to think for themselves — Janus

There is a split that goes back at least as far as Plato. On the one hand, Socrates' human wisdom is his knowledge of his ignorance, and, on the other, the philosopher-king who possesses divine wisdom.

Those who read philosophy typically stand on one or the other side of this divine - those for whom philosophy is a matter of inquiry and those for whom philosophy provides answers; those who think for themselves and those who are told what to think and believe.

In a world ruled by opinion, the task of the philosopher is twofold. On the one hand to provide necessary, useful, and salutary opinions, and, on the other, to lead those who are not satisfied with opinion to think for themselves. The road to the latter, however, is by way of the former. All along the way one must ask if this or that is something one knows and how it is that they know it.

I think there must have been some form of training as this was the whole purpose of a school. — Apollodorus

The purpose of Plato's academy certainly was about training thinkers. It was a specifically discursive endeavor with the express goal of improving discourse. Perhaps it included an esoteric element of instruction as you described here::

This is the point where the mind's contemplative faculty, the nous, takes over from language and discursive thought, and leads the philosopher to a direct experience of the realities in question. — Apollodorus

But it is difficult to perceive the school that stands at the center of the City as serving an entirely personal experience. The rigor of rational thought practiced in such schools is at odds with your description given here:

The way I see it, Plato's works provide a number of general guidelines, not a system of water-tight theories, for the simple reason that any unclear matters would have been clarified in conversation with the teacher of your particular school. It was a living tradition based on personal practice and experience, not an academic endeavor in the modern sense. — Apollodorus

One thing that puzzles me about this last statement is that it doesn't square with your efforts in other places to see Plato presenting a unified theory of the soul.

One thing that puzzles me about this last statement is that it doesn't square with your efforts in other places to see Plato presenting a unified theory of the soul. — Valentinus

It also does not square with the dialogues. The dialogues do not clarify themselves in conversation.

The leap from language and discursive thought to direct experience is the very thing that is ignored. Although such an experience can be imagined, we should not make the mistake of imagining that it is our own experience.

One thing that puzzles me about this last statement is that it doesn't square with your efforts in other places to see Plato presenting a unified theory of the soul. — Valentinus

Well, maybe some people are in a perpetual state of puzzlement, which is why they seem so attached to the word "aporia". :smile:

Personally, I prefer to read Plato's dialogues at face value first and then see if anything else may be inferred from them that does not appear to be there on first sight.

For example:

But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we receive our reward, as the victors in the games go about to gather in theirs. And thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, we shall fare well (Rep. 621c-d).

To me, this suggests belief in the soul of the kind that would have been quite widespread in 4th-century BC Greek society. And I see no indication whatsoever that Plato intends the reader to disbelieve that statement.

As regards "theories", we call them that because it has become customary practice, not because Plato himself employed that term.

And because Platonism is a practical system, things like "soul" and "Forms" are to be known or experienced personally, through reason and contemplation. The accounts or arguments relating to them serve as pointers or reminders, which is logical if we consider that the soul is real and that it is supposed to have previous knowledge of the Forms.

In contrast, the assumption that Plato spent all his life writing books, and even founded a school, for no other purpose than to preach ignorance and "aporia", seems rather unfounded and far-fetched to me.