Nicely encapsulated: I agree with what you say here.

In contrast, the assumption that Plato spent all his life writing books, and even founded a school, for no other purpose than to preach ignorance and "aporia", seems rather unfounded and far-fetched to me. — Apollodorus

I don't get any images in my mind when I say "preach ignorance and aporia" out loud. It sounds like a kind of surrender; a reason to stop trying to do something. Socrates did not exemplify a retreat from what is difficult to understand. Did Plato set up a school to learn what wasn't known or tell everybody about what he had found out?

It seems like you want to cast the limits of our understanding, that Plato brings to our attention, to be actually some sort of catechism to something else. That is unfounded and far-fetched.

The leap from language and discursive thought to direct experience is the very thing that is ignored. Although such an experience can be imagined, we should not make the mistake of imagining that it is our own experience. — Fooloso4

Who do you have in mind when you say 'our own experience'? Why is it not possible for 'us' to have such experiences? What prevents it?

There's a author and teacher in the US, Pierre Grimes, who used to offer a class he called 'philosophical midwifery', which was a form of therapy based on Plato's Theaetetus. I think he's probably very old now if indeed he hasn't died, from what I can discern, I don't know if he was ever very well known. There's a brief biographical entry of him here. Anyone here have any knowledge of him?

Also while searching for info on him, I found an article on philosophical counselling.

It seems like you want to cast the limits of our understanding, that Plato brings to our attention, to be actually some sort of catechism to something else. — Valentinus

Not at all. On the contrary, it seems like some people choose to deny Plato's statements and replace everything with spurious claims of "ignorance" and "aporia".

What exactly is the purpose of writing a book - actually, lots of books - that teaches that there are some things that we don't know. Don't we know that already???

Besides, my views are supported by the text of the dialogues and by a very long Platonist tradition and to my knowledge they are mainstream. And I haven't seen any evidence here that Plato teaches atheism, skepticism, and nihilism.

If the text says "the soul is immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says that?

You have gone back to characterizing other peoples' views in place of defending your own.

Why would I need to defend what the text says?

I think it is for the anti-Platonists to show that the text doesn't say what it says.

But you can't do that hence you profess "aporia" and insist that this is all that Plato has to say ....

But you can't do that hence you profess "aporia" and insist that this is all that Plato has to say .... — Apollodorus

I never said anything of the kind. You are a Sophist.

I never said anything of the kind. — Valentinus

Really? What about statements like this one:

The inquiry does lead to aporia. — Valentinus

If philosophical inquiry "leads to aporia," then what is the point in philosophical inquiry?

And you are not answering my question. If the text says "the soul turns out to be immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says this?

Time to mention the 'forgotten wisdom' thesis again. See Huston Smith's 1976 book, Forgotten Truth. He proposes that there is an hierarchy of being, the higher being the origin and ultimate destiny of all beings, the lower being the material and sensory domain. This is depicted in countless forms in traditional literature, art and religion, principally as the 'great chain of being'.

Some vestiges of this understanding are visible in 17th century philosophy - 'most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.'

There are also vestiges of it in German idealism, which inherited the outlines of these conceptions from medieval theology (per Dermot Moran's writings on Eriugena.) But generally speaking, since the rejection of idealism at the beginning of the 20th century, there is nothing remaining of it in analytical and anglo-american philosophy.

Smith says (and I concur) that scientific materialism - not science itself but the belief-system purportedly based on it - is a degradation of the mainstream philosophical tradition.

But at the same time, whatever philosophy we have, has to be able to accomodate the genuinely novel discoveries of science since the 17th century. So we have to thread the needle between the two extremes of dogmatic belief systems on the one hand, and scientific materialism on the other.

But you can't do that hence you profess "aporia" and insist that this is all that Plato has to say — Apollodorus

Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia is not equivalent to stating that the purpose of it has been cancelled. So when you say that I am claiming that "I insist that this is all that Plato has to say", that is a limit you have applied to yourself, not an accurate description of my view. The words you put in my mouth are not very interesting.

Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia is not equivalent to stating that the purpose of it has been cancelled. — Valentinus

Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia does not constitute proof that Plato's statements are not in the dialogue or that he preaches atheism, skepticism, and nihilism, does it?

It is not a matter of something preventing it, it is simply that you and I and others here have not had an experience of being dead.

In contrast, the assumption that Plato spent all his life writing books, and even founded a school, for no other purpose than to preach ignorance and "aporia", seems rather unfounded and far-fetched to me. — Apollodorus

It is quite revealing that you think what Plato is doing is preaching anything at all.

It is not a matter of something preventing it, it is simply that you and I and others here have not had an experience of being dead. — Fooloso4

'Dead' is also a metaphorical expression. From an essay on the Catholic philosopher, Josef Pieper:

Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they must be conformed to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have, he writes on one occasion, “lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity.” That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. The full transformation of character that we need will, in fact, finally require the virtues of faith, hope, and love. And this transformation will not necessarily—perhaps not often—be experienced by us as easy or painless. Hence the transformation of self that we must—by God’s grace—undergo “perhaps resembles passing through something akin to dying.”

It is quite revealing that you think what Plato is doing is preaching anything at all. — Fooloso4

Don't you think it's also revealing that you wish to dissociate Plato from anything religious whatever?

Max Weber wrote of the disenchantment of the world, the cultural rationalization and devaluation of religion apparent in modern society. Your posts reflect that. In saying any of this, I'm not seeking to convert, but I am seeking to draw out some of the cultural dynamics beneath the surface.

But at the same time, whatever philosophy we have, has to be able to accomodate the genuinely novel discoveries of science since the 17th century. So we have to thread the needle between the two extremes of dogmatic belief systems on the one hand, and scientific materialism on the other. — Wayfarer

As a general principle, yes. However, when the materialists insist on denying that Plato makes antimaterialist statements in his dialogues, then it is unclear how their claims can be accommodated.

The issue is, a thorough-going secular philosophy has no imaginative domain which corresponds with 'the mystical'. In a secular system, 'the mystical' is synonymous with nothing, nonsense, non-being, it's a placeholder or a frightening vacuum which the gullible seek to fill with religious beliefs.

Don't you think it's also revealing that you wish to dissociate Plato from anything religious whatever? — Wayfarer

I am speaking specifically about such things as the experience of being dead and the transcendent experience of seeing the unchanging Forms.

a thorough-going secular philosophy has no imaginative domain which corresponds with 'the mystical'. — Wayfarer

As I see it, the problem is when what is imagined is taken for what is. Plato distinguishes between truth and imagination, dreams and reality. What do you know of an imaginative domain other than what you imagine it might be?

The issue is, a thorough-going secular philosophy has no imaginative domain which corresponds with 'the mystical'. In a secular system, 'the mystical' is synonymous with nothing, nonsense, non-being, it's a placeholder or a frightening vacuum which the gullible seek to fill with religious beliefs. — Wayfarer

I think the issue may be described as psychological deficiency if not pathology.

I can understand if some people have an aversion toward religion or spirituality and in particular toward Plato, and I have no problem with that. But when doubt and denial become compulsive then we are dealing with a pathological condition IMHO.

In any event, "aporia" can become a debilitating fixation, it seems, that is as toxic as religious fanaticism - if not worse. :smile:

Saying that an inquiry leads to aporia does not constitute proof that Plato's statements are not in the dialogue or that he preaches atheism, skepticism, and nihilism, does it? — Apollodorus

The double negative combined with the rhetorical question is confusing. Are you saying that saying an inquiry that leads to aporia amounts to atheism, skepticism, and nihilism?

If so, I repeat my previous statement that such a view is at odds with Socrates' willingness to pursue ideas despite such difficulties.

I recommend reading more authors who use the quality of "aporia" as an element of discourse. From Aristotle to Proclus, the term refers to how far one can advance in making distinctions. It is not a cry of meaningless despair at the sight of the abyss.

Don't you think it's also revealing that you wish to dissociate Plato from anything religious whatever? — Wayfarer

Correct. This appears to go so far as to deny that in the Republic, for example, Socrates says that the Sun is one of the Gods (something that most Greeks would have agreed with), in spite of the fact that even notorious anti-Platonists like Strauss admit that the Sun is a God and that Plato has a theology involving cosmic Gods like the Sun:

Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god ... In the tenth book of the Laws Plato presents what one might call his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos [e.g. the Sun] for the gods of the city

- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, pp. 38, 277

I am speaking specifically about such things as the experience of being dead and the transcendent experience of seeing the unchanging Forms. — Fooloso4

As I think has been discussed throughout these threads, in dealing with such matters, there's a mixture of myth, conjecture, suggestion and argument. It's true there's no certainty on the level of discursive reasoning. But what is hinted at, alluded to, is part of the meaning of these texts, also.

I think, possibly, the Platonic forms or ideas are not so remote or mysterious as many are making them out to be. One clue for me is platonism in mathematics. I know that mathematical platonism is not 'the philosophy of Plato', but it provides a way for imagining real abstracts, because in that view, numbers are real, but in a different way to corporeal objects. Naturalism will want to say that these are therefore mental artifacts or constructions. But the counter to that is that they are the same for all who think - they're independent of any particular mind, but can only be seen by the rational faculty. That is nearer to the traditional meaning of 'intelligible'. And I think those ideas have been preserved to some degree in Aristotelian philosophy, which is present in the scholastic tradition.

That's why I'm intrigued by the medieval terminology of 'the rational soul'. I'm intending to do some more reading in that area.

What do you know of an imaginative domain other than what you imagine it might be? — Fooloso4

I recall one the the authors I read in Buddhist Studies speaking of the 'Pali imaginaire'. This was the imaginative world of the ancient Pali texts of Buddhism. It contained various domains of existence, gods, demons, hells, heavens, and Nirvāṇa, in addition to the world of ordinary experience. But the use of that term 'imaginaire' does not mean that all of these domains are taken to be 'merely' imaginary. Rather they provide the extended conceptual framework within which the Buddha's discourses take place. The Buddha denies being a god, demon, or even a human - his self-description just is 'Buddha' - awakened one. But that imaginative depiction of the totality of the cosmos was the setting for those discourses.

But in addition to that imaginative realm there is also in Buddhism a precise definition of degrees and kinds of knowledge - jñāna being one of the terms. That is translated as 'wisdom', although the 'jn-' particle is an etymological cognate with the 'gn-' of gnosticism. In Buddhism, it is understood as a real, practical insight into the principle of dependent origination. It is associated with the jhanas, states of meditative absorption which enables the practitioner to enter higher levels of understanding, to reach states known as 'lokuttara' (transmundane). That is not held to be imaginary in the least, although also not amenable to discursive understanding. The distinction between those kinds of understanding i.e. insight into śūnyatā and discursive understanding, is highly formalised in later Chinese and Japanese forms of Buddhism.

Obviously a very roundabout way of answering your question, but I'm wanting to show that there's a sense in which imagination is more than simply fanciful thought or fictionalism. Imagination opens into other domains of being, not simply conjectural or fanciful. (Interestingly I was just now watching a documentary on Philip K Dick in which he says exactly that.)

If so, I repeat my previous statement that such a view is at odds with Socrates' willingness to pursue ideas despite such difficulties. — Valentinus

But what is the point in "pursuing ideas" if that pursuit leads to "aporia"?

And, having read one dialogue that allegedly leaves the reader in a state of "aporia", why read another dialogue that leaves the reader in the same "aporetic" condition?

What I fail to see is how additional aporia can resolve the initial aporia. Or is the intention to maximize the aporetic state until all reasoning ability has been suspended?

Besides, you are not answering my question. If the text says "the soul turns out to be immortal" or "the Sun is one of the Gods", on what rational basis can we deny that it says this?

I can understand if some people have an aversion toward religion or spirituality and in particular toward Plato, and I have no problem with that. But when doubt and denial become compulsive then we are dealing with a pathological condition IMHO.

In any event, "aporia" can become a debilitating fixation, it seems, that is as toxic as religious fanaticism - if not worse — Apollodorus

As I understand it, such unanswerable questions or conundrums are intrinsic to the Platonic dialogues. Often they are regarded as 'purgative' (i.e. in the Meno) by dismantling a view falsely held.

I think I mentioned before, that I see some similarity between those, and the 'way of unknowing' that is found in later Christian mysticism.

But I'm also aware of the danger of simply asserting as a matter of fact ideas which are in reality conjectural. It's easy to fall into dogmatism that way, which will often amount to claiming to know something that really is only believed. My position is, as I'm not wedded to physicalism, then I'm open to the possibility of higher states of being or higher knowledge, but I can't claim to know them as a matter of fact.

My position is, as I'm not wedded to physicalism, then I'm open to the possibility of higher states of being or higher knowledge, but I can't claim to know them as a matter of fact. — Wayfarer

I totally agree with that. Nobody should claim that they have knowledge that they either don't have or is mere belief.

But nor should they claim that other people's personal experience is just imagination.

And they certainly should not deny statements clearly made in the dialogues. For example, if the Republic says "the Sun is one of the Gods in heaven", then it is irrational to insist that it does not say so.

The issue is not whether one believes that the Sun is or is not a God. The issue is whether Socrates in the dialogue makes this statement. If he unquestionably does so, then it is unacceptable to deny it, all the more so when no rational reason or evidence for the denial is provided.

It's true there's no certainty on the level of discursive reasoning. — Wayfarer

And that is exactly what is required to distinguish knowledge from fanciful speculation. But, as was seen in the Phaedo, argument ends in aporia. So without the experience of being dead we have no knowledge of such things.

I think, possibly, the Platonic forms or ideas are not so remote or mysterious as many are making them out to be. — Wayfarer

Many would include Plato himself.

One clue for me is platonism in mathematics. — Wayfarer

The mathematician does not know the mathematical Forms. They are treated as hypothesis.

imagining real abstracts — Wayfarer

You make my point. Unless we know the original we do not know whether the image is really like what it is an image of.

But the counter to that is that they are the same for all who think - they're independent of any particular mind, but can only be seen by the rational faculty. — Wayfarer

We learn about triangles through images. We learn about number by counting.

But in addition to that imaginative realm there is also in Buddhism a precise definition of degrees and kinds of knowledge — Wayfarer

Again, you make my point. These are not things you know, they are things you are told about.

Imagination opens into other domains of being — Wayfarer

There is a difference between the power of imagination and imagining that what is imagained is a "domain of being".

Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god ... In the tenth book of the Laws Plato presents what one might call his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos [e.g. the Sun] for the gods of the city

- L Strauss, On Plato's Symposium, pp. 38, 277 — Apollodorus

In the first part he is not talking about Plato, he is discussing Cicero's Republic and Laws, as can be seen by looking a few lines before what you quote.

As to the second part, having never read Strauss you are bound to misunderstand what he is saying when you take things out of context. It is only when you read the tenth book of the Laws and follow the argument that you may begin to get a better idea of what his theology and political doctrine regarding the gods might be. Hint: it is a political doctrine regarding the gods being discussed in the context of establishing the laws of the city. In other words a theology (speech about the gods) suited to the city.

Strauss is talking about Socrates.

He says:

Socrates seeks the sun in summer, when it is hardest to bear; he seeks the light of the sun at its strongest. In accordance with that he prays to the sun at the end. Let us not forget that the sun is a cosmic god

Obviously, "cosmic God" for Socrates (and Plato).

Strauss is discussing Plato's Symposium (that's what the book is about!) where the information regarding Socrates' praying to the Sun is provided by Alcibiades:

Immersed in some problem at dawn, he stood in the same spot considering it; and when he found it a tough one, he would not give it up but stood there trying. The time drew on to midday, and the men began to notice him, and said to one another in wonder: ‘Socrates has been standing there in a study ever since dawn!’ The end of it was that in the evening some of the Ionians after they had supped—
this time it was summer—brought out their mattresses and rugs and took their sleep in the cool; thus they waited to see if he would go on standing all night too. He stood till dawn came and the sun rose; then walked away, after offering a prayer to the Sun (Symp. 220c-d)

And Plato's "theology that consists in a substitution of the gods of the cosmos for the gods of the city" is a theology that substitutes the cosmic Gods, like the Sun, for the Gods of the city. Period.

There is nothing unclear about that at all. Not to normal people, in any case. :smile:

That is translated as 'wisdom', although the 'jn-' particle is an etymological cognate with the 'gn-' of gnosticism. In Buddhism, it is understood as a real, practical insight into the principle of dependent origination. — Wayfarer

That was exactly what I was thinking myself. "Jn-/gn-" is also cognate with the "kn-" of English "know" which comes from Proto-Indo-European via Germanic and Anglo-Saxon.

The Buddhist concept of dependent origination is related to the Hindu concept of consciousness generating cognition by producing name (nama) and form (rupa) which in turn give rise to sense-perception and the sensible world. And the two concepts come very close to Platonic Forms.

Ancient Greek makes no distinction between "word" and "name". For Plato, a word acquires its meaning by there being an object of which the word is the name. And if there is a word or name for something, there is a corresponding "Form". Hence, "Name" and "Form", exactly as in the Indian concept of nama and rupa.

I think, possibly, the Platonic forms or ideas are not so remote or mysterious as many are making them out to be. One clue for me is platonism in mathematics. — Wayfarer

Those with a "mathematical mind" may indeed find it easier to grasp the idea of Forms. Plato's Forms aim, in the first place, to explain the phenomenon of identity in difference, and this requires a certain kind of abstract imagery where mathematics may be helpful.

But the metaphysical aim of the Forms is to lead the mind to their ultimate source which is the Good or the One, the cause of all things that are good. And this can only be consciousness itself. Thus, by inquiring into the Forms, the mind eventually arrives at the point where determinate cognition arises from indeterminate consciousness, and the inquiring mind merges with consciousness in the process of creating cognition and, ultimately, with transcendent consciousness itself.

This is logically the final stage of self-knowledge which coincides with knowledge of ultimate reality where all is One.