I think is quite mistaken — Janus
they more or less ignore the rather abundant and compelling reasons to doubt its accuracy or usefulness — Seppo
Dealing with the actual evidence/arguments as stated is, apparently, too painful for them. — Seppo
As they say, "you are welcome to your opinion" on any topic. What was John Dalton's opinion of Atomism? Atomism has metamorphosed over the centuries from solid balls of stuff, to a tiny planetary system, to the notion of empty space with statistical potential for virtual particles. At the same time, the Mechanical models of reality have been superseded by a bizarre array of specialized Forces, and Spooky Action at a Distance.I disagree. QT has only "undermined" John Dalton, not Democritus. — 180 Proof
What does it matter? He called a phenomenon an "atom" that is, in fact, not "uncuttable" (i.e. indivisible) as classical atomists conceptualized it. Dalton used a misnomer that then stuck which subsequent particle physics exposed as, at best, premature when he had first used it. Your question, Gnomon, makes no sense either in the context (with a link too) from which you quoted me.What was John Dalton's opinion of Atomism? — Gnomon
Love it or hate it, phenomena like this [e.g. organic molecular action] exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe.
Human beings, Mr. Dennett said, quoting a favorite pop philosopher, Dilbert, are “moist robots.”
“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?” — Daniel Dennett
What quantum mechanics tells us, I believe, is surprising to say the least. It tells us that the basic components of objects – the particles, electrons, quarks etc. – cannot be thought of as "self-existent". The reality that they, and hence all objects, are components of is merely "empirical reality".
This reality is something that, while not a purely mind-made construct as radical idealism would have it, can be but the picture our mind forces us to form of ... Of what ? The only answer I am able to provide is that underlying this empirical reality is a mysterious, non-conceptualisable "ultimate reality", not embedded in space and (presumably) not in time either. — Bernard D'Espagnat
The true nature of things is evident only at the bottom, that is, on the molecular level, and so life can only be understood in those terms, that is, from the bottom up. (This is what 'biological reductionism' means, and Dennett is acknowledgly and avowedely a biological reductionist.) — Wayfarer
Love it or hate it, phenomena like this [e.g. organic molecular action] exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe
The true nature of things is evident only at the bottom, that is, on the molecular level, and so life can only be understood in those terms, that is, from the bottom up. — Wayfarer
With regard to everything it is most important to begin at the natural beginning. (29b)
That question was rhetorical, and not intended to to elicit an answer. But you seemed to drop his name as an expert on the topic under discussion. Your responses on this thread about Metaphysics mostly seem to be defensive, rather than contributing to a relevant definition of the term. So a pertinent question is, what are you defending? Physics from Metaphysics, Reality from Ideality?What does it matter? He called a phenomenon an "atom" that is, in fact, not "uncuttable" (i.e. indivisible) as classical atomists conceptualized it. Dalton used a misnomer that then stuck which subsequent particle physics exposed as, at best, premature when he had first used it. Your question, Gnomon, makes no sense either in the context (with a link too) from which you quoted me. — 180 Proof
"Expert"? He coined the damned term in the context of modern chemistry. As I said, Dalton's "atom" was a premature misnomer, and had he been an "expert on the topic" (re: atomism) he would not have made such a conspicuous mistake. Can't you draw obvious inferences from context anymore? :roll:But you seemed to drop his name as an expert on the topic under discussion. — Gnomon
180, your defenses of Science and Realism are mostly attacks on the messenger, whom you deem "pedantic" etc, not on his message. If that is not "ad hominem", then what kind of philosophical argument is it? What are we supposed to learn from your characterization of Wayfarer, except that "realistic scientists should not trust anything he says"? If the quote above is "not an ad hominem", then what does it reveal about the legitimate philosophical topic of Metaphysics? Was Aristotle pedantic, dishonest, smug, evasive and shameless? :cool:Wayfarer's pedantic dishonesty and smug evasiveness are as shameless as they are legendary. Warranted observation, not an "ad hominem", W. :eyes: — 180 Proof
"I'm more interested in problematizing the very distinction between reality and unreality, not by claiming there is no such thing as real, but rather by wagering that everything" -- including metaphysics??? -- "is in some sense real, and not just what is deemed 'independent of us'." — Gnomon
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