The irony is that Nagel and Wayfarer are doing precisely what they accuse Dennett/the eliminativist of doing: blindly holding onto a thesis in spite of the evidence. They are so beholden to this naïve and outdated folk understanding of consciousness and the self that they more or less ignore the rather abundant and compelling reasons to doubt its accuracy or usefulness... to the extent that they can't engage with it without mischaracterizing it into an absurd strawman. Dealing with the actual evidence/arguments as stated is, apparently, too painful for them.

You'd think (or hope) that the phrase "philosophical dogma" would be something of an oxymoron, but that's about what this amounts to.

:up: :clap:

I think is quite mistaken — Janus

Noted, but I still think Nagel’s criticism is correct.

they more or less ignore the rather abundant and compelling reasons to doubt its accuracy or usefulness — Seppo

Any tips on what those compelling reasons are?

Dealing with the actual evidence/arguments as stated is, apparently, too painful for them. — Seppo

If the whole argument about ‘the first person’ is a priori, then what constitutes ‘evidence’ one way or the other? What is David Chalmers saying can’t be explained in the third person, and how does Dennett respond to his argument?

Simply that propositions and the understandings they express are creatures of particular contexts, and outside of their proper contexts or misapplied, mean little or nothing. People unclear on this point cannot be other than unclear on any point, except by accident.

You might try reading what Dennett actually says, rather than Nagel's ridiculous and tortured exegesis (i.e. strawmen)- as some posters have already urged.

But then, if you had the stomach for that, you probably would've done that already? Much safer and more comfortable to just pretend that Dennett believes something ridiculous, like that consciousness doesn't exist at all or some such nonsense.

But if you're feeling brave, you could peruse this: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/#ArgForEliMat

But we both know your usual shtick here, as you've been doing it for years, so I obviously won't be holding my breath for you to engage with any of this in good faith. I'm certainly not the first one to encourage you to engage with what materialism actually says, and if it didn't work the first 100 times its probably not going to work this time either.

I disagree. QT has only "undermined" John Dalton, not Democritus. — 180 Proof

As they say, "you are welcome to your opinion" on any topic. What was John Dalton's opinion of Atomism? Atomism has metamorphosed over the centuries from solid balls of stuff, to a tiny planetary system, to the notion of empty space with statistical potential for virtual particles. At the same time, the Mechanical models of reality have been superseded by a bizarre array of specialized Forces, and Spooky Action at a Distance.

All I meant by the "undermined" remark was that QT has replaced hard little Atoms (matter) with amorphous Fields (mathematics) as the current canonical fundamental element of reality. So a Google search will return several uses of the term "undermined", or equivalent, to label the relationship of AtomicTheory (balls) to Quantum particles (waveforms). Anyway, snarky remarks won't really convince anyone on this forum that your opinion is the correct one. :smile:

Atomism from the 17th to the 20th Century :
Newtonian atomism was a speculation that at least held the promise of explaining material phenomena in a way that mechanical atomism did not and so experimental support in the future was a possibility. A critic, on the other hand, could argue that, from the philosophical perspective, the introduction of force undermined the case for the clarity and intelligibility of mechanical atomism on which its originators had based their case. From a scientific point of view, there was no significant empirical support for atomism and it was unable to offer useful guidance to the experimental sciences that grew and prospered in the seventeenth century and beyond.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atomism-modern/

What was John Dalton's opinion of Atomism? — Gnomon

What does it matter? He called a phenomenon an "atom" that is, in fact, not "uncuttable" (i.e. indivisible) as classical atomists conceptualized it. Dalton used a misnomer that then stuck which subsequent particle physics exposed as, at best, premature when he had first used it. Your question, Gnomon, makes no sense either in the context (with a link too) from which you quoted me.

I'm certainly not the first one to encourage you to engage with what materialism actually says, — Seppo

I’m perfectly aware of what eliminative materialism actually says, and I think it is absurd.

of those books, Kumar’s is the best.

Sufficiently aware, at least, to distort it into to something which you can call "absurd".

Of course, what it actually says is far from absurd, but against which you have no counter-arguments... which brings us back to where we started: you (apparently deliberately) mischaracterizing what materialism says, in order to cling to a thesis that evidently holds great emotional/existential importance (for you) despite the fact that its very probably false (or, at the very best, an extreme over-simplification).

Like I said, philosophical dogma, nothing more. And a particularly boring and tiresome bit of dogma at that.

:up: :up:

Like I said, philosophical dogma, nothing more. And a particularly boring and tiresome bit of dogma at that. — Seppo

You’re under no obligation to respond, and you’ve made nothing but assertions.

Assertions which we both* know perfectly well to be true (and which have been amply demonstrated in this very thread).

*Also, anyone else who's read more than a handful of your posts.

:zip:

Keep it up, you’re delighting the peanut gallery.

Just for those who haven't caught on yet, Dennett's 'philosophy' can be summed up in a few paragraphs. This is neither straw man, nor caricature, nor satire, it is really what he says, writes, believes, and if it seems ridiculous, it's because, in many of his critics eyes, it is.

Love it or hate it, phenomena like this [e.g. organic molecular action] exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe.

(Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 202-3.)

Dennett's overall argument in that and his other books is:

The true nature of things is evident only at the bottom, that is, on the molecular level, and so life can only be understood in those terms, that is, from the bottom up. (This is what 'biological reductionism' means, and Dennett is acknowledgly and avowedely a biological reductionist.)

What is found at bottom are scraps of molecular machinery which exhibit apparent purpose which comprises the only kind of purpose anywhere in nature.

Through the power of natural selection — which operates as a mechanistic algorithm (Dennett) and blind, unconscious automatism (Dawkins) — these low-level molecular machines slowly evolve into the kind of apparently purposeful, complex entities we recognize as organisms, including ourselves.

Whatever we are to make of this appearance of meaning and purpose — including my own intentions as I write this and yours as you read it — we are urged to shed our prejudices and acknowledge that we with our intentions somehow arise from more basic, underlying processes that are essentially dumb, meaningless, and mindless.

The feeling we have of being conscious agents who make judgements is really the result of the 'unconscious competence' arising from these layered neuronal and molecular transactions that have evolved according to the algorithm of Darwinian evolution.

Human beings, Mr. Dennett said, quoting a favorite pop philosopher, Dilbert, are “moist robots.”

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?” — Daniel Dennett

There is an answer to that question, although he obviously wouldn't get it, and I don't expect anyone here will be interested, so I'll leave it at that.

And on the meaning of quantum mechanics:

What quantum mechanics tells us, I believe, is surprising to say the least. It tells us that the basic components of objects – the particles, electrons, quarks etc. – cannot be thought of as "self-existent". The reality that they, and hence all objects, are components of is merely "empirical reality".

This reality is something that, while not a purely mind-made construct as radical idealism would have it, can be but the picture our mind forces us to form of ... Of what ? The only answer I am able to provide is that underlying this empirical reality is a mysterious, non-conceptualisable "ultimate reality", not embedded in space and (presumably) not in time either. — Bernard D'Espagnat

So - another 'woofarer'! But this one is qualified.

The true nature of things is evident only at the bottom, that is, on the molecular level, and so life can only be understood in those terms, that is, from the bottom up. (This is what 'biological reductionism' means, and Dennett is acknowledgly and avowedely a biological reductionist.) — Wayfarer

Yes, reductionists believe that small things cause and explain big things, but never vice versa. I never really understood why.

Something to do with atoms, I believe.

“....The true nature of things is evident only at the bottom, that is, on the molecular level, and so life can only be understood in those terms, that is, from the bottom up....”

And yet.....for those thinking, e.g., the moon landing a hoax, not one of them ever substituted the variables in the Hodgkin/Huxley equations, when explaining why he thought so, given his understanding of that which he considers as pertinent evidence.

So, no, not even close; the human conscious system, the primary determinant for understanding, does not operate in the same terms as cognitive neural biology measures.

Doesn’t matter how the brain works, when the ways and means for the transition from the given physical law governing matter, to the abstract logical law governing rational agency, is what we actually want to know.

Truth is small.

Love it or hate it, phenomena like this [e.g. organic molecular action] exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe

I hate to use the "S" word, but in this case I'll make an exception, this is just stupid, just as much of Dennett's consciousness arguments are.

The true nature of things is evident only at the bottom, that is, on the molecular level, and so life can only be understood in those terms, that is, from the bottom up. — Wayfarer

But this is absurd on its face. What, for example, is "the true nature" of water, or where or in what is it to be found? Certainly in an assemblage of water molecules and nothing less. Because any less and it's no longer water. The same applying to all things, mutatis mutandis: what it is to be includes as a minimum what is required to be, less than which it isn't.

Just calling a spade a spade. If you don't like it, stop doing... spade-like stuff?

And its telling how NOT ridiculous it is, once you're being self-conscious about having gotten caught grossly mischaracterizing it. We get it, you have a negative emotional reaction to this view, but its not obviously wrong or unreasonable like the tired strawman about denying consciousness or first-person experience or whatever nonsense the dogmatists and supernaturalists like to parrot every time Dennett or materialism comes up.

Wayfarer's pedantic dishonesty and smug evasiveness are as shameless as they are legendary. Warranted observation, not an "ad hominem", W. :eyes:

give him one thing, you can't say he's not consistent. He's been doing this same exact shtick for years now.

Its just incredible that he hasn't gotten tired or bored with it.

Timaeus said:

With regard to everything it is most important to begin at the natural beginning. (29b)

The problem, of course, is where to begin.

For every natural beginning is there something that stands outside that beginning? Must the story begin: "In the beginning ..." or, perhaps more accurately translated, "To begin ..."? In this story the backstory is presumed to be beyond our reach. This beginning, and all others that begin with some agent that begins, begins at the end. It begins with the consequence of some cause, something without which things could not be or could not be as they are.

If, instead, we begin with what is most simple or elemental, then we begin in some way as Dennett proposes, at the bottom, and work our way up. How complexity emerges from simplicity, how consciousness, for instance, could emerge from things that are not conscious, should not be taken as a refutation, but as what must be explained starting at the beginning. That we have not yet been able to do this is in no way an indication that it cannot be done.

What does it matter? He called a phenomenon an "atom" that is, in fact, not "uncuttable" (i.e. indivisible) as classical atomists conceptualized it. Dalton used a misnomer that then stuck which subsequent particle physics exposed as, at best, premature when he had first used it. Your question, Gnomon, makes no sense either in the context (with a link too) from which you quoted me. — 180 Proof

That question was rhetorical, and not intended to to elicit an answer. But you seemed to drop his name as an expert on the topic under discussion. Your responses on this thread about Metaphysics mostly seem to be defensive, rather than contributing to a relevant definition of the term. So a pertinent question is, what are you defending? Physics from Metaphysics, Reality from Ideality?

I just read an interview in the current issue of Philosophy Now magazine, that may apply to your attempt to draw a hard line between those categories of human thought. Sociologist Martin Savransky talks about Pragmatism and "pluralistic realism". He says that some realisms are "profoundly concerned with the question of how to draw the line between what is real and what is not. In a sense, each form of realism is its own way of drawing that line. But that, to my mind, ends up transforming realism into a belligerent gesture." He goes on to explain his notion of "pluralistic realism". "I'm more interested in problematizing the very distinction between reality and unreality, not by claiming there is no such thing as real, but rather by wagering that everything" -- including metaphysics??? -- "is in some sense real, and not just what is deemed 'independent of us'."

But of course, he's a sociologist-philosopher -- not a real scientist . . . :joke:

But you seemed to drop his name as an expert on the topic under discussion. — Gnomon

"Expert"? He coined the damned term in the context of modern chemistry. As I said, Dalton's "atom" was a premature misnomer, and had he been an "expert on the topic" (re: atomism) he would not have made such a conspicuous mistake. Can't you draw obvious inferences from context anymore? :roll:

Wayfarer's pedantic dishonesty and smug evasiveness are as shameless as they are legendary. Warranted observation, not an "ad hominem", W. :eyes: — 180 Proof

180, your defenses of Science and Realism are mostly attacks on the messenger, whom you deem "pedantic" etc, not on his message. If that is not "ad hominem", then what kind of philosophical argument is it? What are we supposed to learn from your characterization of Wayfarer, except that "realistic scientists should not trust anything he says"? If the quote above is "not an ad hominem", then what does it reveal about the legitimate philosophical topic of Metaphysics? Was Aristotle pedantic, dishonest, smug, evasive and shameless? :cool:

Pedantic is an insulting word used to describe someone who annoys others by correcting small errors, caring too much about minor details, or emphasizing their own expertise especially in some narrow or boring subject matter.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pedantic

Kant's Concept of Metaphysics :
Still the fact that Kant does not face Aristotle's theory of metaphysics has some deeper reasons too. ... (a) Metaphysics is the science containing the first grounds or the principal truths of all human knowledge. This can be called the nominal definition of metaphysics as put forth by Meier and the school he belonged to.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23936829

"I'm more interested in problematizing the very distinction between reality and unreality, not by claiming there is no such thing as real, but rather by wagering that everything" -- including metaphysics??? -- "is in some sense real, and not just what is deemed 'independent of us'." — Gnomon

Oh dear. We're in Meinong's Jungle then...

True, corroborated, statements are not ad hominems.