My problem is that I think my assent (provisional or otherwise) adds nothing to the conversation of “is true” because the state-of-affairs is what it is regardless. Do I believe “a fact is true”? Why invest so much emotion or mental energy? I’d go with, “Does acting as if appear to further my agenda more than acting as if not?” — Ennui Elucidator

I'm ok with some of this, although I take a more pragmatic, less cynical, view. It's not that I want to "further my agenda." It's that I need to make decisions and to do that effectively, I need a good understanding of the uncertainty of the information I am using.

Facts don’t matter, truth is meaningless, and belief is an aside. — Ennui Elucidator

This is not nihilism, it's solipsism. Not the same thing.

I don't hold the opinion that facts can be used pragmatically when needed, in case they are needed, and how they are needed. — Shawn

Ultimately, what value do facts and the truth have other than providing information to allow making effective decisions?

The price of doubting everything is incoherence. — Banno

You're right. I overstated the case. In this case, that's a sin for someone who sometimes calls himself a pragmatist. I'll restate:

On a practical level, there is uncertainty in most of what we call facts. The important thing when making a decision is to understand the level of uncertainty and balance that with an understanding of the consequences of being wrong.

Indeed, the word "fact" seems to be an endorsement of the correspondence theory of truth. — TheMadFool

Facts are usually given to us as form of selective interpretations on the occurrences of the past in the world.

This is not nihilism, it's solipsism. Not the same thing. — T Clark

Not sure why you’d think that is solipsism and not nihilism. In this case, we are discussing epistemology and, so far as I know, epistemological nihilism makes the claim that no knowledge is possible while solipsism makes the claim that only one thing can be known. Where in my writing did I make the claim that something can be known, let alone the claim that only one thing can be known or that the only knowable thing is that my mind exists?

I long ago came to peace with the idea that non-referential indexicals and other tricks of language account for much of the problem of “my mind” and that my version of “mind” is both constructed and re-constructed so seamlessly that even if I conquered the idea that there was something to “I”, I’d hardly know what it is and would find that anything to be said about it is conjecture.

More precisely, if knowledge is Justified-True-Belief, then how do facts fit into such a conceptual scheme for or of knowledge? — Shawn

If knowledge is JTB, then facts carry the T bit of the matter. They are the 'it just is what it is" of this model.

In a pragmatic world facts are what we intend our conjectures to correspond to if indeed they are good approximations of truth.

epistemological nihilism — Ennui Elucidator

I had never heard that term before. Thanks for the education.

epistemological nihilism makes the claim that no knowledge is possible while solipsism makes the claim that only one thing can be known. — Ennui Elucidator

Actually, for me, this is a more interesting entry into the subject of knowledge than the one in the OP. It highlights the issues I find most important. On the one hand, of course there is knowledge. Wait a second ..... See, I was just knowing that the capital of France is Paris. I guess your question is whether "valid knowledge" is a contradiction in terms. For me, that just brings us back to my contention that knowledge is inextricably tied up with decision making. Knowledge, truth, is a tool we use to make decisions and act. If I decide to go to the capital of France, I will definitely make my flight reservations to Paris and not Kabul.

Where in my writing did I make the claim that something can be known, let alone the claim that only one thing can be known or that the only knowable thing is that my mind exists? — Ennui Elucidator

I admit, when I first read your previous response to me, I thought your idea sounded like "I think therefore I am and that's all that is," which is pretty much solipsism. Your formulation sounds like solipsistic solipsism, or Solipsism^2. Nothing exists but me, and I don't exist either.

I long ago came to peace with the idea that non-referential indexicals and other tricks of language account for much of the problem of “my mind” and that my version of “mind” is both constructed and re-constructed so seamlessly that even if I conquered the idea that there was something to “I”, I’d hardly know what it is and would find that anything to be said about it is conjecture. — Ennui Elucidator

And yet, you talk about yourself all the time. In my formulation, the fact that you act on the basis that "I" is a meaningful phenomenon means that it is.

Nothing exists but me, and I don't exist either. — T Clark

That would be metaphysics (rather than epistemology) and I don’t talk about such things.

As for talking about myself, that is the way language works. It is simple enough to take for granted that “I” does some useful stuff when talking and that it makes for a convenient narrative device when trying to unify the noun that is telling then narrative, but we shouldn’t confuse acting as if for the sake of utility with either belief or argument.

Your point about Paris is pretty spot on. We fly to Paris when we want to see the Eiffel Tower and not to New York - not because we know that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but because our best information makes it far more likely to find it there (if at all) rather than New York. So “knowledge” in that sense is the sort of thing that assists us in increasing the likelihood of desired outcome. What is interesting about this is “knowing” where the Eifell tower is is a bit of intellectual slight of hand - what we know is that “acting as if” regarding certain pieces of information from certain sources increases our chances of desired outcome and that it is convenient to claim knowledge with respect to such pieces of information even if a particular piece of information is wholly unrelated to any outcome we may desire. In other words, knowledge is typically communal rather than personal and the most important a bits of information (especially these days) are necessarily communal and outside the ability of any single person to test and/or apply to their purpose.

That would be metaphysics (rather than epistemology) and I don’t talk about such things. — Ennui Elucidator

Many, including me, include epistemology in metaphysics. It doesn't make sense for them to be separate. In my understanding, ontology and epistemology, what there is and how we know what there is, are inseparable.

we shouldn’t confuse acting as if for the sake of utility with either belief or argument. — Ennui Elucidator

I'm not sure, but maybe you're making the same argument I am from the other side. I'm saying knowledge is information we use to make decisions and act. It seems like you're saying there is no knowledge, just the decisions and acts themselves. Or maybe not.

not because we know that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but because our best information makes it far more likely to find it there (if at all) rather than New York. — Ennui Elucidator

Now you're just playing with language. Knowledge is provisionally verified information.

Now you're just playing with language. Knowledge is provisionally verified information. — T Clark

But I’ve never verified it, provisionally or otherwise. I’ve just accepted that the reports of others (in word or picture) have been helpful before.

As to metaphysics, I am dancing on the door step of the distinction between subjective knowledge and intersubjective knowledge (while totally avoiding objective knowledge). I am not, however, dealing with the issue. For what it is worth, I am a process epistemologist and unconcerned with the “what there is”, rather I am concerned with what is done. The object is never accessible or knowable regardless of your metaphysics and so it isn’t helpful as anything besides a linguistic convenience to even make reference to it.

...unconcerned with the “what there is”, rather I am concerned with what is done. — Ennui Elucidator

This is a good description of my thoughts in regard to truth.

The object is never accessible or knowable regardless of your metaphysics and so it isn’t helpful as anything besides a linguistic convenience to even make reference to it. — Ennui Elucidator

All language, thought, and conceptualization is "linguistic convenience to even make reference" to something.

Your opinion can't be true? Nor your beliefs? — Banno

In fact they are factually adequate perceptions of a metaphysical reality.

while totally avoiding objective knowledge — Ennui Elucidator

Why avoiding that? Do I perceive an unconscious fear towards objects?

To the extent that "objective" is in opposition to "subjective" and whether something is "known" is an evaluation of subjects, I find the idea of "objective knowledge" to be non-sense. One might certainly say that any member of a class of subjects would judge the same given certain criteria, but that is not "objective" in the sense I believe most who use such a term would hope for.

Regarding my fear of objects, it is rarely the case that a thought will make my head explode, but a well swung hammer will. So if there is something for me to fear, I am confident that objects make the cut.

In fact they are factually adequate perceptions of a metaphysical reality. — Prishon

You perceive your opinions? So you perceive that the cat is on the mat, and subsequently you perceive that you are of the opinion that the cat is on the mat?

I perceive the cat in the outside world and the opinion on the inside world. Sometimes the coincide. Then its the truth.

Odd. I'd just say that the cat is on the mat. One world.

All knowledge is the property of a conscious subject and nothing in the world has meaning in and of itself, but only in relation to a conscious subject or consciousness in general. A fact establishes itself as knowledge or meaning through the experience of ones biology, and experience is the effect of ultimate realities affect upon said biology. This is not infalliable, but, judgement is always true to its experience even when that experience is delusional or otherwise in disagreement with the physical world.

But knowledge isn't justified true belief, it can't be defined by a strict set of criteria. — Manuel

Why in the world not?

Why in the world not? — Artemis

What are you asking:

Why isn't knowledge justified true belief or why can't it be defined by a strict set of criteria?

Both.

Mostly the latter, though.

This is a week old but:

Imagine you watch the finals in the NBA and team A beats team B. You saw it and reached this conclusion. Unbeknownst to you, what you were watching was a replay of a previos game in which the same team wins (team A) against the same opponent (team B). In the actual finals team A does beat team B, but you were watching a replay, not the actual game. So you had justified true belief, but it wasn't knowledge. — Manuel

Mostly the latter, though. — Artemis

Outside of mathematics, I don't know of a single word which has an easy definition. A dictionary will give you the most simple idea, but the concept is extremely expansive.

Is my favorite colour knowledge? Does the itch I feel in my arm knowledge? Is alchemy knowledge? Do I know that a comet won't hit me (or anyone) in the head today?

Etc. It soon becomes way too slippery for a strict definition, IMO.

I'm familiar with Gettier's work. But as far as I understand it, it really challenges more the concept of justification and notions of absolute and absolutely ascertainable truth.

Easy solution: you acknowledge fallibility when asserting knowledge claims. That doesn't mean you don't have strict criteria for "knowledge," but that you may or may not actual know what you think you know.

Is my favorite colour knowledge? Does the itch I feel in my arm knowledge? Is alchemy knowledge? Do I know that a comet won't hit me (or anyone) in the head today? — Manuel

1. It is knowledge that you know what your favorite color is.
2. It is knowledge that you know your arm itches.
3. I'm not sure what you mean by alchemy.
4. I would say, you don't think it's impossible that a comet will hit someone in the head today, you just know the likelihood is so small that you may as well proceed as though it won't.

I'm familiar with Gettier's work. But as far as I understand it, it really challenges more the concept of justification and notions of absolute and absolutely ascertainable truth. — Artemis

There's a few ways to interpret the paper and much subsequent literature on it. But the title is literally Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? He gives examples with coins and a friend in Barcelona, but I think it is correct in saying that JTB is not knowledge, it's not the rock solid definition as was assumed. Though Russell pointed this out in the 1920's, and was mostly ignored.

you acknowledge fallibility when asserting knowledge claims. That doesn't mean you don't have strict criteria for "knowledge," but that you may or may not actual know what you think you know. — Artemis

That's good to me. It's a sound attitude to have.

It's not that we can't speak about knowledge or fallibility, it's just that these words don't have precise meanings. But we speak of things that lack precision very frequently. So it's not a problem for "knowledge" talk.

3. I'm not sure what you mean by alchemy. — Artemis

The beliefs that came prior to modern chemistry. Turning lead into gold, life elixir etc. Now considered mostly pseudoscience, though maybe not all of it.

There's a few ways to interpret the paper and much subsequent literature on it. But the title is literally Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? He gives examples with coins and a friend in Barcelona, but I think it is correct in saying that JTB is not knowledge, it's not the rock solid definition as was assumed. Though Russell pointed this out in the 1920's, and was mostly ignored. — Manuel

Gettier came up with an interesting challenge to naive interpretations of JTB, but the literal title of his paper still doesn't actually dismantle JTB. You'll need to give more arguments than just "well Russell said it too" I'm afraid.

It's not that we can't speak about knowledge or fallibility, it's just that these words don't have precise meanings. — Manuel

Which you still haven't thoroughly justified.

The beliefs that came prior to modern chemistry. Turning lead into gold, life elixir etc. Now considered mostly pseudoscience, though maybe not all of it. — Manuel

Okay, I thought so. Simple: that which in Alchemy was justified and true belief is knowledge and that which was unjustified and/or untrue was not knowledge.

To phrase it another way: Gettier wasn't really showing that the formula doesn't work per se. He did the typical philosopher thing: "But what does it mean to be justified? And that's a sticky question indeed. But a wholly different question from the definition of knowledge itself.

Unfortunately in a way that is rarely expounded upon in a fair manner. Perspective is a sense of knowing, but still knowing not. The end result existentialist horror.

Gettier came up with an interesting challenge to naive interpretations of JTB, but the literal title of his paper still doesn't actually dismantle JTB. You'll need to give more arguments than just "well Russell said it too" I'm afraid. — Artemis

Well, you've now introduced the idea of "naivety" to JTB's. Some some beliefs are naïve, hence not really JTB. What beliefs are naïve as opposed to non-naïve?

Which you still haven't thoroughly justified. — Artemis

I'm saying that knowledge does not have a strict definition, you say that it is JTB. I cannot give you a thorough justification of anything.

I can give you more examples: A person born 10,000 years ago has JTB that the Earth is the center of the Universe, that stars are diamonds and that when he dies he'll go back to a supreme being. That's surely JTB and knowledge for that time. We would not call it knowledge today.

What else? I mean, almost everything we thought of prior to enlightenment was false. Things don't go down because that's "the natural order", there are not corpuscles (miniscule concrete solid atoms), Kings do not have divine right, etc., etc.

Back then they were JTB, no question. Today we wouldn't say these things are knowledge. But what about our beliefs now? They could be rendered false in a few decades. So we would have no knowledge.

"But what does it mean to be justified? And that's a sticky question indeed. — Artemis

It is.