But insofar as they're physical processes then they're not different in principle. — Wayfarer

Feser's argument is making a positive claim about different "types" of material processes having some commonality, namely, that they don't posses inherent meaning. That's false though because brain processes don't have the same "kinds" of properties and don't "behave" in the "same" kinds of ways as the other non-brain processes examples he gave. That all the examples are, "in principle", material/physical processes is beside the point he's making.

He then goes on to make another positive claim that thoughts have inherent meaning. The problem is thoughts are identical with brain processes.

Another problem is Feser says things like brain processes don't "seem" to have inherent meaning. But that's a claim from a third-person perspective. One can't actually perceive others' first-person experiences of meaning-making.

When you examine brain-scans, you're interpreting graphical images, which are physical in nature - you're examining the trace left by blood-flows in millions of neurons, which is surely a physical process. But it's the nature of interpretation which is at issue - interpreting what the data means is what is at issue in all of this. And you indeed then go on to concede this very point, by saying that 'mental processes are meaning makers' and 'meaning-making is first person'. So your second two paragraphs take back what the first is trying to assert. — Wayfarer

I don't really understand. How is this the issue: "the nature of interpretation which is at issue - interpreting what the data means is what is at issue in all of this"?

That is why the role of number, logic, and language are significant in this context. Numbers are objectively constant for anyone capable of counting, but at the same time, they're not material objects - they're purely intellectual in nature. The same can be said for logical operators such as 'equals' 'greater than' and so on. — Wayfarer

I disagree. "Numbers", "equals" etc., are concepts that occur in minds. They are abstract ways minds organise and try to make quantitative relationships.

They might prove that information is not to be identified with any specific material thing, but that's not quite the same thing as proving that information is not material itself. After all, I cannot identify mass with any specific material thing, since it is a feature shared by many (well, let's face it, all) material things, but mass is a material property. — ProcastinationTomorrow

And it’s not an attribute of numbers, or ideas. Hence, the thread.

Some here are saying that these are simply ‘in the mind’ - as if this amounts to an explanation.

Anyway, this thread has run its course as far as I’m concerned.

Firstly, in my ontology, all existents are constantly changing. There are no "static-instants", for example. That means that both (objective) facts/events/states of affairs and mental events (which are subjective facts/events/states of affairs) are constantly changing/in motion. Any existent at time T1 is non-identical with itself at any other time in the past or future. — numberjohnny5

If everything is constantly changing, then there is no such thing as a state of affairs. To assume that everything is changing, and that there are states of affairs is contradictory. So in your claimed ontology, facts or truths cannot be expressed as states of affairs.

So "objective relations," as the ways in which particular things/properties interact with other things/properties, are constantly changing, through time T1, T2, T3, and so on. — numberjohnny5

Further, T1, T2, and T3, cannot refer to anything real in such an ontology. Things are always changing, time is always passing. So such designations correspond to nothing real, and the claims of truth you refer to cannot be true either because T1 etc., cannot refer to anything real. There is no such thing as the points in time indicated by T1, T2, T3, etc., according to that ontology, so to premise such is to make a false premise. And you will not make any true conclusions when you start from false premises.

So "objective relations," as the ways in which particular things/properties interact with other things/properties, are constantly changing, through time T1, T2, T3, and so on.

You are missing the point. Just because the relata of a relation are constantly changing does not entail that the relation itself is constantly changing. Counting relata and counting relations are to count two different kinds of things.

I have the horrible feeling that @numberjohnny5 is going to come right back at you and say relations are just mental and so material things always in flux , T1, T2...etc etc etc. Basically, numberjohnny5 is regurgitating the Heraclitan idea that everything, everywhere at all times is in flux. What numberjohnny5 needs to do is read Plato's Theatetus for the definitive refutation of that idea. The basic idea of Plato's (and I think @Metaphysician Undercover is getting at precisely the same point) is that the notion of flux only makes sense in the context where there is a background of stability (and one can turn the table also and say even the notion of stability requires that there is some kind of flux). So insisting that everything is everywhere and always just a seething soup of flux is, no matter how much technical jargon you dress it up in, meaningless drivel. Like @Wayfarer, I think this thread has run its course, although I suspect that the serious issues raised during the exchanges will rear their heads in other discussions.

You are missing the point. Just because the relata of a relation are constantly changing does not entail that the relation itself is constantly changing. Counting relata and counting relations are to count two different kinds of things. — ProcastinationTomorrow

I think you're missing my point. I didn't say that the changing things ("relata") being referred to entail that the mental relations are constantly changing.

I said "Firstly, in my ontology, all existents are constantly changing. There are no "static-instants", for example. That means that both (objective) facts/events/states of affairs and mental events (which are subjective facts/events/states of affairs) are constantly changing/in motion. Any existent at time T1 is non-identical with itself at any other time in the past or future." That's because to exist is to change. Existents change/are in motion.

There's no entailment there between the changing relata and the changing mental relations that refer to relata. The first "premise" is that the mental and non-mental are constantly changing. And while "relations" and "relata" are two kinds of things, they both are material, and they both constantly change.

What numberjohnny5 needs to do is read Plato's Theatetus for the definitive refutation of that idea. The basic idea of Plato's (and I think Metaphysician Undercover is getting at precisely the same point) is that the notion of flux only makes sense in the context where there is a background of stability (and one can turn the table also and say even the notion of stability requires that there is some kind of flux). — jkg20

I think you give yourself (and Plato) too much credit. It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general stability to things. That's a false dichotomy: either everything is in constant flux and has no stability, or that nothing is in constant flux and there is stability.

It also seems as though people are assuming that continuous flux or constant change precludes anyone from saying anything true (or false), i.e. making truth-claims or having ontological commitments. That's not the case. We observe flux happening around us, and we refer to it. There is a regularity to change/flux when we observe it. It's not like by things being in continual flux things are only just randomly/acausally doing all sorts of strange, unpredictable things. But it's not that "stability" means "static-non-change" either. That's a very black-and-white, simplistic way of describing those terms in lieu of change/non-change. Further, many things appear not to change on particular levels of scale, and we observe that change is occurring on micro-scales, or over longer and longer periods of change/time.

If everything is constantly changing, then there is no such thing as a state of affairs. To assume that everything is changing, and that there are states of affairs is contradictory. So in your claimed ontology, facts or truths cannot be expressed as states of affairs. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only if you parse that as a false dichotomy between "constant change" as not having a regularity to it, and "non-constant change" as being only or permanently static. It's more nuanced than that. Think of it as two dancers dancing together. One dancer represents a person/mind, and the other dancer represents what the mind refers to. Maybe the dancers are waltzing incredibly slowly, so you can't very easily perceive that they're moving/constantly changing. But at any time that one dancer refers to the other dancer re a truth-claim, the other dancer obtains and "makes" the truth-claim "true".

(1) Why you're deflecting the question back to me? — numberjohnny5


I expected that you'd recognize that the question was a rhetorical question. You asked me how do non-physical things exist if they have no properties and my answer (by way of rhetorical question) is that properties are non-physical things. So it doesn't really make sense to ask about the properties of properties. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't realise, no. It's difficult for me to grasp how non-physical things exist (even if you say that properties are non-physical), and at the time, I was hoping you'd clarify that for me. That's why I asked you a direct (non-rhetorical) question.

So, Ill now ask you the question. Do you or do you not apprehend properties as non-physical things? Take the property "large" for example. Many physical things are large, so it is impossible that large is any particular physical thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends how we use "large" -- whether it's a mental property of our minds assigning things as "large" (the concept "large" is a thought) in terms of relative scales, or whether we're referring to non-mental properties of things that actually take up more space than other things, say. There are no "comparisons/measurements" that are non-mental though.

It appears to me, like you do not adequately understand what "ontology" is. Ontology consists of the assumptions which we make about existence, and we always have our own reasons for the assumptions which we make. So my ontological assumption is that non-physical things have existence no less than physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's how I use ontology too, except I'd add claims and commitments to that criteria as well as assumptions.

Non-physical things are apprehended by the mind, they are called intelligible objects like universal ideas, concepts like "large", "red", etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I guessed that you'd believe something like that. It just isn't coherent to me.

How do you think that the numeral "2" stays the same, as the numeral "2", within my mind, if all there is in my mind is brain activity? How does the numeral "2" stay in my mind as a static object, if my "mind" is only accounted for by brain activity? — Metaphysician Undercover

The numeral "2" doesn't stay the same when I visualise it. If I visualise the number "2" now, I notice it isn't this stable image; it fluctuates and changes. It's relatively "stable" in that as long as I try to visualise it, it remains there in some form. But it's in no way an actually non-changing, static thing in my mind.

So let's readdress this question. There is brain activity which corresponds to me thinking should I or should I not shut down my computer. Then I make a choice and proceed with the appropriate activity. What, other than the non-physical mind, causes the actual choice? It cannot be the brain activity which is the cause of the decision, because the brain activity is considering the options, weighing the possibilities, and the choice causes the end of this brain activity, to be replaced with a different activity, the movement of the body parts. The brain activity cannot cause the activity of the bodily parts directly, because a choice is required. Nor is it something external, which is the cause, because the choice comes from within me. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not that it's not like a sequence of brain activity that involves perceiving the situation, weighing up possibilities, making a choice, and making sense of the consequences of that choice. That's all (conscious) brain activity; and it's constantly doing/juggling multiple things sequentially; and this is all happening while nonconscious brain activity is working too.

Brain activity causes the actual choice. It's not like the brain activity only amounts to "considering the options, weighing the possibilities". Whatever gave you that idea? And I'd say "the choice is the end of that particular sequence of brain activities." The brain activity sends projections from the motor regions to the muscle sites in the body. So it is directly responsible (along with other nonconscious processes) for causing movement of body parts. Also, making choices is the mental aspect of brain activity, and it can only be mental activity if non-mental activity (autonomic processes) is functional.

Metaphysician Undercover has been too patient trying to help you understand your errors and as a result has allowed you another opportunity to become enthused by the verbosity of your own loquaciousness. @jkg20 was correct in his prediction - you are clearly incorrigible, but let me have one stab at this before I move on, as it upsets me to think that someone so wrong can believe they are so right.

It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general stability to things.

This is utter nonesense. To say that everything is always in flux is precisely to say that there is no general stability to things.

This is utter nonesense. To say that everything is always in flux is precisely to say that there is no general stability to things. — MetaphysicsNow

It depends what you mean by "general stability", which I mean as a general regularity to how things occur/are.

So instead of
It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general stability to things.
You should have more accurately stated;
It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general regularities to how things occur/are.

I repeat; this is utter nonsense - to say that everything is always in flux is precisely to deny that there are general regularities to how things occur/are, since if there were such general regularities they would be things exonerated from being in flux.

So instead of
It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general stability to things.
You should have more accurately stated;
It's not that because everything is always in flux that there is no general regularities to how things occur/are. — MetaphysicsNow

It's not about being more accurate. "General stability" is synonymous with "general regularity" for me in this context. Maybe you would have preferred me to have stated one thing over the other, but both statements mean the same thing for me.

I repeat; this is utter nonsense - to say that everything is always in flux is precisely to deny that there are general regularities to how things occur/are, since if there were such general regularities they would be things exonerated from being in flux. — MetaphysicsNow

Again, it depends on what you mean by "general regularities/stability". You'd have to explain/define those terms for me to understand how you're supporting that claim. In other words, you haven't actually given any good reasons for me to buy the claim you're making. You've just said, A wouldn't happen because B. Well, what does A mean and what does B mean for you? I personally find it coherent for "constant flux" and "general regularities" to be ontologically compatible. Show me how that's incoherent.

I wonder whether you'll repeat "this is utter nonsense" again.

I didn't realise, no. It's difficult for me to grasp how non-physical things exist (even if you say that properties are non-physical), and at the time, I was hoping you'd clarify that for me. That's why I asked you a direct (non-rhetorical) question. — numberjohnny5

As it is difficult for you to grasp that non-physical things exist, it is equally difficult for me to grasp that physical things exist. I have extreme difficulty grasping what it means to exist. When I started to understand what "exists" means, I started to realize that it's more logical to assume that non-physical things exist than it is to assume that physical things exist. This is expressed by Descartes' "I think therefore I am". However, I see the need to assume that physical things exist as well, therefore I lean toward a dualism.

It depends how we use "large" -- whether it's a mental property of our minds assigning things as "large" (the concept "large" is a thought) in terms of relative scales, or whether we're referring to non-mental properties of things that actually take up more space than other things, say. There are no "comparisons/measurements" that are non-mental though. — numberjohnny5

My point is that it is impossible that there is such a thing as a "non-mental property". If something takes up more space than another thing, this is a judgement made by a mind.

It's not that it's not like a sequence of brain activity that involves perceiving the situation, weighing up possibilities, making a choice, and making sense of the consequences of that choice. That's all (conscious) brain activity; and it's constantly doing/juggling multiple things sequentially; and this is all happening while nonconscious brain activity is working too. — numberjohnny5

Let's say that a brain is "weighing up possibilities" as you describe. What is a "possibility" other than a non-physical thing?

Do you see why I hit your questions with other questions? Your way of speaking has inherent within it, the assumption of non-physical things. You claim that your ontology allows for no such non-physical things, but you're always referring to them in your speech. So I ask you, how can you talk about these non-physical things, "properties", and "possibilities", as if the brain is doing something with these non-physical things, while you deny that these things have any reality? This is why wayfarer says your ontology leaves you in a position of meaningless nonsense. You insist that the brain is doing something, but all the material which it is working with, when it is doing this, is non-existent nothing. But you, in order to make it appear like what you are saying is somehow intelligible, speak of this non-existent nothing, as if it were something. So all you do is contradict yourself, or behave in an extremely hypocritical way at best, talking about all these non-physical things as if they exist, but then denying that they exist, as an ontological principle.

Metaphysician Undercover has been too patient trying to help you understand your errors and as a result has allowed you another opportunity to become enthused by the verbosity of your own loquaciousness. — MetaphysicsNow

"Loquaciousness", that's a new word for me, I'll have to remember that. Numberjohnny goes on and on, talking about how the brain is using non-physical things like properties and possibilities, in mental processes, then denies all reality to these non-physical things. If these things are not real, then the brain is doing nothing, working away with no material to work with, therefore doing nothing.

Numberjohnny gives us a similar problem in relation to the physical world when saying everything is in flux. In talking about "changing relations", it is implied that there are static things which are being related to each other in this expression of change. Numberjohnny keeps referring to these static things and in the same breath denies that they are real. It's an ontology of denial, denying the reality of what is being talked about, and this renders the talk as nothing more than loquacious nonsense.

Definition of the claim "Everything is in constant flux": Every single existent thing alters from one moment to the next.

Definition: "General regularity" = An unaltering pattern, such as a natural law (e.g the force felt by a falling object is proportional to its gravitational mass).

Are there such things as general regularities?
Response 1: "No" - then since there are no such things as general regularities, they cannot be appealed to in any way shape or form to explain anything at all.
Response 2: "Yes" - then the claim "Everything is in constant flux" is false, since there exists something, i.e. at least one general regularity, and possibly many more, which does not alter from one moment to the next.

Your responses are utter nonsense because you seem to think you can give both responses at one and the same time, which you cannot, since by doing so you would be violating the law of non-contradiction. Please don't respond "paraconsistent logic", because that really is utter nonsense.

@Metaphysician Undercover I've done the best I can, I wish you luck if you continue to struggle on with numberjohnny5.

As it is difficult for you to grasp that non-physical things exist, it is equally difficult for me to grasp that physical things exist. I have extreme difficulty grasping what it means to exist. When I started to understand what "exists" means, I started to realize that it's more logical to assume that non-physical things exist than it is to assume that physical things exist. This is expressed by Descartes' "I think therefore I am". However, I see the need to assume that physical things exist as well, therefore I lean toward a dualism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this brings something up I often think about, actually. The idea that we all have a "network of beliefs" that cohere with one another, and which keep our general perspectives relatively stable. And I also think that people are, in general, relatively resistant to change or changing their ideas because of this stable network. I never expect nor assume anyone will change their mind when I discuss/debate philosophy with them. Nor do I assume or expect my mind to be changed, at least not immediately. But I am generally curious about others' views, especially when they are radically different to mine.

My point is that it is impossible that there is such a thing as a "non-mental property". If something takes up more space than another thing, this is a judgement made by a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are necessarily bound by statements that refer when referring to things. But this doesn't constrain us from being able to use statements to refer to things we believe are actually external-to-minds. So when I use a statement in the form of an ontological claim, for instance, I am referring to what obtains ontologically, not to the actual ontological statement that refers. And that is supported by other beliefs, of course.

Let's say that a brain is "weighing up possibilities" as you describe. What is a "possibility" other than a non-physical thing? — Metaphysician Undercover

A brain weighing up possibilities is a brain experiencing a situation with perceived options that they care enough about in order to make a decision re which options to choose. It's a process. If you're talking about "possibility" in a logical or metaphysical sense, that's different; the former being any claim that is not contradictory, and the latter being anything that is possible based on past and present actuals.

Your way of speaking has inherent within it, the assumption of non-physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm afraid not, and it's interesting that you believe that's the case. Which makes me think that's because your ontology re this stuff is so ingrained that it's difficult for you to imagine or make sense of physical existents, as you noted already. That's not a criticism, really; merely an observation. On the other hand, one reason why I don't buy the notion of non-physical existents is because no one has been able to clarify the ontological nature of non-physical existents, except to offer some vague examples like objects of the intellect or universals. In my opinion, the problem with those answers/explanations is the fact that the reason they're intangible is precisely why I think no one can offer a tangible/graspable explanation. It's a self-defeating problem that can't be resolved because of the fuzzy/vague/intangibility of what non-physical existents are for people. And also, I believe that "explanations" are subjective, which means that some people are satisfied with the explanations they have for their beliefs, while others aren't so satisfied.

Anyway...

You claim that your ontology allows for no such non-physical things, but you're always referring to them in your speech. — Metaphysician Undercover

That you believe I'm referring to non-physical existents in my speech is only because you can't imagine how to refer to physical existents in your speech.

In talking about "changing relations", it is implied that there are static things which are being related to each other in this expression of change. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you just keep putting words in my mouth. I don't believe anything is actually static/non-changing. I've repeatedly claimed the opposite. It's just that you can't (and I don't think you care to) understand my perspective on this, so you just make this stuff up so you can wrap me up in a box and label me as "the guy who thinks there exists physical things but is confused and talks nonsense." That's fine, but all you're doing is showing how dogmatic and close-minded you are.

Definition of the claim "Everything is in constant flux": Every single existent thing alters from one moment to the next.

Definition: "General regularity" = An unaltering pattern, such as a natural law (e.g the force felt by a falling object is proportional to its gravitational mass). — MetaphysicsNow

All that shows, so far, is that we don't share the same views regarding "general regularity" there, which is one reason why I wanted you to reveal your definitions.

It depends how you're using "alter" and "unalter" too. I'm guessing you mean change or non-change, respectively. If so, then that's not how I use them, at least not when I'm talking about this ontologically.

I define "general regularity" as a consistent, recurring or reiterative pattern of particulars (as in, particular properties) in particular relations interacting. That's compatible with "constant flux" or "existent altering from one moment to the next."

Your responses are utter nonsense because you seem to think you can give both responses at one and the same time, which you cannot, since by doing so you would be violating the law of non-contradiction. Please don't respond "paraconsistent logic", because that really is utter nonsense. — MetaphysicsNow

Rather than impulsively assuming you're right, why don't you first try to understand and check what others are claiming? Your comments and attitude reek of "utter" arrogance and condescension. There really is no need for that. It'd be nice if we could have friendly debates/discussion without all the pomposity.

I define "general regularity" as a consistent, recurring or reiterative pattern

"consistent, recurring or reiterative" are you supposing those terms are synonymous? Pick up a dictionary, they are not. Nevertheless, leaving your mastery of the English language aside, let's focus in on "recurring" shall we?

If a P pattern recurs, then P occurs at at least two distinct times, T1 and T2. Since P at T1 is the same pattern as P at T2 then P has not changed between the times T1 and T2, consequently P has not altered between T1 and T2. Hence a recurring pattern is an unaltering pattern, and despite your word play our definitions are ontologically equivalent.

Nevertheless, leaving your mastery of the English language aside, let's focus in on "recurring" shall we? — MetaphysicsNow

Is that how you speak to people face to face?

"consistent, recurring or reiterative" are you supposing those terms are synonymous? — MetaphysicsNow

I'm using them in a similar sense, yes. Whether that's conventional per dicitionary definitions I don't know. But I'm willing to bet you'll throw that in my face.

If a P pattern recurs, then P occurs at at least two distinct times, T1 and T2. Since P at T1 is the same pattern as P at T2 then P has not changed between the times T1 and T2, consequently P has not altered between T1 and T2. Hence a recurring pattern is an unaltering pattern, and despite your word play our definitions are ontologically equivalent. — MetaphysicsNow

As a nominalist, I don't buy that two things/events are numerically identical. So P occurring at two distinct times involve two non-identical ocurrences of P. Ontologically, things/events are relatively similar or disimilar in terms of "degrees of similarity." So P at time T1 is relatively similar to P at T2 but not identical. The degree of similarity of P at T1 and T2 entails a "general regularity" of P, where "general regularity" does not mean identical occurrences or re-occurences of some thing/event, but rather siimilar occurrences or re-occurences of some thing/event.

"P" is a pattern, patterns are not events, events are (amongst other things) things that conform to or break patterns. Let's say that pattern P is the following:
the force applied to a falling object is proportional to its gravitational mass.

Let's say event1 is me dropping a stone from a tall building at a given time. Let event2 be me dropping a banana from a bridge at some other given time. Event1 and event2 have similarities and differences, they are certainly not identical. If you like, even the me involved in event1 is not identical with the me involved in event2. None of that matters. The issue is that both event1 and event2 conform to the pattern P. Pattern P does not change in all of this, it does not alter.

Wait--what are patterns for you ontologically? I don't buy that "natural laws" are real, btw, if that's how you support or use "pattern". That's mainly because of the (unresolvable) problem of induction. Rather, we observe tendencies or regularities and project a "law" onto them to help us organise reality and be able to make instrumental predictions.

patterns are not events — MetaphysicsNow

Patterns are, ontologically, identical to properties (re-)occurring, which include things and events, and where things are comprised of properties, and events are collections of things interacting. (I use "events" as "facts" or "states of affairs" too, btw.)

I leave you with the recommendation to read this article
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154157?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

I leave you with the recommendation to read this article
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154157?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents — MetaphysicsNow

Why would you do that?

brain weighing up possibilities is a brain experiencing a situation with perceived options that they care enough about in order to make a decision re which options to choose. — numberjohnny5

So there are "options" which are perceived. These options are non-physical things. If these non-physical things, the options that is, are not real, then it is nonsense for the brain to consider them as possibilities; because if there are not any real options, determinism is what is the case, so there is no reason for the brain to consider options which have no reality.

I suppose you believe that options are somehow real, and therefore physical? Perhaps you could explain how an option is physical?

I'm afraid not, and it's interesting that you believe that's the case. — numberjohnny5

Clearly it is the case that your talk refers to non-physical things. You have talked about properties, possibilities, and now "options". All of these are non-physical things.

Anyway... — numberjohnny5

You haven't addressed any of my criticism of your ontology, principally, that you deny that non-physical things are real, but you support your physicalist argument by referring to non-physical things. Now you are denying that you are referring to non-physical things. Unless you can show me an option or a possibility which has physical existence, then surely you are referring to non-physical things.

Because it is a carefully reasoned, reasonably short article on nominalism that will, if you read it with care, help you understand what nominalism is and what problems it faces.
You appear to have a "humpty dumpty" view of language that allows you to pick and choose at will the meanings you give to words. It is impossible to reason with someone of that nature. Goodbye.

Information is not physical. Information has levels of subjectivity, while physical is objective.

For example, sticks and stones can break my bones, but names can never hurt me.

If I throw a stick or stone at you; physical, this will cause pain. If I throw information at you, like name calling, the impact can vary from person to person, due to the subjectivity of information. There is no universal or consistent action and reaction when it comes to name calling. Physical is consistent.

Information, like name calling, can trigger different levels of response and different levels of emotional and physical energy output. Picture is lighting a match with the result different reaction each time or for each person. The impact of the rock is not different each time, unless the person extrapolates the cause and affect of the rock, through information; overreaction or under reaction.

The difference has to do with the connection between language and information. Language is subjective. There are roughly 6500 languages in the world. The sounds, noises and characters for language are arbitrary with no consistent reason why any sound is chosen. The medium used to process information is subjective.

The hydrogen atom, which is physical, is not arbitrary. It can become so, as information. As information the hydrogen atom can be like a planet orbiting the sun, or as a wave function. We can have more than one theory for any given phenomena. This is not a function of physical reality, but rather it is a function of human subjectivity; information.

This forum demonstrates how the same evidence; information, can impact each of us differently; different written output. Physical does not work that way, except when massaged by information.

delete

How, then, could the information be physical? — Wayfarer

All that the claim "information is physical" means is that it's either matter or energy or both, in and of themselves, or changes in them. So, either information is matter (has mass & occupies space) or energy (can do work) or are changes in mass/volume/energy.

It's unlikely that information has mass or occupies space - what they're stored on might but not the information itself. We could, for instance, record & transmit the exact same information online, via radio, or TV, or print - the mass and volume equivalent of a given piece of information varies from 0 to some finite amount. This generates a contradiction and so, information can't be matter ergo, impossible too that changes in matter can account for it.

Is information energy? Well, can we convert information into heat or other forms of energy or can we do work with it? "O" can be understood as both the number zero and the letter "O" with the same shape. Since the same amount of energy is being used to display the letter "O" or the number O but the information differs, information can't be energy. If information can't be energy, how can change in energy be information.

In conclusion, information isn't physical!

It is physical because the cause is physical. Is there an actual three-masted Greek ship on the horizon? Yes, or no?
[...]
What has happened is that the cause has triggered a chain of events that results in some physical structure representing the cause in some way. We can say that the information was processed, or changed, in some way, but we can still point to the initial cause as what this new structure refers to. — Harry Hindu

But, Harry, the information and the cause are distinct entities; the reality of the latter need not impart reality to the former. I would define "information" as "any mental abstraction of data from the perception of a phenomenological object or occurrence which contributes to the evaluation of an entity". What if the entity being evaluated is itself not real? If I were to research, in a dictionary of the supernatural, about the supposed ghost of Dylan Thomas haunting the old Chelsea Hotel in New York City, I would gather much information about this haunting. Even so, I think that we can all agree that there is no ghost of Dylan Thomas haunting the Chelsea...if the object of the information is not real to begin with, then how can the information itself based upon said unreality be real?

The key is, that the creation of information involves abstracting data from phenomena, be that phenomena real or imagined. The process of abstraction creates an imaginary data set based upon phenomena which may result from a real entity, a natural object, or from an imagined entity, like the ghost of Dylan Thomas. We see Desmond Doss performing acts of extreme valor during the Battle of Okinawa in WW2, and we say that Doss "has courage", and "displays courageousness". Does this "courageousness" really exist? We have gathered information from our observation of Doss's actions during that military operation. Looking at the data thus compiled, we make the evaluation that "Desmond Doss is endowed with courageousness". But, what is said "courageousness" other than a label for a historical pattern of behavior...a series of past real occurrences? Is this "courageousness" something evidence of which might be found upon a dissection of Desmond Doss? Desmond Doss is a real object, and the actions of that object during the Battle of Okinawa were real occurrences, but the bits of data ("there is an act of courage...oh! there is one more act of courage...etc.") which we gain from observing those real actions exist only within our minds, and not in the universe of reality, and that unreal data leads us to attribute to Desmond Doss an equally unreal abstraction: courageousness. Mental abstractions always result in unrealities. The data sets, composed of bits of information, which are derived from the perception of real objects and occurrences, could only be said to be real themselves if they could exist independently of the objects and occurrences from which they are derived, without those objects and occurrences having ever been...they cannot. The point is, that information gained mentally from the perception of real objects and occurrences has no reality in and of itself.

The key is, that the creation of information involves abstracting data from phenomena — Michael Zwingli

Which data?