Yes, I read it. It does not support your view.

He goes on to ask how we learn the names of sensations (e.g. "pain"):

But how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example, of the word “pain”. — PI 244

He answers:

Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place. — PI 244

You take from this that the expression is the sensation. But he clearly distinguishes pain from its expression at §245.

A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. — PI 244

Adults teach the child linguistic expressions (e.g. "I have a pain in my toe") to replace the natural expressions of pain (e.g. crying). This does not imply that the pain (sensation) is identical to the pain-behaviour (expression).

Wittgenstein is saying that the child learns the names of sensations by being taught new expressions of pain. The child sees that words are connected with the natural expressions.

“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?” — On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it. — PI 244

Saying "I have a pain in my toe" is an expression of pain; a pain-behaviour, not a description of the pain-behaviour. "Pain" does not mean crying.

If we all had a pain in your toe, then that pain would be like the tree.

We don't, so it ain't.

Moreover, it makes sense to claim to know based on sensory experiences, but not, to claim to know that I'm having a pain, which has been the main idea of this thread. There's no knowing one is having a private sensation, I just have them. — Sam26

Are you saying that you just have private sensations, but that you don't know you have them? I don't see the difference between feeling a pain in my foot and seeing a tree in my garden. neither of these experiences require any further justification.

Pain is not an object of one of the five "external" senses, but it is sense nonetheless I would say. It makes sense to me to say I feel pain or I sense pain.

If we all had a pain in your toe, then that pain would be like the tree.

We don't, so it ain't. — Banno

Pain is different only in that it is internal to the body and so irretrievably hidden from the senses of others. As I said before the only different is the contingency of perspective; where pain is the extreme case.

Adults teach the child linguistic expressions (e.g. "I have a pain in my toe") to replace the natural expressions of pain (e.g. crying). — Luke

Both are expressions. As opposed to names.

Saying "I have a pain in my toe" is an expression of pain; a pain-behaviour, not a description of the pain-behaviour. "Pain" does not mean crying. — Luke

Yes. Pain-talk is primarily expressive, but has a superficial resemblance to reference talk, to naming. That's what I say Wittgenstein is saying. And here I think I am expressing the view long held by Kenny, Anscombe, and those who were in his company.

Pain is different only in that it is internal to the body and so irretrievably hidden from the senses of others. — Janus

Well, yes - and hence drops out of the discussion. Unlike a tree.

That is rather the point.

Well, yes - and hence drops out of the discussion. Unlike a tree.

That is rather the point. — Banno

I agree that my being in pain cannot be intersubjectively corroborated as my seeing a tree can be. From my own point of view though; I feel the pain, I see the tree; and no further justification is needed.

intersubjectively corroborated... — Janus

Not happy with that sort of language. Wash your mouth out.

What about the pain in @Sam26's toe, and the tree in his yard? What do you know of them?

Are you saying that you just have private sensations, but that you don't know you have them? I don't see the difference between feeling a pain in my foot and seeing a tree in my garden. neither of these experiences require any further justification. — Janus

It's not a matter of knowing you have a pain. Contrast this with it's negation, "I don't know that I have a pain in my toe," it doesn't make sense. If we claim to have knowledge, then this has to be juxtaposed with not having knowledge, which is why it's important to understand the importance of the doubt. What would it mean to doubt you're in pain? Wittgenstein asks the same question of Moore's proposition, viz., "What would it mean to doubt this is your hand in the context Moore's using it?"

You don't see a difference between not being able to doubt you're in pain, as opposed to being able to doubt there is a tree over there. Of course the latter depends on context, it would be easy to imagine someone doubting that your seeing a tree. For example, maybe it's foggy and you can't see clearly. However, try doubting the pain you're having.

Not happy with that sort of language. Wash your mouth out.

What about the pain in Sam26's toe, and the tree in his yard? What do you know of them? — Banno

I know nothing of the pain in Sam's toe or the tree in his yard. If I went to his place I could, via the senses, directly confirm whether or not there is a tree in his backyard, but not whether or not there is a pain in his toe. That all I mean by "Intersubjective corroboration".

@Sam26

Have you read the SEP article?

I think it rather clear on the topic - but then I sympathise with Kenny's account. I particularly like the concluding remark that

...on Wittgenstein’s view, while chess is essentially a game for two players, this does not exclude the possibility of playing it against oneself provided such solitary games are not regarded as paradigm instances of chess.

Perhaps that artilce can serve to move beyond mere explanation to critique of private language?

If I went to his place I could, via the senses, directly confirm whether or not there is a tree in his backyard, but not whether or not there is a pain in his toe. — Janus

Indeed.

This sub-thread is in reply to your post:

I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard".. — Janus

Do you see it now?

Perhaps that artilce can serve to move beyond mere explanation to critique of private language? — Banno

I like figuring it out from the primary source. Some of these philosophers may or may not understand Wittgenstein's points. However, this is also true of me. Too many of these so-called Wittgenstein experts just have it wrong. Although you and I are excluded. :wink:

You don't see a difference between not being able to doubt you're in pain, as opposed to being able to doubt there is a tree over there. Of course the latter depends on context, it would be easy to imagine someone doubting that your seeing a tree. For example, maybe it's foggy and you can't see clearly. However, try doubting the pain you're having. — Sam26

As I said to Banno, I can see the difference in the intersubjective context. But from my point of view it would make no more sense to doubt I was seeing the tree I'm looking at, than it would to doubt that I'm feeling the pain that's throbbing in my toe.

Do you see it now? — Banno

As I say above and have said from the start, I see the difference in the intersubjective context. But I put that down to the contingency of perspective: in some cases there is just no way you can get yourself into a position to experience what the other is experiencing.

But from my point of view it would make no more sense to doubt I was seeing the tree I'm looking at, than it would to doubt that I'm feeling the pain that's throbbing in my toe. — Janus

I agree with this, but note again, that we can imagine a doubting situation with the tree e.g., but not the pain e.g..

Sure. So what do you think the topic is here?

I agree with this, but note again, that we can imagine a doubting situation with the tree e.g., but not the pain e.g.. — Sam26

That's true, and maybe that's because doubting situations always arise in the contexts of what can be intersubjectively corroborated (sorry Banno).

Discussions of the argument usually get stuck - as this one - in explaining it. It'd be interesting to move on to critiquing it.

Sure. So what do you think the topic is here? — Banno

The PLA. So, the discussion has veered into the question of private experiences. I already agreed that no private language is possible (because to determine and subsequently know what its words referred to we would need to translate it into a public language).

↪Sam26 Discussions of the argument usually get stuck - as this one - in explaining it. It'd be interesting to move on to critiquing it. — Banno

Wittgenstein is not easy to understand. In fact, some of what he says, seems, at first glance, to be plainly incorrect. When Russell first read the Tractatus he completely missed the point. Moreover, it's difficult to explain some of these ideas, which is why we get stuck. We end up just repeating ourselves.

As I say above and have said from the start, I see the difference in the intersubjective context. But I put that down to the contingency of perspective: in some cases there is just no way you can get yourself into a position to experience what the other is experiencing. — Janus

Seems you missed it. Oh, well.

If you think I missed something, you should be able to explain what it was you think I missed.

Or was it something ineffable?

↪Banno If you think I missed something, you should be able to explain what it was you think I missed. — Janus

Ya, answer that in your one sentence reply. :yikes:

Wittgenstein is not easy to understand. — Sam26

Here's a thing: I think is would be a mistake to think of him as setting out an argument for a particulate conclusion. Instead I think he is presenting a way of arguing.

So understanding him does not consist in agreeing with his conclusions, and hence in following his arguments, but in taking on a certain approach to dealing with philosophical issues.

After all, if philosophy is a process of clarification, there are no conclusions.

Ya, I agree, it's a matter of learning his method of analyzing.

I did. Leading horses to water and so on.

This sub-thread is in reply to your post:
I'm finding it difficult to see a cogent difference in kind between "I feel a pain in my toe" and "I see a tree in my backyard"..
— Janus

Do you see it now? — Banno

How's that? :wink:

Enlightenment does not come from seeing the duck as a rabbit, but from seeing that it can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit.

Both are expressions. As opposed to names. — Banno

Obviously both are expressions. Wittgenstein asked: "How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations?" He suggests that it's via an association with their expression (e.g. pain-behaviour).

You're putting a lot of emphasis on the word "refer". Do you view reference as being restricted to a particular class or something, e.g. only to real world objects? Otherwise, I don't understand your concern here.

Enlightenment does not come from seeing the duck as a rabbit, but from seeing that it can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit. — Banno

Yes, and I see the situation can be understood differently from a subjective or an inter-subjective point of view. Is there anything else of interest to say about it, or is this the Wittgenstein Secret Handshakes Club?

A common philosophical error is to assume that a grammar implies a state of affairs. In the phone example, the similarity of grammar is taken to imply that pain is some sort of individual, or thing, and so leads to questions of observation and identity and so on, all of them misplaced, all of them the result of not noticing that the grammar hides a distinction.

@Metaphysician Undercover in particular makes this sort of mistake often and repeatedly, but doesn't see it.

We do use language to refer to pains and to phones. But pains are quite different to phones. Paying attention to the difference allows us to identify and explain certain philosophical errors - see how Janus at first claimed not to be able to see a difference except as perspective? He went all the way to saying that

If I went to his place I could, via the senses, directly confirm whether or not there is a tree in his backyard, but not whether or not there is a pain in his toe. — Janus

but then reneged, choosing only to see this as a difference in perspective and not of kind.

The same floppiness occurs throughout philosophical discussions; it's most noticeable in talk of qualia, but it's also there in talk of truth and belief, and in the foundation of mathematics.

So yes, it is a recurring theme.