A common philosophical error is to assume that a grammar implies a state of affairs. In the phone example, the similarity of grammar is taken to imply that pain is some sort of individual, or thing, and so leads to questions of observation and identity and so on, all of them misplaced, all of them the result of not noticing that the grammar hides a distinction. — Banno
He went all the way to saying that
If I went to his place I could, via the senses, directly confirm whether or not there is a tree in his backyard, but not whether or not there is a pain in his toe. — Janus
but then reneged, choosing only to see this as a difference in perspective and not of kind.
The same floppiness occurs throughout philosophical discussions; it's most noticeable in talk of qualia, but it's also there in talk of truth and belief, and in the foundation of mathematics.
So yes, it is a recurring theme. — Banno
I also have a problem with the notion of an experiential state; there's a reification there that I find uncomfortable. Experiences are not always sufficiently static to count as individuals; or at least there are issues for consideration in the individuating of sensations. (@Metaphysician Undercover mentioned something along these lines above, but it made no sense.) — Banno
A common philosophical error is to assume that a grammar implies a state of affairs. In the phone example, the similarity of grammar is taken to imply that pain is some sort of individual, or thing, and so leads to questions of observation and identity and so on, all of them misplaced, all of them the result of not noticing that the grammar hides a distinction.
@Metaphysician Undercover in particular makes this sort of mistake often and repeatedly, but doesn't see it. — Banno
try doubting the pain you're having — Sam26
Since when did philosophers become experts on limits of human imagination?Wittgenstein starts by asking an important question. “But could we imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences—his feelings, moods, and the rest—for his private use?” — Sam26
Since when did philosophers become experts on limits of human imagination?
I can imagine it. Prove me wrong. — Wheatley
Okay, give an example of what you're talking about so we can compare (in terms of doubting one's pain). Are you referring to something like phantom limb pains? — Sam26
Could you be in pain and not know it? — Luke
244. How do words refer to sensations?
Why does Wittgenstein mention "imagination"? — Wheatley
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