I have some sympathy for this line of thinking. There's a reply from Davidson that I might try to re-formulate to match the case you present. I think there remains something here that is a bit puzzling, methodologically.

SO you have a

Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). The six signals are obviously not themselves 'pain' (again, in the way Wittgenstein is using the term), so it must be the model. But if it's the model, we do doubt it because those six triggering physiological signals overlap with some of the triggering physiological signal for other state/emotion models. — Isaac

The idea is that we can map "pain" against signals a, b, c, d, e. Now suppose that we see a suitable combination of four of more signals, such that it fits within the model. We would expect to have the person in whom we observe this - let's call him John - report a suitable pain.

But John does not.

We have a choice. We might say that the John is in pain but does not feel it. I gather that this is what you are proposing. Or alternately we might say that the claim that we can map "pain" against signals like a, b, c, d, e is faulty.

To tie things down, this in in response to @Sam26's

try doubting the pain you're having. — Sam26

SO we might also consider the alternative; John reports having a pain, but does not exhibit a suitable combination of signals. We might again either insist that John is not in pain, but only thinks he is; that his pain is an illusion of some sort. That looks a more than precarious position to adopt, methodologically and ethically. Or we might modify or drop the theory.

I think we addressed this long ago, but we might have a clearer example here.

@Sam26, if this is too far off topic I am happy to move it to another thread. Just give the nod.

@Hanover @Janus

The first problem with the private language "argument" is that it (and the whole of PI for that matter) is seen as only true/false statements, rather than the work of finding out for ourselves the insights from these claims. It is taken as an argument for a conclusion, as @Banno has noted (or multiple). As elsewhere, Witt is coming up with examples (even fantasies such as this), in order to draw out their implications which reveal our interests, needs, and desires (at times, looking for a particular outcome). This is not an explanation of human biology or "language" (the language claims/examples are to reveal the implications, which are about our lives).

People also get stuck just saying language cannot be private (and how it cannot), overlooking that we do have "privacy", as in personal experiences (the awe of a sunset by myself), sensations (feelings), and our own desires, interests, needs, and intuitions. These are mine, separately, perhaps secretly, maybe alone (this counters some* of our feeling of being denied/losing something). Witt could be said to make room for the personal, even the ineffable (think: opera, painting, crying). This is not the erasure of the self, nor is it a fight against "solipsism"--the idea I control, judge, or value everything, as it were, individually (without history, our lives, language, etc.)--which ends in our solving our skepticism of each other by saying "you do not!", perhaps (as emphatically) pointing to our "forms of life", language, rules, etc.

More important than proving that a private language is not possible or is nonsensical (pointless), his investigation is to reveal our hidden desires and the state of our human condition. Beyond (in between) the "Private Language Argument" is that:

1) I do not "know" my own pain; I feel it/I express it. There is no space between those for certainty (my "knowledge"). So "referring" to my pain, even the sensation, is in the sense of making it known, as in revealed (to you), not "referring to", as in pointing to a "thing" (an object of knowledge). And "doubt" is just not what I do with pain; I repress it, ignore it (though the example of pain makes this seem impossible, as if I am skewered on it, Cavell says; imagine instead, say, sadness). We focus on, or suppress, our pain/experience, as we would express it to others (or hide it). And you and I have the same pain, experience, etc. to the point we can express and accept them as similar. Here Witt shows that the picture of solipsism comes from a desire to be unknowable.

2) I also don't know your pain, say, by inferring it from behavior, or through science (@Isaac). I do not "know" your pain, I acknowledge it, I react to it (or deny it, blind myself to it) (Cavell--drawn out in my OP on the "Lion Quote"). Knowledge is not our only relation to the world; we have a relationship to others (we may treat them as having a soul, PI p. 178); and our acts/expressions at times define us, even adverse to our culture (beyond what is meaningful to it/in it).

3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions. This desire for rules is to ensure beforehand that my expressions work out, but most importantly, without my being responsible for my actions, answerable to others (even myself). And the picture of causality satisfies the human wish (for me) to be necessary and for my experience to be special (certainly known, or never fully).

4) There are such things as deception, lies, faking, acting, repressing, etc. Though our word is our bond (Austin), there is just no getting around this (other than reading credibility and the context, etc.). Our response is to try to reach past you, in a sense, to something fixed (inside or out) that we can rely on. The shear fact of this failing leads us to deny the other (as a person) in order to ward off the conclusions of the skeptic; however,

5) *There is a truth to skepticism: that we are separate(d) individuals (we have our "own" pains/sensations/experiences, not because they are necessarily special, but because we "own" them, express/hide-accept/deny them). More to the point, we are responsible to answer for our expressions--and the attitude we take, the aspects we see (or ignore). And we can always/endlessly work to understand each other and our expressions, though there is no assurance this will lead to a resolution--which is the same fear that fuels our desire to turn the fact of our not being the same (person) into an intellectual problem.

If it is something we construct, then we can doubt the appropriateness and/or utility of the construction. We can't doubt the triggering sensations, but they were not (in Wittgenstein's use) 'pain' in the first place, they're just physiological activity.

Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). The six signals are obviously not themselves 'pain' (again, in the way Wittgenstein is using the term), so it must be the model. — Isaac

You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source [of pain] not natural expressions or reactions, but merely "something we construct"? Don't most animals tend to withdraw from perceived sources of pain?

Such general facts of nature (PI 142) are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work, especially his references to form of life and "shared human behaviour" (PI 206), or that we teach children sensation words on the basis of such shared behaviour (PI 257).

But if it's the model, we do doubt it because those six triggering physiological signals overlap with some of the triggering physiological signal for other state/emotion models. Just as we might say "I wasn't hungry, I was just nervous" (misinterpreting the overlapping signals from the digestive system in those two models), we might be able to say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross". That we don't actually say that is not necessarily a reflection on what is the case so much a cultural artefact of the belief that things like emotions and pains are natural kinds (a belief I believe modern cognitive sciences shows to be unfounded). — Isaac

It's "not necessarily a reflection" that pain is a natural kind, but there's very strong evidence to support it. Why else do you think we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross"?

I think we addressed this long ago, but we might have a clearer example here. — Banno

Yes. Although, to be clear, we'd need to say that John was triggered by signal x. Un-triggered expressions can happen - the brain is almost certainly stochastic, which is why I always talk in likelihoods (tendency to behave as if...) rather than x causes y - but it would be a different proposition if we're saying John randomly says he's in pain despite having none of the traditional triggers. I get the feeling you're wanting to explore the version in which John says he's in pain in response to a different set of triggers to usual.

A tendency to reach for the word "pain" is one part of the model we might call {being in pain}, that model being a network of neural connections which make some set of action-responses much more likely given some set of triggering neural signals, one of those responses being to use the word "pain".

If John was reaching for the word "pain" in response to an unusual set of triggers, I'd probably be first inclined to think he had some form of aphasia, that he once upon a time had a more normal model, but some trauma has disrupted the network and now those signals produce a tendency to reach for the word "banana", and some other set of signals has become linked up to a tendency toward the word "pain".

Alternatively, if John was a very young child, I might assume he's learnt the word wrong, some mishearing has made him think it's appropriate to use it in response to signal x when, in fact it was a misunderstanding and we don't tend to use the word that way.

So the question is why I'd go for either of those two explanations rather than expand my list of normal triggering signals to include John's x.

Psychologically, it'd be because John's use of the word that way probably isn't working for him, it's not yielding the results he wants (he keeps getting sympathy when he wants a quick healthy snack and keeps getting yellow fruit when he wants some pain-killers). Maybe John is quite happy with his re-arrangement though, but even in that case it doesn't seem like an unreasonable assumption that most people wouldn't be, so we still need a model of pain-talk where this kind of response is considered in the category something's-gone-wrong.

Trying to relate that rather psychological way of looking at it back to philosophy and the PLA...we both agree, I think, that language primarily does stuff, it's not just a report, it's a social tool to get stuff done. So how's John going to get the stuff done he want's done in a society of other (biologically similar) humans all using "pain" in response to some loose (but still defined) set of triggers a, b, c, d, e, and f, when he's using it in response to trigger x? It seems to me that our shared biology (triggers a, b, c, d, e, and f are biological) is going to undermine his attempts to use the word "pain" and get the stuff done he wants to get done.

In terms of PLA, isn't John's use is exactly a case of sensation S? Haven't we learnt to use the word pain appropriately by trial and error, I use it here it should do this...no, that didn't quite work out as I expected...perhaps here, like this...all the while watching other humans in our social group to see how they react. If those other humans all share a similar biology, then they're all going to react with sympathy, medical treatment etc, to the use of the word "pain" in response to triggers a, b, c, d, e, and f (which indeed require sympathy, medical treatment etc to deal with them) - where such triggers are things like tissue damage signals, heat/pressure signals, or certain neuronal patterns to trigger mental pain (we don't really understand these yet so I've been deliberately vague).

For John to use the word pain absent of these triggers, he'd have to use it either a) randomly (accident) or b) in response to some other publicly measurable trigger (say, hunger), or c) in response to some private, potentially ever-changing, trigger (sensation S). (a) seems irrelevant to any discussion of language use, (b) is an error of use, if we're to have any rules about the use of terms with public referents, but also for John, would get his hunger dealt with by sympathy and pain killers, and (c) seems to run into the problems of the private language argument.

Have I missed an option?

You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source [of pain] not natural expressions or reactions, but merely "something we construct"? Don't most animals tend to withdraw from perceived sources of pain? — Luke

A natural expression might result from some deeper subconscious network (a direct link from a sensory neuron to a motor neuron - via an association neuron - in the spinal cord). The part of the brain dealing with language doesn't even get a look in on this type of signalling, it gets the second hand messages from the proprioceptive neurons, and the eyes that it's body has already pulled away from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site. Reaching for the word "pain" to describe any of those goings on is a post hoc modelling of the signals telling us what just happened, not the real time signals as they're happening.

Beyond those autonomous responses, then yes, I am saying there are no natural human expression or reactions. It's probably the leading theory of affect cognition at the moment. You can read a primer here if you're interested.

Such general facts of nature (PI 142) are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work — Luke

Well, then scholars would be wise to listen to what scientists say about these facts then, no? It seems odd to say that such facts are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work and simultaneously hold that a philosopher who barely left his offices has a better grasp of those facts than the scientists actually working on them with the full arsenal of modern investigative technology at their disposal.

there's very strong evidence to support it. Why else do you think we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross"? — Luke

I've just given an account of why - we have a cultural belief in natural kinds.

he part of the brain dealing with language doesn't even get a look in on this type of signalling, it gets the second hand messages from the proprioceptive neurons, and the eyes that it's body has already pulled away from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site. — Isaac

I was only talking about natural expressions/reactions, not language.

Beyond those autonomous responses, then yes, I am saying there are no natural human expression or reactions. — Isaac

How are you distinguishing those autonomous responses (such as "already pulled aware from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site") from natural expression/reactions?

I've just given an account of why - we have a cultural belief in natural kinds. — Isaac

I don't understand your account. Your account of why we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross" is because we believe in natural kinds, not because there are natural kinds. I don't see how that's an account rather than an assertion. We might believe in natural kinds because there are natural kinds.

I was only talking about natural expressions/reactions, not language. — Luke

But the subject here is language, no? The use of the word "pain".

How are you distinguishing those autonomous responses (such as "already pulled aware from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site") from natural expression/reactions? — Luke

By examining what's going on in the brain. Autonomous reactions don't have any connections to areas of the brain we know to be involved in conscious processing, language use etc.

Your account of why we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross" is because we believe in natural kinds, not because there are natural kinds. I don't see how that's an account rather than an assertion. We might believe in natural kinds because there are natural kinds. — Luke

I provided a paper to indicate the support for the model, I can give more if you suspect I'm being dishonest in saying it's the prevailing model. I could give a full account here, but that would be considerably dry and totally off-topic, and it's better you read it directly from the scientists doing the work. What other kind of evidence were you expecting to raise my comment above the level of mere assertion?

But the subject here is language, no? The use of the word "pain". — Isaac

Yes, but not with my recent questioning of your implication that there are no natural expressions or reactions.

By examining what's going on in the brain. Autonomous reactions don't have any connections to areas of the brain we know to be involved in conscious processing, language use etc. — Isaac

I don't see what conscious processing and language use have to do with natural reactions/expressions.

I provided a paper to indicate the support for the model, I can give more if you suspect I'm being dishonest in saying it's the prevailing model. I could give a full account here, but that would be considerably dry and totally off-topic, and it's better you read it directly from the scientists doing the work. What other kind of evidence were you expecting to raise my comment above the level of mere assertion? — Isaac

Explain to me how your autonomous reactions are different from natural reactions/expressions and maybe I'll read it.

3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions. — Antony Nickles

Do you acknowledge two different senses of "meaning" here? One sense of "meaning" (as in word meaning) is definition, explanation, or sense. The other sense of "meaning" (as in meaningful) is significance, consequence, or worth.

Yes, but not with my recent questioning of your implication that there are no natural expressions or reactions. — Luke

I see, well on that you're right. If you want to call autonomous responses a natural kind then we'll have to say that there are some natural kinds. It's not how I'd define a natural kind, but that's fine. The point is that there are no natural kinds when it comes to the states we label with words like "pain" and emotion words.

I don't see what conscious processing and language use have to do with natural reactions/expressions. — Luke

As I said above, autonomous responses are not the sort of thing I'd class as a natural kind, so your question sounded like it was asking how we can tell the difference between autonomous responses and constructed states. If you mean to ask why I don't categorise autonomous responses as natural kinds, I don't know. I've just never come across them being described that way.

Explain to me how your autonomous reactions are different from natural reactions/expressions and maybe I'll read it. — Luke

Well, if we assume it's just a categorisation issue, then it's just a matter of the way I've learned to use the term. I don't think it's that relevant to the topic is it?

The point is that "pain" is used to describe a complex state, not an autonomous response, so when determining if it refers to a simple, what matters is whether such states are natural kinds. Whether autonomous responses are natural kinds seems immaterial.

You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source [of pain] not natural expressions or reactions, but merely "something we construct"? Don't most animals tend to withdraw from perceived sources of pain?

Such general facts of nature (PI 142) are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work, especially his references to form of life and "shared human behaviour" (PI 206), or that we teach children sensation words on the basis of such shared behaviour (PI 257). — Luke

The distinction between natural and artificial is untenable in the modern world which has done away with the supernatural (God) as the support for the natural. So you are inclined to assign things like instinct and intuition to "the natural", even though they are more similar to "the artificial", by showing intention. The theist could attribute the intention displayed within "natural" things to God, "the supernatural".

Now we'd say that a human construction is artificial, but a bird's nest, or a beaver's dam is natural, though all of these ought to be classed as the same type, because they are purposefully created, therefore created intentionally. So instead of supporting all the intention which is evident within the natural world, with the supernatural, God, we have turned the other way, to say that human beings and their artifacts are a part of nature, natural. Clearly, the division you want, between the natural and the artificial is untenable in the modern world, where we see human beings and their artificial products as a part of nature.

Therefore your proposed division between natural (instinctual) reactions and learned reactions is not at all useful to the subject at hand. They are all intentional (purposeful), and your claim that "shared human behaviour" is somehow not natural is completely untenable without support from the supernatural, God. And to imply that such a division is "pivotal to Wittgenstein's work" is simply wrong. So it's time for me to turn the judgement you made against me, back at yourself. You have a very keen capacity to produce quotes, but ".I don't think you understand ... much of anything that Wittgenstein says."

In terms of PLA, isn't John's use is exactly a case of sensation S? Haven't we learnt to use the word pain appropriately by trial and error, I use it here it should do this...no, that didn't quite work out as I expected...perhaps here, like this...all the while watching other humans in our social group to see how they react. — Isaac

This is exactly what I've been arguing, but there's a tendency at this forum, to argue that certainty is prior to uncertainty, and that we cannot proceed with an action (such as speaking), without first being certain of what the outcome will be. But this is a complete misunderstanding of the nature of language use. It is the type of activity which if we make a mistake there is usually no serious consequence, or punishment. So there is no requirement of certainty in language use, and trial and error plays a significant role. In fact, the mistakes of young children are seen as humourous and entertaining, so they are encouraged to proceed in their trial and error of learning.

The whole idea that language use is rooted in some form of certainty which is produced from following rules, is simply a misrepresentation of language. And to say that Wittgenstein presents us with this model of language, as if it is a rule based activity, with all those rules being founded upon some rock solid indubitable rules, is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. He is actually exposing the flaws of this perspective, in order to discredit it, he is not supporting it.

This is a feature of philosophy which many people do not understand. To discredit an idea, refute an ideology, requires that one lay out for display the complete ideology, all of its features and aspects, in their entirety, revealing the faults. The trained philosopher will see the faults, as revealed, and understand that the person laying out the display is actually refuting the ideology by displaying its faults, rather than supporting it.

The way people relate to Plato is a prime example. Modern day "platonic realism" is really a replica of ancient pythagorean idealism. Plato laid out for display all the features of pythagorean idealism, complete with its flaws, and effectively refuted it. Aristotle formalized that refutation. But today, we learn pythagorean idealism through Plato's descriptions, and most people do not read Plato thoroughly enough to understand him, so they believe he is supporting that ideology, and we even attribute the ideology to him, as platonic realism.

The point is that "pain" is used to describe a complex state, not an autonomous response — Isaac

I'm not saying that "pain" is used to refer to an autonomous response nor to a natural expression or reaction. Pain is not identical with its expression.

This is what I found odd about your post where you said:

Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). — Isaac

You started that post talking about the sensation of pain as a natural kind, but then you went on to talk about constructing models in terms of expressions of pain. Except you didn't note the distinction between pain and its expression, so you ended up denying that there are any natural expressions of pain or reactions to pain, instead of denying that pain is a natural kind.

The point is that "pain" is used to describe a complex state, not an autonomous response, so when determining if it refers to a simple, what matters is whether such states are natural kinds. Whether autonomous responses are natural kinds seems immaterial. — Isaac

It's only immaterial because you started talking about expressions of pain instead of pain.

Also, if the abstract to your primer is anything to go by, then it discusses emotions, not sensations.

3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions.
— Antony Nickles

Do you acknowledge two different senses of "meaning" here? One sense of "meaning" (as in word meaning) is definition, explanation, or sense. The other sense of "meaning" (as in meaningful) is significance, consequence, or worth. — Luke

I would say an explanation does not show something's significance. Or that a definition imposes itself over anything else of consequence. What I was getting at is that the model of meaning based on a word's definition, imagines it as particular and certain; which creates the picture that I cause or intend something particular and/or use rules for a certain outcome. Wittgenstein is taking apart that explanation to see how each thing is important to us (all).

I want to add
d) a sensation that is not private.

Still thinking. Comments welcome.

You started that post talking about the sensation of pain as a natural kind, but then you went on to talk about constructing models in terms of expressions of pain. — Luke

I'm denying that Wittgenstein's 'sensation of pain' is a simple, so I'm "talking about it" only insofar as I'm denying it is as Wittgenstein speaks of it. I'm sorry if that was not clear enough.

There's no such thing as a 'sensation of pain'. There's no consistent neural equivalent and psychologically there's a failure to link reports with any consistent physiology.

There's a set of physiological signals that are non-exclusively associated with a tendency to use the word "pain", and there's the modelling relationship between that set of physiological signals and a similarly non-exclusive set of responses. We can refer to this modeling relationship as 'the experience of pain' as it is consistent in it's output (the use of the word "pain", but this model is definitely socially constructed, and modified on the hoof - ie it can be doubted. The expression of pain is just some of that non-exclusive set of responses which form the 'output' half of the 'pain' model. Because, in this system, both the input signals and the output responses are non-exclusive set, the correctness of the model 'pain' can be doubted.

if the abstract to your primer is anything to go by, then it discusses emotions, not sensations. — Luke

The work on pain (and other sensations) is just more complex and behind paywalls. The paper I cited is a good introduction to the theory, it covers (as the title suggests) all interoception, it just focuses on emotions because that's the author's original field. I can provide the papers on pain perception, but you'll need journal access to read them.

I want to add
d) a sensation that is not private. — Banno

See my comments to Luke above. There's considerable doubt now that such simples as 'sensations' even exist. The prevailing model consists of non-exclusive sets of triggers, and non-exclusive sets of responses (all stochastic I should add - people get a bit jumpy when we start to talk about stimuli-response, and for good reason). The non-exclusivity of both inputs and outputs means that the modelling relationship is variable - ie there's nothing in the brain that can be called a 'sensation' of pain, only triggers, models and responses.

I think all three could be used as a public referent for the word 'pain', it's not like we have much trouble with non-exclusive sets in other areas of language ('game' as an obvious example). But the non-exclusivity opens the space for doubt. "Am I using this word right? Is it doing what I expect it to do in the circumstances?"

I have an image of someone groaning in agony as the doctor says "no, no, she's not in pain...look at the signals we are getting..."

And so I think there is something amiss in the picture you draw.

Sam26, if this is too far off topic I am happy to move it to another thread. Just give the nod. — Banno

You don't have to go to another thread. I don't mind at all.

Cheers. Noticed you hadn't posted for a few days.

I admit to being a bit perplexed by Isaac's approach.

I have an image of someone groaning in agony as the doctor says "no, no, she's not in pain...look at the signals we are getting..." — Banno

Ha! Yes. But actors, hypochondriacs... don't we already have a perfectly ordinary notion of people showing external signs associated with pain but without the 'sensation'? I don't see that removing the sensation from the picture makes the assessment of honesty or exaggeration any more problematic. What I'm doing is really akin to the way I treat qualia, it's just an unnecessary reification. There's just a purple thing and our tendency to use the word purple in response to it, we don't need 'the experience of purple', it's not playing any useful part in the discourse. Likewise with pain. There's this collection of physiological triggers and there's our tendency to respond to them in certain ways (saying "pain", screaming...), the 'sensation of pain' just drops out of necessity, we don't need it to explain what's going on.

I think all three could be used as a public referent for the word 'pain', it's not like we have much trouble with non-exclusive sets in other areas of language ('game' as an obvious example). But the non-exclusivity opens the space for doubt. "Am I using this word right? Is it doing what I expect it to do in the circumstances?" — Isaac

You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling. Wittgenstein says that it is possible for other people to doubt whether I'm in pain. But if you're the one who is obviously hurting, then doubt is misplaced. There is no hypothesis to be tested or knowledge to be gained from the perspective of the one who's in pain. Maybe the "unpleasant sensation" of pain covers a wide range of sensations that causes some difficulties for scientists, but we all quickly learn what the word means.

288. I turn to stone, and my pain goes on. — What if I were mistaken,
and it was no longer pain? —– But surely I can’t be mistaken here; it
means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain! — That is, if someone
said “I don’t know if what I have is a pain or something else”, we would
think, perhaps, that he does not know what the English word “pain”
means; and we’d explain it to him. — How? Perhaps by means of gestures,
or by pricking him with a pin and saying, “See, that’s pain!” This
explanation of a word, like any other, he might understand rightly,
wrongly, or not at all. And he will show which by his use of the word,
in this as in other cases.
If he now said, for example, “Oh, I know what ‘pain’ means; what
I don’t know is whether this, that I have now, is pain” — we’d merely
shake our heads and have to regard his words as a strange reaction
which we can’t make anything of. (It would be rather as if we heard
someone say seriously, “I distinctly remember that sometime before I
was born I believed . . .”)
That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game; but if
expressions of sensation — human behaviour — are excluded, it looks
as if I might then legitimately begin to doubt. My temptation to say
that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arises
from this: if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game with
the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion of identity for the
sensation; and then the possibility of error also exists. — LW

.

You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling — Luke

No, I'm talking about the first-person, doubting that they are using the word "pain" correctly (or any other response to their set of physiological triggers)

Wittgenstein says that it is possible for other people to doubt whether I'm in pain. But if you're the one who is obviously hurting, then doubt is misplaced. There is no hypothesis to be tested or knowledge to be gained from the perspective of the one who's in pain. — Luke

Yes. Wittgenstein was wrong (which we shouldn't be surprised about since he had no training in cognitive psychology and the models we use to show he was wrong weren't even around at the time he was writing). There is a hypothesis to be tested, it's how all modelling in the brain works - hypothesis testing. That much is not even really in question. The only question is over what proportion of the hypothesis testing there's some conscious awareness, which is the matter addressed by the papers I cited. Not a settled question, I'll grant, but an interesting one.

Maybe the "unpleasant sensation" of pain covers a wide range of sensations that causes some difficulties for scientists, but we all quickly learn what the word means. — Luke

We quickly learn what the word does. That doesn't require us to refer to any private 'sensation' at all.

"I'm in X" (where X is some mental state) is something which can't meaningfully be doubted, it wouldn't make any sense to say that I was not in some mental state, it would require denying that I had mental processes at all (an obvious contradiction), or denying that they are always in some configuration or other (which seems a logical impossibility). But "I'm in pain" where we've used a word in response to our particular mental state is something which can be doubted because the word is public object, it's use (and associated conceptual responses) is a strategy to get something done within a social context. It might be the wrong strategy, it might not do what we expect it to do (same as any other response). In that case we've used the wrong model, we made a mistake reaching for the word "pain".

No, I'm talking about the first-person, doubting that they are using the word "pain" correctly — Isaac

First-person is you, not they.

No, I'm talking about the first-person, doubting that they are using the word "pain" correctly — Isaac


First-person is you, not they. — Luke

I was referring to another person's first-person experience, but it makes no odds I could have said "I doubt that I use the word 'pain' correctly"

Notice Wittgenstein's peculiar word usage at 258: " I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation." With the use of "certain" here it is implied that he might have certainty concerning his sensation. But as explained by Isaac above , there is no such thing as certainty in relation to sensations.

Further, Wittgenstein proceeds with "To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation...". Notice his reference here to "the sensation" as if every time that he judges a sensation as being similar to a previous one, he might conclude that it is that very same, "certain" sensation.

What he has done here is set up a scenario, which appears to the untrained mind, to be a completely normal and acceptable scenario, the person is going to mark down every time they experience the same sensation. However, in reality it is an impossible scenario. No two sensations are the same, as Isaac explains, so in reality, he could not ever be using the sign "S", if he could only use it when he was certain that it was "the sensation".

Of course Wittgenstein knows of this impossibility, and he has set up this impossible scenario intentionally, because he knows that many people might believe the scenario to be really possible, and might picture someone in that scenario actually using "S" to signify a "certain sensation". So, he proceeds to question how one might justify the use of "S" to signify that a sensation on one day is the very same sensation as the sensation on another day. Of course this cannot actually be justified.

Now, justification he says, requires an appeal to something else, something independent. So it is a type of comparison, a matter of establishing a relationship. So we see at 270 a correlation between his use of "S" with a rise in blood pressure, as a possible justification for his use of "S". However, as described, this is not a true justification.. So long as his use of "S" is judged as coinciding with a blood pressure rise, his sensations become completely irrelevant. So his use of "S" to signify a "certain sensation" cannot be justified in this way.

In conclusion, that "S" signifies a certain sensation is just a faulty idea created by the language-game.

270 And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?

@Isaac @Luke
I haven't been following closely, but it seems to me that Isaac is really adding a new language-game to the mix based on new information. It could be that the example (not sure at this point) of pain and doubting that one is in pain, is generally senseless, but that there are exceptions. It makes me think of Moore's claim, "I know this is a hand," i.e., can Moore doubt in this context? He's holding his hand up in a well lit room before an audience. Doubting in Moore's example, is a doubt that lacks justification. However, as Wittgenstein points out, there are situations where the doubt would be justified (make sense), then he goes on to explain how that can happen. So, the point with Isaac's example is that it could be just such a counter-example, but this really does nothing in terms of Wittgenstein's overall points about language.

Isaac brings up really interesting points.

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Isaac is really adding a new language-game to the mix based on new information. — Sam26

So @Isaac's scientist is not measuring pain.

It is clear from the examples I gave that the combination of signals being measured is not the exact same thing as being in pain. The patient can be in no doubt as to their pain, while the doctor can - which is, as Isaac points out, no different to our present situation.

So presents an example of someone doubting the applicability of the word "pain" to their present situation. That's not the same as doubting that one is in pain. seems to make a similar point, as does . And here:

But "I'm in pain" where we've used a word in response to our particular mental state is something which can be doubted because the word is public object, it's use (and associated conceptual responses) is a strategy to get something done within a social context. — Isaac

Isaac seems to be agreeing, but I suspect he will differ.

You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling
— Luke

No, I'm talking about the first-person, doubting that they are using the word "pain" correctly (or any other response to their set of physiological triggers) — Isaac

I was referring to another person's first-person experience, but it makes no odds I could have said "I doubt that I use the word 'pain' correctly" — Isaac

Why are you doubting that you or someone else is using the word "pain" correctly?

There is a hypothesis to be tested, it's how all modelling in the brain works - hypothesis testing. — Isaac

I just said that you were now talking in terms of third-person modelling, and you denied it, saying "No, I'm talking about the first-person" and doubting their (or your) use of the word "pain".

Anyhow, how one's brain works is not a first-person perspective, or something that we are consciously aware of in the first-person. Being in pain is not the same as having knowledge of our brain functioning. Otherwise, we'd all be experts in the science; or, perhaps, those who knew nothing of the science could not feel pain.

We quickly learn what the word does. That doesn't require us to refer to any private 'sensation' at all. — Isaac

I don't see how the word could be used (in the sense we are using it here) without reference to the sensation. Pain is a sensation. I might cry in pain, but it doesn't mean that pain is crying (nor any other expression/s of pain).

With the use of "certain" here it is implied that he might have certainty concerning his sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No; he's using "certain" in the attributive sense, as about a specific sensation.

It's your eccentric readings leading you astray, again.