Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). The six signals are obviously not themselves 'pain' (again, in the way Wittgenstein is using the term), so it must be the model. But if it's the model, we do doubt it because those six triggering physiological signals overlap with some of the triggering physiological signal for other state/emotion models. — Isaac
try doubting the pain you're having. — Sam26
If it is something we construct, then we can doubt the appropriateness and/or utility of the construction. We can't doubt the triggering sensations, but they were not (in Wittgenstein's use) 'pain' in the first place, they're just physiological activity.
Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). The six signals are obviously not themselves 'pain' (again, in the way Wittgenstein is using the term), so it must be the model. — Isaac
But if it's the model, we do doubt it because those six triggering physiological signals overlap with some of the triggering physiological signal for other state/emotion models. Just as we might say "I wasn't hungry, I was just nervous" (misinterpreting the overlapping signals from the digestive system in those two models), we might be able to say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross". That we don't actually say that is not necessarily a reflection on what is the case so much a cultural artefact of the belief that things like emotions and pains are natural kinds (a belief I believe modern cognitive sciences shows to be unfounded). — Isaac
I think we addressed this long ago, but we might have a clearer example here. — Banno
You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source [of pain] not natural expressions or reactions, but merely "something we construct"? Don't most animals tend to withdraw from perceived sources of pain? — Luke
Such general facts of nature (PI 142) are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work — Luke
there's very strong evidence to support it. Why else do you think we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross"? — Luke
he part of the brain dealing with language doesn't even get a look in on this type of signalling, it gets the second hand messages from the proprioceptive neurons, and the eyes that it's body has already pulled away from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site. — Isaac
Beyond those autonomous responses, then yes, I am saying there are no natural human expression or reactions. — Isaac
I've just given an account of why - we have a cultural belief in natural kinds. — Isaac
I was only talking about natural expressions/reactions, not language. — Luke
How are you distinguishing those autonomous responses (such as "already pulled aware from the hot thing, or shielded the pain site") from natural expression/reactions? — Luke
Your account of why we don't actually say "I wasn't in pain, I was just cold and cross" is because we believe in natural kinds, not because there are natural kinds. I don't see how that's an account rather than an assertion. We might believe in natural kinds because there are natural kinds. — Luke
But the subject here is language, no? The use of the word "pain". — Isaac
By examining what's going on in the brain. Autonomous reactions don't have any connections to areas of the brain we know to be involved in conscious processing, language use etc. — Isaac
I provided a paper to indicate the support for the model, I can give more if you suspect I'm being dishonest in saying it's the prevailing model. I could give a full account here, but that would be considerably dry and totally off-topic, and it's better you read it directly from the scientists doing the work. What other kind of evidence were you expecting to raise my comment above the level of mere assertion? — Isaac
3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions. — Antony Nickles
Yes, but not with my recent questioning of your implication that there are no natural expressions or reactions. — Luke
I don't see what conscious processing and language use have to do with natural reactions/expressions. — Luke
Explain to me how your autonomous reactions are different from natural reactions/expressions and maybe I'll read it. — Luke
You're implying that there are no natural human expressions or reactions. How are a tendency to say "ouch" or a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source [of pain] not natural expressions or reactions, but merely "something we construct"? Don't most animals tend to withdraw from perceived sources of pain?
Such general facts of nature (PI 142) are pivotal to Wittgenstein's work, especially his references to form of life and "shared human behaviour" (PI 206), or that we teach children sensation words on the basis of such shared behaviour (PI 257). — Luke
In terms of PLA, isn't John's use is exactly a case of sensation S? Haven't we learnt to use the word pain appropriately by trial and error, I use it here it should do this...no, that didn't quite work out as I expected...perhaps here, like this...all the while watching other humans in our social group to see how they react. — Isaac
The point is that "pain" is used to describe a complex state, not an autonomous response — Isaac
Image you've six physiological signals (a, b, c, d, e, and f) you generally model any combination of four or more as 'pain' (by model I mean things like a tendency to use the word 'pain', a tendency to say 'ouch', a tendency to withdraw from the perceived source...etc). — Isaac
The point is that "pain" is used to describe a complex state, not an autonomous response, so when determining if it refers to a simple, what matters is whether such states are natural kinds. Whether autonomous responses are natural kinds seems immaterial. — Isaac
Do you acknowledge two different senses of "meaning" here? One sense of "meaning" (as in word meaning) is definition, explanation, or sense. The other sense of "meaning" (as in meaningful) is significance, consequence, or worth. — Luke
You started that post talking about the sensation of pain as a natural kind, but then you went on to talk about constructing models in terms of expressions of pain. — Luke
if the abstract to your primer is anything to go by, then it discusses emotions, not sensations. — Luke
I want to add
d) a sensation that is not private. — Banno
I have an image of someone groaning in agony as the doctor says "no, no, she's not in pain...look at the signals we are getting..." — Banno
I think all three could be used as a public referent for the word 'pain', it's not like we have much trouble with non-exclusive sets in other areas of language ('game' as an obvious example). But the non-exclusivity opens the space for doubt. "Am I using this word right? Is it doing what I expect it to do in the circumstances?" — Isaac
.288. I turn to stone, and my pain goes on. — What if I were mistaken,
and it was no longer pain? —– But surely I can’t be mistaken here; it
means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain! — That is, if someone
said “I don’t know if what I have is a pain or something else”, we would
think, perhaps, that he does not know what the English word “pain”
means; and we’d explain it to him. — How? Perhaps by means of gestures,
or by pricking him with a pin and saying, “See, that’s pain!” This
explanation of a word, like any other, he might understand rightly,
wrongly, or not at all. And he will show which by his use of the word,
in this as in other cases.
If he now said, for example, “Oh, I know what ‘pain’ means; what
I don’t know is whether this, that I have now, is pain” — we’d merely
shake our heads and have to regard his words as a strange reaction
which we can’t make anything of. (It would be rather as if we heard
someone say seriously, “I distinctly remember that sometime before I
was born I believed . . .”)
That expression of doubt has no place in the language-game; but if
expressions of sensation — human behaviour — are excluded, it looks
as if I might then legitimately begin to doubt. My temptation to say
that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arises
from this: if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game with
the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion of identity for the
sensation; and then the possibility of error also exists. — LW
You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling — Luke
Wittgenstein says that it is possible for other people to doubt whether I'm in pain. But if you're the one who is obviously hurting, then doubt is misplaced. There is no hypothesis to be tested or knowledge to be gained from the perspective of the one who's in pain. — Luke
Maybe the "unpleasant sensation" of pain covers a wide range of sensations that causes some difficulties for scientists, but we all quickly learn what the word means. — Luke
270 And what is our reason for calling "S" the name of a sensation here? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language-game,— And why a "particular sensation," that is, the same one every time? Well, aren't we supposing that we write "S" every time?
Isaac is really adding a new language-game to the mix based on new information. — Sam26
Isaac seems to be agreeing, but I suspect he will differ.But "I'm in pain" where we've used a word in response to our particular mental state is something which can be doubted because the word is public object, it's use (and associated conceptual responses) is a strategy to get something done within a social context. — Isaac
You're now talking in terms of third-person modelling
— Luke
No, I'm talking about the first-person, doubting that they are using the word "pain" correctly (or any other response to their set of physiological triggers) — Isaac
I was referring to another person's first-person experience, but it makes no odds I could have said "I doubt that I use the word 'pain' correctly" — Isaac
There is a hypothesis to be tested, it's how all modelling in the brain works - hypothesis testing. — Isaac
We quickly learn what the word does. That doesn't require us to refer to any private 'sensation' at all. — Isaac
With the use of "certain" here it is implied that he might have certainty concerning his sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover
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