No; he's using "certain" in the attributive sense, as about a specific sensation. — Banno
I would say an explanation does not show something's significance. Or that a definition imposes itself over anything else of consequence. What I was getting at is that the model of meaning based on a word's definition, imagines it as particular and certain; which creates the picture that I cause or intend something particular and/or use rules for a certain outcome. Wittgenstein is taking apart that explanation to see how each thing is important to us (all). — Antony Nickles
3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions. — Antony Nickles
it seems to me that Isaac is really adding a new language-game to the mix based on new information. It could be that the example (not sure at this point) of pain and doubting that one is in pain, is generally senseless, but that there are exceptions. — Sam26
So ↪Isaac
presents an example of someone doubting the applicability of the word "pain" to their present situation. That's not the same as doubting that one is in pain. — Banno
Why are you doubting that you or someone else is using the word "pain" correctly? — Luke
I don't see how the word could be used (in the sense we are using it here) without reference to the sensation. Pain is a sensation. — Luke
That is, if someone said “I don’t know if what I have is a pain or something else”, we would
think, perhaps, that he does not know what the English word “pain” means; and we’d explain it to him. — How? Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and saying, “See, that’s pain!” This explanation of a word, like any other, he might understand rightly, wrongly, or not at all. And he will show which by his use of the word, in this as in other cases.
If he now said, for example, “Oh, I know what ‘pain’ means; what I don’t know is whether this, that I have now, is pain” — we’d merely shake our heads and have to regard his words as a strange reaction which we can’t make anything of. — LW
There's no such thing as 'sensations'. — Isaac
it seems to me that Isaac is really adding a new language-game to the mix based on new information. It could be that the example (not sure at this point) of pain and doubting that one is in pain, is generally senseless, but that there are exceptions.
— Sam26
Yes, that's exactly it. Banno and I have been here before. When we talk about cognition, in the scientific sense, we need a language-game to talk about what we find, but that's often not the folk psychology that gives us many of the terms we use day-to-day. — Isaac
then you lose me. Also, you can't look at X, Y, and Z happening in the brain, and say, that's pain. Moreover, if someone isn't feeling pain, then they're not in pain, regardless of what the body is doing.There's no such thing as 'sensations'. They don't exist. No representation on earth, Non-entities...* — Isaac
Ya, but when you say things like this, — Sam26
Modern science can find no such thing that answers to 'the sensation of being in pain'. That's the problem I'm attempting to address. — Isaac
Modern science can find no such thing that answers to 'the sensation of being in pain'. That's the problem I'm attempting to address. — Isaac
Yeah, I lose a lot of people at that point. — Isaac
You're still assuming that there's a physiological/mental state that answers to the term 'in pain'. What if there wasn't? How would that change things? — Isaac
andThat's just the old problem of trying to identify some thing that corresponds to the word. Obviously, not all words function like that, and sensation, is just one such word. — Sam26
We quickly learn what the word does. That doesn't require us to refer to any private 'sensation' at all. — Isaac
it's use (and associated conceptual responses) is a strategy to get something done within a social context. It might be the wrong strategy, it might not do what we expect it to do (same as any other response). In that case we've used the wrong model, we made a mistake reaching for the word "pain". — Isaac
However, it is the place where you find me. — Metaphysician Undercover
If, seconds later, those signals fail to materialise (for whatever reason) I'll adjust my model response and update my priors - in other words, I'll have been wrong about the only thing we could possibly say constituted being in pain. — Isaac
So "I'm in pain" is a response which does something in a social context, and - being triggered by interocepted physiological states - it's those states we intend the word to act on. — Isaac
So if we reach for that word and it doesn't have the intended effect on those states, we're wrong to reach for it. — Isaac
Note this is not just us not having learned the right use of the word, since the modelling of the "I'm in pain" response at inappropriate times can result from nothing more than a misfiring of triggering signals, or an overlap with similar signals in a noisy part of the network. — Isaac
What I'm saying is not that we can't treat "I'm in pain" as a simple functional expression, and therefore not amenable to being right or wrong, we can. — Isaac
I'm saying that there's an additional matter to be talked about when we speak of as pain responses modelled from what are typically pain triggers. Here we definitely have a moment when we decide, post hoc, if we're going to trigger the 'pain' responses or not and if we decide in such a way as to elicit an unexpected response, we change the prior (ie we consider ourselves to have been 'wrong' the first time). How do we speak about this psychology if not by saying that we decide if we're in pain and can be right or wrong about that? — Isaac
This difference i reading has to do with what to make of rules, grammar, concepts , criteria. Do they have any existence outside of actual, contextual situations? This question would seem to apply equally to terms like model and representation as they are utilized in free energy approaches. Put differently, do you understand and concur with Antony’s objections to Luke’s reading of Wittgenstein on grammar and rules? — Joshs
a private language cannot consist of rules, so right and wrong within a private language is nonsensical. This does not mean that a private language is nonsensical, it just means that the ideas of right and wrong cannot be supported by the private language. So we have a deep division here, a fundamental divide between two very distinct types of language-games, the private game within which there is no such thing as correct and incorrect, and the public game, within which "correct" and "incorrect" appear to form the substance. — Metaphysician Undercover
When we think or talk to ourself, or perceive our surroundings, we know when an event is recognizable or unrecognizable, coherent or incoherent , consistent or inconsistent , with respect to our expectations. Aren’t these forms of correctness? — Joshs
Well, it's nice to have some company, but as ever I can't really make much sense of what you're saying, you may have to be a bit more explicit for me. — Isaac
Of course it could be that MU is right and everyone else is wrong, it's logically possible. — Sam26
my supposition is that he would find its representationalism problematic. — Joshs
This difference i reading has to do with what to make of rules, grammar, concepts , criteria. Do they have any existence outside of actual, contextual situations? This question would seem to apply equally to terms like model and representation as they are utilized in free energy approaches. — Joshs
What if they do materialise? — Luke
How does a sensation differ from an interocepted physiological state? — Luke
And if it does have the intended effect on those states, then we're right to reach for it. — Luke
It sounds like there are also appropriate times that 'I'm in pain' gets used. — Luke
What I'm saying is not that we can't treat "I'm in pain" as a simple functional expression, and therefore not amenable to being right or wrong, we can. — Isaac
Then it's not about the use of the word "pain", as you've been claiming. — Luke
Also, what counts as "right" and "wrong" here? Because it sounds very much as though what is counted as 'right' is if there follows a sensation (or an interocepted physiological signal) of pain. — Luke
You said that if we hit our thumb with a hammer, then we expect a painful sensation to follow but we may find that it does not follow. I would not call that "deciding" whether to be in pain or not. Wittgenstein is only talking about those cases where the pain does follow and we find that we are in pain. — Luke
while the doctor calmly says "You are not in pain, because you are not exhibiting the correct neural signals to be in pain".
Who is to have authority here, in our new language game? — Banno
If, seconds later, those signals fail to materialise (for whatever reason) I'll adjust my model response and update my priors - in other words, I'll have been wrong about the only thing we could possibly say constituted being in pain.
— Isaac
What if they do materialise?
— Luke
Then we'll have been 'right' to assume such. — Isaac
A sensation is a single category, the interocepted physiological state signals are manifold and form a non-exclusive set. — Isaac
And if it does have the intended effect on those states, then we're right to reach for it.
— Luke
Yes. Although, we could later revise that in the light of other goals, we have more than one objective that these outputs form part of the subsequent model for. — Isaac
Note this is not just us not having learned the right use of the word, since the modelling of the "I'm in pain" response at inappropriate times can result from nothing more than a misfiring of triggering signals, or an overlap with similar signals in a noisy part of the network.
— Isaac
It sounds like there are also appropriate times that 'I'm in pain' gets used.
— Luke
Yes. I think that's undeniable, the expression wouldn't exist otherwise. — Isaac
What I'm saying is not that we can't treat "I'm in pain" as a simple functional expression, and therefore not amenable to being right or wrong, we can.
— Isaac
Then it's not about the use of the word "pain", as you've been claiming.
— Luke
Not sure what you're getting at here... — Isaac
Again 'pain' does not 'follow', it's not a physiological state, it's a modelling relationship and we make decisions about those. — Isaac
Also, I don't think it's likely that you have created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain. — Sam26
It's not clear to me, and it seems it's not clear to others, so your idea needs more work. — Sam26
According to what I described above, Wittgenstein's PLA, 253-270, demonstrates very clearly that one can never be certain concerning one's own sensations, if certainty requires justification. Do you not agree, that Wittgenstein has created a model that shows we can doubt being in pain? — Metaphysician Undercover
What I was getting at is that the model of meaning based on a word's definition, imagines it as particular and certain; which creates the picture that I cause or intend something particular and/or use rules for a certain outcome. Wittgenstein is taking apart that explanation to see how each thing is important to us (all).
— Antony Nickles
Doesn't what you've written here have a meaning that is "particular and certain"? — Luke
3) That a word can be defined (which we do call: its "meaning") does not reflect the way language works, e.g., a sentence cannot be defined. Meaning is not an action (a cause/our "use") or a thing (internally, like, intention; or externally, like rules for a practice); it is what is meaningful to us as a culture, what is essential to us, expressed in the implications (grammar) of our expressions and actions.
— Antony Nickles
How does this relate back to the private language argument? I don't view the PLA as being about what is meaningful or essential to us as a culture. — Luke
and, by "certain", here you mean specific, which is a different sense of certainty — Antony Nickles
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