Poetry succeeded in virtue of the shared world of poet and reader. Poetry is not private. — Banno
is an individual reaction; but it is not private - after all, you just shared it.I don't know if many people experience this, but when I am reading philosophical works I sometimes find myself visualizing some scene from my childhood, like the backyard of the girl who lived across the road, or the stretch of bush that ran from the back of my grandmother's house to my parent's house. Sometimes it's like the images in dream which don't make any describable sense. This only happens with philosophical works, possibly because they are not describing anything concrete that can be visualized. It's a very strange stream of images and feelings going on in the background. — Janus
is an individual reaction; but it is not private - after all, you just shared it. — Banno
What is supposedly being named is a type of sensation, not a token of the sensation. That’s my point. — Luke
Likewise, the sensation the diarist had last week and the sensation the diarist has today are different tokens and are both named ‘S’ because they are (seemingly) the same type of sensation. There is nothing nonsensical about this. — Luke
...substantive... — Janus
...but unless you have experienced something like it, you would not have any
substantive idea of what I'm talking about... Just like the example I gave earlier of... the blind person. — Janus
you think that it's impossible that two distinct occurrences could be of the same token (an opinion which of course is disproven by the chair) — Metaphysician Undercover
You have two unjustified assumptions here. First that it's impossible that the same token could appear to a person at two distinct times, and second, that two distinct tokens must be tokens of the same type. — Metaphysician Undercover
I can see the same chair last week and this week. Why can't I have the same sensation last week and this week? — Metaphysician Undercover
Second, and this is a significant point to the PLA, if you assert that the person is wrong in naming it the same token, because you insist that it must be two different tokens, then you have no capacity to judge the two as the same type, having no access to the person's private inner feelings which are being named. — Metaphysician Undercover
Basic courtesy dictates that you respond to someone you has replied to your topic and in fact in length ... — Alkis Piskas
Just "Thank you for your response" suffices. It only takes a couple of seconds of your time, which I believe are well spent, because you show that you are not ignoring the people who respond to you your topic. Otherwise, why one should respond to the topics at all? Responding to a topic is the minimum that can happen in a discussion that has started by launching a topic.I don't always have the time to respond to every post — Sam26
. Sensations typically have a duration; they start and end, or come and go. A particular instance or duration of a sensation is a token of that sensation. Like the chair, the token of the sensation is a single (instance/duration of the) sensation that can only be the same as itself. — Luke
What is assumed in Wittgenstein's scenario is that the diarist will write 'S' in their diary for each instance or token of the sensation. — Luke
First, it is impossible to have two of "the same token", by definition. — Luke
Second, tokens are of the same type, by definition — Luke
It is sensible to question - as you did earlier - whether it is the same type of chair that only looks similar to the one you saw here yesterday, or whether it is the same token of chair - in fact, the same chair - that you saw here yesterday. This is how the type/token distinction can help to clarify the matter. — Luke
My access is not the issue. — Luke
If the same token of a chair can come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience, then why can't the same token of sensation come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience? — Metaphysician Undercover
Why would you think that each time the memory occurs to you, it is a different token? — Metaphysician Undercover
You are still refusing to acknowledge Wittgenstein has explicitly said that the diarist is naming a "particular sensation" — Metaphysician Undercover
What happened to "let's suppose you are right..." , and proceeding from there? — Metaphysician Undercover
I am arguing that the same token can occur to the conscious mind, two, or a multitude of distinct times. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I'm not going to allow you to redefine terms as we go. Many different types of tokens occur to a person, — Metaphysician Undercover
Why would you think it is senseless to determine the identity of a particular token? — Metaphysician Undercover
Because it isn't the same token of the sensation, obviously. If you have a sensation and it goes away, then it's not the same token of the sensation when you have it again. — Luke
You have changed the subject to talk about memories. — Luke
That could be either a particular token of the sensation or a particular type of sensation. Unless you can provide an argument for why 'S' must be the name of a particular token of the sensation (only), and not the name of a particular type of sensation, then stop mindlessly repeating this. — Luke
You said there was no problem with naming a token! But there is a problem with the diarist scenario, right? — Luke
An instance of a sensation or an instance of a chair is not how many times these things appear to your consciousness or your memory, or whatever rubbish you are spouting. I already explained to you that a token or an instance of these things is their entire existence or "lifetime". It is one unit or one instance of a class of objects, which is what 'S' denotes with regards to a sensation. The word "sensation" does not apply to one token only; it applies to a class of objects - a type. — Luke
I said it was senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type. — Luke
A person who has never felt pain does not know what the word refers to; — Janus
I suspect that you have not actually engaged with the analysis, from Wittgenstein, presented by @Sam26 myself and others, actually has to say. SOIt makes me wonder what planet you've been living, on to be honest. — Janus
in asking what I mean by "refer" when I am arguing against the use of that notion in this context seems unhelpful.It depends on what you mean by 'refer' — Janus
Where is your proof? — Metaphysician Undercover
it is who who needs an argument to show that your interpretation which switches in "type" for Wittgenstein's "particular" — Metaphysician Undercover
Every object is a token of some type or types. Why would it be senseless to ask what type is that object a token of? — Metaphysician Undercover
It's because you can refer to a single tree that you can refer to trees in general. — Banno
The point I’ve unsuccessfully been trying to make is that Wittgenstein is talking about establishing the name of a sensation. This means not only establishing the name for a single token, but for a class of tokens, i.e., a type. Wittgenstein is debunking the idea that a name or word can be established in the way he describes. — Luke
The “proof” is that it is assumed by the scenario that the diarist writes ‘S’ “every time”, for each token or instance of the sensation. What prompts the diarist to write ‘S’ is the recurrence of the sensation. — Luke
On the other hand, I have cited further context to support that he means a particular type. — Luke
The type/token distinction is used to clarify the distinction between a particular class and its instances, so it is senseless of you to question which instances belong to which class. — Luke
If what you claim as "proof" was true, then every distinct time that I see a chair, it would necessarily be a different token — Metaphysician Undercover
All I have to do is point at 258 where Wittgenstein uses "the sensation" four times to stress that he is talking about a particular sensation rather than a type. — Metaphysician Undercover
When there is ambiguity in the words used (as there always is to some extent, especially in philosophical writing), the latter is very conducive to misreading. This is a danger which is amplified by reading secondary sources prior to the primary source. — Metaphysician Undercover
The replies are
1. We agree that the grammar of talk of pain is superficially the same as that of other object - hence the example that "I have a phone in my hand " and "I have a pain in my hand". The cogent difference is exactly "the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at". — Banno
2. If the account in (1) is correct, it's not just folk who have not felt pain who do not refer to it; rather, we all express pain. But further, the blind rugby player mentioned above might not share in the experience of seeing, but can kick goals, with all that involves; and so it's not shared experience that counts, but being in a shared world.
3. Arguably Wittgenstein's purpose was to dissuade philosophers from arguing in terms of words having meanings, especially if they are considered some sort of mental furniture. The admonition is to look at use in the place of meaning.
I still maintain that if someone has not experienced what a word commonly signifies, then they will not understand what the word refers to — Janus
See those words, again?
Not all words are nouns. But further, that the noun is used does not imply that the thing named exists.
That's the essential observation that seems not to be present in your thinking. — Banno
What those words signify are not objects, but they exist as feelings; so I'm not seeing any substance to your objection. — Janus
The cogent difference is exactly "the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at". — Banno
I still maintain that if someone has not experienced what a word commonly signifies, then they will not understand what the word refers to... — Janus
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