OK, but this:

My point is just that the feelings elicited by a poem are ultimately private, like sensation. — Janus

is too strong. Poetry succeeded in virtue of the shared world of poet and reader. Poetry is not private.

Poetry succeeded in virtue of the shared world of poet and reader. Poetry is not private. — Banno

I do agree that poetry as an institution or cultural phenomenon is public. So, perhaps I should have said that the feelings elicited by a poem may be ultimately private, not they necessarily are.

I'll push the point.

This:

I don't know if many people experience this, but when I am reading philosophical works I sometimes find myself visualizing some scene from my childhood, like the backyard of the girl who lived across the road, or the stretch of bush that ran from the back of my grandmother's house to my parent's house. Sometimes it's like the images in dream which don't make any describable sense. This only happens with philosophical works, possibly because they are not describing anything concrete that can be visualized. It's a very strange stream of images and feelings going on in the background. — Janus

is an individual reaction; but it is not private - after all, you just shared it.

is an individual reaction; but it is not private - after all, you just shared it. — Banno

Sure, but unless you have experienced something like it, you would not have any substantive idea of what I'm talking about. Say you have never visualized anything, your mind just doesn't work that way. Just like the example I gave earlier of someone who has never experienced pain, or the blind person who has never seen anything. So, it's public because it's expressed in a public language, but it's not all public because its communication depends on some commonality of experience which may not always be in play.

What is supposedly being named is a type of sensation, not a token of the sensation. That’s my point. — Luke

Well we're right back to the same point. I thought you said "Let’s suppose you are right and that Wittgenstein is talking only about a single particular token of the sensation." Under this premise, what is named as "S" is a single particular token. You are completely unjustified in saying that it is a type of sensation being named. If the person was wrong in the naming practice, in your judgement, because you think that it's impossible that two distinct occurrences could be of the same token (an opinion which of course is disproven by the chair), and the two occurrences are actually different, being different still doesn't make them the same type. And you have no way to judge what is being named as the same type, because it's private. You have two unjustified assumptions here. First that it's impossible that the same token could appear to a person at two distinct times, and second, that two distinct tokens must be tokens of the same type.

Likewise, the sensation the diarist had last week and the sensation the diarist has today are different tokens and are both named ‘S’ because they are (seemingly) the same type of sensation. There is nothing nonsensical about this. — Luke

There is nothing nonsensical, it's just a completely unjustified conclusion, doubly so, as explained above. First, the two occurrences might very well be two occurrences of the same token. I can see the same chair last week and this week. Why can't I have the same sensation last week and this week? Second, and this is a significant point to the PLA, if you assert that the person is wrong in naming it the same token, because you insist that it must be two different tokens, then you have no capacity to judge the two as the same type, having no access to the person's private inner feelings which are being named.

To make your point, you need to ask the diarist to justify his judgement of "the same". And that's why Wittgenstein takes us to the device which reads blood pressure as an example of justification. But then the person's sensation becomes irrelevant, and the symbol signifies a rise in blood pressure instead. And if the diarist argued that there is a corresponding sensation, which is always "the same" sensation, you could argue that it is just the same type, the type which causes the blood pressure to rise. But this only a feature of the justification, which makes "rise in blood pressure" the definition of "S", and the sensations which the diarist refers to are judged by you as the type which coincide with the rise in blood pressure. You still wouldn't know for sure that they weren't the very same token occurring at a different time, like the chair.

...substantive... — Janus

This blind Rugby player seems to have a substantive idea of how to kick a gaol, despite not being able to see ball, field or bars.

Thing is, the substance around him - the world we share with him - is substantively the same. The experience - not so much.

...but unless you have experienced something like it, you would not have any
substantive idea of what I'm talking about... Just like the example I gave earlier of... the blind person. — Janus

It's not a shared experience that makes the difference; it's a shared world.

you think that it's impossible that two distinct occurrences could be of the same token (an opinion which of course is disproven by the chair) — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not disproven by the chair. The chair is no different. A token of the chair just means the existence or "lifetime" of the chair. Excluding any kind of Ship of Theseus issues, the token of the chair is a single chair that can only be the same as itself, as per the law of identity. It cannot be the same as any other chair that looks identical or that is of the same type.

We can equally speak of the existence or "lifetime" of a sensation. Sensations typically have a duration; they start and end, or come and go. A particular instance or duration of a sensation is a token of that sensation. Like the chair, the token of the sensation is a single (instance/duration of the) sensation that can only be the same as itself.

What is assumed in Wittgenstein's scenario is that the diarist will write 'S' in their diary for each instance or token of the sensation. The next time the diarist has the sensation it is a new token; a new instance of the sensation. Therefore, it is not possible that two distinct occurrences of the sensation could be the same token.

You have two unjustified assumptions here. First that it's impossible that the same token could appear to a person at two distinct times, and second, that two distinct tokens must be tokens of the same type. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am assuming neither of these things. First, it is impossible to have two of "the same token", by definition. Second, tokens are of the same type, by definition. It is clear that you still do not understand the type/token distinction. The type/token distinction distinguishes between naming a class (type) of objects and naming the individual instances (tokens) of that class. Each class has its own individual instances, so it is senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type.

I can see the same chair last week and this week. Why can't I have the same sensation last week and this week? — Metaphysician Undercover

You can have the same type of sensation, but not the same token of sensation. Anyhow, I thought you were talking about the same chair. It is sensible to question - as you did earlier - whether it is the same type of chair that only looks similar to the one you saw here yesterday, or whether it is the same token of chair - in fact, the same chair - that you saw here yesterday. This is how the type/token distinction can help to clarify the matter.

Second, and this is a significant point to the PLA, if you assert that the person is wrong in naming it the same token, because you insist that it must be two different tokens, then you have no capacity to judge the two as the same type, having no access to the person's private inner feelings which are being named. — Metaphysician Undercover

My access is not the issue. We can each consider doing this sort of private inner labelling process ourselves. Actually, that's what Wittgenstein wants us to do in order to try and free us from the misconception that the way sensations are named and what gives words their meanings is simply memorising the connection between the sign and the sensation.

Basic courtesy dictates that you respond to someone you has replied to your topic and in fact in length ... — Alkis Piskas

I don't always have the time to respond to every post. Life just has a way of getting in the way of my responses. Sometimes I can put more effort into these threads than other times. I would like to respond to every post, but sometimes I just don't have the energy. There are a lot of things that can get into the way of responses, like an illness for example. So, it's not always that someone is being discourteous. When I'm distracted I tend to make mistakes, so I try not to force myself. So, don't take it personally.

I don't always have the time to respond to every post — Sam26

Just "Thank you for your response" suffices. It only takes a couple of seconds of your time, which I believe are well spent, because you show that you are not ignoring the people who respond to you your topic. Otherwise, why one should respond to the topics at all? Responding to a topic is the minimum that can happen in a discussion that has started by launching a topic.

If you don't have the time to cope with a discussion even on a minimul level (e.g. with a response like I mentioned at above), do not "Start a new Discussion" (as TFP prompts you to).

I gave you my response, now you're going to lecture me. If you don't like the way I respond move to a different thread.

If it were a honest response I would just say "OK" (two letters). But it wasn't.
Besides, according to your spirit of communication, since you didn't like "the way I responded" you should ignore my reply and do something else with your time! (I didn't expect a reply, anyway.) :smile:
Which, BTW shows that you do have time to spare for responding! (Hence your dishonest response! :smile:)

. Sensations typically have a duration; they start and end, or come and go. A particular instance or duration of a sensation is a token of that sensation. Like the chair, the token of the sensation is a single (instance/duration of the) sensation that can only be the same as itself. — Luke

You appear to be missing the point Luke. If the same token of a chair can come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience, then why can't the same token of sensation come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience? One comes from ,and goes to; an external source which is outside my conscious experience, and the other comes from and goes to an internal source which is outside my conscious experience How could your memory work, if it wasn't the same token coming and going, to and from your mind, each time that you remember the same event? A memory of an event comes and goes from your conscious experience, coming from and going to some internal place. Why would you think that each time the memory occurs to you, it is a different token? If it was a different token, you would not remember it as the same event, it would occur to you as a different event each time. And if each time the idea of two came into your mind, that is the number two not the symbol, it was a different token, how could you do any mathematics?

What is assumed in Wittgenstein's scenario is that the diarist will write 'S' in their diary for each instance or token of the sensation. — Luke

You are still refusing to acknowledge Wittgenstein has explicitly said that the diarist is naming a "particular sensation" (270), therefore the very same token. He says absolutely nothing to indicate that the diarist is naming a type. This fabrication of yours is misleading you, causing you to misunderstand, and miss the whole point of the example, the criterion of identity What happened to "let's suppose you are right..." , and proceeding from there? we didn't get anywhere because you just jumped back to your old fabricated reading.

First, it is impossible to have two of "the same token", by definition. — Luke

I'm not arguing "two of the same token". I am arguing that the same token can occur to the conscious mind, two, or a multitude of distinct times. This is extremely common in the case of external things. Yet you are insisting that in the case of internal private things this is impossible. But you have provided absolutely no justification for this assumed difference, only repeated assertions.. I have provided examples of when we commonly speak of the very same internal private token, recurring to the mind a multitude of times, the tooth-ache, and the ideas, or concepts of mathematics. Now I offer you memories as another example.

Second, tokens are of the same type, by definition — Luke

False. a "token" can be a token of any type. I am only using "token" as a term here instead of "particular", "individual" at your insistence, because you do not seem to have the capacity to understand this subject by other terms. But I'm not going to allow you to redefine terms as we go. Many different types of tokens occur to a person, and the person must decide which type they are tokens of. You are just spouting nonsense to insist that two tokens must be of the same type. If this were the case then there would only be one type, because all tokens would necessarily be of the same type.

It is sensible to question - as you did earlier - whether it is the same type of chair that only looks similar to the one you saw here yesterday, or whether it is the same token of chair - in fact, the same chair - that you saw here yesterday. This is how the type/token distinction can help to clarify the matter. — Luke

That is the very question which Wittgenstein asks. Why would you think it is senseless to determine the identity of a particular token? Suppose you and I have the very same "identical" chairs, the same type. Yet mine has five times as much use, so it is weaker and more worn. Why do you think it's senseless to distinguish which token of that type is which, which is mine and which is yours? Would you readily trade? What if it was something more valuable like a car. Would you trade yours for one of the same type with five times as much distance on it?

My access is not the issue. — Luke

Of course access is the issue, that's what makes the private language "private". How can you say such a thing and claim to have any understanding of the PLA? If it wasn't the issue why make an example of a "private language" in the first place? It's the beetle in the box thing, you can't see into another's box.

If the same token of a chair can come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience, then why can't the same token of sensation come and go many times, relative to my conscious experience? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because it isn't the same token of the sensation, obviously. If you have a sensation and it goes away, then it's not the same token of the sensation when you have it again.

Why would you think that each time the memory occurs to you, it is a different token? — Metaphysician Undercover

You have changed the subject to talk about memories.

You are still refusing to acknowledge Wittgenstein has explicitly said that the diarist is naming a "particular sensation" — Metaphysician Undercover

That could be either a particular token of the sensation or a particular type of sensation. Unless you can provide an argument for why 'S' must be the name of a particular token of the sensation (only), and not the name of a particular type of sensation, then stop mindlessly repeating this.

What happened to "let's suppose you are right..." , and proceeding from there? — Metaphysician Undercover

You said there was no problem with naming a token! But there is a problem with the diarist scenario, right?

I am arguing that the same token can occur to the conscious mind, two, or a multitude of distinct times. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you think a token is?

An instance of a sensation or an instance of a chair is not how many times these things appear to your consciousness or your memory, or whatever rubbish you are spouting. I already explained to you that a token or an instance of these things is their entire existence or "lifetime". It is one unit or one instance of a class of objects, which is what 'S' denotes with regards to a sensation. The word "sensation" does not apply to one token only; it applies to a class of objects - a type.

But I'm not going to allow you to redefine terms as we go. Many different types of tokens occur to a person, — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you know what the type/token distinction is? Have you ever heard of it? I'm not the one trying to "redefine terms". You're the one not using the word "token" correctly. Look it up.

Why would you think it is senseless to determine the identity of a particular token? — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said it was senseless to determine the identity of a particular token. I said it was senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type.

Because it isn't the same token of the sensation, obviously. If you have a sensation and it goes away, then it's not the same token of the sensation when you have it again. — Luke

Where is your proof? You continue with this unsupported assertion. If I see a chair, and someone takes the chair away, then brings the very same chair back, obviously it is the very same token. Would you assert that because it went away and came back, it is obviously not the same token. Your assertion, that if a sensation goes away and comes back it cannot be the same token, makes no sense because it is completely unjustified. I get a pain in my toe sometimes at night, I can get it many nights in a row, or some nights I don't get it. It wakes me up when I'm sleeping. I cannot see what causes it to come and go. But the fact that it comes and goes does not give me reason to claim that it is not the same token of the type "pain" every time it occurs .

You have changed the subject to talk about memories. — Luke

Wittgenstein is talking about private experiences in general. 256: "what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?" He uses sensation as an example. If what you assert about sensations is only true about sensations, and not true about other inner experiences, such as memories and ideas, then sensation would not serve as a good example of inner experiences. Obviously, Wittgenstein has chosen sensation as a good example of inner experiences, so he surely is not expressing what you are asserting, as you seem to be admitting that what you are asserting about sensation, does not hold for other inner experiences.

That could be either a particular token of the sensation or a particular type of sensation. Unless you can provide an argument for why 'S' must be the name of a particular token of the sensation (only), and not the name of a particular type of sensation, then stop mindlessly repeating this. — Luke

I don't need to provide an argument, it is what Wittgenstein explicitly stated, "a particular sensation". You are fabricating something else, that Wittgenstein is talking about a type of sensation rather than "a particular sensation", so it is who who needs an argument to show that your interpretation which switches in "type" for Wittgenstein's "particular" is consistent with what Wittgenstein intended to demonstrate, and not a category mistake. All you have is repetitive assertions, that Wittgenstein could not have meant anything other than the interpretation which you've fabricated. But I've shown very clearly how he could have intended exactly what he stated, a "particular", not a "type".

You said there was no problem with naming a token! But there is a problem with the diarist scenario, right? — Luke

No, there is no problem inherent within the diarist's scenario. the problem arises when the diarist wants to justify the use of "S", to the public.

An instance of a sensation or an instance of a chair is not how many times these things appear to your consciousness or your memory, or whatever rubbish you are spouting. I already explained to you that a token or an instance of these things is their entire existence or "lifetime". It is one unit or one instance of a class of objects, which is what 'S' denotes with regards to a sensation. The word "sensation" does not apply to one token only; it applies to a class of objects - a type. — Luke

Sure, but "S", as Wittgenstein uses it, does not refer to a type of inner experience called "sensation", it refers to a particular sensation, a single token of that type of inner experience called "sensation". And if my tooth-ache goes away and comes back, depending on drugs sleeping, internal conditions, etc., all these reoccurrences are part of the "entire existence or 'lifetime'" of that one single token of sensation, my tooth-ache.

I said it was senseless to question whether two distinct tokens are of the same type. — Luke

How is this senseless? Every object is a token of some type or types. Why would it be senseless to ask what type is that object a token of? It seems it's who who misunderstands the type/token terminology. You are just requesting that we use it, even though Wittgenstein did not, because it provides you with sufficient ambiguity to create the confusion required to make your fabrication look acceptable.

In what senses, if any, is the following thought empirically meaningful? : "my present experience is different from my previous experience"

Suppose that I (somehow) denote my "previous" sense-data with the label "R", and that I directly denote my present sense-data S with the label "S". Paradoxically, the condition of empirical meaningfulness entails that R, although conceived as being "previous" to the "present" experience S, is nevertheless contained within S, for otherwise "R" would not be an empirically referring term. In actuality, "R" is being used as an indexical referring what is presently being remembered as part of S.

In other words, R and S are analogous to the concept of two adjacent ordinal numbers, say R = { 0 } and S = { { 0 } , 0 } , while their labels "R" and "S" are analogous to the corresponding numerals, i.e. "R" = 1 and "S" = 2.

In mathematics it could be said that every finite ordinal is part of the same first limiting ordinal. Analogously it could be said that all experience, whether past , present or future, is of the same experience.

Therefore the reason one says "my present experience" isn't to assign a quality of "being present" to the experience, but because one is using a subset of his experience as a memory, and is using "present experience" as an indexical referring to the other part.

Maybe he's one of those who are able to use echolocation to "see" what is around them.

And if so, his sensations have nothing in common with yours, and yet he can kick a goal - so again it is not the shared experiences, but the shared ball, goalposts and rules that are relevant; that is, it is the shared reality, not the shared experience.

I haven't argued against that conclusion, though. My argument has only been that when it comes to language that talks about sensations, our paradigm case being pain, the private experience is an essential part of mutual understanding. A person who has never felt pain does not know what the word refers to; the closest they could get would be to think it referred to pain-behavior. If you have felt pain, then when I speak to you of pain, you know what I am talking about because you know what pain feels like.

A person who has never felt pain does not know what the word refers to; — Janus

By way of checking that we agree what is being argued here, the point I think Wittgenstein has quite successfully argued is that pain-talk does not refer.

That is clear to you, I hope? And you disagree with it?

It depends on what you mean by 'refer'. If referring is understood by analogy to pointing, then pain-talk doesn't refer because others cannot see what i am referring to. So, perhaps it could be said that pain-talk cannot refer to a token but only to a type.

If I talk about a particular tree then I am referring to that tree; would you say I am referring to anything if I were to talk about trees in general?

Yeah, seems we are headed around the May Pole yet again.

It's because you can refer to a single tree that you can refer to trees in general.

If instead fo referring to a pain you express pain, then the status of the collective noun is ambiguous. Does it refer to the collection fo expressions of pain, or is it an expression of those expressions, or both, or either.

Given

It makes me wonder what planet you've been living, on to be honest. — Janus

I suspect that you have not actually engaged with the analysis, from Wittgenstein, presented by @Sam26 myself and others, actually has to say. SO

It depends on what you mean by 'refer' — Janus

in asking what I mean by "refer" when I am arguing against the use of that notion in this context seems unhelpful.

Is there a way to move away from the May Pole?

The point I’ve unsuccessfully been trying to make is that Wittgenstein is talking about establishing the name of a sensation. This means not only establishing the name for a single token, but for a class of tokens, i.e., a type. Wittgenstein is debunking the idea that a name or word can be established in the way he describes.

Where is your proof? — Metaphysician Undercover

The “proof” is that it is assumed by the scenario that the diarist writes ‘S’ “every time”, for each token or instance of the sensation. What prompts the diarist to write ‘S’ is the recurrence of the sensation.

it is who who needs an argument to show that your interpretation which switches in "type" for Wittgenstein's "particular" — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn’t switch in “type” for “particular”. A “particular sensation” could mean either a particular type or a particular token. Your repetition of “a particular sensation” does not resolve which one it is. On the other hand, I have cited further context to support that he means a particular type.

Every object is a token of some type or types. Why would it be senseless to ask what type is that object a token of? — Metaphysician Undercover

The type/token distinction is used to clarify the distinction between a particular class and its instances, so it is senseless of you to question which instances belong to which class.

It's because you can refer to a single tree that you can refer to trees in general. — Banno

It's because I can refer to single instances of pain "This headache is killing me" that I can refer to pain in general. I don't see a cogent difference other than the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at. Or if I said "The headache I had the other day was severe" you could reply " Is it the headache you had yesterday you are referring to or the one you had last week". To my way of thinking that is a perfectly valid usage of 'refer'

In any case I'm not really arguing about the coherence of various usages of 'refer'. I have been saying that if you had never felt pain, you would not know what the term is intended by the speaker to refer to. This would be the same as if you had never seen a tree.

I don't hold Wittgenstein to be a sage, by the way. If meaning is use, it's even possible that usages have changed somewhat since his time. In any case I do think it is wrongheaded to say that there can be no reference to pain, even though that is not what I have been focusing on. I'm not trying to be difficult, rather I'm just trying to communicate what seems to make sense to me.

So it's off around the May Pole one more time.

Let's track the arguments, though, since you list them with care.
1. That pain can be referred to, not just expressed; and the argument for this is that you don't see a cogent difference other than the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at.
2. That someone who had not felt pain could not refer to it.
3. That Wittgenstein thought meaning was use.

The replies are
1. We agree that the grammar of talk of pain is superficially the same as that of other object - hence the example that "I have a phone in my hand " and "I have a pain in my hand". The cogent difference is exactly "the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at".
2. If the account in (1) is correct, it's not just folk who have not felt pain who do not refer to it; rather, we all express pain. But further, the blind rugby player mentioned above might not share in the experience of seeing, but can kick goals, with all that involves; and so it's not shared experience that counts, but being in a shared world.
3. Arguably Wittgenstein's purpose was to dissuade philosophers from arguing in terms of words having meanings, especially if they are considered some sort of mental furniture. The admonition is to look at use in the place of meaning.

The point I’ve unsuccessfully been trying to make is that Wittgenstein is talking about establishing the name of a sensation. This means not only establishing the name for a single token, but for a class of tokens, i.e., a type. Wittgenstein is debunking the idea that a name or word can be established in the way he describes. — Luke

And, the point I 've been trying to make (unsuccessfully it appears), is that this is a misreading. Wittgenstein proceeds from a brief description of a problem which concerns the lack of a criterion of identity, to ask how do we talk about our inner experiences, and then provides an example of naming a sensation.

There is no talk here about a class, or a type, or tokens of a type. You are apparently approaching what he says with this preconceived notion that he is going to talk about a type,, and this influences the way you are reading him. If, in the end, it turns out that he successfully proves that a word or symbol cannot be used in a certain way the that way he is demonstrating in his example, then we can walk away with that conclusion. However, we need to follow the demonstration through, and understand it as it is presented, to see what it actually does demonstrate, rather than interpreting the writing in relation to a foregone conclusion. When there is ambiguity in the words used (as there always is to some extent, especially in philosophical writing), the latter is very conducive to misreading. This is a danger which is amplified by reading secondary sources prior to the primary source.

You appear to have the preconceived notion that language cannot be used without rules. So when at the end of 258, Wittgenstein says that there is no right or wrong in relation to the diarist's use of S, you conclude that a word cannot be used in this way. That's a faulty conclusion though because your preconceived premise is unstated and unsupported.

The “proof” is that it is assumed by the scenario that the diarist writes ‘S’ “every time”, for each token or instance of the sensation. What prompts the diarist to write ‘S’ is the recurrence of the sensation. — Luke

Clearly we must dismiss such a proof as contrary to the evidence. If what you claim as "proof" was true, then every distinct time that I see a chair, it would necessarily be a different token, and it would be impossible that I could see the same chair (token of the type chair) twice. I do see the same token, the same chair, on a multitude of distinct occasions, therefore the evidence disproves your supposed "proof", and what you claim as proof must be rejected as invalid.

On the other hand, I have cited further context to support that he means a particular type. — Luke

Of course that's BS. It is I who have cited support. In all your great capacity to quote Wittgenstein (which I admit is absolutely fantastic), you've come up with nothing except support for what I say: . That's because there is no support for your position, it's a misread based in a preconceived notion. All I have to do is point at 258 where Wittgenstein uses "the sensation" four times to stress that he is talking about a particular sensation rather than a type. Why would you use "the chair" when referring to a chair, if you were talking about a type rather than a particular chair? There is no evidence to support your claim that the diarist is naming a type.

The type/token distinction is used to clarify the distinction between a particular class and its instances, so it is senseless of you to question which instances belong to which class. — Luke

That is utter nonsense. You are saying that it is senseless to question whether an object (token) has been wrongly classed. If it was senseless to do such questioning, I could present you with absolutely anything, and claim it is a token of absolutely any class, and you'd say that it's senseless to question this.

This is what comes up at 261 now. " 261. What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation?
For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.—"

In the private language "S" stands for an internal experience which the diarist has identified and named as S. In the common language "sensation" is a type. Now the diarist must justify that the thing referred to by "S" is a token of that type.

If what you claim as "proof" was true, then every distinct time that I see a chair, it would necessarily be a different token — Metaphysician Undercover

A token does not refer to how many times you see something. In the case of chairs it refers to one (instance of a) chair.

All I have to do is point at 258 where Wittgenstein uses "the sensation" four times to stress that he is talking about a particular sensation rather than a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says: "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation."

For "every day" on which he has the sensation means more than once. He is not talking about a single instance which would be a token of the sensation. You clearly do not understand the type/token distinction. All you have done is attempt to argue against it, displaying your ignorance. I'm not going to waste my time arguing with you about it anymore.

When there is ambiguity in the words used (as there always is to some extent, especially in philosophical writing), the latter is very conducive to misreading. This is a danger which is amplified by reading secondary sources prior to the primary source. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't presume to know what I've read or in what order. You're a sad little man.

The replies are
1. We agree that the grammar of talk of pain is superficially the same as that of other object - hence the example that "I have a phone in my hand " and "I have a pain in my hand". The cogent difference is exactly "the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at". — Banno

As you know I have acknowledged that difference, but I think we differ when it comes to what each of us believe follows from that difference.

2. If the account in (1) is correct, it's not just folk who have not felt pain who do not refer to it; rather, we all express pain. But further, the blind rugby player mentioned above might not share in the experience of seeing, but can kick goals, with all that involves; and so it's not shared experience that counts, but being in a shared world.

I agree with that too, but I think there are different contexts within, and degrees to which, our experiences of that shared world can themselves be shared. The situation is not simple and monolithic, it is diverse and complex, in my view.

3. Arguably Wittgenstein's purpose was to dissuade philosophers from arguing in terms of words having meanings, especially if they are considered some sort of mental furniture. The admonition is to look at use in the place of meaning.

To say meaning is use is simplistic I agree. Meaning is given and indicated by use, just as use determines the definitions of words that are given in a dictionary. Personal meanings or variations on meanings, if you prefer, are the sets of associations unique to individuals. I wouldn't call that "mental furniture" because it is dynamic and ever-changing. I still maintain that if someone has not experienced what a word commonly signifies, then they will not understand what the word refers to, even if they might appear to be able to use the word correctly. If someone has never felt lonely, for example, they will not be able to use the sentence "I feel lonely" authentically, because they don't really know what 'lonely' means.

I still maintain that if someone has not experienced what a word commonly signifies, then they will not understand what the word refers to — Janus

See those words, again?

Not all words are nouns. But further, that the noun is used does not imply that the thing named exists.

That's the essential observation that seems not to be present in your thinking.

See those words, again?

Not all words are nouns. But further, that the noun is used does not imply that the thing named exists.

That's the essential observation that seems not to be present in your thinking. — Banno

The words we have been considering: 'pain', and the example I used last 'loneliness' are both nouns. There are many other nouns like those that denote feelings: 'fear', 'anger', 'timidity', 'love', 'hate', 'desire', 'disgust', and so on. What those words signify are not objects, but they exist as feelings; so I'm not seeing any substance to your objection.

What those words signify are not objects, but they exist as feelings; so I'm not seeing any substance to your objection. — Janus

The cogent difference is exactly "the fact that my headache is not an object in the external world which can be pointed at". — Banno

I still maintain that if someone has not experienced what a word commonly signifies, then they will not understand what the word refers to... — Janus

Suppose you are right. Then those feelings and sensations are private. There is therefore, by your own argument, no way we can ensure that we are talking about the same thing when we use the word "pain" or "Loneliness".

No?