An actual real life report from stroke victims can open up a bit of a window into this problem. People who've had strokes don't understand (lose the ability to see colour) the concept of 'colour' yet when they 'recall' what colour is they see colour again.

I think this is much more about how we order and prioritise concepts. For example a table is not a table to people who have no use or need for tables. It is just an object of curiosity perhaps but they don't 'see' a table.

She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like "red", "blue", and so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence "The sky is blue". ... — frank

Too far fetched to make sense imo. I've never been fond of Dennett's Mary tbh. If all the 'physical information' is all the 'information' then what this has to do with actual subjective experience doesn't seem to be on the same plane.

I wouldn't say she learns anything new, so much as has a new experience. No implications for physicalism.

For example a table is not a table to people who have no use or need for tables. It is just an object of curiosity perhaps but they don't 'see' a table — I like sushi

But how would you describe the concept of color? Of red?

No implications for physicalism. — khaled

I think the thought experiment is supposed to have implications for physicalism, along the lines of: there are aspects of the mental that aren't physical.

I think the thought experiment is supposed to have implications for physicalism, along the lines of: there are aspects of the mental that aren't physical. — frank

I don't.

There was clearly a physical change that led to mary's new experience wasn't there? Why can't her reaction simply be attributed to that? If you can change something mental without changing anything physical, then you'd have a case for aspects of the mental that aren't physical. But as it stands, someone being surprised for seeing something for the first time, isn't a challenge to physicalism.

But how would you describe the concept of color? Of red? — frank

I don't understand how that has anything to do with it? I can describe colours to congenially blind people by way of referring to others senses.

As with 'table' (for someone who has no concept of what a table is) I'd maybe go for it's use rather than it's physical appearance.

Mary would understand that there are different shades of things. She would know this. There are people who cannot see colour but can distinguish between colours by the shade and the item they are looking at (reds and greens) by experience. There is a professional photographer who takes colour photos even though she cannot see colour.

I don't understand how that has anything to do with it? I can describe colours to congenially blind people by way of referring to others senses. — I like sushi

I think that shows it's more of a sense than a concept. But maybe your point is that without the concept of color, we wouldn't remember seeing color?

Basically he is asking is there anything to do with the perception of colour other than our sensory input. Clearly the answer is yes because we can see colours whereas once we couldn't.

How much this is due to experience or not is up for debate. I don't think the thought experiment does much for ideas of 'Qualia' OR pure forms of 'Physicalism'. It is an interesting thing to ponder though and makes us think about what we mean by colour and perception, as well as how perception and sensory input relate and amalgamate into a consciousness.

We would have a hard time saying the same thing about circular objects. Could Mary live in a room that only contained straight lines and sharp angles learn all there is to know about circles and not find anything astounding about the sight of a curved line outside of her straight lined and angled room? She could certainly make some attempts at imagining such (much like we can understand how a fourth dimensional space object may appear to us) but the 'learning' something new is irrelevant to the actual experience of. WE can read about riding a bike, watch people ride bikes and maybe even dream of riding bikes ... but that isn't riding a bike.

That is why I have an issue with how people approach this one sometimes.

Assuming that Mary is an adult female and that she has got a functional uterus, at a minimum she sees the color red every 28 days. Some thought experiment... :razz:

There was clearly a physical change that led to mary's new experience wasn't there? Why can't her reaction simply be attributed to that? — khaled

She already knew about those changes.

Basically he is asking is there anything to do with the perception of colour other than our sensory input — I like sushi

This is an argument for qualia, and against physicalism.

I think you’ll find it’s the other way around. Daniel Dennett right? Or am I going slowly mad?

@frank Turns out I’m wrong. I guess I’ve just heard him haro on about it so much I assumed it was his baby :D

He did write a response to it.

The whole point of Mary's room thought experiment seems to be that Mary knows everything physical about the color red and yet, when Mary sees red, she learns something new. This then implies there's something nonphysical about red (?) and Mary, to be precise her mind.

@khaled's objection isn't valid because the thought experiment specifically mentions Mary knows everything physical. Looking and seeing red is a physical activity of course but don't forget that the mind is involved too - we don't know in what way, to what extent the mind affects the process of seeing and that's exactly what the thought experiment is about.

Assuming that Mary is an adult female and that she has got a functional uterus, at a minimum she sees the color red every 28 days. Some thought experiment... — Olivier5

:up: :rofl:

khaled's objection isn't valid because the thought experiment specifically mentions Mary knows everything physical. — TheMadFool

You're confused. khaled's objection is valid because the thought experiment specifically mentions Mary knows everything physical. If I know everything about how Neil Armstrong landed on the moon, would that mean I'd need a space suit? Or would we have proven something non-physical since actually being on the moon leads to my suffocating, but presuming I know everything about landing on the moon doesn't require me to suffocate? Both of these are kind of ridiculous.

So why should Mary likewise knowing everything physical about seeing red be expected to "be on the moon"... to actually be seeing red? When Mary sees red, she "goes to the moon". Mary knowing about red is simply "knowing how Neil Armstrong landed on the moon"; it doesn't require a space suit.

Unless, of course, by "knowing everything physical" about going to the moon, you mean Mary actually goes to the room... in which case, she saw red.

You're confused — InPitzotl

It takes time to understand these things. Allow me to explain: In the bodily and mental activity of seeing red, is the mind not involved? How come then Khaled believes it's all physical? Petitio principii.

I don't understand how that has anything to do with it? I can describe colours to congenially blind people by way of referring to others senses. — I like sushi

I agree. It has always seemed to me the idea that a blind or color blind person could not have a concept of color is wrong.

It's a derivative of Wittgenstein's beetle in a box.

It takes time to understand these things. — TheMadFool

It's kind of presumptuous to diagnose disagreements. You should just state your business, not theorize what you think is wrong with me such that I dare disagree with you.

In the bodily and mental activity of seeing red, is the mind not involved? — TheMadFool

The mind is involved when you ride a ship to the moon. Surely Neil had quite an astounding experience. There's an argument to be had that Neil's experience of going to the moon is still physical, and knowing everything physical about Neil's experience is either not equivalent to going to the moon, or requires going to the moon.

Surely you can picture the dramatic difference between sitting in your chair and pondering a 480,000 mile trip, and actually going 480,000 miles. But that's a physical difference, right?

Mary's not all that different. Knowing about going to the moon can be interpreted in the same two ways; either it requires Mary actually experience seeing red, which is physical (it's different but physically different for Mary to read about seeing red in a book and for Mary to see red monochromatic light), or does not require it, in which case it can be novel for Mary to see red versus know how to see it in the same exact way it could be novel for Mary to go to the moon versus know everything about going to the moon.

It's kind of presumptuous to diagnose disagreements. You should just state your business, not theorize what you think is wrong with me such that I dare disagree with you. — InPitzotl

Sorry if you took offense. It was unintended.

Mary actually experience seeing red, which is physical — InPitzotl

This is where you slip up I'm afraid. This is exactly what's up for debate. Is experiencing red completely physical or not? That, my friend, is the question. You can't assume what needs to be proven unless you want to run around in circles.

To clarify further, the experience of red, true, involves the body, to be precise the eyes but the mind is too and since we don't know if the mind is physical or not, you can't say that experiencing red, the whole mind + body experience, is all physical.

The argument is that Mary's experience is new knowledge.

She has knowledge of something that isn't physical.

This is an argument for qualia, and against physicalism. — frank

Not all arguments against physicalism assume qualia. Approaches which see the conceptual-subjective and the empirical-object as inextricably interdependent will reject both physicalism and qualia.

The argument is that Mary's experience is new knowledge.

She has knowledge of something that isn't physical — frank

Or you could say that she has knowledge of something that isn’t couched in physicalistic terms. But one could
claim that physicalistic accounts share with the experience of color a dependence on subjective process. One could then conclude that the personalistic is more
fundamental than the physicalistic, that physicalism is just a derivative abstraction that we convince ourselves is primary. This trick we play on ourselves makes subjective experiences like color seem to be either an illusion or an ineffable product of a realm outside the physical. We then may start babbling about God or panpsychism.

This is where you slip up I'm afraid. — TheMadFool

Nonsense.

This is exactly what's up for debate. — TheMadFool

I want to pause here and take note of something very specific. The claim under scrutiny is whether physicalism is challenged by this or not.

Is experiencing red completely physical or not? That, my friend, is the question. — TheMadFool

Not in my mind it isn't. This is about whether Mary's room challenges physicalism; not whether physicalism is true or not.

You can't assume what needs to be proven unless you want to run around in circles. — TheMadFool

Ah, but you can do exactly that... if your goal is to answer the question of whether Mary's room challenges physicalism. If a presumption of physicalism is not challenged by Mary's room, then Mary's room does not challenge physicalism.

Even so, I quite honestly do not see it as controversial that it's physically different for Mary to look at something red versus say reading about it. In fact, the whole Mary's room scenario is explicitly set up around Mary not being physically exposed to red until after she has learned about vision. Are you claiming it's actually controversial that there's a physical difference here?

Keep your eyes on the object of knowledge in the thought experiment.

It's going to hinge on your theory of knowledge more than reducibility. I think.

Could you learn to ride a bike just by reading about it? No. Experience is required. Same for seeing (in general and regarding specific colors). People blind at birth don't know what seeing is like. They don't know what it's like if they learn 1% of the physical facts involved or 10% of 100%. Their understanding of what it's like to see red doesn't increase with respect to their knowledge of the physical facts involved. A neuroscientist born blind at birth has the same understanding of the experience of seeing as a caveman born blind at birth: zero. Neither has any idea what the experience is actually like.

Does Mary gain new knowledge from seeing red or a new ability?

Does Mary gain new knowledge from seeing red or a new ability? — RogueAI

We would assume she already had the ability to see red, there was just none in the environment.

It should be a no-brainer that she learned something new. The question is: what does this imply?

If knowledge is JTB or some other internalist interpretation, then it looks like we'd have to say she learned about something non-physical.

I'm just explaining the experiment here.

I wouldn't say she learns anything new, so much as has a new experience. No implications for physicalism. — khaled

How would you fit color experience into physicalism?

We would assume she already had the ability to see red, there was just none in the environment. — frank

With a little more precision, let's assume indeed Mary had the ability to see red. By that I mean that if Mary sees a 750nm LED glowing, then Mary has "experience x". Suppose Mary can also see green: if Mary sees a 550nm LED glowing, then Mary has "experience q".

Mary has a peer, Jane, with an inverted spectrum wrt her. If Jane sees a 750nm LED, Jane has experience q; if Jane sees a 550nm LED, Jane has experience x. There's another peer, Joe, who is a protanope. If Joe sees a 750nm LED, Joe has experience y. If Joe sees a 550nm LED, Joe has experience y (we'll just be fuzzy enough to say these are the same).

So now Mary walks out of the room and sees a 750nm LED. To be very precise here, Mary does not know what type of LED this is.

Now let's add in the other presumption that we're already presuming:

It should be a no-brainer that she learned something new. — frank

Mary learned something new. Okay, but what? Mary can't use what she learned to imply anything other than that she had a novel experience.

If knowledge is JTB or some other internalist interpretation, then it looks like we'd have to say she learned about something non-physical. — frank

What forces us to say she learned about something non-physical? If we're physicalists, Mary is physical. Mary learned something about something physical. Mary didn't even learn anything about red... not yet.