Science has scope and limits. I think some things might be outside its purview. Otherwise, why bother with literature, philosophy or the arts? Science will eventually tell you all about it. I'm skeptical. — Manuel
And there's the fly in the ointment: the knowledge of color was not complete without (before) seeing color. Jackson's thought-experiment fails because of this incoherent premise and therefore implies nothing about physicalism. — 180 Proof
This would imply that the experience of sight is a non-functioning element of sight. But surely the experience of sight is at a minimum functionally necessary to describe the experience of sight; otherwise, how are we having this conversation? If epiphenomenally we are experiencing things, and it just so happens that physically our fingers are getting pressed in such a way as to say we're experiencing things, that would be quite a weird coincidence.Remember, you don't need the experience of sight to have the functioning elements of sight. — frank
This would imply that the experience of sight is a non-functioning element of sight. — InPitzotl
the knowledge of color was not complete without (before) seeing color. Jackson's thought-experiment fails because of this incoherent premise .... — 180 Proof
But it would be trivial, and tautological in a meaningless sense, to say that functional sight excludes the experience of sight. Words are boxes, and boxes are flexible. All you have to do is erase any consequence of experiencing from your box of "sight". We could build functional mimics... robots with cameras... and have them perform tasks that require sight but not experience. We can draw our "sight" box this way; it's what that robot would do. Since we can do this, and since boxes are arbitrary, I can easily upgrade your "difficult" to "impossible".It would be difficult to make the case that functional sight entails the experience of sight. — frank
But "physical" here could be replaced by almost any word: "neutral", "natural", "insubstantial", "substantial", etc. — Manuel
Will she learn anything or not? — frank
WE can read about riding a bike, watch people ride bikes and maybe even dream of riding bikes ... but that isn't riding a bike. — I like sushi
Could you learn to ride a bike just by reading about it? No. Experience is required. — RogueAI
Surely you can picture the dramatic difference between sitting in your chair and pondering a 480,000 mile trip, and actually going 480,000 miles. — InPitzotl
Let me phrase it this way. Imagine we make a robot driver that will stop at a red light; we need not add experience to the robot. By comparison, I'm a human, and being a good driver, if I see a red light, I'll stop at the light.It's just not part of the function of sight. — frank
I get that... but Mary's Room doesn't really address this very point. We could say that physicalism predicts there would be a physical difference in the brain. But it's a physical difference resulting from a physically different scenario... so physicalism would be viable if "knowing-that" mechanisms are insufficient to establish arbitrary states of the brain that "actual going" establishes.That is, can we pinpoint a difference in the structure or functioning of the brain of a person who knows how to ride a bike from the brain of a person who doesn't? — Srap Tasmaner
it's clear that experience is not necessary for sight, if by sight we mean to include what the robot is doing. But what's not so clear is that if I stop at a red light that I'm not stopping because I experienced red; that were it not for that experience, I would not have stopped. — InPitzotl
They are. Anger is: *insert the physical explanation of what's happening when you're angry here* — khaled
And there's the fly in the ointment: the knowledge of color was not complete without (before) seeing color. Jackson's thought-experiment fails because of this incoherent premise and therefore implies nothing about physicalism. — 180 Proof
Can we pinpoint a difference in the structure or functioning of the brain of a person who has been to the moon from the brain of a person who hasn't? Is it conceivable that those differences could be written down and read about? Is there any sort of ability or acquaintance not describable as a physical fact about the person? — Srap Tasmaner
Learning about colours causes changes in the parietal-temporal-occipital region, the hippocampus, the frontal cortex... Seeing colours causes changes in the V4 and VO1 regions.
I can't for the life of me work out what this has to do with challenging physicalism. — Isaac
Knowing all the physical facts about the brain states of people having experience x (e.g., seeing red) won't lead to knowing what experience x is like (e.g., what it's like to see red). — RogueAI
Learning about colours causes changes in the parietal-temporal-occipital region, the hippocampus, the frontal cortex... Seeing colours causes changes in the V4 and VO1 regions. — Isaac
I can't for the life of me work out what this has to do with challenging physicalism. — Isaac
but Mary's Room doesn't really address this very point — InPitzotl
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