she had a novel experience. — InPitzotl

Right. That's all you need. Having had a novel experience, she knows something new.

If there are scrutability issues, it has no bearing on the argument.

Right. That's all you need. — frank

Non-physical means not physical; it does not mean novel. It appears you're using "novel" to establish that this is not physical. That does not seem sufficient to establish that very thing.

ETA: There's a state Mary gets into when being exposed to a 750nm LED. Suppose that state cannot be induced by telling Mary all about 750nm LED's. Show that this state must therefore be non-physical.

You have to understand the argument before you try to refute it. You're doing neither.

Physicalism means whatever people who use that term intend it to mean. But there isn't one agreed upon opinion about the term.

Some people, like Rosenberg, take it to mean essentially physicSalism, implying that everything can be reduced to the level of particles. Yeah, ok. Others use the term in a somewhat slippery manner, trying to get rid of, or minimize consciousness by calling it epiphenomenal or "bad theorizing" or stimulus-reacting illusions. But they can't get rid of it.

The one I think is sensible is Strawson's definition of the term, which is that everything that exists is physical, including consciousness as the fact of which we are best acquainted out of everything.

On this last view, one is simply stressing that physical stuff is much stranger than what we initially take it to be. But it's mostly terminological, not too substantive, in my opinion. What's of substance in this debate is monism vs pluralism.

What Mary learns, assuming her sight and brain are fine, is one important aspect of experience, namely visual experience. But physicalism or idealism per se, are not relevant here.

I think if she learns something new, physicalism is in trouble. I think she learns something new. I would like to see someone defend the ability argument.

But physicalism or idealism per se, are not relevant here. — Manuel

The argument is specifically meant as an attack on physicalism, so I think there might be a little relevance.

She has knowledge of something that isn't physical. — frank

...as opposed to knowledge of something physical. If it's physical, it would likely be a set of states Mary has.

If knowledge is JTB or some other internalist interpretation, then it looks like we'd have to say she learned about something non-physical. — frank

...or some set of physical states of Mary.

You have to understand the argument before you try to refute it. You're doing neither. — frank

You're defaulting on the question before you. You've said twice that this should be something non-physical. How do you rule out that this is physical?

Presumably the argument rules this out. But the argument basically compares a Mary that has never been exposed to a particular kind of stimulus, to a Mary that has been. But if Mary is learning something abstract about states of Mary that are only induced when exposed to that particular kind of stimulus, it could easily be physical. So how do you rule this out?

It's a question that very directly follows from the claim you made twice already.

think if she learns something new, physicalism is in trouble. I think she learns something new. I would like to see someone defend the ability argument. — RogueAI

Ok, but I want someone to take the pro so I can take the con. It sounds like you understand the argument. Would you want to take the pro side?

I'm not following you, sorry.

I don't think the topic hinges on this despite the title, it's a misleading way to think about the problem. It's essentially asking if Mary knows the scientific facts concerning vision, will she learn something new when she experiences colour for the first time?

The problem from my perspective, is that by calling this "physicalism", it excludes visual experience. But why isn't visual experience physical? Eyes are physical, brains are physical, mental phenomena is physical. These things are made of physical stuff.

The difference is between scientific knowledge and physical stuff. The latter is much broader than the former, in my view.

This is the Mary's room thought experiment:
[ ... ]
What's your answer? And what does it imply for physicalism? — frank

The thought-experiment does not imply anything about physicalism per se but does imply that before she ventured "outside", Mary's "knowledge" was, in fact, incomplete as a physical description (and explanation) of color.

The argument is that Mary's experience is new knowledge.

She has knowledge of something that isn't physical. — frank

That does not follow. Mary experiences "new knowledge" (i.e. a more complete, more data-rich, description of the physical system of (human) color-perception) which now includes her own particular physical sensorium: Mary's eyes are (visual cortex is) receptive of stimuli that trigger subtly differentiated neural-systemic affects which are strongly correlated to (i.e. adaptively selected for) specific, or discrete, light frequencies. Mary experiencing 'seeing color' is simply a particular instantiation (deducible experimental prediction) of her generic model (knowledge) of color itself.

Corollary: if "qualia" were only / mostly "non-physical" – wholly subjective, then e.g. auto traffic wouldn't stop at Red and color psychology wouldn't work for e.g. mood therapies, interior design / decorating, product marketing, fashion or cinema.

I'm not following you, sorry. — frank

Try this... Mary is not really learning anything about "red" (the Jane/Joe/LED thing); she is learning something about her experiencing.

Now let's wear the physicalist hat and explain this. When Mary experiences the LED, Mary gets into a specific set of physical states.

So this in my estimation is what you're presuming to be refuting with Mary's room argument, and that is where I think the problem comes in. MR doesn't genuinely refute this. Instead, all it winds up doing is confusing Mary knowing about states with Mary being in states.

I don't think the topic hinges on this despite the title — Manuel

Jackson created the argument as an attack on physicalism. Are you saying it fails so spectacularly that we need not even address Jackson's point?

The problem from my perspective, is that by calling this "physicalism", it excludes visual experience. But why isn't visual experience physical? Eyes are physical, brains are physical, mental phenomena is physical. These things are made of physical stuff. — Manuel

Her new knowledge isn't about brains or eyes.

As I said before, follow the object of knowledge in the experiment.

I'd just like to establish some understanding of the argument before we present challenges to it.

What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not?" — frank

We are tempted to say that she 'learns' what color is (in some, questionable sense.) But this presupposes a common experience of color, or, similarly, a common interpretation of 'black and white.'

As far as I can make out, if we presuppose private experience, then we create a situation where we can never be 'philosophically sure' that we ourselves are outside of Mary's room. How do you prove that you experience color? Puke up the right noises in the right order, etc.

Mary experiences "new knowledge" (i.e. a more complete, more data-rich, description of the physical system of (human) color-perception — 180 Proof

She experienced color. Is an orgasm a more complete, more data rich, description if the physical system of human reproduction? Not for me.

Corollary: if "qualia" were only / mostly "non-physical" – wholly subjective, then e.g. auto traffic wouldn't stop at Red and color psychology wouldn't work for e.g. mood therapies, interior design / decorating, product marketing, fashion or cinema. — 180 Proof

I think Jackson actually was an epiphenomenalist, so he'd be ok with that.

Anyway, I'm looking to attack the argument from knowledge externalism.

Her new knowledge isn't about brains or eyes. — frank

Insofar as it's new knowledge, it's necessarily knowledge about particular kinds of mental states. The question is, why can't those be brain states. Being a brain state does not entail being about brains, or about anything in particular for that matter.

As far as I can make out, if we presuppose private experience, then we create a situation where we can never be 'philosophically sure' that we ourselves are outside of Mary's room. How do you prove that you experience color? Puke up the right noises in the right order, etc. — hanaH

Yes. This is just standard skepticism. How do you know the words you just said to me don't translate as "Fire at will" to me?

You don't. Yet you scribble away as if we're able to communicate.

Private language issues are philosophy kindergarten. No offense intended. I'm just being Frank.

Insofar as it's new knowledge, it's necessarily knowledge about particular kinds of mental states. — InPitzotl

It's knowledge of color.

It's knowledge of color. — frank

Not until it gets associated with color.

Not until it gets associated with color. — InPitzotl

Color is the object of her new knowledge.

Jackson created the argument as an attack on physicalism. Are you saying it fails so spectacularly that we need not even address Jackson's point? — frank

I'm saying that the term "physicalism" as generally used is misleading. Chomsky discusses it quite well, I think:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsLOVYTLt90

Jackson's argument is dualist: it's saying that science and experience aren't compatible. But you can't do science without experience. What you're lacking in this experiment is colour experience.

I'm saying that experience is physical, like magnetism or gravity is physical.

The new aspect experienced belongs to the way we experience the world. There's only one world, with various aspects. Science attempts to study mind independent entities revealed by experience, otherwise we couldn't do science. Unless someone thinks we literally are computers.

Color is the object of her new knowledge. — frank

Mary cannot tell she's seeing red without first learning that what she is seeing is red.

Yes. This is just standard skepticism. How do you know the words you just said to me don't translate as "Fire at will" to me? — frank

Yes, if one accepts private experience, one seemingly opens the door for standard skepticism. To try to answer your question, I speculate that I gain confidence in the use of words by getting the desired reactions, most of the time, from other English speakers. I vote for the primacy of the practical. (For the recognition of its dominance.)

I understand why behaviorism wanted to get away from consciousness. No need to deny it, but arguably a reason to downplay it.

I'm saying that the term "physicalism" as generally used is misleading. Chomsky discusses it quite well, I think: — Manuel

I'm familiar. It's not too hard to pinpoint Jackson's target.

Jackson's argument is dualist: it's saying that science and experience can't be compatible. — Manuel

It's an attack on physicalism. Why are we debating that?

To try to answer your question, I speculate that I gain confidence in the use of words by getting the desired reactions, most of the time, from other English speakers. — hanaH

Skepticism always wins. It can't be killed. We just tend to move on from it (or ride past it unmolested as Schopenhauer put it).

It's an attack on physicalism. Why are we debating that? — frank

Because it states experience isn't physical. But nevermind.

To get to the learning something new part: Mary has colour experience which she lacked. So it is new, compared to the knowledge she had previously, which was colourless.

I would do a bad job. I don't really understand it much.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-knowledge/#NoPropKnow1AbilHypo

Because it states experience isn't physical. But nevermind. — Manuel

The idea is that if you know everything about the physical aspects of sight, there's something extra you learn from actually seeing.

I think you're saying that we can stretch the concept of physicality to include the experience.

If the argument leads to concept stretching, it succeeded, right?

I would do a bad job — RogueAI

I disagree, but ok. :nerd:

Good terminology now.

If she knew "everything about the physical aspects of sight", that would have to include colour experience.

But she is not having colour experience, so she does not know all the physical aspects of sight.

I think the argument is better thought as as an argument against scientism more than against physicalism, but I'm in the minority here. It is an interesting argument though.