Is this reading of Heidegger unusual or well established? — Tom Storm
No, it is not misperception, or misunderstanding. If I may borrow the quotes in your post -- please explain introjection and appresentation. They might have coined words ingeniously, but the fact remains that they could not escape a sort of psychoanalysis method of explaining. One has to speak in a vacuum in order to make it at best, a narrative.It sounds like you are reading phenomenology as subjective introspection. That’s a common misperception. — Joshs
Please explain objectivity in phenomenology. We know what is objectivity in epistemology.Phenomenology is just as much about objectivity and intersubjectivity and the way they are inextricably bound together with subjectivity such that no science can escape the fact that its grounding and condition of possibility leads empiricism back to phenomenology. — Joshs
Please explain objectivity in phenomenology. We know what is objectivity in epistemology. — Caldwell
The real object is in fact an idealization, so they say. And I think objectivity in this sense doesn't fit with Husserl's explanation of spatial objects. Because as much as he or any other phenomenologist wants to make his narrative as objective as possible, he inadvertently implicates his own explanation, thereby exposing his own idealization of the phenomenon. They should not have started with the denial of objects in itself and the denial of access to other minds. They should have, for all intents and purposes, admitted that the "kinaesthetics sensation of our voluntary movement" is indeed physical and material, therefore, no matter how much we call it idealization, we are inextricably made of matter.One of the key aspects of Husserl's approach was his explanation of the origin of spatial objects. Rather than defining an object in terms of its self-subsistence over time with its properties and attributes, he believed such entities to be , not fictions, but idealities. That is to say, what we , in a naive naturalist attitude, point to as this 'real' table in front of us, is the constantly changing product of a process of progressive constitution in consciousness. The real object is in fact an idealization.This process begins at the most primordial level with what he called primal impressions, which we can imagine as the simplest whiffs of sensation(these he calls actual, rather than real. Actual impressions only appear once in time as what they are. When we see something like a table, all that we actually perceive in front of us is an impoverished, contingent partial sense experience. — Joshs
I think objectivity in this sense doesn't fit with Husserl's explanation of spatial objects. Because as much as he or any other phenomenologist wants to make his narrative as objective as possible, he inadvertently implicates his own explanation, thereby exposing his own idealization of the phenomenon. They should not have started with the denial of objects in itself and the denial of access to other minds. — Caldwell
How ironic!You might want to check out some of the recent work on perception in cognitive science(Noe and O’Regan) or the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. You will see that many empirical researchers in perception find the work of Husserl and Merleau-Pontu extremely relevant and valuable to their work. — Joshs
Like Chalmer's "hard problem of consciousness" (re: the "p-zombie"), I've always found Nagel's intuition pump (Dennett) "what is it like to be a bat" to be incoherent. The problematic "like to be" presupposes a comparison, but to what? No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point: an individual human being, like an individual bat, does not "know" what it is like to be other than what s/he, or it, is, so there's no comparison, or differentiation, from the inside-out, so to speak. (E.g. what it's like to ride a motor cycle isn't adequately described until one also rides a bicycle (tricycle or unicycle) with which to compare and contrast.) Again, like Chalmers, Nagel doesn't touch physicalism except maybe to encourage more conceptual clarity and descriptive precision by physicalists.Ever since Thomas Nagel wrote his influential essay What is it Like to Be a Bat (1974), many philosophers and associated hangers on have been preoccupied with understanding phenomenal consciousness as physicalism’s potential coup de grâce. — Tom Storm
My philosophical position is closest to Spinoza's dissolution of the so-called "MBP" over three and a half centuries ago; scientifically, I think, embodied cognition explains much better the phenomenal subject (e.g. T. Metzinger, R.S. Bakker, A. Damasio, D. Dennett) than phenomenology itself does.I’d be interested to hear what members thoughts are about what an understanding of phenomenology can bring to the hoary mind/body question.
No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point — 180 Proof
My view is that Spinoza's thought (plural-aspect holism / dialectical monism) is more consistent with acosmism than any other conception of divinity (or stance toward a/the deity). Of late, however, I've more narrowly interpreted him sub specie durationis through the (epicurean-compatible) lens of pandeism. Benny's only "tradition", so to speak, is rationalism (e.g. Euclid, Descartes & Maimonides).From memory, you view Spinoza as part of the tradition of acosmism? — Tom Storm
:up: Was your mother a teacher?Thanks for this.
I've always found Nagel's intuition pump (Dennett) "what is it like to be a bat" to be incoherent. The problematic "like to be" presupposes a comparison, but to what? No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point: a human being, like a bat, does not "know" what it is like to be other than what is, so there's no comparison, or differentiation, from the inside-out, so to speak. — 180 Proof
But does this accomplish much more than change the language without altering the problem? — Tom Storm
I've always found Nagel's intuition pump (Dennett) "what is it like to be a bat" to be incoherent. The problematic "like to be" presupposes a comparison, but to what? No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point: a human being, like a bat, does not "know" what it is like to be other than what is, so there's no comparison, or differentiation, from the inside-out, so to speak. — 180 Proof
The idea here is that when we relate to the world there both an experience of what the world is like for us and at the same time an experience of the self that is having the experience. — Joshs
if I understood it right, is that the 'what is it like' phrasing is based on the intuition that a comparison should be, or could be. possible. — Janus
The comparison would be one of color for someone born blind from birth. "What it's like" is meant in the literature to denote there is a subjective sensation. There is nothing it's like for a blind person regarding vision, just like there is nothing it's like for humans to echolochate. — Marchesk
Nagel was arguing there is a subjective aspect to perceiving creatures which is not captured by objective descriptions. — Marchesk
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