I'm much interested in expanding on the notion of the given. But I don't want to go through Sellar's route, way too much epistemology and not enough "metaphysics".

I very much like Lewis' ideas on the given, in which he attempts to clarify the notion of the given in relation to the a-priori. That's likely my next big personal task, to read that in great detail.

Whom do you recommend that speaks of the given? Remember that I tend to prefer clearer writing, in as much as possible. Although I'm aware that this topic is very hard.

Do you have any suggestions? I'm quite interested.

Is this reading of Heidegger unusual or well established? — Tom Storm

It’s consistent with Derrida’s reading of him and Eugene Gendlin’s. Gendlin bases his whole approach on the body, but it’s a different notion of embodiment than most of those floating around in embodied cognitive science.
Those approaches rely on reciprocal causality, whereas Gendlin, Heidegger and Derrida abandon causal thinking in favor of a radical understanding of temporality.

Have you read McDowell?

I haven't.

Which book?

Thanks Josh, that gives me something to think about. Can you recommend any works for further study on these themes?

I wish there were a map or diagram outlining these approaches in brief as a kind of primer. A tree of phenomenology.

I recommend Mind and World

Thanks!

It sounds like you are reading phenomenology as subjective introspection. That’s a common misperception. — Joshs

No, it is not misperception, or misunderstanding. If I may borrow the quotes in your post -- please explain introjection and appresentation. They might have coined words ingeniously, but the fact remains that they could not escape a sort of psychoanalysis method of explaining. One has to speak in a vacuum in order to make it at best, a narrative.

Phenomenology is just as much about objectivity and intersubjectivity and the way they are inextricably bound together with subjectivity such that no science can escape the fact that its grounding and condition of possibility leads empiricism back to phenomenology. — Joshs

Please explain objectivity in phenomenology. We know what is objectivity in epistemology.

Please explain objectivity in phenomenology. We know what is objectivity in epistemology. — Caldwell

Here’s a summary of Husserl on the origin of the ‘real’ object:

Edmund Husserl, the founder of modern phenomenological philosophy, attempted to chart a course between realism and idealism by grounding all experience in perception and grounding perception in structures of intentionality in which the subjective and objective aspects(what he called the noetic and noematic poles) are inextricably dependent on each other and inseparable. He was very much influenced in his project by the work of Franz Brentano, but went beyond Brentano's notion of inentionality by abandoning Brrentano's naturalism.

One of the key aspects of Husserl's approach was his explanation of the origin of spatial objects. Rather than defining an object in terms of its self-subsistence over time with its properties and attributes, he believed such entities to be , not fictions, but idealities. That is to say, what we , in a naive naturalist attitude, point to as this 'real' table in front of us, is the constantly changing product of a process of progressive constitution in consciousness. The real object is in fact an idealization.This process begins at the most primordial level with what he called primal impressions, which we can imagine as the simplest whiffs of sensation(these he calls actual, rather than real. Actual impressions only appear once in time as what they are. When we see something like a table, all that we actually perceive in front of us is an impoverished, contingent partial sense experience.

We fill in the rest of experience in two ways. Al experience implies a temporal structure of retention, primal impression and protention. Each moment presents us with a new sensation, th4 retained memory of the just preceding sensation and anticipation of what is to come. We retain the memory of previous experiences with the 'same' object and those memories become fused with the current aspect of it. A the same time, we protend forward, anticipating aspects of the object that are not yet there for us, based on prior experience with it. For example, we only see the front of the table, but anticipate as an empty horizon, its sides, and this empty anticipation joins with the current view and the memory of previous views to form a complex fused totality. Perception constantly is motivated , that is tends toward toward the fulfillment of the experience of the object as integrated singularity, as this same' table'.

Thus , through a process of progress adumbration of partial views, we constitute what we call and object. It must be added that not just the sens of sight, but all other sense modalities can come into play in constituting the object. And most importantly, there is no experience of an object without kineshthetic sensation of our voluntary movement in relation to the thing seen. Intrinsic to what the object means as object is our knowing how its appearance will change when we move our head in a certain way, or our eyes , or when we touch it. The object is what it is for us in relation to the way we know we can change its appearance relative to our interactions with it.

In sum, what the naive realist calls an external object of perception, Husserl treats as a relative product of constantly changing correlated modes of givenness and adumbrations composed of retentions and protentions. The 'thing' is a tentative , evolving achievement of memory , anticipation and voluntary movement.

From this vantage, attempting to explain this constituting process in psychophysiological terms by reducing it to the language of naive realism is an attempt to explain the constituting on the basis of the constituted. The synthetic structure of temporal constitution is irreducible to 'physical' terms. On the contrary, it is the 'physicai' that rests on a complex constitutive subjective process that is ignored in the naive attitude.

One of the key aspects of Husserl's approach was his explanation of the origin of spatial objects. Rather than defining an object in terms of its self-subsistence over time with its properties and attributes, he believed such entities to be , not fictions, but idealities. That is to say, what we , in a naive naturalist attitude, point to as this 'real' table in front of us, is the constantly changing product of a process of progressive constitution in consciousness. The real object is in fact an idealization.This process begins at the most primordial level with what he called primal impressions, which we can imagine as the simplest whiffs of sensation(these he calls actual, rather than real. Actual impressions only appear once in time as what they are. When we see something like a table, all that we actually perceive in front of us is an impoverished, contingent partial sense experience. — Joshs

The real object is in fact an idealization, so they say. And I think objectivity in this sense doesn't fit with Husserl's explanation of spatial objects. Because as much as he or any other phenomenologist wants to make his narrative as objective as possible, he inadvertently implicates his own explanation, thereby exposing his own idealization of the phenomenon. They should not have started with the denial of objects in itself and the denial of access to other minds. They should have, for all intents and purposes, admitted that the "kinaesthetics sensation of our voluntary movement" is indeed physical and material, therefore, no matter how much we call it idealization, we are inextricably made of matter.

But wait, there's the explanation of how our organs act as checkpoints so that we really don't experience the organs themselves, but what's filtered through these checkpoints. But the checkpoints are physical themselves.

The brakes of phenomenology cannot be disengaged to make it work like Descartes's cogito, I'm afraid. The cogito has a built-in protection against fatal counter-argument because look at what Descartes's "constraint" is-- existence itself. If all else fails in top-heavy realism narrative, there's existence. Once you start doubting your own consciousness or mind--because you are just probably being deceived -- you inextricably admit existence.

I think objectivity in this sense doesn't fit with Husserl's explanation of spatial objects. Because as much as he or any other phenomenologist wants to make his narrative as objective as possible, he inadvertently implicates his own explanation, thereby exposing his own idealization of the phenomenon. They should not have started with the denial of objects in itself and the denial of access to other minds. — Caldwell

You might want to check out some of the recent work on perception in cognitive science(Noe and O’Regan) or the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. You will see that many empirical researchers in perception find the work of Husserl and Merleau-Pontu extremely relevant and valuable to their work.

You might want to check out some of the recent work on perception in cognitive science(Noe and O’Regan) or the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. You will see that many empirical researchers in perception find the work of Husserl and Merleau-Pontu extremely relevant and valuable to their work. — Joshs

How ironic!

But thank you. Will do.

Ever since Thomas Nagel wrote his influential essay What is it Like to Be a Bat (1974), many philosophers and associated hangers on have been preoccupied with understanding phenomenal consciousness as physicalism’s potential coup de grâce. — Tom Storm

Like Chalmer's "hard problem of consciousness" (re: the "p-zombie"), I've always found Nagel's intuition pump (Dennett) "what is it like to be a bat" to be incoherent. The problematic "like to be" presupposes a comparison, but to what? No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point: an individual human being, like an individual bat, does not "know" what it is like to be other than what s/he, or it, is, so there's no comparison, or differentiation, from the inside-out, so to speak. (E.g. what it's like to ride a motor cycle isn't adequately described until one also rides a bicycle (tricycle or unicycle) with which to compare and contrast.) Again, like Chalmers, Nagel doesn't touch physicalism except maybe to encourage more conceptual clarity and descriptive precision by physicalists.

I’d be interested to hear what members thoughts are about what an understanding of phenomenology can bring to the hoary mind/body question.

My philosophical position is closest to Spinoza's dissolution of the so-called "MBP" over three and a half centuries ago; scientifically, I think, embodied cognition explains much better the phenomenal subject (e.g. T. Metzinger, R.S. Bakker, A. Damasio, D. Dennett) than phenomenology itself does.

No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point — 180 Proof

Yes, that resonates with me. I can't even describe coherently what it is to be me if I'm honest.

Thanks for this. My mum was a reader of Spinoza - from the same country - her books and notes were thrown out after she died, unfortunately. They were in Dutch. From memory, you view Spinoza as part of the tradition of acosmism?

From memory, you view Spinoza as part of the tradition of acosmism? — Tom Storm

My view is that Spinoza's thought (plural-aspect holism / dialectical monism) is more consistent with acosmism than any other conception of divinity (or stance toward a/the deity). Of late, however, I've more narrowly interpreted him sub specie durationis through the (epicurean-compatible) lens of pandeism. Benny's only "tradition", so to speak, is rationalism (e.g. Euclid, Descartes & Maimonides).

Thanks for this.

:up: Was your mother a teacher?

Was your mother a teacher? — 180 Proof

No, she was an autodidact.

I've always found Nagel's intuition pump (Dennett) "what is it like to be a bat" to be incoherent. The problematic "like to be" presupposes a comparison, but to what? No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point: a human being, like a bat, does not "know" what it is like to be other than what is, so there's no comparison, or differentiation, from the inside-out, so to speak. — 180 Proof

But that's just it: Ordinary people have no trouble imagining and taking for granted what it is like to be this or that. (It's what usually passes for "empathy".) It's why Nagel wrote the essay -- to address precisely this popular notion and show how problematic it is.

Stop making shit up.

But does this accomplish much more than change the language without altering the problem? — Tom Storm

Phenomenology can be a stepping stone toward Buddhism.

If you search https://pathpress.org/ by the keywords phenomenology, phenomenological, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, you'll get many finds.

Every reductionist has his favorite analogy from modern
science. It is most unlikely that any of these unrelated examples
of successful reduction will shed light on the relation of mind to
brain. But philosophers share the general human weakness for
explanations of what is incomprehensible in terms suited for
what is familiar and well understood, though entirely different.
This has led to the acceptance of implausible accounts of the
mental largely because they would permit familiar kinds of
reduction. I shall try to explain why the usual examples do not
help us to understand the relation between mind and body
why, indeed, we have at present no conception of what an expla-
nation of the physical nature of a mental phenomenon would be.

https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/iatl/study/ugmodules/humananimalstudies/lectures/32/nagel_bat.pdf

I've always found Nagel's intuition pump (Dennett) "what is it like to be a bat" to be incoherent. The problematic "like to be" presupposes a comparison, but to what? No one, Nagel or any of us, can aptly say what it is "like to be" a human being since each one of us only has a single data-point: a human being, like a bat, does not "know" what it is like to be other than what is, so there's no comparison, or differentiation, from the inside-out, so to speak. — 180 Proof

I agree; there is nothing it is like to be a bat or a human, in this sense of comparison you are alluding to. Since I encountered this question of Nagel's 'what is it like to be a bat?'. I've always thought the "like" should be dropped, and the question should become 'what is it to be a bat?', since that is what the incoherently phrased question is really asking anyway; and I guess the answer is that we can only guess about the one major perceptual difference with us (unless we are one of those blind people who are able to use echo-location, who might have an inkling).

Phenomenology attempts to deal with the question: 'what is it to be a human?'. At least we have more hope of coming up with something there!

Isn't it rather obvious Nagel was saying bats may have a sonar sensation which is different from any of the sensations we experience, since sonar isn't one of our perceptions? Or it may be a kind of sound or color. We don't know and that's the point.

In these very contentious philosophical subjects, people get worked up over the exact phrasing of words. Semantics, I guess. "What it's like", is just a way of phrasing subjective feels as opposed to behavioral or functional aspects of perception. Someone acting like they are in pain is different from being in pain, which is again different from a description of the neural correlates of pain.

The idea here is that when we relate to the world there is both an experience of what the world is like for us and at the same time an experience of the self that is having the experience.

Zahavi(2005) says “Any convincing theory of consciousness has to respect the difference between our consciousness of an object, and our consciousness of our own subjectivity, and must be able to explain the distinction between intentionality, which is characterized by a difference between the subject and the object of experience, and self-awareness, which implies some form of identity.”(Zahavi 2004)

“Normally, the “what it is like” aspect is taken to designate experiential properties. If, however, our experiences are to have qualities of their own, they must be qualities over and above whatever qualities the intentional object has. It is exactly the silk that is red, and not my perception of it. Likewise, it is the lemon that is bitter, and not my experience of it.” (Zahavi 2005)

But Zahavi doesn’t mean to make the self into a static entity. It is only a pole of the subject-object relation.

“Although these two sides can be distinguished conceptually, they cannot be separated. It is not as if the two sides or aspects of phenomenal experience can be detached and encountered in isolation from one other. When I touch the cold surface of a refrigerator, is the sensation of coldness that I then feel a property of the experienced object or a property of the experience of the object? The correct answer is that the sensory experience contains two dimensions, namely one of the sensing and one of the sensed, and that we can focus on either.”

The point made by @180 Proof, if I understood it right, is that the 'what is it like' phrasing is based on the intuition that a comparison should be, or could be. possible. If you ask what is it to be a bat, it is more obvious in the framing that we are not referring to some reified something which could be compared with some other reified something. We actually can answer that question; it is to fly, to roost upside down, to be covered in your own urine, to be active at night, and so on. The main part we can't relate to exactly is the echolocation part (except some people may).

What it is to be human, is dealt with by phenomenology, but also by music, the arts, poetry, literature, architecture, religion and so on. What it is to be human is enacted within those pursuits; it is not like there could be a simply encapsulated answer to the question.

The idea here is that when we relate to the world there both an experience of what the world is like for us and at the same time an experience of the self that is having the experience. — Joshs

I agree with what you've said, but again I think the phrasing would be better, less apt to mislead, if you had said "when we relate to the world there both an experience of what the world is for us and at the same time an experience of the self that is having the experience.".

The point is as to what work the "like" is doing there.

if I understood it right, is that the 'what is it like' phrasing is based on the intuition that a comparison should be, or could be. possible. — Janus

The comparison would be one of color for someone born blind from birth. "What it's like" is meant in the literature to denote there is a subjective sensation. There is nothing it's like for a blind person regarding vision, just like there is nothing it's like for humans to echolochate.

Nagel was arguing there is a subjective aspect to perceiving creatures which is not captured by objective descriptions.

The comparison would be one of color for someone born blind from birth. "What it's like" is meant in the literature to denote there is a subjective sensation. There is nothing it's like for a blind person regarding vision, just like there is nothing it's like for humans to echolochate. — Marchesk

What is the word "like" doing there, though?

"The comparison would be one of color for someone born blind from birth. "What it is" is meant in the literature to denote there is a subjective sensation. There is nothing it is for a blind person regarding vision, just like there is nothing it is for humans to echolochate."

Does that change of phrasing make a difference? I think it is less prone to foster reification. Admittedly the second sentence sounds a little strange and would be better written as: Vision is nothing for a blind person, just like echolocation is nothing for (most) humans.

You know, "bewitchment by means of language" and all that?

Nagel was arguing there is a subjective aspect to perceiving creatures which is not captured by objective descriptions. — Marchesk

I think that’s true. I should note that at least for Zahavi it is not the sense object that is the source of the ‘feeling of what it is like’, not the echolalic input for the bat, but a aubjective component that is paired with that imput. So for example, tie people could both be experiencing the same semantic content in almost identical ways , and yet there would still be a subjective ‘feel’ of mineness that is unique to each of them which also belongs to the experience.

You know, "bewitchment by means of language" and all that? — Janus

I don't think Wittgenstein is of much help when it comes to consciousness. There is something it is to have experiences, and this is not easily accounted for in the sciences.