Why are you introducing truth and falsity? — Luke
Correctly call what existence? Are you questioning the existence and use of nouns? — Luke
Whose imagination does common usage exist in? If all types are imaginary, then all nouns in the English language are imaginary. But in that case, I could not call you an imbecile. — Luke
f the problem with naming sensations is found at 258, then why tell me to re-read 244? — Luke
Who claimed that it did? — Luke
Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". — Luke
I should have known better than to engage. — Banno
Why not? Truth and falsity are important features of our communicative reality., and extremely relevant to the subject at hand, the supposed PL:A — Metaphysician Undercover
No I'm questioning the existence of types. You keep claiming that types have existence. I think types are something imaginary, simply made up by peoples' minds, having no real existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Obviously the words are not imaginary, what they represent is. Did you see my example, Santa Clause? — Metaphysician Undercover
I told you to reread 244 because you presented an obvious misrepresentation of what was said there. At 244 Wittgenstein said there doesn't "seem" to be a problem here. You completely ignored the "seem", and claimed that he said there is no problem in naming a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, "the problem", which didn't "seem" to be there, as it was hiding behind the "but", is expounded on between 244 1nd 258, and expressly laid out in the example at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you see that? Conventional usage constitutes the existence of a type — Metaphysician Undercover
I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. — Luke
We can be misled into thinking that these "descriptions" are on equal footing. — Luke
An avowal of pain is not a description of one’s state of mind, nor is it a description of one’s pain. — Baker and Hacker
You overlooked my quote of PI 241. — Luke
Does the English language have real existence? — Luke
Santa Claus or any other proper noun does not really fit types and tokens, because proper nouns only have one type or token. — Luke
However, that is no argument against common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. So your argument isn't what you think. To argue that "what the words represent is imaginary" is to argue that tokens are imaginary, not that types are imaginary. — Luke
There is no problem with naming sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed. — Luke
258 is talking about a private language, not our public language. Think about that, instead of pretending to know what you are talking about. — Luke
es, and who claimed that conventional usage implies that Santa exists? You are confused. Still. — Luke
No, the English language does not have real existence. That is one thing that Wittgenstein demonstrates in the PI, through the game analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover
Anyway, the issue is whether Wittgenstein sees a problem with it, which he clearly does. — Metaphysician Undercover
proper nouns only have one token, which does not make a type. — Luke
common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. — Luke
Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. — Luke
Let's be clear. Everyone else reads the sections around §48 as showing something like that there are no ultimate simples, that the standards we use for defining complexity are in a sense arbitrary. — Banno
I had assumed MU was being at least offered a correct rendition of general usage of the type/token distinction, but I have to admit to being startled, here: — bongo fury
I'm fully aware of the type/token distinction — Metaphysician Undercover
we can have different instances of the very same token. PERIOD. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you mean, they each denote a single individual, which is the unique token of its type, making the type/token distinction superfluous? (Though perhaps harmless.) — bongo fury
Then you might or might not want to get into syntax, distinguishing tokens (utterances, inscriptions etc.) of the denoting noun from the word itself, considered as class or type of those tokens? — bongo fury
common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens.
— Luke
Again, you mean they each denote either (depending how you look at it), a class or type or extension, or on the other hand severally the several objects which are members of that extension, i.e. tokens of the type? — bongo fury
But the general usage admits the implication of such a commitment. Types are an accepted piece of Platonism in linguistics and analytical philosophy. — bongo fury
You overlooked my quote of PI 241.
— Luke
You didn't explain how it was relevant, and I couldn't see the connection. — Metaphysician Undercover
The English language consists of a multitude of language-games, and we cannot point to one game which could be called "the English language". There is nothing which "the English Language" actually refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover
That is why your proposed type/token dichotomy is inapplicable here, where Wittgenstein is talking about "naming". "Naming" is a practice commonly consisting of applying proper nouns. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your writing is so confused, saying that a type is a word, and nouns are themselves classified as types and tokens. Such things always depend on how the word is used, so we cannot make universal judgements about "words" in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no problem with naming sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed.
— Luke
The fact that we do it doesn't imply that there is no problem with it. If that were the case then there'd be no such thing as a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover
the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public — Metaphysician Undercover
our common practise of naming things proceeds in an unjustified manner — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore it has been concluded that we cannot coherently describe a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein first defined a private language by saying “the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.” Does this mean that the entire vocabulary of the language must consist of words referring to the speaker’s private sensations? How then could such a language have any grammatical structure? — Richard Floyd
My bad. — Luke
it is perhaps more correct to say that a proper noun is both a token and a type - — Luke
"the unique token of its type" as you say. — Luke
Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? — bongo fury
A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon, as distinguished from a common noun, which is a noun that refers to a class of entities and may be used when referring to instances of a specific class. — Wikipedia
Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? Anyone would assume the first and not the second — bongo fury
It can't be both. — bongo fury
No, only to the name. — bongo fury
A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon — Wikipedia
At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say". — Luke
How can you maintain both that "The English language consists of a multitude of language-games", and also that "There is nothing which "the English language" actually refers to"? — Luke
I'm saying consider the type as a word, a noun, a concept, or a class, because that might help you to distinguish types from tokens, which are concrete instances or objects of that type. Or forget the type-token distinction altogether and look at Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" at PI 258 instead. — Luke
That is, it is your position that all naming (naming anything) is a mistake. — Luke
Why can a common noun refer to its instances but a proper noun cannot refer to its instance? — Luke
So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object? — Luke
So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object? — Luke
That would be grossly unfair. Both are fine. It doesn't mean, though, that the phrases "common noun" and "proper noun" refer to any non-linguistic items. Which is what you seem to claim here: — bongo fury
A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon, as distinguished from a common noun, which is a noun that refers to a class of entities and may be used when referring to instances of a specific class. — Wikipedia
At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".
— Luke
Another example of your misreading. — Metaphysician Undercover
A multitude of things is not a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you think that the "word" written here is the same thing as the "word" written here? — Metaphysician Undercover
Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token? — Metaphysician Undercover
Or would you say that each is a different token of the same type, the type being a type of word expressed by "word"? — Metaphysician Undercover
What we call "the same word", could be either a noun or a verb depending on the instance of use. — Metaphysician Undercover
Then each instance of use must be a different token. And therefore it is incorrect to say the "word" written here is the same word as the "word" written here. — Metaphysician Undercover
Each instance of use must be a different word — Metaphysician Undercover
So, let's start, as you suggest with Wittgenstein's use of "the recurrence of a certain sensation". If we put that in context, we see that he is talking about naming a particular sensation, which occurs on numerous occasions (recurrence of the very same thing), which is referred to as "the sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover
It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading. — Luke
No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens. — Luke
What do you mean by “the very same thing”?
You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?
What do you think “recurrence” means? — Luke
My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK, so let's say that there are two distinct instance of what we commonly call "the same word". In one instance the word is used as a noun, and in the other instance, the word is used as a verb. They are two distinct tokens, as you say here. By what principle do we call these two tokens "the same"? They are not tokens of the same type, because one is a token of the type of word called "noun", and the other is a token of the type of word called "verb". — Metaphysician Undercover
What do you mean by “the very same thing”?
You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?
What do you think “recurrence” means?
— Luke
It's not me who said that two instances of the same word are not the same word. I asked you that question, and you gave me that answer. — Metaphysician Undercover
I would say that if we adhere to the principle stated by Wittgenstein at 253, it is "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover
In so much as the two instances are "exactly the same as" each other, we can say that it is "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover
So, "recurrence", in the context of 258, means a repeated instance of the very same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Likewise, a person might have a repeated instance of the very same word, within one's mind. Don't you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover
According to your translation, what comes after the question? — Luke
My explanation obviously didn't take. Try this: First, establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. Second, apply the type/token distinction. — Luke
In this case, we are talking about a "sensation". Do you need any help with the meaning of that word? — Luke
It's not me, either. Where did I ever say "two instances of the same word are not the same word"? — Luke
Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token?
— Metaphysician Undercover
No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens. — Luke
I have introduced the type/token distinction to try and create clarity about the meaning of "the same". You have done nothing but try to maintain opacity. — Luke
You have not answered my question: What do you mean by "the same"? — Luke
ntil you can clarify what you mean by "the same", then I don't understand what this means. — Luke
At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".
— Luke
Another example of your misreading.
— Metaphysician Undercover
It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading.
— Luke
My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement.
— Metaphysician Undercover
According to your translation, what comes after the question?
— Luke
The answer to the question is negative. "That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." — Metaphysician Undercover
241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and
what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. — Wittgenstein
I don't need any help with the meaning of "sensation". I see it very clearly as ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover
I asked whether two distinct instances of the same word are the same token. You answered they are not the same token. However, they are clearly not the same type, because as I said, one might be a noun, and one might be a verb. You continue to insist that they are "the same word", but you haven't explained by what principle you use "same". — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is very clear to me. There is a use of "same" which refers to neither a type nor a token. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is a use of "same" which we commonly call "identical". Wittgenstein calls it "exactly the same as". It does not mean the same token because it clearly refers to two distinct things. It does not mean the same type, because there is no classing the things within a type, just a judgement of "same". There is no type mentioned, only the very strong assertion that they are "exactly the same". — Metaphysician Undercover
What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? — Luke
How can you possibly understand the scenario if you don't know what he means by "sensation"? — Luke
No two tokens are the same token, but they can be considered as (tokens of) the same type/class. — Luke
What does it refer to then? — Luke
We learn the names of types and we learn what tokens (typically) belong to those types by means of examples and repetition. — Luke
If it's not by type, then how else can two distinct tokens be the same? Try to answer without simply repeating that they're the same (or some other synonym). — Luke
To use your type/token distinction, It could refer to what you call a type, or it could refer to what you call a token of a type, as we've discussed. — Metaphysician Undercover
Easily, he means to create ambiguity with the use of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover
You have given me no principle by which we can determine whether two instances, such as what Wittgenstein is talking about at 258, are of two different tokens, or of one and the same token. — Metaphysician Undercover
But of course you are wrong, as Wittgenstein demonstrates with the example of a chair, the same token of a chair can occur as two distinct instances of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover
In this case, "same" refers to two distinct things which have been judged to be identical, they appear to be exactly the same as each other. They are not judged as being the same token, nor are they judged as being of the same type, they are judged as being the same — Metaphysician Undercover
We do not "learn the names of types, and we learn what tokens( typically) belong to those types". — Metaphysician Undercover
We learn the names of particular things, and we judge others as being "the same" in the sense described above, and so we call them by the same name. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you understand that we can, and commonly do, judge two things to be similar, and even "the same as each other", without judging them to be the same type? — Metaphysician Undercover
That they are "the same type" is a logical conclusion drawn from the judgement that they are the same, or similar, along with another premise stating that having the same, or similar features constitutes a type. — Metaphysician Undercover
"The sensation" which is referred to at 258 is not meant to be a token nor is it meant to be a type, — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not asking about "the same" sensation or types and tokens here. I asked you what you think "sensation" means in Wittgenstein's scenario. How do you think the word "sensation" is being used there? — Luke
This is only to repeat that you don't know how he is using the word. — Luke
You claim to understand the point of the scenario yet you don't understand his use of words? — Luke
The same in what respect? — Luke
I'm not claiming that when we learn a language we are explicitly taught about types and tokens. — Luke
No, that's exactly what I don't understand: how two distinct things can be classed as "the same" without being the same type. — Luke
How do you know, when you claim not to know what the word "sensation" means here? — Luke
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