Why are you introducing truth and falsity? — Luke

Why not? Truth and falsity are important features of our communicative reality, and extremely relevant to the subject at hand, the supposed PL:A. Remember the point I made, that your argument was proven wrong by the possibility of lying.

Correctly call what existence? Are you questioning the existence and use of nouns? — Luke

No I'm questioning the existence of types. You keep claiming that types have existence. I think types are something imaginary, simply made up by peoples' minds, having no real existence.

Whose imagination does common usage exist in? If all types are imaginary, then all nouns in the English language are imaginary. But in that case, I could not call you an imbecile. — Luke

Obviously the words are not imaginary, what they represent is. Did you see my example, Santa Clause?

f the problem with naming sensations is found at 258, then why tell me to re-read 244? — Luke

I told you to reread 244 because you presented an obvious misrepresentation of what was said there. At 244 Wittgenstein said there doesn't "seem" to be a problem here. You completely ignored the "seem", and claimed that he said there is no problem in naming a sensation. That's what you claimed, that Wittgenstein said at 244 that there is no problem with naming a sensation. This is very clearly a misreading. What he really says is "There doesn't seem to be any problem here... But how is the connexion between the name and the thing set up?". He then proceeds to investigate what follows the "but.". So, "the problem", which didn't "seem" to be there, as it was hiding behind the "but", is expounded on between 244 1nd 258, and expressly laid out in the example at 258. Did you reread 244 yet, to see what I mean?

Who claimed that it did? — Luke

Luke! How short is your memory?

Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". — Luke

Do you see that? Conventional usage constitutes the existence of a type. Why bother replying to what was written if you are not even trying to follow the conversation? You take a few days to reply, and all your responses are completely off track from what was being discussed.

I should have known better than to engage. — Banno

Yes, you should have. And please, if you can, refrain from blurting out ridiculous things about me, such as that I am "convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings". That simply could not be further from the truth, and only demonstrates that you are incapable of engaging with what I actually say. When you do not have the capacity to do something it's best not to try to do it, that's called getting in over your head.

Why not? Truth and falsity are important features of our communicative reality., and extremely relevant to the subject at hand, the supposed PL:A — Metaphysician Undercover

You overlooked my quote of PI 241.

No I'm questioning the existence of types. You keep claiming that types have existence. I think types are something imaginary, simply made up by peoples' minds, having no real existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does the English language have real existence?

Obviously the words are not imaginary, what they represent is. Did you see my example, Santa Clause? — Metaphysician Undercover

Santa Claus or any other proper noun does not really fit types and tokens, because proper nouns only have one token, which does not make a type. However, that is no argument against common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. So your argument isn't what you think. To argue that "what the words represent is imaginary" is to argue that tokens are imaginary, not that types are imaginary.

I told you to reread 244 because you presented an obvious misrepresentation of what was said there. At 244 Wittgenstein said there doesn't "seem" to be a problem here. You completely ignored the "seem", and claimed that he said there is no problem in naming a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no problem with referring to sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed.

So, "the problem", which didn't "seem" to be there, as it was hiding behind the "but", is expounded on between 244 1nd 258, and expressly laid out in the example at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

258 is talking about a private language, not our public language. Think about that, instead of pretending to know what you are talking about.

Do you see that? Conventional usage constitutes the existence of a type — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, and who claimed that conventional usage implies that Santa exists? You are confused. Still.

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. — Luke

It is meaningless to say that I am in pain and don't know it. But this use of the term 'know' is no the same as its use in other contexts.

We can be misled into thinking that these "descriptions" are on equal footing. — Luke

I agree and would say that the same is true of "know".

An avowal of pain is not a description of one’s state of mind, nor is it a description of one’s pain. — Baker and Hacker

If I say that I am in pain I am not describing my pain or a state of mind, it is, however, still a description of how I feel. If someone asks how I feel and I say that I am in pain, that is a description of how I feel.

You overlooked my quote of PI 241. — Luke

You didn't explain how it was relevant, and I couldn't see the connection.

Does the English language have real existence? — Luke

No, the English language does not have real existence. That is one thing that Wittgenstein demonstrates in the PI, through the game analogy. The English language consists of a multitude of language-games, and we cannot point to one game which could be called "the English language". There is nothing which "the English Language" actually refers to.

Santa Claus or any other proper noun does not really fit types and tokens, because proper nouns only have one type or token. — Luke

That is why your proposed type/token dichotomy is inapplicable here, where Wittgenstein is talking about "naming". "Naming" is a practice commonly consisting of applying proper nouns. You just don't seem to grasp the meaning of "naming", that naming is to relate a word directly to an object, as we do with proper nouns.

However, that is no argument against common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. So your argument isn't what you think. To argue that "what the words represent is imaginary" is to argue that tokens are imaginary, not that types are imaginary. — Luke

I really don't see how you draw this conclusion. Your writing is so confused, saying that a type is a word, and nouns are themselves classified as types and tokens. Such things always depend on how the word is used, so we cannot make universal judgements about "words" in this way.

There is no problem with naming sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed. — Luke

The fact that we do it doesn't imply that there is no problem with it. If that were the case then there'd be no such thing as a mistake. Anyway, the issue is whether Wittgenstein sees a problem with it, which he clearly does.

258 is talking about a private language, not our public language. Think about that, instead of pretending to know what you are talking about. — Luke

That is not true, and again demonstrates that your preconceived ideas influence your reading. At 257 Wittgenstein proposes a sort of private language, where he questions "So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?" But by the end of 257 he concludes with "And when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word "pain"; it shews the post where the new word is stationed."

I request that you consider the conclusion of 257 very closely. When we say that the person has given a name to one's pain we are already using "pain" to reference the thing which the person has named. In other words, since we are describing what the person is doing, with words of our common language, it is already impossible that what the person is doing can be called a 'private language' such as proposed earlier in 257. What the person is doing is already in the context of being public, because it is being described. Therefore it has been concluded that we cannot coherently describe a private language. That would be an incoherency, because to describe what the person is doing, makes it necessarily public already.

Then he proceeds to 258. So, the conclusion of 257 ensures that it is impossible that he is describing a private language at 258. He has already excluded that as impossible due to the described incoherency at the end of 257. The diarist at 258 is naming a sensation with "S", and as explained at 261 "sensation" is a word of our common language. Therefore the grammar of the word "sensation" is presupposed, just like "pain" at the end of 257. And Wittgenstein is not talking about a private language at all here. He is talking about the problems involved with naming a sensation. It is impossible that he is describing a private language, because he has already demonstrated that it is impossible to describe a private language.

es, and who claimed that conventional usage implies that Santa exists? You are confused. Still. — Luke

You, explicitly claimed that the existence of something, "a type" is constituted by conventional usage.

No, the English language does not have real existence. That is one thing that Wittgenstein demonstrates in the PI, through the game analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you mean it doesn't exist independently of language games. It's not an Aristotelian substance. It's not the Absolute.

Anyway, the issue is whether Wittgenstein sees a problem with it, which he clearly does. — Metaphysician Undercover

Apparently not. He talked about direct apprehension of mental states.

Let's be clear. Everyone else reads the sections around §48 as showing something like that there are no ultimate simples, that the standards we use for defining complexity are in a sense arbitrary.

You alone read it as an argument that identity is determined by "spatial-temporal continuity"* .

And you want to be taken seriously.

I had assumed MU was being at least offered a correct rendition of general usage of the type/token distinction, but I have to admit to being startled, here:

proper nouns only have one token, which does not make a type. — Luke

Do you mean, they each denote a single individual, which is the unique token of its type, making the type/token distinction superfluous? (Though perhaps harmless.)

Then you might or might not want to get into syntax, distinguishing tokens (utterances, inscriptions etc.) of the denoting noun from the word itself, considered as class or type of those tokens?

common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens. — Luke

Again, you mean they each denote either (depending how you look at it), a class or type or extension, or on the other hand severally the several objects which are members of that extension, i.e. tokens of the type?

The syntactic items properly called common nouns are identifiable either as single items or as classes (types) of tokens, no different from the situation with proper nouns (see above).

Types represent their tokens in the sense that a type is a word that represents a (class/type of) concrete token/object. — Luke

This could be (to a nominalist) a lovely way to start deflating types/classes/extensions so that there's no commitment to them as entities. But the general usage admits the implication of such a commitment. Types are an accepted piece of Platonism in linguistics and analytical philosophy.

AFAIK. You might be channeling a different tradition? Apologies if so.

Let's be clear. Everyone else reads the sections around §48 as showing something like that there are no ultimate simples, that the standards we use for defining complexity are in a sense arbitrary. — Banno

Yes I see that, but if you read carefully you'll see the reason for the conclusion, that there are no ultimate simples. The idea is logically incoherent. What 48 shows is that what you call an "ultimate simple" exists as a part of a proposal, a proposition, as a feature of a description. Therefore it could not be a thing named, because it would only exist as a proposed part of a complex. It's existence is relative to the proposal. So there would be a description of the complex, which includes "ultimate simples", but there could be no real name for the proposed simples which compose the complex, because they are only proposed, not observed and named. There is only a description of the role, or function which they are supposed to play in the complex.

Then the problem of differentiating between one proposed ultimate simple and another is exposed at the end of 48. Is each element named by the same letter the same element, or are they different elements of the same type, bearing the same name by being of the same type? Well, as Wittgenstein says, and Banno says, it doesn't matter, so long as we can avoid misunderstandings. So, we'd say "no problem", they are different elements of the same type.

Well, at 49 it is shown that misunderstanding cannot be avoided. Those who propose ultimate simples, propose them as elements which can only be named, and cannot be described. To be describable would imply that they are themselves composed of parts, and therefore could not be ultimate simples. If they are not describable, we cannot judge them as the same type. So the idea of an ultimate simple turns out to be logically incoherent, because they can only be named, not described, but each and every one would all have the very same name, because they are supposed to be of the same type. But they really cannot be of the same type, because they cannot be described as such, nor can they be distinguished one from another. So they cannot be named, nor can they be described, and it's an incoherent proposal.

To perhaps get a clearer picture of my interpretation of this, refer to the PI reading group, p12 in my pagination, (I'd provide a link but I don't know how). There I describe how Wittgenstein demonstrates that the idea of "primary elements" is self-refuting, because it is as I describe there, simply an attempt to circumvent the law of identity, the proposal of a thing which cannot have any sort of identity.

I had assumed MU was being at least offered a correct rendition of general usage of the type/token distinction, but I have to admit to being startled, here: — bongo fury

I'm startled that you are criticising me instead of MU, who asserts:

I'm fully aware of the type/token distinction — Metaphysician Undercover

while at the same time contradicting his claimed awareness with comments such as:

we can have different instances of the very same token. PERIOD. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't claim to be any sort of expert on the type-token distinction. As I've said several times now, I only thought it would help to clarify for MU the difference between two different possible meanings of "the same": the same type and the same token.

I attempted to apply the distinction to PI 258 in order to show that Wittgenstein was not talking about a once-off token of the sensation "S", but that his intention was for the diarist to establish the name "S" for a type of sensation. I see now that my introduction of the type-token distinction was a fool's errand, and that a better approach would have been to stress Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" instead. I did try that early on, but maybe I should have perservered. Either way, MU failed to understand the type-token distinction or the basic meaning of of the word "recurrence".

Do you mean, they each denote a single individual, which is the unique token of its type, making the type/token distinction superfluous? (Though perhaps harmless.) — bongo fury

If I were to follow my nominalist claim that a type is simply a concept or a noun, then it is perhaps more correct to say that a proper noun is both a token and a type - or "the unique token of its type" as you say. However, it's not much of a type if there is only one token. But I'm not too concerned either way.

Then you might or might not want to get into syntax, distinguishing tokens (utterances, inscriptions etc.) of the denoting noun from the word itself, considered as class or type of those tokens? — bongo fury

You are talking about distinguishing tokens from their type. Isn't that just what the type-token distinction is?

common nouns which can be classified into types and their tokens.
— Luke

Again, you mean they each denote either (depending how you look at it), a class or type or extension, or on the other hand severally the several objects which are members of that extension, i.e. tokens of the type? — bongo fury

Yes.

But the general usage admits the implication of such a commitment. Types are an accepted piece of Platonism in linguistics and analytical philosophy. — bongo fury

If that's what the general usage is, then I guess I wasn't following the general usage. My bad.

If I say that I am in pain I am not describing my pain — Fooloso4

You are not describing your pain, but you are describing your sensation? I take W to be saying that if you say you are in pain, then you are expressing your pain and this is not a description.

You overlooked my quote of PI 241.
— Luke

You didn't explain how it was relevant, and I couldn't see the connection. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said that common or conventional language use "may dictate what is correct and incorrect, [but] it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false."

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".

The English language consists of a multitude of language-games, and we cannot point to one game which could be called "the English language". There is nothing which "the English Language" actually refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can you maintain both that "The English language consists of a multitude of language-games", and also that "There is nothing which "the English language" actually refers to"?

That is why your proposed type/token dichotomy is inapplicable here, where Wittgenstein is talking about "naming". "Naming" is a practice commonly consisting of applying proper nouns. — Metaphysician Undercover

Naming also applies to common nouns, so the type-token distinction is not inapplicable here.

Your writing is so confused, saying that a type is a word, and nouns are themselves classified as types and tokens. Such things always depend on how the word is used, so we cannot make universal judgements about "words" in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are no universal judgements; I'm trying to help you understand the distinction. I'm saying consider the type as a word, a noun, a concept, or a class, because that might help you to distinguish types from tokens, which are concrete instances or objects of that type. Or forget the type-token distinction altogether and look at Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" at PI 258 instead.

There is no problem with naming sensations in our public language; we do do that every day, in case you hadn't noticed.
— Luke

The fact that we do it doesn't imply that there is no problem with it. If that were the case then there'd be no such thing as a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is your position that:

the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public — Metaphysician Undercover

our common practise of naming things proceeds in an unjustified manner — Metaphysician Undercover

That is, it is your position that all naming (naming anything) is a mistake. If everything were a mistake, then there'd be no such thing as a mistake.

Therefore it has been concluded that we cannot coherently describe a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

You haven't gone far enough. It's not that there can be a private language only we cannot describe it. It's that there cannot be a private language at all.

As noted in the earlier article I posted:

Wittgenstein first defined a private language by saying “the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.” Does this mean that the entire vocabulary of the language must consist of words referring to the speaker’s private sensations? How then could such a language have any grammatical structure? — Richard Floyd

My bad. — Luke

Now I feel bad. But if you're a Wittgenstein exegisist that dares answer to the name 'nominalist', then hooray, but I want to be sure I understand you.

it is perhaps more correct to say that a proper noun is both a token and a type - — Luke

I just need clarification. Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? Anyone would assume the first and not the second, and possibly "both a token and a type" in the sense of referring ambiguously to either a particular token (utterance or inscription) of the noun in question, or the type which is the class of all such tokens. But then, with

"the unique token of its type" as you say. — Luke

I was definitely referring to the second and not the first. The unique bearer of the name.

It can't be both.

I know I've made this sound pedantic. But it's the difference between written notes and sounded tones. It's going to be crucial. I've had the same trouble with most of the big shots around here, so you oughtn't worry.

MU is on his own road.

Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? — bongo fury

Wikipedia tells me:

A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon, as distinguished from a common noun, which is a noun that refers to a class of entities and may be used when referring to instances of a specific class. — Wikipedia

From this I gather that a 'proper noun' is a noun that refers to a single entity.

Does 'proper noun' refer to the name or the named object? Anyone would assume the first and not the second — bongo fury

I guess, but then the first also refers to the second. So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object?

It can't be both. — bongo fury

I don't see why not. A common noun "refers to a class...and may be used when referring to instances of [that class]". If common nouns can refer to both, then why can't proper nouns?

I'm happy for this to be moved to a new thread if it is warranted.

the first also refers to the second. — Luke

Do you mean, the name refers to the named? Sure.

So 'proper noun' refers to both? — Luke

No, only to the name.

No, only to the name. — bongo fury

Why can a common noun refer to its instances but a proper noun cannot refer to its instance?

A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon — Wikipedia

A proper noun is a noun that is used to refer to a single entity. The proper noun "Jupiter", for example, refers to the single entity which is that planet.

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say". — Luke

Another example of your misreading.

How can you maintain both that "The English language consists of a multitude of language-games", and also that "There is nothing which "the English language" actually refers to"? — Luke

A multitude of things is not a thing. Sorry, I should have wrote "no thing", instead of "nothing" which is a bit ambiguous. But it should have been obvious because we were talking about the existence of things, and what I was claiming is that types have no real existence because they are not things and are imaginary. Your misreading appears intentional.

I'm saying consider the type as a word, a noun, a concept, or a class, because that might help you to distinguish types from tokens, which are concrete instances or objects of that type. Or forget the type-token distinction altogether and look at Wittgenstein's use of the word "recurrence" at PI 258 instead. — Luke

It makes no sense at all to me to see a word as a concept. It's a physical thing, written on a page, or screen, or spoken. If you want me to be able to see a word as a concept, you'll really need to elaborate on this idea.

Do you think that the "word" written here is the same thing as the "word" written here? Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token? Or would you say that each is a different token of the same type, the type being a type of word expressed by "word"? This demonstrates the problem with saying that a word is itself a noun. What we call "the same word", could be either a noun or a verb depending on the instance of use. Therefore we have to refer to the context of the instance of use to see "the type" (verb or noun) which the word is a token of. Then each instance of use must be a different token. And therefore it is incorrect to say the "word" written here is the same word as the "word" written here. Each instance of use must be a different word, if we adhere to your proposed type-token distinction.

The alternative, to forget the type-token distinction is what I've been trying to get you to do since you introduced it. So, let's start, as you suggest with Wittgenstein's use of "the recurrence of a certain sensation". If we put that in context, we see that he is talking about naming a particular sensation, which occurs on numerous occasions (recurrence of the very same thing), which is referred to as "the sensation". Further, he talks about the possibility of pointing to this thing, "the sensation" to give it an ostensive definition, but declares that this is not possible.

That is, it is your position that all naming (naming anything) is a mistake. — Luke

Utter nonsense, as is your habit. You've fallen back into that habit of intentionally misreading to create a straw man.

Why can a common noun refer to its instances but a proper noun cannot refer to its instance? — Luke

That would be grossly unfair. Both are fine. It doesn't mean, though, that the phrases "common noun" and "proper noun" refer to any non-linguistic items. Which is what you seem to claim here:

So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object? — Luke

Reference isn't transitive (in the mathematical sense of transitive). "Proper noun" refers to names; names refer to their bearers; but "proper noun" doesn't generally refer to the bearers (either severally or as a class). Perhaps your single quotes are scary but not, like my doubles, quotational? Then you are perhaps saying that a name e.g. "Jupiter" refers to itself as well as the planet? That can't be right either. I mean, I see that you're not saying that at all. But then what to make of,

So 'proper noun' refers to both the name and the named object? — Luke

That would be grossly unfair. Both are fine. It doesn't mean, though, that the phrases "common noun" and "proper noun" refer to any non-linguistic items. Which is what you seem to claim here: — bongo fury

I said from the outset that I don’t think a proper noun, which refers only to a single entity, makes a type. Because it makes little difference to me, I was trying to be accommodating of your view, but it looks like I cannot.

A proper noun does not refer to a noun or a name.
A proper noun is a noun or a name.

A proper noun is a noun that identifies a single entity and is used to refer to that entity, such as Africa, Jupiter, Sarah, or Amazon, as distinguished from a common noun, which is a noun that refers to a class of entities and may be used when referring to instances of a specific class. — Wikipedia

Ok, cool, I think you were just unaware that "token of a noun" would tend to be understood as referring to a syntactic, linguistic item, such as an utterance or inscription of the noun itself. You mean rather the one (for a proper noun) or several (for a common noun) objects denoted by the noun. Pardon me and carry on.

I don’t believe I ever used the phrase “token of a noun”, but if I did I wasn’t talking about nouns as tokens - which is what I take you to mean by “an utterance or inscription of the noun itself”.

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".
— Luke

Another example of your misreading. — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading.

A multitude of things is not a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Almost every thing is a multitude of things. The English language is no exception.

Do you think that the "word" written here is the same thing as the "word" written here? — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends what you mean by “the same thing” (this has been my point all along).

Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens.

Or would you say that each is a different token of the same type, the type being a type of word expressed by "word"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

What we call "the same word", could be either a noun or a verb depending on the instance of use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I said to consider a type as a word, noun, concept or class in the quote you responded to, so I don’t need to clarify if i mean a verb or a noun. I already have.

Then each instance of use must be a different token. And therefore it is incorrect to say the "word" written here is the same word as the "word" written here. — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s not incorrect. Same type, different tokens.

Each instance of use must be a different word — Metaphysician Undercover

Same type, different tokens.

So, let's start, as you suggest with Wittgenstein's use of "the recurrence of a certain sensation". If we put that in context, we see that he is talking about naming a particular sensation, which occurs on numerous occasions (recurrence of the very same thing), which is referred to as "the sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by “the very same thing”?

You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?

What do you think “recurrence” means?

It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading. — Luke

My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement.

No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens. — Luke

OK, so let's say that there are two distinct instance of what we commonly call "the same word". In one instance the word is used as a noun, and in the other instance, the word is used as a verb. They are two distinct tokens, as you say here. By what principle do we call these two tokens "the same"? They are not tokens of the same type, because one is a token of the type of word called "noun", and the other is a token of the type of word called "verb".

What do you mean by “the very same thing”?

You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?

What do you think “recurrence” means? — Luke

It's not me who said that two instances of the same word are not the same word. I asked you that question, and you gave me that answer. That's not my answer. I would say that if we adhere to the principle stated by Wittgenstein at 253, it is "the same word". In so much as the two instances are "exactly the same as" each other, we can say that it is "the same word".

So, "recurrence", in the context of 258, means a repeated instance of the very same thing. Likewise, a person might have a repeated instance of the very same word, within one's mind. Don't you agree?

My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to your translation, what comes after the question?

OK, so let's say that there are two distinct instance of what we commonly call "the same word". In one instance the word is used as a noun, and in the other instance, the word is used as a verb. They are two distinct tokens, as you say here. By what principle do we call these two tokens "the same"? They are not tokens of the same type, because one is a token of the type of word called "noun", and the other is a token of the type of word called "verb". — Metaphysician Undercover

My explanation obviously didn't take. Try this: First, establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. Second, apply the type/token distinction.

In this case, we are talking about a "sensation". Do you need any help with the meaning of that word?

What do you mean by “the very same thing”?

You don’t allow that two instances of “word” can be the same but you allow that two instances of a sensation can be the same?

What do you think “recurrence” means?
— Luke

It's not me who said that two instances of the same word are not the same word. I asked you that question, and you gave me that answer. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not me, either. Where did I ever say "two instances of the same word are not the same word"?

I have introduced the type/token distinction to try and create clarity about the meaning of "the same". You have done nothing but try to maintain opacity.

I would say that if we adhere to the principle stated by Wittgenstein at 253, it is "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not answered my question: What do you mean by "the same"?

In so much as the two instances are "exactly the same as" each other, we can say that it is "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover

You realise that two instances is two tokens, right? How can two tokens be the same? You have refused to accept this until now.

So, "recurrence", in the context of 258, means a repeated instance of the very same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by "the very same"?

Likewise, a person might have a repeated instance of the very same word, within one's mind. Don't you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

Until you can clarify what you mean by "the same", then I don't understand what this means.

According to your translation, what comes after the question? — Luke

The answer to the question is negative. "That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."

My explanation obviously didn't take. Try this: First, establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. Second, apply the type/token distinction. — Luke

Obviously, the example I made would be analogous only to a case where the particular sense cannot be conclusively determined. That is the situation we have with Wittgenstein's use of "a sensation". We disagree on the particular sense/use/meaning of the word. We cannot establish the particular sense/use/meaning of the word, so how do we proceed toward applying the type/token distinction?

In this case, we are talking about a "sensation". Do you need any help with the meaning of that word? — Luke

I don't need any help with the meaning of "sensation". I see it very clearly as ambiguous. You seem to see a particular sense/use/meaning, and so you proceed toward applying a type/token distinction. Of course that is a misreading, because Wittgenstein intended that the meaning of "sensation" be left as ambiguous.

It's not me, either. Where did I ever say "two instances of the same word are not the same word"? — Luke

Are the two of these, two distinct instances of the same token?
— Metaphysician Undercover

No. An instance is a token, so they are two distinct instances or two distinct tokens. — Luke

I asked whether two distinct instances of the same word are the same token. You answered they are not the same token. However, they are clearly not the same type, because as I said, one might be a noun, and one might be a verb. You continue to insist that they are "the same word", but you haven't explained by what principle you use "same". You say they are not the same token, and I say they are not the same type, so what makes them "the same"?

I have introduced the type/token distinction to try and create clarity about the meaning of "the same". You have done nothing but try to maintain opacity. — Luke

The issue is very clear to me. There is a use of "same" which refers to neither a type nor a token. You apply a type/token dichotomy, and refuse to grasp the fact that many times when we use the word "same", such as "the same word" exemplified above, there is neither a type nor a token implied by "same". So your introduction of the type/token dichotomy does not produce clarity, because if it's adhered to, it produces misunderstanding.

You have not answered my question: What do you mean by "the same"? — Luke

I mean exactly as I said, what Wittgenstein explains at 253. There is a use of "same" which we commonly call "identical". Wittgenstein calls it "exactly the same as". It does not mean the same token because it clearly refers to two distinct things. It does not mean the same type, because there is no classing the things within a type, just a judgement of "same". There is no type mentioned, only the very strong assertion that they are "exactly the same".

ntil you can clarify what you mean by "the same", then I don't understand what this means. — Luke

I don't think you will ever understand, because you refuse to release yourself from the grips of that type/token dichotomy. To me it's like you are adhering to the law of excluded middle, to say, it must mean one or the other, and cannot be both, nor can it be neither. But you seem to refuse to accept the reality of ambiguity, and that an author can intentionally mean both, and you refuse to accept the reality of a meaning of "the same" which is neither.

At PI 241, W states that "What is true or false is what human beings say".
— Luke

Another example of your misreading.
— Metaphysician Undercover

It’s a direct quote. Explain how it’s a misreading.
— Luke

My translation gives what you present as the statement: "What is true or false is what human beings say", as a question: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"' There's a big difference between a question and a statement.
— Metaphysician Undercover

According to your translation, what comes after the question?
— Luke

The answer to the question is negative. "That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." — Metaphysician Undercover

241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and
what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. — Wittgenstein

Evidently I'm being played for a fool.

I don't need any help with the meaning of "sensation". I see it very clearly as ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? How can you possibly understand the scenario if you don't know what he means by "sensation"?

I asked whether two distinct instances of the same word are the same token. You answered they are not the same token. However, they are clearly not the same type, because as I said, one might be a noun, and one might be a verb. You continue to insist that they are "the same word", but you haven't explained by what principle you use "same". — Metaphysician Undercover

I use the type/token distinction. You have offered only synonyms of "same", which explains nothing. No two tokens are the same token, but they can be considered as (tokens of) the same type/class. The principle is one of conventional language use. We learn the names of types and we learn what tokens (typically) belong to those types by means of examples and repetition. I would recommend you to read PI 208, but I'm quite sure that you would intentionally misread it.

The issue is very clear to me. There is a use of "same" which refers to neither a type nor a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does it refer to then?

There is a use of "same" which we commonly call "identical". Wittgenstein calls it "exactly the same as". It does not mean the same token because it clearly refers to two distinct things. It does not mean the same type, because there is no classing the things within a type, just a judgement of "same". There is no type mentioned, only the very strong assertion that they are "exactly the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

You keep telling me what "same" does not mean, without telling me what it does mean.

If it's not by type, then how else can two distinct tokens be the same? Try to answer without simply repeating that they're the same (or some other synonym).

What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? — Luke

To use your type/token distinction, It could refer to what you call a type, or it could refer to what you call a token of a type, as we've discussed.

How can you possibly understand the scenario if you don't know what he means by "sensation"? — Luke

Easily, he means to create ambiguity with the use of the word. He demonstrates that words do not necessarily have what you call "a meaning", that meaning is complex, and not a simple thing.

No two tokens are the same token, but they can be considered as (tokens of) the same type/class. — Luke

You have given me no principle by which we can determine whether two instances, such as what Wittgenstein is talking about at 258, are of two different tokens, or of one and the same token. You simply insist that two instances are necessarily two distinct tokens. But of course you are wrong, as Wittgenstein demonstrates with the example of a chair, the same token of a chair can occur as two distinct instances of sensation. And you readily admit this but you change the meaning of "instance" to say that they are not the same "instance" of chair.

What does it refer to then? — Luke

I explained that. In this case, "same" refers to two distinct things which have been judged to be identical, they appear to be exactly the same as each other. They are not judged as being the same token, nor are they judged as being of the same type, they are judged as being the same

We learn the names of types and we learn what tokens (typically) belong to those types by means of examples and repetition. — Luke

This is exactly the idea which Wittgenstein is dispelling with the so-called private language argument. We do not "learn the names of types, and we learn what tokens( typically) belong to those types". That is a misrepresentation, it is false. We learn the names of particular things, and we judge others as being "the same" in the sense described above, and so we call them by the same name. A "type" is a complicated concept, which we do not learn until after we get proficient at using words, so it is impossible that we learn how to use words by learning the names of types. We learn to use words by judging things as "the same", in the sense demonstrated by Wittgenstein, which means something other than the same token, and other than the same type.

When learning to use words we learn to judge things as "the same" in this sense, having common features, without learning anything about types. Nor are we learning to judge things by type. Learning types is a complex feature of abstract thought which a child learning language is incapable of.

If it's not by type, then how else can two distinct tokens be the same? Try to answer without simply repeating that they're the same (or some other synonym). — Luke

OK, I'll use other terms like "common features". Do you understand that we can, and commonly do, judge two things to be similar, and even "the same as each other", without judging them to be the same type? That they are "the same type" is a logical conclusion drawn from the judgement that they are the same, or similar, along with another premise stating that having the same, or similar features constitutes a type.

When all the features of the two things appear to match each other, we say that the two things are "the same". We are not saying they are the same type, simply that they are the same. We do not refer to criteria. This is what Wittgenstein is describing at 253. when he uses "exactly the same as". In this sense, two chairs are the same as each other (not being said to be the sane type, but being said to be "the same"), and two people might be said to have "the same pain". And Wittgenstein proceeds at 258 to discuss the same sensation. "The sensation" which is referred to at 258 is not meant to be a token nor is it meant to be a type, It is two occurrences which are simply judged to be "the same" as each other.

That's why he proceeds at 261 to ask what reason do we have for calling S the sign of a "sensation". The person judging the two occurrences as 'the same" has not produced a "type classification" he has simply judged them as 'the same".

To use your type/token distinction, It could refer to what you call a type, or it could refer to what you call a token of a type, as we've discussed. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not asking about "the same" sensation or types and tokens here. I asked you what you think "sensation" means in Wittgenstein's scenario. How do you think the word "sensation" is being used there?

Easily, he means to create ambiguity with the use of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is only to repeat that you don't know how he is using the word. If you don't know how he is using the word, then how can you understand the scenario? You claim to understand the point of the scenario yet you don't understand his use of words?

You have given me no principle by which we can determine whether two instances, such as what Wittgenstein is talking about at 258, are of two different tokens, or of one and the same token. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't need to give you a principle. An instance of X is a token of X by definition. And I've told you this about 30 times.

But of course you are wrong, as Wittgenstein demonstrates with the example of a chair, the same token of a chair can occur as two distinct instances of sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

A chair is not a sensation, and an instance of a chair is not an instance of a sensation.

In this case, "same" refers to two distinct things which have been judged to be identical, they appear to be exactly the same as each other. They are not judged as being the same token, nor are they judged as being of the same type, they are judged as being the same — Metaphysician Undercover

The same in what respect?

We do not "learn the names of types, and we learn what tokens( typically) belong to those types". — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you realise that I'm applying the concept of the type-token distinction here as a conceptual tool in an attempt to clarify different meanings of "the same"? I'm not claiming that when we learn a language we are explicitly taught about types and tokens.

We learn the names of particular things, and we judge others as being "the same" in the sense described above, and so we call them by the same name. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the type-token distinction in other words.

Do you understand that we can, and commonly do, judge two things to be similar, and even "the same as each other", without judging them to be the same type? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's exactly what I don't understand: how two distinct things can be classed as "the same" without being the same type.

That they are "the same type" is a logical conclusion drawn from the judgement that they are the same, or similar, along with another premise stating that having the same, or similar features constitutes a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not always about resemblance. It's about the use of the word that names the type.

"The sensation" which is referred to at 258 is not meant to be a token nor is it meant to be a type, — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know, when you claim not to know what the word "sensation" means here?

I'm not asking about "the same" sensation or types and tokens here. I asked you what you think "sensation" means in Wittgenstein's scenario. How do you think the word "sensation" is being used there? — Luke

I told you, I believe it is used in an ambiguous way. Do you understand that? It is a common tool in creative writing to leave the meaning of a word unclear so that it may be interpreted in numerous different ways. Therefore I think there is no such thing as what the word means in that context, because the meaning is intentionally ambiguous.

This is only to repeat that you don't know how he is using the word. — Luke

No, I think I know how he is using the word, he is intentionally creating ambiguity with it.

You claim to understand the point of the scenario yet you don't understand his use of words? — Luke

No, again that's not the case. I do understand his use of words; It's you who doesn't understand what he is doing with the words, if you do not recognize that he is intentionally using them ambiguously.

The same in what respect? — Luke

Why must "same". be qualified with "in what respect" for you? When we say that two things are the same, we simply say that they are the same (e.g. I know someone who has the same hat as me). if we qualified that with some respect, we would not be saying they are the same, we'd be saying they are the same in that respect.

I'm not claiming that when we learn a language we are explicitly taught about types and tokens. — Luke

Why did you say that then? You said that we learn types, and now you say that's not what you meant, then what did you mean?

No, that's exactly what I don't understand: how two distinct things can be classed as "the same" without being the same type. — Luke

They are not "classed" as the same, they are just judged to be the same. Whether or not they are the same type, is irrelevant, because they are not judged to be the same type. They are judged to be the same. When I saw the guy wearing the same hat as mine, I saw it, and judge it as "the same". I didn't make any judgement of type. And many other things I judge as the same in this way. I make judgements of "similar" in the same way, without even thinking about types.

On the other hand, if I learn what an oak tree looks like, I learn that type or classification, I might see a tree and judge it as that type. Do you see the difference between judging things as "the same", or even as "similar", and judging things as being of the same type? These are two distinctly different forms of judgement.

How do you know, when you claim not to know what the word "sensation" means here? — Luke

Because I know how "sensation" is being used. This is why "use" is a better way of understanding words than "meaning". There are ways of using words which do not give the word a meaning.