I told you, I believe it is used in an ambiguous way. Do you understand that? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it's why I asked you this:

What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? — Luke

You still haven't answered the question.

It is a common tool in creative writing to leave the meaning of a word unclear so that it may be interpreted in numerous different ways. Therefore I think there is no such thing as what the word means in that context, because the meaning is intentionally ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are claiming both that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous and "may be interpreted in numerous different ways", but also that "there is no such thing as what the word means in that context".

It cannot be both that "sensation" has more than one possible meaning in context and that it has no possible meaning in context.

When I saw the guy wearing the same hat as mine, I saw it, and judge it as "the same". I didn't make any judgement of type. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you have a fedora and I have a fedora, then we both have the same hat, right? These are the same type of hat. Otherwise, how are they the same?

I make judgements of "similar" in the same way, without even thinking about types. — Metaphysician Undercover

We are not discussing "similar"; we are discussing "the same".

You are claiming both that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous and "may be interpreted in numerous different ways", but also that "there is no such thing as what the word means in that context". — Luke

Right "what the word means" implies that it has a determinate meaning. What I am claiming is ambiguity, and therefore that there is a multitude of possible meanings. A multitude of possible meanings is not compatible with one determinate meaning. Therefore, if there is a multitude of possible meanings in this context, there is no such thing as what the word means in that context..

You do not seem to understand what ambiguity is. Can you not see that if an author intentionally uses a word in an ambiguous way, there is no such thing as what the word means in that context? It is not the case that the phrase in which the word is uttered will be devoid of meaning, or nonsensical, the phrase may be very rich in meaning, as metaphors are commonly like this. But it is the case that there is no such things as what the word means. This indicates that "what the word means" is a faulty way of looking at language.

Do you appreciate abstract art? Or do you think that art can only be meaningful if it depicts or represents something? If you accept that the meaning which a piece of art has, is distinct from what is supposedly represented by the individual aspects of the piece of art, then you will see that a phrase can have meaning without the particular words being used, having any specific meaning.

You just don't seem to get this, insisting that each word must have a specific meaning

It cannot be both that "sensation" has more than one possible meaning in context and that it has no possible meaning in context. — Luke

I didn't say "it has no possible meaning", I said "there is no such thing as what the word means". Do you not see a difference between the possibility which is explicitly stated with "possible meaning", and the actuality implied by "what the word means". You seem to jump across the logical gap between 'there is the possibility of meaning' to 'there is an actual meaning'.

We are not discussing "similar"; we are discussing "the same" — Luke

Right, but your example, of the same type of hat, demonstrates that you just don't get it.

What I am claiming is ambiguity, and therefore that there is a multitude of possible meanings. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario.

I didn't say "it has no possible meaning", I said "there is no such thing as what the word means". — Metaphysician Undercover

There is "no such thing as what the word means" in Wittgenstein's scenario, even though the word ["sensation"] has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario? Make up your mind.

Or do you think that art can only be meaningful if it depicts or represents something? — Metaphysician Undercover

If I think that it depicts or represents more than one thing, then I don't think that it depicts or represents nothing. But that's just me.

You just don't seem to get this, insisting that each word must have a specific meaning — Metaphysician Undercover

Not always, but in Wittgenstein's scenario, yes, obviously the word "sensation" has a specific meaning there. You are just being disingenuous, as usual.

Right, but your example, of the same type of hat, demonstrates that you just don't get it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since you have a thing for principles, perhaps you could explain by what principle you judge two things to be the same?

I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario. — Luke

We've been through this for weeks with your type/token distinction. You argued "the sensation" refers to a type, I argued it refers to a token. You simply refuse to accept that it could possibly refer to anything other than a type, so you do not see the ambiguity. But you ignore the obvious, "the..." almost always refers to a particular, and rarely, if ever, is used to refer to a type. That's why I say, you just don't get it.

Since you have a thing for principles, perhaps you could explain by what principle you judge two things to be the same? — Luke

I don't think it is by "a principle". You are the one who insists that language requires rules, I do not agree. I agree with what Wittgenstein says at 258, there is no criterion of identity here. I think that I look at two things and see that they appear to be the same, so I say that they are the same. Likewise with "similar". I look at two things and see that they appear similar, so I say that they are similar. This is clearly not a matter of classing things by type. But if you were to ask me why I think they are "similar", or "the same", I could find reasons for you, to justify my judgement. But I don't look for, nor find those reasons, before you ask me. I just make the judgement.

Conversely, if you show me two things of the same type, and I know that they are of the same type, two dogs for example, then even if I see them as very different, I would judge then as similar, because of that principle, I know they are of the same type.

I think Wittgenstein point, present throughout his philosophy, is that we talk even to ourselves through language. It's incredibly hard to do philosophy on language because you can only do philosophy WITH language. Wittgenstein latter work was simply fixing the solipsism that some of his ideas early on may have led to

What distinguishes us from animals is the complexity of our language. Philosophy of nature is about who we are as humans as much as ontology. Language itself is complex in that what we tell ourselves is not necessary what we tell ourselves. If I have a private language, do I really understand it's function in me?

Ludwig Wittgenstein said “If you and I are to live religious lives, it mustn't be that we talk a lot about religion, but that our manner of life is different. It is my belief that only if you try to be helpful to other people will you in the end find your way to God.”

So someone may use religious language and yet be not religious at all. It's not that we can do anything apart from language in this world but that we don't fully realize all the time what our own personal language means (and especially how it's taken by others)

My two cents..

I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario.
— Luke

We've been through this for weeks with your type/token distinction. You argued "the sensation" refers to a type, I argued it refers to a token. You simply refuse to accept that it could possibly refer to anything other than a type, so you do not see the ambiguity — Metaphysician Undercover

You hid behind the type/token distinction when I originally asked you this question, and now you're doing it again. Let me get this straight: the "multitude of possible meanings" that the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario are that "sensation" means "type" or "sensation" means "token"?

Surely you are not referring to types and tokens when you say that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario.

Again: what are the multitude of meanings that the word "sensation" has in the scenario? Name two possible meanings, at least.

I think that I look at two things and see that they appear to be the same, so I say that they are the same. Likewise with "similar". I look at two things and see that they appear similar, so I say that they are similar. This is clearly not a matter of classing things by type. But if you were to ask me why I think they are "similar", or "the same", I could find reasons for you, to justify my judgement. But I don't look for, nor find those reasons, before you ask me. I just make the judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you would prefer to talk about "similar" instead of "the same" (or attempt to conflate the two) because you have no reason to judge two things as being the same except that they are of they same type. It's much easier to argue that you don't need a reason or principle to judge two things as being similar than it is to judge them as being the same. There must be a reason why you judge two things as the same and not merely similar.

Conversely, if you show me two things of the same type, and I know that they are of the same type, two dogs for example, then even if I see them as very different, I would judge then as similar, because of that principle, I know they are of the same type. — Metaphysician Undercover

There you go again. They're not similar; they're the same. What makes them the same is that they are both of the same type; they're both dogs.

You hid behind the type/token distinction when I originally asked you this question, and now you're doing it again. Let me get this straight: the "multitude of possible meanings" that the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario are that "sensation" means "type" or "sensation" means "token"? — Luke

There is no hiding behind the type/token distinction here, you have made it front and centre, as the standard for interpretation. So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. But you refuse to even accept this as a possibility because it is unintelligible from your perspective of the model of a type/token dichotomy. But the referent is neither a type nor a token. That's what Wittgenstein indicates at 261 when he says " he has something—and that is all that can be said". I am quite confident that there are other possible meanings as well, but to find more, we'd have to look at the interpretations made by others.

Again: what are the multitude of meanings that the word "sensation" has in the scenario? Name two possible meanings, at least. — Luke

There you have three now, and the means for deriving many more, ask other people. It seems the evidence of two was insufficient to convince you of the possibility of more. Of course this insufficiency is just a function of your type/token dichotomy. If it's not one, then it's the other, and there is no reason to believe in the real possibility of a multitude. But the possibility of a multitude is already a third option, and denying it doesn't make it unreal.

I think you would prefer to talk about "similar" instead of "the same" (or attempt to conflate the two) because you have no reason to judge two things as being the same except that they are of they same type. It's much easier to argue that you don't need a reason or principle to judge two things as being similar than it is to judge them as being the same. There must be a reason why you judge two things as the same and not merely similar. — Luke

I think that you are spluttering nonsense here. I gave you the reason why I would judge two things as the same, it's just what Wittgenstein mentions at 253, they are perceived as being exactly the same as each other. And I gave you an example, when I see someone with a hat exactly like mine. This does not mean that I judge it as the same type, a fedora or something like that, I might not even know what type my hat is. I simply see all the features as being the same, and judge it as exactly the same. Imagine seeing two cars on the street which look exactly the same. You do not need to know the type (make, model etc.), to judge the two as being exactly the same.

I brought up "similar" because it is a comparable judgement, and I thought it might help you to understand. We judge two things as similar without classifying them by type, in the same way that we would judge two things as exactly the same (identical), without classifying then by type. Judging two things as exactly the same is just a stronger form of judging two things as similar.

There you go again. They're not similar; they're the same. What makes them the same is that they are both of the same type; they're both dogs. — Luke

You're really spluttering nonsense now, saying that two very different dogs are "the same". That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same. It is the type which is the same, not the two things. Can't you see that? You are saying the type which they are is the same, they are of the same type. You are not saying that the two things are the same.

Notice the difference between "these two things are the same type" which means in this case that they are both dogs, and "those two hats are the same". In the latter case, we are not saying that the type is the same, that's already given by calling them both hats. Saying "these two hats" tells us that the type is the same. So "the same" would just be redundant if it referred to type. However, "the same" is not redundant, it means that beyond them being the same type, they are also judged as being exactly the same, identical. And it makes no sense to say that it refers to a further type, fedora, because then we would just say "these two fedoras are the same". And if you say the type is "black fedora", so we now say "these two black fedoras are the same", it is still implied that other features are the same. "Same" in this context always refers to something further than the type.

There is no hiding behind the type/token distinction here, you have made it front and centre, as the standard for interpretation. So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". — Metaphysician Undercover

For the last 10 pages or more, we have been discussing whether Wittgenstein's diarist is naming a type or a token of the sensation. Note that these are not the same question:

(i) "Does the diarist name a type or a token of the sensation?"
(ii) "What is the meaning of "sensation"?"

I don't see how you can answer question (i) without knowing the meaning of "sensation". Either you have greatly misunderstood this whole time, or else you are now pretending that we have been discussing question (ii) instead of question (i).

I've mentioned several times that I introduced the type-token distinction to distinguish two different meanings of "the same", viz. the same type and the same token. I have also explained that the type-token distinction is used to distinguish between a class and its concrete instances. Moreover, I recently said that you should firstly establish the sense of the word and then subsequently apply the type-token distinction.

You have insisted this entire time that you understand the type-token distinction, yet you now claim that the word "sensation" is being used by Wittgenstein at PI 258 to mean "a type" and "a token"? I find this difficult to believe.

These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

There you have three now — Metaphysician Undercover

The third possible meaning of "sensation" is that it has no determinate meaning? You cannot count "no determinate meaning" as one of its possible meanings; it isn't one.

So your "multitude of possible meanings" consists only of "type", "token" and "no determinate meaning". None of these are the obvious meaning of the word "sensation" at PI 258. Did you ever wonder why Wittgenstein talks a lot about "pain" in the surrounding passages as well as "sensation"?

That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same. It is the type which is the same, not the two things. Can't you see that? You are saying the type which they are is the same, they are of the same type. You are not saying that the two things are the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

By the same logic, you are saying that the two things look the same, you are not saying that the two things are the same.

Two things can be the same type without looking the same, and two things can look the same without being the same type. But things don't have the same name only because they look the same. Consider two dogs, for example.

I don't see how you can answer question (i) without knowing the meaning of "sensation". Either you have greatly misunderstood this whole time, or else you are now pretending that we have been discussing question (ii) instead of question (i). — Luke

Question #1 was never answered. I gave an opinion and you gave an opinion, they differed, so the question was left as unanswered, inconclusive, and we moved on. Now I'm trying to explain to you what that inconclusiveness entails.

You have insisted this entire time that you understand the type-token distinction, yet you now claim that the word "sensation" is being used by Wittgenstein at PI 258 to mean "a type" and "a token"? I find this difficult to believe. — Luke

No, I never said it means both a type and a token. I am saying that both of those, though they are possible interpretations, are incorrect interpretations, because they do not reflect what Wittgenstein intended, what he was actually doing. They each assign a determinate meaning to "the sensation" which is signified by "S", when he intended that the named sensation has an indeterminate referent.

I'm still saying that "the sensation" refers to neither a type nor a token. That's what I've been arguing since the beginning. The type/token distinction is inapplicable in this scenario because it makes a false dichotomy, rendering "neither" as impossible by the nature of a "dichotomy", and the law of excluded middle.

But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. That's why I keep requoting 261 "he has something—and that is all that can be said". At this point he makes it very clear that we cannot say whether it is a type or a token. I suggest you reread this passage very carefully. He even states that what the diarist has, need not even be "a sensation", according to our use of "sensation" in our public language. He says: " And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; ".

By the same logic, you are saying that the two things look the same, you are not saying that the two things are the same. — Luke

This is false. What is said, is that the two things are the same. "His hat is the same as mine". That is how we speak. But you have a very bad habit of thinking that if it doesn't make sense to me, then the person cannot mean what they say. So, in your mind you change what the person has said, into something which makes sense to you, so that you now think that what the person said is "the two things look the same", when the person actually said "are the same".

This justifies my accusation that you misread Wittgenstein. When Wittgenstein explicitly says at 261, that we cannot say anything about whatever it is that "S" refers to, you have already concluded that it must refer to a type, because this is the only thing which makes sense to you. So you completely ignore what Wittgenstein actually said, opting for what you think he must have meant instead. Then you present what you think he must have meant, as what he said, like in this clear example above.

No, I never said it means both a type and a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

You claimed that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario. When I asked you to name some of this "multitude", you could only name "type" and "token" as two possible meanings. In your previous post, you attempted to include "no determinate meaning" as a third possible option. Now you claim to have never said that the word "sensation" means both a type and a token. So where is this "multitude of possible meanings"? You cannot even name one.

The type/token distinction is inapplicable in this scenario because it makes a false dichotomy, rendering "neither" as impossible by the nature of a "dichotomy", and the law of excluded middle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you want to argue that "S" denotes neither a type of sensation nor a token of that type?

But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. — Metaphysician Undercover

So do I. I never said that this is what Wittgenstein meant. Once again, I introduced it to clarify two possible meanings of "the same". I did this because it seemed to me from other discussions that, for you, "the same" can only mean the same token, as per the law of identity. That is, that you allowed only for the same token, but not the same type (nor of two things that looked the same, for that matter).

I am quite surprised to hear you recently stating that two distinct but similar things can be the same. You were previously adamant that they were not the same, only similar.

But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. That's why I keep requoting 261 "he has something—and that is all that can be said". At this point he makes it very clear that we cannot say whether it is a type or a token. I suggest you reread this passage very carefully. He even states that what the diarist has, need not even be "a sensation", according to our use of "sensation" in our public language. He says: " And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; ". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words.

This is false. What is said, is that the two things are the same. "His hat is the same as mine". That is how we speak. But you have a very bad habit of thinking that if it doesn't make sense to me, then the person cannot mean what they say. So, in your mind you change what the person has said, into something which makes sense to you, so that you now think that what the person said is "the two things look the same", when the person actually said "are the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”: for example, to say, “This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it”. — PI 253

Wittgenstein says at 253 that what makes it possible (although not necessary) to speak of "two exactly the same" is that it is the same (type of?) chair as the one you saw yesterday. The implication seems to be that it looks no different to the one you saw yesterday.

Now, you said earlier: "That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same." I replied, by the same logic, that two things look the same does not make the two things the same. Wittgenstein never says that if two things look the same then they necessarily are the same. He only talks about what makes it possible that we might speak of "two exactly the same"; and he appears to be saying that what makes it possible for us to say this is if they look or seem the same.

You claimed that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario. When I asked you to name some of this "multitude", you could only name "type" and "token" as two possible meanings. In your previous post, you attempted to include "no determinate meaning" as a third possible option. Now you claim to have never said that the word "sensation" means both a type and a token. So where is this "multitude of possible meanings"? You cannot even name one. — Luke

There you have three now, and the means for deriving many more, ask other people. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you want to argue that "S" denotes neither a type of sensation nor a token of that type? — Luke

Because the interpretation of Wittgenstein's example which you gave me was based in the type/token distinction, and I've been trying to tell you, to no avail, that the type/token distinction is not applicable here

So do I. I never said that this is what Wittgenstein meant. Once again, I introduced it to clarify two possible meanings of "the same". I did this because it seemed to me from other discussions that, for you, "the same" can only mean the same token, as per the law of identity. That is, that you allowed only for the same token, but not the same type (nor of two things that looked the same, for that matter).

I am quite surprised to hear you recently stating that two distinct but similar things can be the same. You were previously adamant that they were not the same, only similar. — Luke

If meaning is given by the way a word is used, then very clearly, two distinct things can be the same. Whether or not this is a proper, "rule abiding" use of "same", is not the question here. But then the question is what exactly is meant when we say that two things are the same.. But you seem to think that all word use must be "rule abiding" to be meaningful. And that appears to be why you do not understand Wittgenstein's example, the so-called "private language argument", where the individual person names two occurrences as the same without a criterion of identity (rule).

Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words. — Luke

Wow, your misreading never ceases to amaze me. Wittgenstein is explicitly talking about the use of the word "sensation" here, not the use of "S". "

For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.——And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said.

Now, you said earlier: "That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same." I replied, by the same logic, that two things look the same does not make the two things the same. Wittgenstein never says that if two things look the same then they necessarily are the same. He only talks about what makes it possible that we might speak of "two exactly the same"; and he appears to be saying that what makes it possible for us to say this is if they look or seem the same. — Luke

Right. Now notice that whether or not they are the same, or "exactly the same" is not at question. We say that they are "two exactly the same", or in my example, "that hat is the same as mine", meaning "exactly the same", but whether or not they actually are, doesn't matter. As Banno pointed to at 148, it doesn't matter so long as misunderstanding is avoided.

But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our
sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence
consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the
types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as
we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case? — PI 148

But I think, as I said to Banno, that Wittgenstein proceeds to demonstrate that misunderstanding cannot be avoided, as is evident from your misunderstanding, and the common misunderstanding in general, of the so-called private language argument

Because the interpretation of Wittgenstein's example which you gave me was based in the type/token distinction, and I've been trying to tell you, to no avail, that the type/token distinction is not applicable here — Metaphysician Undercover

So you still have no examples to support your claim that the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario has a "multitude of possible meanings"?

Right. Now notice that whether or not they are the same, or "exactly the same" is not at question. We say that they are "two exactly the same", or in my example, "that hat is the same as mine", meaning "exactly the same", but whether or not they actually are, doesn't matter. As Banno pointed to at 148, it doesn't matter so long as misunderstanding is avoided. — Metaphysician Undercover

At 253, Wittgenstein asks us to "consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”. So what makes it possible? When might we say that two physical objects are "exactly the same"?

But you seem to think that all word use must be "rule abiding" to be meaningful. — Metaphysician Undercover

If word use is not rule abiding, then you must be using all of your words in a non-conventional manner. Therefore, you will need to explain how you are using all of your words. But then you will also be using all of the words in your subsequent explanation non-conventionally, and so you will then have to explain how you are using all of those words. And so on.

Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words.
— Luke

Wow, your misreading never ceases to amaze me. Wittgenstein is explicitly talking about the use of the word "sensation" here, not the use of "S". " — Metaphysician Undercover

If you're correct, then address my argument that sensations don't have referents or meanings.

So you still have no examples to support your claim that the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario has a "multitude of possible meanings"? — Luke

I'm really sorry that your inability to read English has left you incapable of understanding the examples I presented. You seem to be having a similar problem with Wittgenstein's example of the private language. No matter how many times and different ways I try to explain it to you, you just don't get it.

At 253, Wittgenstein asks us to "consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”. So what makes it possible? When might we say that two physical objects are "exactly the same"? — Luke

There is no specific criterion which tells us when to say that two things are exactly the same, that's the point Wittgenstein makes.

If you're correct, then address my argument that sensations don't have referents or meanings. — Luke

The issue I've been talking about is Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation". I thought we were both talking about that, because you asked me why I thought the word's meaning was intentionally made ambiguous. He even explicitly states at 261 "the use of this word stand in need of a justification which everyone understands" ,indicating that his use has not been in a conventional way.

But now I really don't know what you're talking about.

I'm really sorry that your inability to read English has left you incapable of understanding the examples I presented. — Metaphysician Undercover

What examples? Where? Quote them.

There is no specific criterion which tells us when to say that two things are exactly the same, that's the point Wittgenstein makes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Prove it. Where does he say this?

The issue I've been talking about is Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation". I thought we were both talking about that, because you asked me why I thought the word's meaning was intentionally made ambiguous. He even explicitly states at 261 "the use of this word stand in need of a justification which everyone understands" ,indicating that his use has not been in a conventional way. — Metaphysician Undercover

261. What reason have we for calling “S” the sign for a sensation? For “sensation” is a word of our common language, which is not a language intelligible only to me. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands. — And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes “S” he has Something — and that is all that can be said. But “has” and “something” also belong to our common language. — So in the end, when one is doing philosophy, one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. — But such a sound is an expression only in a particular language-game, which now has to be described. — LW

He refers to "S" here twice, which undermines your assertion that he is not talking about "S" here. Furthermore, you are misreading this. He is not using the word "sensation" in any unconventional way. The point is that the use of the word "sensation" stands in need of a justification which everybody understands because it is a word of our common language. If the word "sensation" has a public use then how can we be talking about a private language? "S" is meant to be a private word with a private meaning, but this cannot be if it refers to a sensation, where the word "sensation" has a public meaning. For the same reason, "S" cannot refer to "Something" which is also a word of our public language. In the end, the private language advocate has no recourse but to emit an inarticulate sound in defence of their claims. But that won't do either.

What examples? Where? Quote them. — Luke

So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

He refers to "S" here twice, which undermines your assertion that he is not talking about "S" here. — Luke

He calls "S" a sign, and "sensation" a word. Then he says the use of this word stands in need of justification. You really can't read.

The point is that the use of the word "sensation" stands in need of a justification which everybody understands because it is a word of our common language. If the word "sensation" has a public use then how can we be talking about a private language? "S" is meant to be a private word with a private meaning, but this cannot be if it refers to a sensation, where the word "sensation" has a public meaning. For the same reason, "S" cannot refer to "Something" which is also a word of our public language. In the end, the private language advocate has no recourse but to emit an inarticulate sound in defence of their claims. But that won't do either. — Luke

This makes no sense at all.

"S", the private sign, is supposed to represent something which has been called "a sensation", public word. That "sensation" is the appropriate word to call whatever it is which the sign "S" represents is what needs to be justified

It is not the case that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, because S is part of a private language. What is the case is that if "S" is to be said to refer to "a sensation", this must be justified. There is nothing mentioned about "private meaning", or "private word".

But if we assume that "S' starts out as a private sign, then to be understood, even by the private person using the sign, it must be placed into the context of a language (justified). So a private language will always be unintelligible from the perspective of a person who understands through the means of a public language, because the private sign will always need to exist within that context, making it a part of a language which is not private.

However, there is no reason why there cannot be a private sign, and other private signs, and even a private language, which has no part of any public language.

What examples? Where? Quote them.
— Luke

So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The third is not a possible meaning of "sensation". Additionally, you later said:

I never said it means both a type and a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

As such, you have yet to provide any examples of your so-called "multitude of possible meanings" of the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario.

There is nothing mentioned about "private meaning", or "private word". — Metaphysician Undercover

See PI 243:

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

What were you saying about the inability to read?

But if we assume that "S' starts out as a private sign, then to be understood, even by the private person using the sign, it must be placed into the context of a language (justified). — Metaphysician Undercover

Hence "the private language argument".

So a private language will always be unintelligible from the perspective of a person who understands through the means of a public language, because the private sign will always need to exist within that context, making it a part of a language which is not private. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a person speaks a public language, why would their private language be unintelligible to them? Why does the private sign "always need to exist within" the context of a public language?

However, there is no reason why there cannot be a private sign, and other private signs, and even a private language, which has no part of any public language. — Metaphysician Undercover

How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you?

Furthermore, what role does the private sign play? Does it signify a type of sensation - or a type of whatever - or does each instance of a private thing get its own sign? How is this language used and what is it used for? You say there is no reason that there cannot be a private sign or private language, but there also seems to be no reason that there can be a private sign or private language.

The third is not a possible meaning of "sensation". Additionally, you later said: — Luke

A word's meaning is a function of the way the word is used. If it is used in a way so as to be ambiguous, then its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore the third option, "ambiguous", is a possible meaning.

See PI 243:

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.
— PI 243 — Luke

Obviously, the example at 258 is not such a private language, because the terms are given to us in a way which we can potentially understand. I explained this to you already, 258 provides an example of naming a sensation, it does not provide an example of a private language, as described at 243. The fact that you do not understand the example at 258 does not mean that "another person cannot understand" it.

If a person speaks a public language, why would their private language be unintelligible to them? Why does the private sign "always need to exist within" the context of a public language? — Luke

I didn't say "speaks" a public language, I said "understands through the means of" a public language. That's the example of 258, we as observers understand the use of "S", through public language, "S" is the sign of "a sensation". Further, it is written by Wittgenstein, so that the diarist is also recognizing what is signified by S as "the sensation". Therefore the meaning of "S" is within the context of a public language, as "sensation" is part of a public language. However, that whatever "S" refers to is actually what ought to be called "a sensation" is what needs to be justified.

In theory, a private sign does not necessarily exist within the context of a public language. That's why a private language is not impossible in theory. But since we as human beings learn language at a very young age, and language rapidly becomes a fundamental feature of how we understand things, it is impossible for a person to create a private language, because any attempt would be within the structured understanding provided by public language use, within one's own mind. Therefore it would not be a private language as described at 243.

How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you? — Luke

I could tell you how it would work, just like Wittgenstein does at 243. The person would have unique signs and symbols referring to one's own experiences. That might happen if a person grew up in complete isolation from other human beings or something like that. If the person meets up later with other people speaking public language, the person's private language would need to be altered to become consistent with the others', to understand them, and would no longer be a "private language", even though it was a "private language" prior to this alteration.

That's similar to if an individual person travels to an isolated part of the world. The natives there speak a public language, and the stranger arrives with what is in relation to their language, a private language. The private language, as the context for understanding, must be altered to become consistent with the native language, in order for the person to learn the language. This alteration to the private language renders it as something other than a "private language", it's been affected by the public. But the fact that the new language, produced by the alteration is not a private language, does not mean that it wasn't a private language prior to alteration.

You say there is no reason that there cannot be a private sign or private language, but there also seems to be no reason that there can be a private sign or private language. — Luke

Clearly, there is no obvious reason for a "private language" as described at 243. We learn in the context of public language. Wittgenstein is producing these thought experiments as an aid toward understanding the nature of language. As for a private sign, one could think of many reasons for that. It could be used as a memory aid. You write something down, so that you do not forget it, and if it's a secret, you don't want anyone else to be able to understand it. And of course private meaning plays a big role in deception. Therefore we cannot exclude the "private" aspects of language as being irrelevant to language use. Hence Wittgenstein's discussion.

A word's meaning is a function of the way the word is used. If it is used in a way so as to be ambiguous, then its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore the third option, "ambiguous", is a possible meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since any word could be used in an ambiguous way, then all words mean "ambiguous". Right? You're an idiot.

How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you?
— Luke

I could tell you how it would work, just like Wittgenstein does at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein tells us what he means by a private language at 243; he doesn't tell us how a private language works.

If the person meets up later with other people speaking public language, the person's private language would need to be altered to become consistent with the others', to understand them, and would no longer be a "private language", even though it was a "private language" prior to this alteration. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein's private language is private in principle: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." (PI 243) That is, it's not possible for others to ever come to understand a private language, or for a private language to ever be translated into a public language (or vice versa).

The natives there speak a public language, and the stranger arrives with what is in relation to their language, a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

The natives' language is not private if they all use it.

The private language, as the context for understanding, must be altered to become consistent with the native language, in order for the person to learn the language. This alteration to the private language renders it as something other than a "private language", it's been affected by the public. But the fact that the new language, produced by the alteration is not a private language, does not mean that it wasn't a private language prior to alteration. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not what Wittgenstein means by a private language.

As for a private sign, one could think of many reasons for that. It could be used as a memory aid. You write something down, so that you do not forget it, and if it's a secret, you don't want anyone else to be able to understand it. And of course private meaning plays a big role in deception. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are suggesting a translation from a public language into a private language. This is not what Wittgenstein means by a private language. Try and find another reason to use a private language.

Since any word could be used in an ambiguous way, then all words mean "ambiguous". Right? You're an idiot. — Luke

The meaning of a word is only ambiguous when it is used in an ambiguous way. I agree that any word can be used in an ambiguous way, and therefore have "ambiguous" as its meaning. But do you not understand that the meaning of a word is dependent on how it is used? Often words are not used ambiguously, so in those situations we cannot say that their meaning is ambiguous. You seem to be especially thick on the subject of ambiguity.

Wittgenstein's private language is private in principle: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." (PI 243) That is, it's not possible for others to ever come to understand a private language, or for a private language to ever be translated into a public language (or vice versa). — Luke

As I explained, the example of 258 is not supposed to be an example of a private language as described at 243. So this is not relevant to our discussion.

The meaning of a word is only ambiguous when it is used in an ambiguous way. I agree that any word can be used in an ambiguous way, and therefore have "ambiguous" as its meaning. But do you not understand that the meaning of a word is dependent on how it is used? Often words are not used ambiguously, so in those situations we cannot say that their meaning is ambiguous. You seem to be especially thick on the subject of ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't believe you're persisting with this crap. To use an example off the top of my head, if I say "I am going to the bank", then there is potential ambiguity in the word "bank" which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment. What the word "bank" does not mean here is "ambiguous" because "I am going to the ambiguous" makes no apparent sense. Although the meaning of the word "bank" may be ambiguous - because it has more than one possible interpretation - it does not seem that the word "bank" could possibly mean "ambiguous" or could be one of the possible interpretations.

As I explained, the example of 258 is not supposed to be an example of a private language as described at 243. So this is not relevant to our discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

You've already demonstrated that you don't understand what Wittgenstein means by a private language, so I won't bother addressing your unsupported assertions.

To use an example off the top of my head, if I say "I am going to the bank", then there is potential ambiguity in the word "bank" which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment. What the word "bank" does not mean here is "ambiguous" because "I am going to the ambiguous" makes no apparent sense. Although the meaning of the word "bank" may be ambiguous - because it has more than one possible interpretation - it does not seem that the word "bank" could possibly mean "ambiguous" or could be one of the possible interpretations. — Luke

I do not understand why this is so difficult for you Luke. Let me provide a very clear explanation by referring to your example. You say "I am going to the bank". You also say "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". Since you are the one making both these statements we can see the two as inconsistent with each other. If the first statement means that you are going to a financial establishment, then you would not allow that it possibly means the side of a river, and vise versa. You know where you are going, and you know what you mean by the statement, one or the other. If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, However, you do say that this is a possibility. On the basis of this statement, your statement, that "bank" in this expression could mean either the side of a river, or a financial establishment, we can come to the conclusion that "bank" means neither.

Do you understand this so far? By saying that "bank" could mean either one, you are implying that it means neither one. This is because if it meant the former, it could not mean the latter, and if it meant the latter it could not mean the former. And if you were in fact telling me where you are going, you would mean one or the other. So by saying that it could mean either, you are saying that it does not mean the former, and you are saying that it does not mean the latter. Therefore, you are giving "bank" a third and very distinct meaning. You are saying that "bank" in this context does not mean a financial establishment, nor does it mean the side of a river.

To know what "bank" means we have to look and see what purpose the word serves in this context, what you are doing with it. And, here we can see that you are giving an example of ambiguity. You are using the word to create ambiguity for your example. The meaning of the word is ambiguous, and you have inserted into the sentence to create an ambiguous statement. Now, we can see that "I am going to the..." is irrelevant because you are not telling me where you are going at all. Your intention was never to tell me where you are going, it was simply to make an example of ambiguity. All that "bank" is doing for you is allowing you to make a statement of indeterminate meaning.

Further to this, we cannot say that "bank" in this context has no meaning. It definitely has meaning, because it definitely serves a purpose in your example of ambiguity. And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. And of course it is very reasonable to say that the meaning of "bank" here is ambiguous.

That is what I propose Wittgenstein is doing with "the sensation" at 258. He is making a statement of ambiguity. He is intentionally using it in a way which you might interpret as referring to a type, and someone else might interpret as referring to a particular token. And, since this way of using it is intentional, I can conclude that it refers to neither, as in your example of "bank". This is a third and distinct meaning for "the sensation". Its meaning is ambiguous.

Furthermore, when Wittgenstein says "S is the name of...", he is not at all saying what S is the name of (as indicated by 261), just like when you say "I am going to the..." you are not at all saying where you are going. "S is the name of..." is completely irrelevant in Wittgenstein's example, just like "I am going to the..." is completely irrelevant in your example. In each case, the word "sensation" and the word "bank" are simply being used to create an expression of ambiguity. Wittgenstein is not telling us what S names, he is simply creating ambiguity with "the sensation", just like you are not telling us where you are going, you are simply creating ambiguity with "the bank".

You say "I am going to the bank". You also say "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". Since you are the one making both these statements we can see the two as inconsistent with each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

There aren't two statements; there is only one. That the one statement has more than one possible meaning is what "ambiguous" means.

If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how I could prevent the ambiguity using that statement alone. I could proceed to clarify what I meant if questioned.

Do you understand this so far? By saying that "bank" could mean either one, you are implying that it means neither one. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't see how that follows. How does either imply neither?

This is because if it meant the former, it could not mean the latter, and if it meant the latter it could not mean the former. — Metaphysician Undercover

It could mean either. That's what makes it ambiguous.

So by saying that it could mean either, you are saying that it does not mean the former, and you are saying that it does not mean the latter. — Metaphysician Undercover

By saying It could mean either, then I am saying it does not mean either? Is that your argument?

Therefore, you are giving "bank" a third and very distinct meaning. You are saying that "bank" in this context does not mean a financial establishment, nor does it mean the side of a river. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it could mean either. That's what it means for the word "bank" to be ambiguous.

To know what "bank" means we have to look and see what purpose the word serves in this context, what you are doing with it. — Metaphysician Undercover

We could imagine a context in which I often frequent both the financial establishment and the side of a river, and it is unclear from the statement which one I mean.

All that "bank" is doing for you is allowing you to make a statement of indeterminate meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

The word "bank" does that itself by having more than one common meaning/synonym.

And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

You either don't understand my argument or you are purposefully ignoring it. It was your claim that the word "sensation" is ambiguous (having a "multitude of possible meanings") and that "ambiguous" is one of its possible meanings. It is the latter half of this conjunction that I find ridiculous.

It is one thing to describe the meaning of the word "sensation" as ambiguous, which is to say that the word "sensation" has more than one possible meaning. It is quite another thing to say that the word "sensation" itself has the possible meaning of, or is possibly synonymous with, the word "ambiguous". Can you not see the difference between a description about the meaning of the word and the meaning of the word? The former tells us that the word has more than one possible meaning, the latter tells us what those possible meanings are. You somehow make the leap from describing the use/meaning of the word “sensation”as ambiguous to giving the word “sensation” a use/meaning which is synonymous with "ambiguous". That's ridiculous.

What makes you think that Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" to mean "ambiguous"? Please do not repeat your spurious reasoning that if the word "sensation" has an ambiguous (more than one) meaning, then the word "sensation" means "ambiguous". Look up the word "sensation" in the dictionary if you want to know its common meanings/synonyms.

Similarly with type and token: these are not readily apparent as possible meanings of the word "sensation". Types name a class of objects, and tokens are the instances of that class of objects. The type/token distinction can be applied to many words/nouns, but you would rarely consider most words to have the same meaning as, or to be synonymous with, the words "type" and "token". You are making some sort of category error here. Wittgenstein does not use the word "sensation" to mean "type" nor "token" nor "ambiguous", and it's absurd to think so.

You either don't understand my argument or you are purposefully ignoring it. It was your claim that the word "sensation" is ambiguous (having a "multitude of possible meanings") and that "ambiguous" is one of its possible meanings. It is the latter half of this conjunction that I find ridiculous. — Luke

You do not seem to be recognizing the difference between using a word with a specific intended meaning, but which could be wrongly interpreted because it is ambiguous, and intentionally using a word to create ambiguity. In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). You do not seem to acknowledge the reality of intentional ambiguity, as a tool in creative writing.

This intentional ambiguity, I explained to you with reference to your example "bank". Your use of "bank" was meant as an example of ambiguity. Therefore there is no correct interpretation of "bank". It does not mean "financial establishment" nor does it mean "side of a river", because it was intended by you, the author, to signify the possibility of either one.

If you so desire, you can continue to refuse to acknowledge the reality of the intentional use of ambiguity. I suppose, then you will not have to address the issue of whether or not Wittgenstein is engaged in this activity. But, if he is, then you will have an incorrect interpretation, a misreading. So I really see no point in that approach, especially since you gave a clear example of intentional use of ambiguity in your post concerning "the bank". So it is hypocritical of you to deny the reality of the intentional use of ambiguity.

It is one thing to describe the meaning of the word "sensation" as ambiguous, which is to say that the word "sensation" has more than one possible meaning. It is quite another thing to say that the word "sensation" itself has the possible meaning of, or is possibly synonymous with, the word "ambiguous". — Luke

The first :"thing" here, is to unintentionally create ambiguity. In this case, the person attempting to interpret would have to choose between "possible meanings". However, one of the possible meanings is the correct interpretation; "correct" here means what was intended by the author. The ambiguity is not intentional, and there is a true meaning intended.

The "quite another thing", is the intentional creation of ambiguity, by the author. In this case none of the possible meanings which the interpreter might come up with is the "correct" meaning (the one intended by the author), because what the author intended was to write something ambiguous.

You somehow make the leap from describing the use/meaning of the word “sensation”as ambiguous to giving the word “sensation” a use/meaning which is synonymous with "ambiguous". That's ridiculous. — Luke

What is ridiculous, is your refusal to acknowledge the reality of intentional ambiguity. And, when someone uses a word to intentionally create ambiguity, the person does not intend that any of the apparently "possible meanings" is the correct meaning, because what was meant by the author (the intent), is that the meaning would be ambiguous.

What makes you think that Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" to mean "ambiguous"? Please do not repeat your spurious reasoning that if the word "sensation" has an ambiguous (more than one) meaning, then the word "sensation" means "ambiguous". Look up the word "sensation" in the dictionary if you want to know its common meanings/synonyms. — Luke

I've read much philosophy in my life, and I am very well acquainted with the intentional use of ambiguity. It is a technique derived from poetry.

Poetry uses forms and conventions to suggest differential interpretations of words, or to evoke emotive responses. Devices such as assonance, alliteration, onomatopoeia, and rhythm may convey musical or incantatory effects. The use of ambiguity, symbolism, irony, and other stylistic elements of poetic diction often leaves a poem open to multiple interpretations. — Wikipedia: Poetry

Plato teaches us very well, how to recognize the intentional use of ambiguity, through multiple examples including ancient poetry. Then he proceeds to attack the intentional use of ambiguity by the sophists, to produce fallacious logic, in the form of what we now call "equivocation".

There are key signifiers of intentional ambiguity. One is an absurd logical conclusion, which signifies a likelihood of equivocation, and the need to carefully consider the use of terms. Another is the author's alluding to one's own use of ambiguity. This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described.

You do not seem to be recognizing the difference between using a word with a specific intended meaning, but which could be wrongly interpreted because it is ambiguous, and intentionally using a word to create ambiguity. In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). — Metaphysician Undercover

Whether intentional or not, “ambiguous” means that a word has more than one possible meaning, not - as you claim - that a word has no possible meaning or is meaningless. Any reasonable English speaker or dictionary could correct you on this, but so does your own quote on poetry:

Poetry uses forms and conventions to suggest differential interpretations of words… — Wikipedia: Poetry

Note that it says differential/different (i.e. more than one) interpretations.

You may claim that W uses the word “sensation” to be ambiguous (not to mean ambiguous), but then you will need to say what (more than one) meanings the word “sensation” could possibly have in the text.

You can’t have it both ways by saying that the word has more than one possible meaning but also no meaning.

Otherwise, simply stop using the word “ambiguous” incorrectly.

Note that it says differential/different (i.e. more than one) interpretations. — Luke

Right. Now do you see that if the author intends multiple interpretations, there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of the word? So if meaning is rule dependent, as you think it is, then the word has no meaning in these situations.

You may claim that W uses the word “sensation” to be ambiguous (not to mean ambiguous), but then you will need to say what (more than one) meanings the word “sensation” could possibly have in the text. — Luke

Didn't I already give you three possible meanings for the word "sensation" in that context?

You can’t have it both ways by saying that the word has more than one possible meaning but also no meaning. — Luke

As I said, the third is not really "no meaning". In the third possibility the meaning is "ambiguous": It's just your refusal to acknowledge the reality of this sort of meaning, and your insistence that meaning is given by following a rule, which creates the appearance that ambiguous meaning is no meaning.

Now do you see that if the author intends multiple interpretations, there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of the word? — Metaphysician Undercover

What reason do you have for thinking that Wittgenstein intends multiple interpretations of the word "sensation"? This might seem like a silly question, but what makes you think Wittgenstein is not using the word "sensation" to mean a sensation such as pain?

Didn't I already give you three possible meanings for the word "sensation" in that context? — Metaphysician Undercover

I gave you arguments two posts ago for why your examples were not possible meanings of the word "sensation". You have not addressed them.

As I said, the third is not really "no meaning". — Metaphysician Undercover

That "ambiguous" really means that the word has no meaning is precisely what you said here:

In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). — Metaphysician Undercover

You have still failed to explain how having more than one possible meaning implies having less than one possible meaning. Or, that is, how either implies neither.

It's just your refusal to acknowledge the reality of this sort of meaning, and your insistence that meaning is given by following a rule, which creates the appearance that ambiguous meaning is no meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't just spout this rubbish; tell me how it follows.

You've just finished stating "there is no such thing as what the word means" and equated this with saying "its meaning is ambiguous", but now you're trying to blame me for your dual claims that the word has multiple possible meanings and (at the same time) no meaning? Please. I'm not the one saying these silly things.

Is a trail with a fork ( ---< ) vague or ambiguous?

If one intends to use the trail as a path to a destination in mind, then the trail is ambiguous. If one merely intends to use the trail without a destination in mind, then the trail is vague. And if one doesn't intend to use the trail, then the trail is neither vague nor ambiguous.

What reason do you have for thinking that Wittgenstein intends multiple interpretations of the word "sensation"? This might seem like a silly question, but what makes you think Wittgenstein is not using the word "sensation" to mean a sensation such as pain? — Luke

I answered this:

Plato teaches us very well, how to recognize the intentional use of ambiguity, through multiple examples including ancient poetry. Then he proceeds to attack the intentional use of ambiguity by the sophists, to produce fallacious logic, in the form of what we now call "equivocation".

There are key signifiers of intentional ambiguity. One is an absurd logical conclusion, which signifies a likelihood of equivocation, and the need to carefully consider the use of terms. Another is the author's alluding to one's own use of ambiguity. This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have still failed to explain how having more than one possible meaning implies having less than one possible meaning. Or, that is, how either implies neither. — Luke

I didn't say "less than". And, I explained very clearly how the appearance of either, implies neither, when the appearance of either is intentionally created. You just seem to be incapable of apprehended the intentional use of ambiguity. That's your failure, not mine

Go back to your "bank" example and reread my reply carefully. Remember, you, as the author said both, "I am going to the bank", and, "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". In saying that the word could mean either of the two, you are admitting to intentional ambiguity, and you are saying that neither one is the correct one, because if there was a correct one you would have to say which one is the one which is meant, thereby negating the possibility of either.

Here, I'll repost, and don't get distracted by the question of whether "I am going to the bank", and "'bank' which could mean either... or..." is two distinct statements. Just accept the reality of the example, that you are saying both, I am going to the bank", and "bank" in this phrase has an indeterminate meaning. This implies that you are intentionally creating ambiguity with the word.

If the first statement means that you are going to a financial establishment, then you would not allow that it possibly means the side of a river, and vise versa. You know where you are going, and you know what you mean by the statement, one or the other. If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, However, you do say that this is a possibility. On the basis of this statement, your statement, that "bank" in this expression could mean either the side of a river, or a financial establishment, we can come to the conclusion that "bank" means neither. — Metaphysician Undercover

See, if a person intentionally uses a word ambiguously, the appearance is that the word has numerous possibilities for meaning. However, since the use of ambiguity is intentional, we can conclude that the author cannot possibly mean any single one of these possibilities. Furthermore, it is impossible that the author means all of the possibilities because that would be contradictory. Therefore we can conclude that the author means none of the possibilities.

Ad so I continued the explanation with this:

Further to this, we cannot say that "bank" in this context has no meaning. It definitely has meaning, because it definitely serves a purpose in your example of ambiguity. And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. And of course it is very reasonable to say that the meaning of "bank" here is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you are still having difficulty understanding, that if an author intentionally uses a word to create the appearance of numerous possibilities, then not any one of .these numerous possibilities is what is meant by the author, then please let me know what aspects of the explanation are insufficient

Is a trail with a fork ( ---< ) vague or ambiguous?

If one intends to use the trail as a path to a destination in mind, then the trail is ambiguous. If one merely intends to use the trail without a destination in mind, then the trail is vague. And if one doesn't intend to use the trail for walking, then the trail is neither vague nor ambiguous. — sime

The issue is the intent behind the creation of the thing. So the trail with a fork is not analogous, because each fork may have been created and intended to lead you somewhere different. Instead, we could talk about a sign which is intended to lead you in two distinct and incompatible directions. Such a sign is really not intended to lead you anywhere. However, this does not mean that it is not intended to do something, i.e. it does not mean that the sign is meaningless.

This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does he say at 261 that "sensation" has no referent or that we cannot say what it refers to?

In saying that the word could mean either of the two, you are admitting to intentional ambiguity, and you are saying that neither one is the correct one, because if there was a correct one you would have to say which one is the one which is meant, thereby negating the possibility of either. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's say that what I meant by the statement "I am going to the bank" is "I am going to the financial establishment". How does my intention remove the ambiguity from the statement? It could still mean either the financial establishment or the side of the river.

See, if a person intentionally uses a word ambiguously, the appearance is that the word has numerous possibilities for meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

This can also occur when a person unintentionally uses a word ambiguously. Again, having more than one possible meaning is what "ambiguous" means. Do you understand that?

However, since the use of ambiguity is intentional, we can conclude that the author cannot possibly mean any single one of these possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have a lot of work to do to demonstrate that Wittgenstein intentionally uses the word "sensation" ambiguously (or at all ambiguously). And I know you're wrong about it, but you cannot be reasoned with, so I'm out.