I told you, I believe it is used in an ambiguous way. Do you understand that? — Metaphysician Undercover
What different possible meanings do you think "sensation" has in the context of Wittgenstein's scenario? — Luke
It is a common tool in creative writing to leave the meaning of a word unclear so that it may be interpreted in numerous different ways. Therefore I think there is no such thing as what the word means in that context, because the meaning is intentionally ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover
When I saw the guy wearing the same hat as mine, I saw it, and judge it as "the same". I didn't make any judgement of type. — Metaphysician Undercover
I make judgements of "similar" in the same way, without even thinking about types. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are claiming both that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous and "may be interpreted in numerous different ways", but also that "there is no such thing as what the word means in that context". — Luke
It cannot be both that "sensation" has more than one possible meaning in context and that it has no possible meaning in context. — Luke
We are not discussing "similar"; we are discussing "the same" — Luke
What I am claiming is ambiguity, and therefore that there is a multitude of possible meanings. — Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't say "it has no possible meaning", I said "there is no such thing as what the word means". — Metaphysician Undercover
Or do you think that art can only be meaningful if it depicts or represents something? — Metaphysician Undercover
You just don't seem to get this, insisting that each word must have a specific meaning — Metaphysician Undercover
Right, but your example, of the same type of hat, demonstrates that you just don't get it. — Metaphysician Undercover
We've been through this for weeks with your type/token distinction. You argued "the sensation" refers to a type, I argued it refers to a token. You simply refuse to accept that it could possibly refer to anything other than a type, so you do not see the ambiguity. But you ignore the obvious, "the..." almost always refers to a particular, and rarely, if ever, is used to refer to a type. That's why I say, you just don't get it.I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario. — Luke
Since you have a thing for principles, perhaps you could explain by what principle you judge two things to be the same? — Luke
I'll ask you a third time: name the "multitude of possible meanings" that you think the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario.
— Luke
We've been through this for weeks with your type/token distinction. You argued "the sensation" refers to a type, I argued it refers to a token. You simply refuse to accept that it could possibly refer to anything other than a type, so you do not see the ambiguity — Metaphysician Undercover
I think that I look at two things and see that they appear to be the same, so I say that they are the same. Likewise with "similar". I look at two things and see that they appear similar, so I say that they are similar. This is clearly not a matter of classing things by type. But if you were to ask me why I think they are "similar", or "the same", I could find reasons for you, to justify my judgement. But I don't look for, nor find those reasons, before you ask me. I just make the judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover
Conversely, if you show me two things of the same type, and I know that they are of the same type, two dogs for example, then even if I see them as very different, I would judge then as similar, because of that principle, I know they are of the same type. — Metaphysician Undercover
You hid behind the type/token distinction when I originally asked you this question, and now you're doing it again. Let me get this straight: the "multitude of possible meanings" that the word "sensation" has in Wittgenstein's scenario are that "sensation" means "type" or "sensation" means "token"? — Luke
Again: what are the multitude of meanings that the word "sensation" has in the scenario? Name two possible meanings, at least. — Luke
I think you would prefer to talk about "similar" instead of "the same" (or attempt to conflate the two) because you have no reason to judge two things as being the same except that they are of they same type. It's much easier to argue that you don't need a reason or principle to judge two things as being similar than it is to judge them as being the same. There must be a reason why you judge two things as the same and not merely similar. — Luke
There you go again. They're not similar; they're the same. What makes them the same is that they are both of the same type; they're both dogs. — Luke
There is no hiding behind the type/token distinction here, you have made it front and centre, as the standard for interpretation. So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". — Metaphysician Undercover
These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover
There you have three now — Metaphysician Undercover
That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same. It is the type which is the same, not the two things. Can't you see that? You are saying the type which they are is the same, they are of the same type. You are not saying that the two things are the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see how you can answer question (i) without knowing the meaning of "sensation". Either you have greatly misunderstood this whole time, or else you are now pretending that we have been discussing question (ii) instead of question (i). — Luke
You have insisted this entire time that you understand the type-token distinction, yet you now claim that the word "sensation" is being used by Wittgenstein at PI 258 to mean "a type" and "a token"? I find this difficult to believe. — Luke
By the same logic, you are saying that the two things look the same, you are not saying that the two things are the same. — Luke
No, I never said it means both a type and a token. — Metaphysician Undercover
The type/token distinction is inapplicable in this scenario because it makes a false dichotomy, rendering "neither" as impossible by the nature of a "dichotomy", and the law of excluded middle. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I find it obvious that neither is what is intended by Wittgenstein. That's why I keep requoting 261 "he has something—and that is all that can be said". At this point he makes it very clear that we cannot say whether it is a type or a token. I suggest you reread this passage very carefully. He even states that what the diarist has, need not even be "a sensation", according to our use of "sensation" in our public language. He says: " And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; ". — Metaphysician Undercover
This is false. What is said, is that the two things are the same. "His hat is the same as mine". That is how we speak. But you have a very bad habit of thinking that if it doesn't make sense to me, then the person cannot mean what they say. So, in your mind you change what the person has said, into something which makes sense to you, so that you now think that what the person said is "the two things look the same", when the person actually said "are the same". — Metaphysician Undercover
Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”: for example, to say, “This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it”. — PI 253
You claimed that the word "sensation" has a "multitude of possible meanings" in Wittgenstein's scenario. When I asked you to name some of this "multitude", you could only name "type" and "token" as two possible meanings. In your previous post, you attempted to include "no determinate meaning" as a third possible option. Now you claim to have never said that the word "sensation" means both a type and a token. So where is this "multitude of possible meanings"? You cannot even name one. — Luke
There you have three now, and the means for deriving many more, ask other people. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you want to argue that "S" denotes neither a type of sensation nor a token of that type? — Luke
So do I. I never said that this is what Wittgenstein meant. Once again, I introduced it to clarify two possible meanings of "the same". I did this because it seemed to me from other discussions that, for you, "the same" can only mean the same token, as per the law of identity. That is, that you allowed only for the same token, but not the same type (nor of two things that looked the same, for that matter).
I am quite surprised to hear you recently stating that two distinct but similar things can be the same. You were previously adamant that they were not the same, only similar. — Luke
Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words. — Luke
For "sensation" is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands.——And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S", he has something—and that is all that can be said.
Now, you said earlier: "That two things are of the same type, does not make the two things the same." I replied, by the same logic, that two things look the same does not make the two things the same. Wittgenstein never says that if two things look the same then they necessarily are the same. He only talks about what makes it possible that we might speak of "two exactly the same"; and he appears to be saying that what makes it possible for us to say this is if they look or seem the same. — Luke
But I do not know whether to say that the figure described by our
sentence consists of four or of nine elements! Well, does the sentence
consist of four letters or of nine?—And which are its elements, the
types of letter, or the letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as
we avoid misunderstandings in any particular case? — PI 148
Because the interpretation of Wittgenstein's example which you gave me was based in the type/token distinction, and I've been trying to tell you, to no avail, that the type/token distinction is not applicable here — Metaphysician Undercover
Right. Now notice that whether or not they are the same, or "exactly the same" is not at question. We say that they are "two exactly the same", or in my example, "that hat is the same as mine", meaning "exactly the same", but whether or not they actually are, doesn't matter. As Banno pointed to at 148, it doesn't matter so long as misunderstanding is avoided. — Metaphysician Undercover
But you seem to think that all word use must be "rule abiding" to be meaningful. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, but this does not imply what you said earlier: "that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible." At best, 261 implies this about the word/sign "S", not about the sensation(s) had by the diarist. Sensations don't have referents or meanings; sensations are not words.
— Luke
Wow, your misreading never ceases to amaze me. Wittgenstein is explicitly talking about the use of the word "sensation" here, not the use of "S". " — Metaphysician Undercover
So you still have no examples to support your claim that the word "sensation" in Wittgenstein's scenario has a "multitude of possible meanings"? — Luke
At 253, Wittgenstein asks us to "consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of “two exactly the same”. So what makes it possible? When might we say that two physical objects are "exactly the same"? — Luke
If you're correct, then address my argument that sensations don't have referents or meanings. — Luke
I'm really sorry that your inability to read English has left you incapable of understanding the examples I presented. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no specific criterion which tells us when to say that two things are exactly the same, that's the point Wittgenstein makes. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue I've been talking about is Wittgenstein's use of the word "sensation". I thought we were both talking about that, because you asked me why I thought the word's meaning was intentionally made ambiguous. He even explicitly states at 261 "the use of this word stand in need of a justification which everyone understands" ,indicating that his use has not been in a conventional way. — Metaphysician Undercover
261. What reason have we for calling “S” the sign for a sensation? For “sensation” is a word of our common language, which is not a language intelligible only to me. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands. — And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes “S” he has Something — and that is all that can be said. But “has” and “something” also belong to our common language. — So in the end, when one is doing philosophy, one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. — But such a sound is an expression only in a particular language-game, which now has to be described. — LW
What examples? Where? Quote them. — Luke
So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover
He refers to "S" here twice, which undermines your assertion that he is not talking about "S" here. — Luke
The point is that the use of the word "sensation" stands in need of a justification which everybody understands because it is a word of our common language. If the word "sensation" has a public use then how can we be talking about a private language? "S" is meant to be a private word with a private meaning, but this cannot be if it refers to a sensation, where the word "sensation" has a public meaning. For the same reason, "S" cannot refer to "Something" which is also a word of our public language. In the end, the private language advocate has no recourse but to emit an inarticulate sound in defence of their claims. But that won't do either. — Luke
What examples? Where? Quote them.
— Luke
So I've used it to distinguish two possible meanings, you took type, I took token. These are two of the "multitude of possible meanings". A third, is what I really believe, and that is that "the sensation" is left ambiguous, having no real referent, only indeterminate meaning, inviting as many different interpretations as possible. — Metaphysician Undercover
I never said it means both a type and a token. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is nothing mentioned about "private meaning", or "private word". — Metaphysician Undercover
But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243
But if we assume that "S' starts out as a private sign, then to be understood, even by the private person using the sign, it must be placed into the context of a language (justified). — Metaphysician Undercover
So a private language will always be unintelligible from the perspective of a person who understands through the means of a public language, because the private sign will always need to exist within that context, making it a part of a language which is not private. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, there is no reason why there cannot be a private sign, and other private signs, and even a private language, which has no part of any public language. — Metaphysician Undercover
The third is not a possible meaning of "sensation". Additionally, you later said: — Luke
See PI 243:
But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.
— PI 243 — Luke
If a person speaks a public language, why would their private language be unintelligible to them? Why does the private sign "always need to exist within" the context of a public language? — Luke
How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you? — Luke
You say there is no reason that there cannot be a private sign or private language, but there also seems to be no reason that there can be a private sign or private language. — Luke
A word's meaning is a function of the way the word is used. If it is used in a way so as to be ambiguous, then its meaning is ambiguous. Therefore the third option, "ambiguous", is a possible meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
How would that work? Or are you unable to tell me? If you can't justify the possibility of a private language, or provide anything more than a mere assertion that it is possible, then why should I believe you?
— Luke
I could tell you how it would work, just like Wittgenstein does at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the person meets up later with other people speaking public language, the person's private language would need to be altered to become consistent with the others', to understand them, and would no longer be a "private language", even though it was a "private language" prior to this alteration. — Metaphysician Undercover
The natives there speak a public language, and the stranger arrives with what is in relation to their language, a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover
The private language, as the context for understanding, must be altered to become consistent with the native language, in order for the person to learn the language. This alteration to the private language renders it as something other than a "private language", it's been affected by the public. But the fact that the new language, produced by the alteration is not a private language, does not mean that it wasn't a private language prior to alteration. — Metaphysician Undercover
As for a private sign, one could think of many reasons for that. It could be used as a memory aid. You write something down, so that you do not forget it, and if it's a secret, you don't want anyone else to be able to understand it. And of course private meaning plays a big role in deception. — Metaphysician Undercover
Since any word could be used in an ambiguous way, then all words mean "ambiguous". Right? You're an idiot. — Luke
Wittgenstein's private language is private in principle: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." (PI 243) That is, it's not possible for others to ever come to understand a private language, or for a private language to ever be translated into a public language (or vice versa). — Luke
The meaning of a word is only ambiguous when it is used in an ambiguous way. I agree that any word can be used in an ambiguous way, and therefore have "ambiguous" as its meaning. But do you not understand that the meaning of a word is dependent on how it is used? Often words are not used ambiguously, so in those situations we cannot say that their meaning is ambiguous. You seem to be especially thick on the subject of ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover
As I explained, the example of 258 is not supposed to be an example of a private language as described at 243. So this is not relevant to our discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover
To use an example off the top of my head, if I say "I am going to the bank", then there is potential ambiguity in the word "bank" which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment. What the word "bank" does not mean here is "ambiguous" because "I am going to the ambiguous" makes no apparent sense. Although the meaning of the word "bank" may be ambiguous - because it has more than one possible interpretation - it does not seem that the word "bank" could possibly mean "ambiguous" or could be one of the possible interpretations. — Luke
You say "I am going to the bank". You also say "the word 'bank' which could mean either the side of a river or a financial establishment". Since you are the one making both these statements we can see the two as inconsistent with each other. — Metaphysician Undercover
If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you understand this so far? By saying that "bank" could mean either one, you are implying that it means neither one. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is because if it meant the former, it could not mean the latter, and if it meant the latter it could not mean the former. — Metaphysician Undercover
So by saying that it could mean either, you are saying that it does not mean the former, and you are saying that it does not mean the latter. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore, you are giving "bank" a third and very distinct meaning. You are saying that "bank" in this context does not mean a financial establishment, nor does it mean the side of a river. — Metaphysician Undercover
To know what "bank" means we have to look and see what purpose the word serves in this context, what you are doing with it. — Metaphysician Undercover
All that "bank" is doing for you is allowing you to make a statement of indeterminate meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover
You either don't understand my argument or you are purposefully ignoring it. It was your claim that the word "sensation" is ambiguous (having a "multitude of possible meanings") and that "ambiguous" is one of its possible meanings. It is the latter half of this conjunction that I find ridiculous. — Luke
It is one thing to describe the meaning of the word "sensation" as ambiguous, which is to say that the word "sensation" has more than one possible meaning. It is quite another thing to say that the word "sensation" itself has the possible meaning of, or is possibly synonymous with, the word "ambiguous". — Luke
You somehow make the leap from describing the use/meaning of the word “sensation”as ambiguous to giving the word “sensation” a use/meaning which is synonymous with "ambiguous". That's ridiculous. — Luke
What makes you think that Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" to mean "ambiguous"? Please do not repeat your spurious reasoning that if the word "sensation" has an ambiguous (more than one) meaning, then the word "sensation" means "ambiguous". Look up the word "sensation" in the dictionary if you want to know its common meanings/synonyms. — Luke
Poetry uses forms and conventions to suggest differential interpretations of words, or to evoke emotive responses. Devices such as assonance, alliteration, onomatopoeia, and rhythm may convey musical or incantatory effects. The use of ambiguity, symbolism, irony, and other stylistic elements of poetic diction often leaves a poem open to multiple interpretations. — Wikipedia: Poetry
You do not seem to be recognizing the difference between using a word with a specific intended meaning, but which could be wrongly interpreted because it is ambiguous, and intentionally using a word to create ambiguity. In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). — Metaphysician Undercover
Poetry uses forms and conventions to suggest differential interpretations of words… — Wikipedia: Poetry
Note that it says differential/different (i.e. more than one) interpretations. — Luke
You may claim that W uses the word “sensation” to be ambiguous (not to mean ambiguous), but then you will need to say what (more than one) meanings the word “sensation” could possibly have in the text. — Luke
You can’t have it both ways by saying that the word has more than one possible meaning but also no meaning. — Luke
Now do you see that if the author intends multiple interpretations, there is no such thing as the correct interpretation of the word? — Metaphysician Undercover
Didn't I already give you three possible meanings for the word "sensation" in that context? — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said, the third is not really "no meaning". — Metaphysician Undercover
In the latter case there is no such thing as what the word means (or we can simply say as I did, its meaning is ambiguous). — Metaphysician Undercover
It's just your refusal to acknowledge the reality of this sort of meaning, and your insistence that meaning is given by following a rule, which creates the appearance that ambiguous meaning is no meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
What reason do you have for thinking that Wittgenstein intends multiple interpretations of the word "sensation"? This might seem like a silly question, but what makes you think Wittgenstein is not using the word "sensation" to mean a sensation such as pain? — Luke
Plato teaches us very well, how to recognize the intentional use of ambiguity, through multiple examples including ancient poetry. Then he proceeds to attack the intentional use of ambiguity by the sophists, to produce fallacious logic, in the form of what we now call "equivocation".
There are key signifiers of intentional ambiguity. One is an absurd logical conclusion, which signifies a likelihood of equivocation, and the need to carefully consider the use of terms. Another is the author's alluding to one's own use of ambiguity. This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described. — Metaphysician Undercover
You have still failed to explain how having more than one possible meaning implies having less than one possible meaning. Or, that is, how either implies neither. — Luke
If the first statement means that you are going to a financial establishment, then you would not allow that it possibly means the side of a river, and vise versa. You know where you are going, and you know what you mean by the statement, one or the other. If you meant that you are going to a financial establishment then it is not possible that you meant that you are going to the side of a river, However, you do say that this is a possibility. On the basis of this statement, your statement, that "bank" in this expression could mean either the side of a river, or a financial establishment, we can come to the conclusion that "bank" means neither. — Metaphysician Undercover
Further to this, we cannot say that "bank" in this context has no meaning. It definitely has meaning, because it definitely serves a purpose in your example of ambiguity. And since you are not telling us where you are going at all, as you are creating ambiguity with the word instead, we wouldn't say that you have said "I am going to the ambiguity", the word "bank" simply makes the entire statement an expression of ambiguity. And of course it is very reasonable to say that the meaning of "bank" here is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover
Is a trail with a fork ( ---< ) vague or ambiguous?
If one intends to use the trail as a path to a destination in mind, then the trail is ambiguous. If one merely intends to use the trail without a destination in mind, then the trail is vague. And if one doesn't intend to use the trail for walking, then the trail is neither vague nor ambiguous. — sime
This is what Wittgenstein does throughout the PI, and especially at the passage I quoted from, at 261. What he is saying at 261 is that "sensation" has no referent (or, we cannot say what it refers to), and this is very consistent with intentional ambiguity, as I've described. — Metaphysician Undercover
In saying that the word could mean either of the two, you are admitting to intentional ambiguity, and you are saying that neither one is the correct one, because if there was a correct one you would have to say which one is the one which is meant, thereby negating the possibility of either. — Metaphysician Undercover
See, if a person intentionally uses a word ambiguously, the appearance is that the word has numerous possibilities for meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
However, since the use of ambiguity is intentional, we can conclude that the author cannot possibly mean any single one of these possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
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