Nothing can justify evil, no amount of good. — unenlightened

Citation needed.

Citation needed. — Michael

True by definition. If it's justified, it's not evil.

True by definition. If it's justified, it's not evil. — unenlightened

Clearly this definition isn't agreed upon by everyone, given the free will defence and utilitarianism.

But even if we accept this definition as stipulated, the free will theodicist and utilitarian could simply argue that because certain harmful acts are justified for the greater good it then follows that these harmful acts aren't evil, and so the problem of evil is dismissed on the grounds that evil doesn't actually exist.

So in this case what needs to be argued is that certain acts are indeed evil (i.e. unjustified).

what needs to be argued is that certain acts are indeed evil (i.e. unjustified). — Michael

You really need me to argue that? I don't think I can. Take a look around.

You really need me to argue that? I don't think I can. Take a look around. — unenlightened

I don't see how looking addresses the issue. Is justifiability a visual phenomenon?

Or maybe you just meant this metaphorically, and justifiability (or lack thereof) is something that is reasoned? In which case the free will theodicist (and utilitarian in related cases) has applied the reasoning given above; the existence of free will justifies the existence of harm, and if evil is unjustified then this harm isn't evil.

It seems to me that you're treading close to equivocation, where the so-called evil I see by looking around is evil in a sense in which "not justified" isn't part of the definition.

If you're going to discuss evil in relation to God, you need to take the proper perspective. God has the entire universe to look after, why would He think that a bunch of lowly human beings in a far off corner of the universe, hurting each other, is evil? That's like us thinking that it's evil for ants to be attacking one another. Is it evil for ants to be attacking one another and stealing from each other? Who's going to make that decision?

he free will theodicist and utilitarian could simply argue that because certain harmful acts are justified for the greater good it then follows that these harmful acts aren't evil, and so the problem of evil is dismissed on the grounds that evil doesn't actually exist. — Michael

Couldn't this line of reasoning be used to justify any action? It's the ends justify the means sort of morality. Genocide isn't evil if it leads to something better.

And indeed, you do find it in the OT, where God is commanding Joshua to go slaughter a bunch of people.

All of this seems like rationalization to me.

Couldn't this line of reasoning be used to justify any action? It's the ends justify the means sort of morality. Genocide isn't evil if it leads to something better. — Marchesk

If evil is defined (in part) as being unjustified. If it isn't defined in this way then genocide could still be evil even if justified by the greater good.

What I'm really trying to get at here is that it begs the question to say "this evil act isn't justified because evil is defined as being unjustified". If you define evil as being unjustified then you need to show that this so-called evil really is unjustified. And if you don't define evil as being unjustified then you need to defend the claim "nothing can justify evil, no amount of good.".

If evil is defined (in part) as being unjustified. If it isn't defined in this way then genocide could still be evil even if justified by the greater good. — Michael

I don't think evil is defined as justifiable. We might agree that sometimes war is necessary and therefore justifiable, but it's still evil. It's just less evil than the alternative (or at least so we think, although not everyone will agree).

We're forced into those moral dilemmas at times because we're not God, and have serious constraints on what we can do or know.

We might agree that sometimes war is necessary and therefore justifiable, but it's still evil. — Marchesk

Yes, so unenlightened needs to defend his claim "Nothing can justify evil, no amount of good." His attempt at doing so – "True by definition. If it's justified, it's not evil." – doesn't work (unless he can also show that this so-called evil really isn't justified).

And if you don't define evil as being unjustified then you need to defend the claim "nothing can justify evil, no amount of good.". — Michael

When it comes to God, the question is why evil would ever need to be justifiable. The FWD is that the existence of free will does this, but God's omniscience should allow him to only create those who will choose not to do evil.

Otherwise, God's omniscience is in doubt. The theist will need to argue that God didn't know Lucifer would rebel, and somehow this lack of knowledge is not a limitation on knowing everything, because presumably free will prevents such knowledge.

So then the argument becomes about God being able to know everything to prevent evil.

When it comes to God, the question is why evil would ever need to be justifiable. The FWD is that the existence of free will does this, but God's omniscience should allow him to only create those who will choose not to do evil.

Otherwise, God's omniscience is in doubt. The theist will need to argue that God didn't know Lucifer would rebel, and somehow this lack of knowledge is not a limitation on knowing everything, because presumably free will prevents such knowledge.

So then the argument becomes about God being able to know everything to prevent evil. — Marchesk

The simple answer is that God has a good reason for creating things that choose to do evil, given that he is omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent. That he has a good reason for doing so would follow from the premises, even if we don't know what that good reason is.

That he has a good reason for doing so would follow from the premises, even if we don't know what that good reason is. — Michael

Or the concept is simply flawed, resulting in defenders of it claiming that we mere mortals can't know. It's really suspicious that the argument ends up with God's mysterious ways.

Or the concept is simply flawed, resulting in defenders of it claiming that we mere mortals can't know. — Marchesk

It's not that the concept (of an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God) is flawed (notwithstanding any omnipotence/omniscience paradox), but that the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent God is supposedly inconsistent with the existence of evil. But the point of the free will defence (and others) is that this isn't inconsistent. There are good reasons for creating things that choose to do evil.

here are good reasons for creating things that choose to do evil. — Michael

And what are those good reasons? You just stated that God must have a good reason, but it can't be known by us, which seems like a huge cop out.

And what are those good reasons? You just stated that God must have a good reason, but it can't be known by us, which seems like a huge cop out. — Marchesk

We don't need to know what the good reasons are for "there are good reasons" to follow from the premises.

Just as we don't need to know what's in the box to infer from the evidence that something is in the box (e.g. it weighs more than it would if empty).

We don't need to know what the good reasons are for "there are good reasons" to follow from the premises. — Michael

But if the argument can't show what the good reasons are, then why isn't the argument flawed? The argument is assuming there is one.

Just as we don't need to know what's in the box to infer from the evidence that something is in the box (e.g. it weighs more than it would if empty). — Michael

That's because we know the difference in weight between an empty box and one that has something in it. That analogy doesn't apply here.

But if the argument can't show what the good reasons are, then why isn't the argument flawed? The argument is assuming there is one. — Marchesk

The argument doesn't assume that there is a good reason. The argument concludes that there is a good reason. The argument doesn't need to explain what the good reasons are for "there are good reasons" to follow from the premises.

That's because we know the difference in weight between an empty box and one that has something in it. That analogy doesn't apply here.

The principle is the same. We can infer that there is some X even if we can't infer what that X is.

the existence of free will justifies the existence of harm, and if evil is unjustified then this harm isn't evil.

It seems to me that you're treading close to equivocation, where the so-called evil I see by looking around is evil in a sense in which "not justified" isn't part of the definition. — Michael

I'm not treading close, I'm jumping in with both feet. But I'm not saying that free will is the justification of evil, nor that good is the justification of evil. There is no justification for evil, but only excuses. But here I am speaking as an evil-doer, a mere mortal.

But speaking as a philosopher, I am saying that there can be no evil and no good without free will, and that is what we generally mean by evil, when we are being careful about how we speak. If I couldn't help running you down by any sensible precaution, then I am not guilty of the misfortune you suffered. Likewise, the cruelty of a cat that plays with a mouse is not evil, because cats lack a moral sensibility.

And then speaking for God, I say I'm glad I don't have to make Her decisions. But I can vaguely see that the unfailing tolerance and equanimity of the good forum contributor may not be appropriate to the admin.

I'm not treading close, I'm jumping in with both feet. — unenlightened

Then you haven't justified your claim that nothing can justify evil. You admit that your prior responses employed equivocation, and equivocation is a fallacy.

Then you haven't justified your claim that nothing can justify evil. You admit that your prior response "True by definition. If it's justified, it's not evil." is equivocation, and equivocation is a fallacy. — Michael

No. I'm defining evil as a voluntary unjustified act of harm. Harm that is involuntary or justified is not evil. Do you have a better conception?

No. I'm defining evil as a voluntary unjustified act of harm. — unenlightened

Then we're back to what I said before: even if we accept this definition as stipulated, the free will theodicist and utilitarian could simply argue that because certain harmful acts are justified for the greater good it then follows that these harmful acts aren't evil, and so the problem of evil is dismissed on the grounds that evil doesn't actually exist (or, at the very least, that allowing evil isn't itself evil).

So in this case what needs to be argued is that certain acts are indeed unjustified (e.g. allowing people to murder).

That certain voluntary acts of harm are justified by no means implies that they invariably are. Do you think that? I've not come across anyone that thinks so.

That certain voluntary acts of harm are justified by no means implies that they invariably are. Do you think that? I've not come across anyone that thinks so. — unenlightened

The free will theodicist argues that the existence of free will justifies the existence of all harmful actions. If evil is defined in part as being unjustified then the existence of harmful actions isn't evil. So there is no problem of evil.

The free will theodicist argues... — Michael

They're wrong then.
Or possibly they are attempting to speak for God, which I think is unwise. But they might be saying, I hope they are saying, that freewill necessitates, and thus justifies the possibility of evil rather than the actuality. I think I could live with that and still be friends.

They're wrong then. — unenlightened

Then to repeat: citation needed.

You seem to simply be asserting that certain voluntary and harmful actions cannot be justified, and so the free will defence doesn't solve the problem of evil. But you are yet to show that these actions cannot be justified. Your previous response "just look around" obviously doesn't work, for the reasons I gave earlier.

You seem to simply be asserting that certain voluntary and harmful actions cannot be justified, — Michael

Yes. I'm not going to argue about that, or cite the bible; take it or leave it.

Yes. I'm not going to argue about that, or cite the bible; take it or leave it. — unenlightened

Then you don't have a reasoned argument against the free will defence. You're more than welcome to simply deny it, but then you're also more than welcome to simply deny the existence of God and not bother with using the problem of evil as an argument against theism in the first place.

I have a reasoned argument based on my definition of evil. When someone comes up with another definition of evil, I'll consider it. But it is not really an argument against the freewill defence, more an exposition of the meaning of it.

What the definition does do though, is carve out a distinction between natural evil and human evil. I'm surprised you didn't pursue that line.

I have a reasoned argument based on my definition of evil. — unenlightened

You can't simply define a term in such a way that your opponent's claim is false by definition. This is why I accused you of equivocating (which bizarrely you then admitted to).