Bear in mind that I said "consciously experienced"; I already allowed that there is a sense in which we could say that reflected electromagnetic radiation is (pre-consciously) experienced by the body. giving rise to the (possibly) conscious experience of coloured things. — Janus
Some likes and dislikes may change overnight...(...) I wouldn't call such fickle likes and dislikes "aesthetic judgements"). — Janus
That you are fickle with respect to your feelings regarding cauliflower....
— Mww
......You seem to be claiming that liking or disliking the flavor.... — Janus
The taste may simply be unpleasant and you might simply avoid it without any conscious thought about it at all — Janus
In my view an aesthetic judgement always carries a discursive dimension, and I don't see a discursive dimension being involved in simply liking or disliking foods. — Janus
Only by physical instruments. Any physical instrument can serve as a scientific one, so maybe the distinction is unnecessary, but your choice of words seems to limit your thinking only to 'gadgetry', so to speak, as illustrated by your following comment:My intuitive sense is that people have no feel for what might be beyond the physical because they're instinctively oriented around the world of sensory detection - that only what can be sensed, weighed, measured by the senses or by scientific instruments is real. — Wayfarer
But the human body (among other things perhaps) is such a physical instrument, hardly 'unthinkably powerful' and yet you assert this other domain is available to it. That means a physical device (your body) is measuring this domain somewhere. All you have to do is investigate where, which is after all a scientific endeavor. Perhaps we can build a simple device that measures the same thing.Obviously today's scientific instruments are unthinkably powerful but people still have trouble understanding the sense that there might be some dimension or domain that is not available to apprehension by those means.
The explanatory gap is a scientific problem, not a philosophical aporia, because it concerns explaining facts of the matter which philosophy does / can not; therefore philosophers can only propose woo-of-the-explanatory-gap nonsense (e.g. panpsychism, substance dualism, subjective idealism) that only begs the question of one unknown with a further (metaphysical? magical?) unknowable. — 180 Proof
Would you, for example, agree with a person who claims that because a certain other individual (science) can't do something (can't explain consciousness physically) that that something can't be done at all (there's no physical explanation for consciousness)? There maybe a perfectly good workaround; we just haven't found out what that is. — TheMadFool
:100:The explanatory gap is itself an invalid preconception of what the answer must be, based on a prejudice against the notion that minds can be functions of lowly, base, physical stuff. It really doesn't matter what model of consciousness physics ends up with, consciousness is by definition "not that". — Kenosha Kid
My point is science, if there are absolute limits to science, may not be the only materialist/physicalist game in town. Another materialistic/physicalist, albeit nonscientific, perspective may be out there waiting for the right person to discover it, loads of luck a sine qua non as far as I can tell. — TheMadFool
Nonphysicalists can hope that mind is a different kind of physical. I'd consider that a win! — TheMadFool
The explanatory gap is itself an invalid preconception of what the answer must be, based on a prejudice against the notion that minds can be functions of lowly, base, physical stuff. — Kenosha Kid
It really doesn't matter what model of consciousness physics ends up with, consciousness is by definition "not that".
It's not that. — bert1
Apo weirdly has tried to just reverse the burden of proof and to ask "why shouldn't it feel like something" without having first said why it must. — bert1
There's nothing weird about that. Neurons aren't firing in a vacuum: the central nervous system is an integrated system. Biology can only do what it can do. If it does something, then clearly it can do it. — Kenosha Kid
Why does the response to a red ball feel like me _seeing_ a red ball and not a blue ball or hearing a red ball or feeling a red ball...? Well, it has to integrate somehow and biology only has so many tricks up it's sleeves. For a bat, a the sound of the ball might be something it sees. For a racoon, touch is something it might see.
According to them. But it sure seems like that from the outside, including in Chalmers' case. — Kenosha Kid
There's no need to explain that in order to show it happens, we already know it happens. It's therefore up to the person who questions that fact to explain themselves first. Have I understood your point? — bert1
"How does a brain generate conscious experience at all?" ...is a different question from "Why do particular functions feel the way they do?" — bert1
I never hear an answer to the question "Why can't that function happen in the dark?" which does not involve a redefinition: — bert1
Apo weirdly has tried to just reverse the burden of proof and to ask "why shouldn't it feel like something" without having first said why it must. — bert1
So does the function ever in fact happen “in the dark”? Is there any reason to believe that? — apokrisis
I was very much deterred from thinking of particular functions as in any way capable of being carved out of the whole and considered in a vacuum. It's not that their not contributing to consciousness, rather that they do so in the context of everything else. — Kenosha Kid
If I hear a piece of music, there are structured processes going on in my brain (looking at it from the outside). But why should they be conscious experiences? Because of the very fact there is structure? I can imagine the same processes going on without a conscious experience. — Cartuna
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