'It', the fact, doesn't seem reliant on you, but no one claimed it was. — Isaac

When people say things like "it's raining", they mean that they have a belief that it's raining (in this case, one they're very confident in ,one with good justifications. — Isaac

I can't help but find this contradictory. Am I looking at this wrong?

Determining that meaning is not, by necessity, the same as determining why or how the fact expressed obtains. — Isaac

I don't understand. By what necessity is it not the same as how a fact obtains?

I'm claiming that the meaning is determined by the full expression, in context. It requires a speaker and a listener, and it has no meaning at all out of context. — Isaac

I don't fully understand... Do you mean to say that 1+1=2, as a mode of expression, has no meaning if theres no context?

If you think it has a meaning outside of any language game it might form part of, then you'd have to say where we look to find that meaning. In what does the meaning inhere? — Isaac

What meaning does 1+1=2 contain as a mode of expression? I must admit I'm a little confused...

Let's say the cat either is or is not on the mat. It's on-the-matness is belief independent. That has nothing to do with my claim that we can't talk about the cat's on-the-matness without someone holding a belief about it. — Isaac

The above is why I don't believe that you believe what you're trying to argue; you're inconsistent. How am I to interpret the above if we follow your logic that "the cat is on the mat" means "I believe that the cat is on the mat", that the "the cat is on the mat" part of this has no meaning on its own, and that the statement is about your belief rather than an actual cat on a mat?

If I wanted to check where my understanding of JTB was confused on this matter, I'd return to the text, or just ask someone in the Philosophy department. — Isaac

Perhaps I didn't express it well. I meant that you seem confused about what I am saying about JTB, evidenced by your objections seeming to be irrelevant. Also it seems obvious to me from my general experience of talking with people and observing how they view knowledge and truth, as manifested in their discourse and actions, that JTB is the default understanding.

They subsequently came to believe it's a sphere. They could still be wrong. They believe it to be a sphere using exactly the same fundamental process those who believed it to be flat used - justification. We've not gained some magic additional access. We just have much, much better justifications than the flat-earthers had. — Isaac

Right, but I've already said that knowledge, as it is generally understood, is defeasible. This is an example of what I meant when I referred to your "confusion"; presenting an objection as though it is a problem for the JTB understanding, when it really isn't, makes it seem that you are confused about it.

In any case, the earth has been observed and imaged from space, from satellites, and we can see that it is a sphere, so the likelihood of that observation being wrong is minuscule. That is not magical, but it is a paradigm leap to be able to observe the Earth from space.

Then we'd be in no better boat. No-one would use the word knowledge because everyone would be quite aware that they could not demonstrate their belief was 'truly' justified. Since we do use the word knowledge, it must be some other threshold that we mean by it. — Isaac

It's not a matter of demonstrating anything. The point is only that to the degree that we can be confident that our justifications are based on true observations, the degree to which we can be confident that our beliefs are true is commensurate, and that is what is generally meant by claiming to have knowledge.

None of this changes the fact that we can never be absolutely sure we possess knowledge. I think the idea of dropping the 'true' part is fine if you are also happy with dropping the 'knowledge' part. Then we would never claim to have knowledge at all, but merely beliefs which seem more or less justified, or not justified at all, depending on what we take to be the criteria for saying what constitutes evidence. — Janus


How odd. You're so wedded to a particular definition that you'd rather we just never use the word than admit that since we do use the word, the definition must be wrong. Is that how you see the rest of language working. Some philosophers decide what the definition really is and and if we're not using it right then we don't get to use the word at all, they'll just take their ball home if we're not going to play by their rules? — Isaac

.Again, it's not what I said. I didn't say I want to drop the "true" part. I said if you want to drop the true part, then you could still talk in terms of beliefs instead of knowledge. This would equate to some kind of coherentism, I suppose. Beliefs would never be true, or constitute knowledge; we would just feel entitled to have more confidence in them the more they cohered with our overall understanding of things as presented in the various sciences and everyday commonsense.

It's not something I'm advocating.

I can't help but find this contradictory. Am I looking at this wrong? — john27

Possibly, or I might have explained it poorly. I'm not seeing a direct contradiction (the two quotes aren't even on the same subject), so perhaps you could expand on what you find contradictory here.

I don't understand. By what necessity is it not the same as how a fact obtains? — john27

All I'm saying there is that there's two enquiries, 1)what it is for 1+1 to equal 2, and 2)what the expression "1+1=2" means. You seem to be treating them the same (ie if 1+1=2 is a mind-independent fact, then "1+1=2" must be referring to this mind independent fact). They may well be the same, but sine they are not the same by logical necessity, you'd have to provide an argument to support your position.

Do you mean to say that 1+1=2, as a mode of expression, has no meaning if theres no context? — john27

Yes. Mathematical statements are at a very extreme end where the rules constraining the maths language game are pretty tight, so it's probably the hardest example to use (and good for that reason), but It's still (as a spoken or written expression) spoken or written for a reason and that reason is a more pragmatic and concrete measure of meaning than any other.

What meaning does 1+1=2 contain as a mode of expression? — john27

Well, it depends on the context. I might be correcting someone's maths, in which case it means that when faced with the sum '1+1' one should write the answer '2', or an instruction that one can replace the word '2' for any instances of a group of 1 and another 1, ad so on...

I must admit I'm a little confused... — john27

What I'm asking is for you to fill in some of the gaps in the model you're espousing. If an expression (as say, "it's raining") has a meaning outside of the various uses to which that expression is put, where should we look to find it, and on what grounds can that source claim primacy of other sources of meaning?

your logic that "the cat is on the mat" means "I believe that the cat is on the mat" — Michael

You're still not allowing that the position I'm discussing entails all propositions only have meaning in context. You still take a meaning I've given in one context and complain that applying it to another makes no sense, is inconsistent. It's inconsistency is exactly the point I'm making. Whole expressions, in context have meaning, not individual components of them, and not out of any context. I've said (in certain contexts) that "It's raining" means the same as like "I believe it's raining". I've also given examples of contexts where it doesn't mean the same (where the 'I believe' prefix is meant to indicate a level of uncertainty).

I don't mind continuing to explain my position, but I can't do so if you insist that I do so by half adopting yours. It is not a part of my position that expressions have the same meaning in all contexts, so claiming that I'm inconsistent in the meaning I give to expressions between contexts is not pointing out a flaw in my position, it's a feature of it. Merely pointing it out doesn't constitute an argument against it, you'd have to say why that's a bad thing.

Right, but I've already said that knowledge, as it is generally understood, is defeasible. This is an example of what I meant when I referred to your "confusion"; presenting an objection as though it is a problem for the JTB understanding, when it really isn't, makes it seem that you are confused about it. — Janus

If knowledge (correctly used) is defeasible, then it can't also be 'true' (where 'true is used to denote some property other than simply 'well justified' - I'm not yet clear what that property is meant to be). People are then (apparently) constantly using 'knowledge; incorrectly. Applying it to beliefs which they merely think are 'true', not to beliefs which actually are 'true'. But merely thinking something is 'true' is just the same as having good justifications for that belief, so that can't be right because JTB implies that 'Truth' and 'Good Justification' are two different things. In order to correctly use the term 'knowledge' is must be that the belief being referred to actually is 'true'. Since no-one can ever establish that about any belief, they're all using the word incorrectly. That just seems a silly conclusion to me.

the earth has been observed and imaged from space, from satellites, and we can see that it is a sphere, so the likelihood of that observation being wrong is minuscule. That is not magical, but it is a paradigm leap to be able to observe the Earth from space. — Janus

That's right. The justification for believing the earth to be spherical is very, very good.

to the degree that we can be confident that our justifications are based on true observations, the degree to which we can be confident that our beliefs are true is commensurate, and that is what is generally meant by claiming to have knowledge. — Janus

...which sounds identical to the position I'm presenting. Perhaps you could highlight what you think is different? Both are saying that we use the word knowledge when we have a high degree of confidence in our justifications. So that's just JB, not JTB. all you seem to be saying is that we use 'knowledge' when we have a very high degree of confidence in our justifications. I agree. Not just any old justification will do, it's usually the two most powerful ones (when I act as if X is the case I get the results I'd expect if it were, and most of my epistemic peers would agree that X is the case). These are why 'The earth is a sphere' is knowledge. Everything we do to the earth, every test we can think of treating it as a sphere produces exactly the results we'd expect of it were a sphere, and (by way of checking we're not mad, or hallucinating) everyone who knows about these sorts of things would agree that it's a sphere. (Incidentally, this is how I define 'truth' also, but is seems to mean something else in JTB)

Then consider what you meant by the cat being on the mat being belief-independent in that context. That is how a true belief is distinguished from a false belief in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge. According to the JTB definition of knowledge, one knows that the cat is on the mat iff one believes that the cat is on the mat, one is justified in believing that the cat is on the mat, and the cat is on the mat (as a belief-independent fact).

Can you finally accept that, in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge, this third condition has nothing to do with what any particular person or language community believes or with justification? It's a reference to a belief-independent fact that must obtain for the belief to be true and the person to have knowledge.

'It', the fact, doesn't seem reliant on you, but no one claimed it was.
— Isaac

When people say things like "it's raining", they mean that they have a belief that it's raining (in this case, one they're very confident in ,one with good justifications. — john27

I found it contradictory because if one views "it's raining" separate from its factual counterpart, and solely as a mode of expression, it is reliant on the speaker to be true. However, "it's raining" is not reliant on belief.

They may well be the same, but since they are not the same by logical necessity, you'd have to provide an argument to support your position. — Isaac

Could you elaborate on this logical necessity? I still don't fully understand why one must refer to them as different..

What I'm asking is for you to fill in some of the gaps in the model you're espousing. If an expression (as say, "it's raining") has a meaning outside of the various uses to which that expression is put, where should we look to find it, and on what grounds can that source claim primacy of other sources of meaning? — Isaac

I assume by the various uses you mean its uses in a linguistical context. However, how could I find a mode of expression without a speaker and a listener? If I did, I would only be referring to the belief independent/not mode of expression part of 1+1=2 or "it's raining."

Then consider what you meant by the cat being on the mat being belief-independent in that context. — Michael

I meant that the success of our tests aren't determined by how much we expect them to be successful. If I continue to test my belief that the cat is on the mat, there may be some future time where I no longer believe it. The entire language community's present and future beliefs about the cat's on-the-matness is not governed by my current belief, or any of their current beliefs, but rather by the properties of the hidden state we're trying to model. I can't see a way in which it could be that...

That is how a true belief is distinguished from a false belief in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge. — Michael

We don't have any access to the asymptotic beliefs of a community who've thrown every test they can think of at the model. So it can't possibly be how a true belief is distinguished from a false belief, otherwise no one would ever use the word, because no one would ever carry out such process.

Can you finally accept that, in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge, this third condition has nothing to do with what any particular person or language community believes? It's a reference to a belief-independent fact that must obtain for the belief to be true and the person to have knowledge. — Michael

I've never denied that. As I said...

At best JTB could be an account of what 'knowledge' could mean, or ought to mean. In which case... thanks, but no thanks. — Isaac

The issue I have is not that 'knowledge' couldn't be defined that way, it's that it isn't.

The process thereby needed to use 'knowledge' correctly is one which is impossible to carry out. So we're left either concluding that everyone is constantly using the word incorrectly or the definition is wrong. I just think the former is a bit silly, so prefer the latter.

It's like saying that 'human' is a term only correctly applied to someone God has invisibly marked. It's a daft definition because no one could ever use the term to describe anyone since there's no way of identifying an invisible divine symbol.

You could argue that we use the term to apply to things we think are true (just like we use term 'human' to apply to someone we think has a certain genetic make-up, even though we can't check.

There's normally no problems with this approach to definition, but with JTB, us thinking it's true is just what JB already is. T, then can only refer to the state of actually being 'true', which renders the word unusable.

You’re wrong.

if one views "it's raining" separate from its factual counterpart, and solely as a mode of expression, it is reliant on the speaker to be true. — john27

I don't see how. It seems perfectly possible that someone saying "It's raining" tells us about their beliefs, and there still be a fact about whether it actually is raining, I can't see any logical way on prevents the other.

I still don't fully understand why one must refer to them as different.. — john27

I'm not suggesting one must refer to them as different, only that one could (as things stand). Your argument relied on assuming that they were the same. I'm just saying that such an assumption is not a logical necessity, so you ought have a means by which you justify it.

how could I find a mode of expression without a speaker and a listener? — john27

I don't see a way you could.

If I did, I would only be referring to the belief independent/not mode of expression part of 1+1=2 or "it's raining." — john27

I don't see how. If there were no speaker, why would the content refer to anything at all, surely, if there were no speaker, the content would be as yet undetermined?

I don't see how. If there were no speaker, why would the content refer to anything at all, surely, if there were no speaker, the content would be as yet undetermined? — Isaac

Because 1+1=2 exists, regardless on whether I have said it exists or not. For example, I could find 1+1=2 in nature by taking two sticks and putting them together to make a pair. I think I have said earlier that the content that I am referring to does not rely on me to exist.

I'm not suggesting one must refer to them as different, only that one could (as things stand). Your argument relied on assuming that they were the same. I'm just saying that such an assumption is not a logical necessity, so you ought have a means by which you justify it.[/quote]
— Isaac

They may well be the same, but since they are not the same by logical necessity, you'd have to provide an argument to support your position — Isaac

I'll be honest, I have no idea what you're talking about. At one time you are saying that my assumption requires a logical necessity, but earlier you had stated that they are not the same by logical necessity. I don't know, I can't wrap my head around it.

Though, I can give a logical necessity as to why one must refer to them as the same.

1+1=2. I think we can agree on that. The mode of expression dictates that my content changes according to its context. Therefore, it is a possibility for me give a context that allows 1+1=2 to be false. However, that is false; 1+1=2. And hence, the mode of expression is false. But when we talk about 1+1=2, we can never use it in a context that allows 1+1=2 to be false. Therefore, we always use the independent fact, and hence, the "mode of expression" and the independent fact is the same.

You’re wrong. — Michael

Oh. You could have saved us a lot of time by just telling me that in the first place. I bet you let people leave the restaurant with spinach still stuck in their teeth too.

Because 1+1=2 exists, regardless on whether I have said it exists or not. — john27

Houses exist, that doesn't mandate that I refer to them. I can refer to whatever I want. I can say "house" and mean 'fish', nothing prevents me from doing so, the mere existence of houses included.

I think I have said earlier that the content that I am referring to does not rely on me to exist. — john27

We agree there.

At one time you are saying that my assumption requires a logical necessity, but earlier you had stated that they are not the same by logical necessity. I don't know, I can't wrap my head around it. — john27

You've said two things are the same. They're not necessarily the same (by tautology or somesuch), so you need an argument demonstrating why you think they're the same.

it is a possibility for me give a context that allows 1+1=2 to be false. However, that is false; 1+1=2 — john27

If there's a context in which 1+1=2 is false, then 1+1=2 is false (in that context), otherwise the prior statement is itself false. 1+1=2 remains true in other contexts, and there's no context-free 1+1=2 that represents the really real expression against which all others must be measured.

I don’t understand your response.

If there's a context in which 1+1=2 is false, then 1+1=2 is false (in that context), otherwise the prior statement is itself false. 1+1=2 remains true in other contexts, and there's no context-free 1+1=2 that represents the really real expression against which all others must be measured. — Isaac

Yes, but there is no context in which 1+1=2 is false. It is true in every context. Therefore, The independent fact and the mode of expression are the same.

If knowledge (correctly used) is defeasible, then it can't also be 'true' (where 'true is used to denote some property other than simply 'well justified' - I'm not yet clear what that property is meant to be). People are then (apparently) constantly using 'knowledge; incorrectly. — Isaac

Right I misspoke, knowledge itself, if it is justified true belief is not understood to be defeasible. Our taking some proposition to be knowledge is what is defeasible. This is the distinction you seem to keep missing.

I don’t understand your response. — Michael

Of all the responses it feels as though you've not understood, that was the one I had most confidence in. I was just a joke.

there is no context in which 1+1=2 is false. It is true in every context. Therefore, The independent fact and the mode of expression are the same. — john27

Maybe. I think @I like sushi mentioned this earlier. There are conceivably abstract systems in which we can know for sure what's true because it's declared to be so by the system. I don't see how these examples prove any kind of general case, it's easy to prove exceptions, harder to prove the rule.

Our taking some proposition to be knowledge is what is defeasible. This is the distinction you seem to keep missing. — Janus

Not missing, no. Just saying that the expression is universally and solely used to express this 'taking', and as such to suggest the actual real definition is something other than it is ever used for seems odd at the least.

You’re wrong — Michael

Oh. You could have saved us a lot of time by just telling me that in the first place. I bet you let people leave the restaurant with spinach still stuck in their teeth too. — Isaac

People use the phrase “you’re wrong” when they disagree with the other person. Given that I disagree with you my use was felicitous, and as there’s nothing more to truth than felicitous use, I was right to say that you’re wrong.

That is why I don’t understand your response. I’ve been expressing my disagreement for several pages, and your joke about letting people leave the restaurant with spinach still stuck in their teeth seems entirely out of place, even nonsensical in context. It’s almost as if you understood something else by my claim that you’re wrong. I wonder what that could possibly be. Perhaps you understood me as saying that the facts aren’t as you claim them to be, as any reasonable English speaker would?

It seems perfectly possible that someone saying "It's raining" tells us about their beliefs, and there still be a fact about whether it actually is raining, — Isaac

What do you mean by “whether it actually is raining”? Are you referring to your beliefs?

People use the phrase “you’re wrong” when they disagree with the other person. — Michael

Rarely, in my experience. They mostly use it when they disagree with the other person and they think the other person ought to believe what they themselves believe (or they want to signal as such to others). That's why we don't often say "you're wrong" when we disagree about minor tastes, or matters which are complex and difficult to judge (like scientific theories).

So no. Here "you're wrong" is used in a context where we'd reasonably expect an appeal to rational thinking (an 'argument', a set of reasons, some justification). The implication of "you're wrong" in a discussion forum whose sole purpose is to exchange reasons, is that you have some.

Hence my joke. Your comment, unargued for, unsupported, was acting like it's pointing out the obvious, as if I'd look and say "oh yes, you're right, so I am, I hadn't noticed"

I’ve been expressing my disagreement — Michael

Your disagreement is not under scrutiny, your reasons are.

It’s almost as if you understood something else by my claim that you’re wrong. I wonder what that could possibly be. — Michael

I did, and I explained above what the 'else' is. Justifications

What do you mean by “whether it actually is raining”? Are you referring to your beliefs? — Michael

No, as I've said quite a few times now, in expressions like this I'm referring to the notion of the beliefs a community of my epistemic peers would have once they've thrown all the tests they can think of at it...which is clearly not the same notion (though might have the same content) as the belief I currently hold.

Our taking some proposition to be knowledge is what is defeasible. This is the distinction you seem to keep missing. — Janus


Not missing, no. Just saying that the expression is universally and solely used to express this 'taking', and as such to suggest the actual real definition is something other than it is ever used for seems odd at the least. — Isaac

Right, I think I see your objection now, but I would still maintain that although we can never be 100% sure we have knowledge, we can reasonably believe that we do, while still acknowledging that we could be wrong.

Maybe. I think I like sushi mentioned this earlier. There are conceivably abstract systems in which we can know for sure what's true because it's declared to be so by the system. I don't see how these examples prove any kind of general case, it's easy to prove exceptions, harder to prove the rule. — Isaac

Hm, then what about this:

1+1=2 may be considered as both an independent fact and a mode of expression because it is relegated to mathematics. It's raining, however, is not because it is not constrained by a previous system. Therefore, if we constrain "it's raining" using mathematical language, it would be considered to be both an independent fact and a mode of expression.

It's raining can be translated into a mathematical term: hence, it is both an independent fact and mode of expression. Do that for every linguistic mode of expression you have some qualms with and boom, everything relates back to its independent fact.

although we can never be 100% sure we have knowledge, we can reasonably believe that we do, while still acknowledging that we could be wrong. — Janus

Yes, I think that's perfectly coherent. It's just not how I think language works. For me, there's a difference between something which we can't be 100% sure about for pragmatic reasons and something we cannot be 100% sure of definitionally. For me, the 'truth' of whether the cat is on the mat, is simply the state of belief my community of epistemic peers would have about the world if they threw every test possible at it. The ultimate champion model. So, it's plausible, but pragmatically unachievable. That way I could say that I think my model is the ultimate champion model, but I can't be sure because I can't actually carry out the tasks required to check.

But with 'truth' meaning something other than 'justification' (of the ultimate champion model type), some sort of additional property a belief could have...well... I just grind to a halt there. I don't know what it would be for my model of the world's hidden states not just to be accurate (survive all tests), but to actually somehow be the same as the external world, match it precisely (where precisely means something other than predictive function). I've honestly no idea what that might mean.

We've been skirting around it, but I suspect this whole issue comes down to this incomprehensibility (for me) of non-pragmatic notions of 'truth'.

It's raining can be translated into a mathematical term: hence, it is both an independent fact and mode of expression. Do that for every linguistic mode of expression you have some qualms with and boom, everything relates back to its independent fact. — john27

That sounds consistent. We'd need to see the demonstration of reducing "it's raining" to mathematical terms.

That sounds consistent. We'd need to see the demonstration of reducing "it's raining" to mathematical terms. — Isaac

Noo! Math, my worst enemy. :grimace:

Well, I'll try my best.

Before I start making stuff up, let's define what sort of parameters we're using. I'd say that for the case of simplicity, we should stick to deterministic terms. As in, cause-effect, more classical mathematics.

Rain is an effect. Rain doesn't necessarily need an observer to exist, but it might make future discussions more simple if we include one, that way the "it" part of the statement holds. so:

Let a=observer

and the mathematical term 1+2=3 can be used to represent rain, specifically the number three, as an effect of something.

So, ax3= It's raining.

Therefore if a=0, rain does not exist. However, because there is an infinite observer, the mathematical system of the universe, a will always equal 1, hence making rain always relate back to its independent fact.

I'm probably wrong, but I think someone a little more advanced in math could make it work.

Do you think that we can say things like" the cat is on the mat" or "it is raining" and that it is the case that what we say in those simple kinds of observation statements is either in accordance or not in accordance with what is there to be observed?

Do you think that when the statements are in accordance with what is observed then what we have said is true and when they are not in accordance what we have said is false?

Do you agree that this is pretty much how people generally understand truth and falsity, and that our legal system is also based on this kind of understanding? Say when people are called upon to give evidence, for example?

I have tried (and tried, tried again - as per boy scout instruction), but I'm afraid I can't make head nor tail of what you've done there.

Any chance of a more step-by-step explanation

Do you think that we can say things like" the cat is on the mat" or "it is raining" and that it is the case that what we say in those simple kinds of observation statements is either in accordance or not in accordance with what is there to be observed? — Janus

No. I don't think it makes any sense at all for statement to be 'in accordance' with a state of affairs. States of affairs are causes of our sensations (and recipients of our actions). Statements are constituents of language - a tool we use for communication etc. They're an article of behaviour - speech acts. They're just not the kind of thing that can accord or not with a state of affairs.

Statements can be felicitous. They can do what we intended for them to do (the objective of the behaviour). I don't see any way they can 'accord', I'm afraid.

Do you think that when the statements are in accordance with what is observed then what we have said is true and when they are not in accordance what we have said is false? — Janus

No. Notwithstanding the issue laid out above, I don't think the words 'true' and 'false' are used that way, and for good reason. Since we cannot ever tell for sure what the hidden states we attempt to refer to are, we routinely use words like 'true' and 'false' to communicate our level or certainty.

Do you agree that this is pretty much how people generally understand truth and falsity, and that our legal system is also based on this kind of understanding? Say when people are called upon to give evidence, for example? — Janus

Yes, I'd say it's generally how people 'understand' truth and falsity. People 'generally understand' morality as judgement according to set rules too (yet fMRI scans tell us there are other considerations, several different brain regions are involved). People 'generally understand' infinity to be just a really big number that can be treated like any other - mathematicians tell us that doesn't work. People 'generally understand' their perception to be a direct unfiltered reflection of their environment - neuroscience tells us otherwise. People 'generally understand' their decisions to be the result of rational calculation - experiments frequently show us we can't make sense of their behaviour that way. I could go on, you get the picture. I don't see any reason at all to use what people 'generally understand' as a guide for what is actually the case. If we did, then what would we be doing here (with philosophy/science) at all?

Basically, when I started with this

:

I'd say that for the case of simplicity, we should stick to deterministic terms. As in, cause-effect, more classical mathematics. — john27

It's to assume the fact that rain is the effect of "something". Water cycle, the earth, something like that.
So when I translate that fact into mathematical terms:

and the mathematical term 1+2=3 can be used to represent rain, specifically the number three, as an effect of something. — john27

It's to say that yeah, 1+2=3 doesn't actually encompass fully the fact that its raining; rain is much more complicated than that. But it's the same function, that is, the effect "rain" is just a bunch of other effects added together. In other words, It's just a simpler way of saying that rain is due to a bunch of effects. You could describe the water cycle mathematically for maybe a more precise translation, but this is honestly way simpler.

Let a=observer — john27

The observer here is to satisfy the fact that someone is saying "it". The observer, realistically, is the universe. I don't have the mathematical proof that the universe exists, but I'm sure its out there, so I just condensed that equation that is probably real, into a.

Therefore you get:

If the universe (a) recognizes that this addition of effects (1+2) is happening, he will say it is raining (=3)

Hence the universe exists, and there's only one universe (probably), the (a) is always equal to 1.

Hence:

ax(1+2)=3 / it's raining

or,

ax3=3 / it's raining

Fair enough. I think your view is very wrong, but I don't think anything further I could say would be anything but repeating what I've already said, so...