'It', the fact, doesn't seem reliant on you, but no one claimed it was. — Isaac
When people say things like "it's raining", they mean that they have a belief that it's raining (in this case, one they're very confident in ,one with good justifications. — Isaac
Determining that meaning is not, by necessity, the same as determining why or how the fact expressed obtains. — Isaac
I'm claiming that the meaning is determined by the full expression, in context. It requires a speaker and a listener, and it has no meaning at all out of context. — Isaac
If you think it has a meaning outside of any language game it might form part of, then you'd have to say where we look to find that meaning. In what does the meaning inhere? — Isaac
Let's say the cat either is or is not on the mat. It's on-the-matness is belief independent. That has nothing to do with my claim that we can't talk about the cat's on-the-matness without someone holding a belief about it. — Isaac
If I wanted to check where my understanding of JTB was confused on this matter, I'd return to the text, or just ask someone in the Philosophy department. — Isaac
They subsequently came to believe it's a sphere. They could still be wrong. They believe it to be a sphere using exactly the same fundamental process those who believed it to be flat used - justification. We've not gained some magic additional access. We just have much, much better justifications than the flat-earthers had. — Isaac
Then we'd be in no better boat. No-one would use the word knowledge because everyone would be quite aware that they could not demonstrate their belief was 'truly' justified. Since we do use the word knowledge, it must be some other threshold that we mean by it. — Isaac
None of this changes the fact that we can never be absolutely sure we possess knowledge. I think the idea of dropping the 'true' part is fine if you are also happy with dropping the 'knowledge' part. Then we would never claim to have knowledge at all, but merely beliefs which seem more or less justified, or not justified at all, depending on what we take to be the criteria for saying what constitutes evidence. — Janus
How odd. You're so wedded to a particular definition that you'd rather we just never use the word than admit that since we do use the word, the definition must be wrong. Is that how you see the rest of language working. Some philosophers decide what the definition really is and and if we're not using it right then we don't get to use the word at all, they'll just take their ball home if we're not going to play by their rules? — Isaac
I can't help but find this contradictory. Am I looking at this wrong? — john27
I don't understand. By what necessity is it not the same as how a fact obtains? — john27
Do you mean to say that 1+1=2, as a mode of expression, has no meaning if theres no context? — john27
What meaning does 1+1=2 contain as a mode of expression? — john27
I must admit I'm a little confused... — john27
your logic that "the cat is on the mat" means "I believe that the cat is on the mat" — Michael
Right, but I've already said that knowledge, as it is generally understood, is defeasible. This is an example of what I meant when I referred to your "confusion"; presenting an objection as though it is a problem for the JTB understanding, when it really isn't, makes it seem that you are confused about it. — Janus
the earth has been observed and imaged from space, from satellites, and we can see that it is a sphere, so the likelihood of that observation being wrong is minuscule. That is not magical, but it is a paradigm leap to be able to observe the Earth from space. — Janus
to the degree that we can be confident that our justifications are based on true observations, the degree to which we can be confident that our beliefs are true is commensurate, and that is what is generally meant by claiming to have knowledge. — Janus
'It', the fact, doesn't seem reliant on you, but no one claimed it was.
— Isaac
When people say things like "it's raining", they mean that they have a belief that it's raining (in this case, one they're very confident in ,one with good justifications. — john27
They may well be the same, but since they are not the same by logical necessity, you'd have to provide an argument to support your position. — Isaac
What I'm asking is for you to fill in some of the gaps in the model you're espousing. If an expression (as say, "it's raining") has a meaning outside of the various uses to which that expression is put, where should we look to find it, and on what grounds can that source claim primacy of other sources of meaning? — Isaac
Then consider what you meant by the cat being on the mat being belief-independent in that context. — Michael
That is how a true belief is distinguished from a false belief in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge. — Michael
Can you finally accept that, in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge, this third condition has nothing to do with what any particular person or language community believes? It's a reference to a belief-independent fact that must obtain for the belief to be true and the person to have knowledge. — Michael
At best JTB could be an account of what 'knowledge' could mean, or ought to mean. In which case... thanks, but no thanks. — Isaac
if one views "it's raining" separate from its factual counterpart, and solely as a mode of expression, it is reliant on the speaker to be true. — john27
I still don't fully understand why one must refer to them as different.. — john27
how could I find a mode of expression without a speaker and a listener? — john27
If I did, I would only be referring to the belief independent/not mode of expression part of 1+1=2 or "it's raining." — john27
I don't see how. If there were no speaker, why would the content refer to anything at all, surely, if there were no speaker, the content would be as yet undetermined? — Isaac
I'm not suggesting one must refer to them as different, only that one could (as things stand). Your argument relied on assuming that they were the same. I'm just saying that such an assumption is not a logical necessity, so you ought have a means by which you justify it.[/quote]
— Isaac
They may well be the same, but since they are not the same by logical necessity, you'd have to provide an argument to support your position — Isaac
Because 1+1=2 exists, regardless on whether I have said it exists or not. — john27
I think I have said earlier that the content that I am referring to does not rely on me to exist. — john27
At one time you are saying that my assumption requires a logical necessity, but earlier you had stated that they are not the same by logical necessity. I don't know, I can't wrap my head around it. — john27
it is a possibility for me give a context that allows 1+1=2 to be false. However, that is false; 1+1=2 — john27
If there's a context in which 1+1=2 is false, then 1+1=2 is false (in that context), otherwise the prior statement is itself false. 1+1=2 remains true in other contexts, and there's no context-free 1+1=2 that represents the really real expression against which all others must be measured. — Isaac
If knowledge (correctly used) is defeasible, then it can't also be 'true' (where 'true is used to denote some property other than simply 'well justified' - I'm not yet clear what that property is meant to be). People are then (apparently) constantly using 'knowledge; incorrectly. — Isaac
I don’t understand your response. — Michael
there is no context in which 1+1=2 is false. It is true in every context. Therefore, The independent fact and the mode of expression are the same. — john27
Our taking some proposition to be knowledge is what is defeasible. This is the distinction you seem to keep missing. — Janus
You’re wrong — Michael
Oh. You could have saved us a lot of time by just telling me that in the first place. I bet you let people leave the restaurant with spinach still stuck in their teeth too. — Isaac
It seems perfectly possible that someone saying "It's raining" tells us about their beliefs, and there still be a fact about whether it actually is raining, — Isaac
People use the phrase “you’re wrong” when they disagree with the other person. — Michael
I’ve been expressing my disagreement — Michael
It’s almost as if you understood something else by my claim that you’re wrong. I wonder what that could possibly be. — Michael
What do you mean by “whether it actually is raining”? Are you referring to your beliefs? — Michael
Our taking some proposition to be knowledge is what is defeasible. This is the distinction you seem to keep missing. — Janus
Not missing, no. Just saying that the expression is universally and solely used to express this 'taking', and as such to suggest the actual real definition is something other than it is ever used for seems odd at the least. — Isaac
Maybe. I think I like sushi mentioned this earlier. There are conceivably abstract systems in which we can know for sure what's true because it's declared to be so by the system. I don't see how these examples prove any kind of general case, it's easy to prove exceptions, harder to prove the rule. — Isaac
although we can never be 100% sure we have knowledge, we can reasonably believe that we do, while still acknowledging that we could be wrong. — Janus
It's raining can be translated into a mathematical term: hence, it is both an independent fact and mode of expression. Do that for every linguistic mode of expression you have some qualms with and boom, everything relates back to its independent fact. — john27
That sounds consistent. We'd need to see the demonstration of reducing "it's raining" to mathematical terms. — Isaac
Do you think that we can say things like" the cat is on the mat" or "it is raining" and that it is the case that what we say in those simple kinds of observation statements is either in accordance or not in accordance with what is there to be observed? — Janus
Do you think that when the statements are in accordance with what is observed then what we have said is true and when they are not in accordance what we have said is false? — Janus
Do you agree that this is pretty much how people generally understand truth and falsity, and that our legal system is also based on this kind of understanding? Say when people are called upon to give evidence, for example? — Janus
I'd say that for the case of simplicity, we should stick to deterministic terms. As in, cause-effect, more classical mathematics. — john27
and the mathematical term 1+2=3 can be used to represent rain, specifically the number three, as an effect of something. — john27
Let a=observer — john27
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