BTW, I'm not sure why you added "(sic)" to the quote. — Andrew M
Qualia is central to the argument in the paper you originally quoted: — Andrew M
Perception is the process by which we become aware of an object with such characteristics. It's not a process of purple, squareness and boxhood being synthesized in our minds or, alternatively, brains. — Andrew M
the 'binding problem' assumes there must be a unified representation or image, which the non-representationalist view rejects. — Andrew M
At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of of a single encompassing state of consciousness. — Chalmers and Bayne
That Bitbol lecture is a blast, but it does not argue for the impossibility of self-knowledge. Rather, it argues that one must recognize the knower as a condition for knowledge, that it is necessary to put back the human mind at the heart of any human knowledge, rather than try and abstract of it. — Olivier5
Against Schophehauer apparently, I would think that self-awareness is a key feature of the mind. There's a mise en abîme somewhere there, and one of my favorite hypotheses is that our two brains produce such an effect by perceiving one another. — Olivier5
Unicorns don't exist on planet earth other than as a human fantasy -- though we can't rule out that they might 'exist for real' elsewhere in this vast universe -- so the question seems to be: how many Joules for a dream? — Olivier5
Unlike any type of monism, pluralist philosophies try to recognise the diversity and complexity of our experience. They don't try to put square pegs into round holes. I suppose their disadvantage is that they don't offer a fully coherent view of the world. — Olivier5
[...] Physicalism has no leg to stand on, right? — Agent Smith
At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of of a single encompassing state of consciousness. — Chalmers and Bayne
This is not dependent on representative realism. — Wayfarer
[...] Physicalism has no leg to stand on, right?
— Agent Smith
Some, such as myself, would agree with this statement. :smile: — javra
I guess my main point with that example of unicorns as existent thoughts was the absurdity of stipulating that there can be "existent physical things that are not physically real". — javra
I have listened to the Gerson lecture a couple of times. Do you know of a link to a printed copy? — Paine
Is that a compromise, as Gerson would describe it? It seems to me that Aristotle's efforts to separate inquiries reflect an interest in avoiding putting matters in those terms of opposition. — Paine
If I touched a hot stove with my bare hand, I would know my subjective experience.
If I see someone touch a hot stove with their bare hand and instantly jump back exclaiming, I can understand what I have objectively observed, but I can never know what subjective experience that person may or may not have had. — RussellA
your thoughts and attitudes can be directed at either yourself or at others — SophistiCat
The whole problem of 'scientism' can be seen as treating human being as an object while simultaneously overlooking or denying the centrality of the subjective nature of perception. — Wayfarer
There is the subjective pole of experience, which is the condition of consciousness, in other words, it must be conscious before any experience. Knowing-being, you could call it. I'm sure it is real even in primitive organisms but only the subject of rational analysis in man (also something Schopenhauer says). — Wayfarer
That is what I regard as the nature of 'being'. Notice the word - be-ing. It's a verb, denoting an act. (Somehow this strikes me as significant.) — Wayfarer
My take on the reality of universals (and numbers, laws, principles and the like) is that they are only perceptible to reason, but they're the same for all who think. I suppose you can say mythological animals, like unicorns, and fictional characters, like Sherlock Holmes, are real in the sense that they're part of a shared culture, but they're fictional nonetheless. The Pythagoeran theorem is real in a way that they aren't, although spelling out why is obviously going to be tricky. — Wayfarer
my main point with that example of unicorns as existent thoughts was the absurdity of stipulating that there can be "existent physical things that are not physically real". I'll stand by the absurdity of this till evidenced wrong. — javra
the last sentence might imply to some that physicalism does offer a fully coherent view of the world. It doesn't. — javra
Except I am more than my thoughts. I am not only my thoughts. — Mww
In contrast to such stance...... — javra
Descartes: if he knew he was because he thought — javra
personal identity is quite the headache, at least for me — javra
Perhaps Descartes should have said: "I am my thoughts, therefore I am" — RussellA
But who will doubt that he lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts, he lives. If he doubts where his doubts come from, he remembers. If he doubts, he understands that he doubts. If he doubts, he wants to be certain. If he doubts, he thinks. If he doubts, he knows that he does not know. If he doubts, he judges that he ougth not rashly to give assent. So whoever acquires a doubt from any source ought not to doubt any of these things whose non-existence would mean that he could not entertain doubt about anything. — Augustine, On the Trinity 10.10.14 quoted in Richard Sorabji Self, 2006, p.219
To be conscious is to be conscious of something, and that something must be external to whatever is being conscious, that something cannot be itself. — RussellA
That a thing is necessary doesn’t tell us anything about what it is. Or ontology claims are not epistemological claims — Mww
Which stance are we talking about here? His, or mine? You quoted me, so supposing my stance, that we are not only our thoughts, your comment that we don’t necessarily change along with our thoughts, seems to support it, which isn’t in contrast to it. — Mww
On the other hand, one could fall back on “knowledge that”, in order to escape “knowledge of”. Like I said....gotta be careful. — Mww
Hmmmm. “In the world” implies spatial location, and because experience is not in the world, I would go with “grounded by the world”. This removes the ambiguity of location ... — Mww
Ever wonder how it became “red flower in a vase”? How does something....anything.....get its characteristics? — Mww
No, we have thoughts and feelings about representations of perceived objects in the world. It behooves the purely physicalist-minded, to remember 100% efficiency of energy transformation is absolutely impossible for human sensory apparatus. Because there is necessarily energy loss, that which is upstream from sensation can never be the same as what is downstream from it. If the latter is different in some way, it can no more than merely represent the former to some arbitrary degree.
That relieves us of invoking the tautological nonsense of saying things like, “there are no basketballs, ‘57 DeSoto’s.....and no “red flowers in a vase”.....in my head”. — Mww
All that reduces to.....is it a red flower in a vase because it just is that, or, is it a red flower in a vase because we say it is just that. Personal preference? — Mww
This is not dependent on representative realism. — Wayfarer
No, we have thoughts and feelings about representations of perceived objects in the world. — Mww
Whereas B&H's position is that we experience the world (say, watching a sunset). The inclusion of "subjectively" and "representation" just is the homunculus looking at a theater screen. Remove those terms (and the conceptual scheme they represent) and no binding problem arises, since there's nothing to bind or synthesize. There's no binding of a sunset, it's already of one piece, so to speak.[*] — Andrew M
We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak. — Andrew M
I'm curious whether you would agree with Mww's comment here: — Andrew M
my thoughts and other attributes are things that belong, or else pertain, to me (rather than equating to me) — javra
I was going more for knowledge by acquaintance — javra
I am not only my thoughts — Mww
and because experience is not in the world......
— Mww
That doesn't seem right to me. — Andrew M
Are you using the term "experience" differently to all of those? — Andrew M
On a non-representationalist view, no copy is being made. Instead we are perceiving the original object — Andrew M
This is a conceptual, not an empirical point. We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak. — Andrew M
On a non-representationalist model, objects have natural characteristics that we can discover. — Andrew M
Perhaps Descartes should have said: "I am my thoughts, therefore I am" — RussellA
———-Not bad. — Mww
As Descartes might have said "I am my subjective experiences, therefore I am" — RussellA
Descartes — Wayfarer
This doesn't make science wrong but it surely challenges materialism — Wayfarer
You still have to prove that thoughts and feelings are equally experienced, in order to affirm that I am only my subjective experiences. — Mww
Because I doubt the existence of the apple, there must be an "I" doing the doubting, proving the existence of an "I" — RussellA
I don't see how Aristotle's Direct Realism or Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism. — RussellA
Even if Aristotle's Direct Realism was true - the claim that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world - the causal path from object in the world to thought in the mind can still be explained within materialism. — RussellA
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