BTW, I'm not sure why you added "(sic)" to the quote. — Andrew M

Because it was written as 'hole' not 'whole'.

Qualia is central to the argument in the paper you originally quoted: — Andrew M

Fair enough, the paper does refer to it qualia in that particular reference to Chalmers. But note that the section of the subjective unity of experience is one of four sections.

Perception is the process by which we become aware of an object with such characteristics. It's not a process of purple, squareness and boxhood being synthesized in our minds or, alternatively, brains. — Andrew M

Well, those processes can be identified and analysed according to the source. There are identifiable neural systems associated with color, number, shape and movement. Perception must require the synthesis of those elements of experience, despite saying 'no it doesn't'.

the 'binding problem' assumes there must be a unified representation or image, which the non-representationalist view rejects. — Andrew M

At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of of a single encompassing state of consciousness. — Chalmers and Bayne

This is not dependent on representative realism.

That Bitbol lecture is a blast, but it does not argue for the impossibility of self-knowledge. Rather, it argues that one must recognize the knower as a condition for knowledge, that it is necessary to put back the human mind at the heart of any human knowledge, rather than try and abstract of it. — Olivier5

Quite right. This was also central to Husserl's whole project. The whole problem of 'scientism' can be seen as treating human being as an object while simultaneously overlooking or denying the centrality of the subjective nature of perception.

Against Schophehauer apparently, I would think that self-awareness is a key feature of the mind. There's a mise en abîme somewhere there, and one of my favorite hypotheses is that our two brains produce such an effect by perceiving one another. — Olivier5

I think the kind of awareness that the subject has of its own existence is different in kind to awareness of objects and the environment. My knowledge of my own existence is internal to consciousness, were I deprived of all sensory stimulus I still know that I am. There is the subjective pole of experience, which is the condition of consciousness, in other words, it must be conscious before any experience. Knowing-being, you could call it. I'm sure it is real even in primitive organisms but only the subject of rational analysis in man (also something Schopenhauer says). That is what I regard as the nature of 'being'. Notice the word - be-ing. It's a verb, denoting an act. (Somehow this strikes me as significant.)

Unicorns don't exist on planet earth other than as a human fantasy -- though we can't rule out that they might 'exist for real' elsewhere in this vast universe -- so the question seems to be: how many Joules for a dream? — Olivier5

I guess my main point with that example of unicorns as existent thoughts was the absurdity of stipulating that there can be "existent physical things that are not physically real". I'll stand by the absurdity of this till evidenced wrong.

Unlike any type of monism, pluralist philosophies try to recognise the diversity and complexity of our experience. They don't try to put square pegs into round holes. I suppose their disadvantage is that they don't offer a fully coherent view of the world. — Olivier5

I like that, though the last sentence might imply to some that physicalism does offer a fully coherent view of the world. It doesn't. Otherwise there wouldn't be logically substantiated debates about it.

[...] Physicalism has no leg to stand on, right? — Agent Smith

Some, such as myself, would agree with this statement. :smile:

At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of of a single encompassing state of consciousness. — Chalmers and Bayne


This is not dependent on representative realism. — Wayfarer

:100:

I have listened to the Gerson lecture a couple of times. Do you know of a link to a printed copy? Each of his statements are proposals to discuss very specific topics.

I agree with Gerson's argument that Aristotle is not stepping outside of what 'urPlatonism' militates against. On the other hand, it seems that Aristotle worked hard to have the empirical inquiry of the natural world be worthy and capable of going forward, even if upon a problematical basis.

Is that a compromise, as Gerson would describe it? It seems to me that Aristotle's efforts to separate inquiries reflect an interest in avoiding putting matters in those terms of opposition.

[...] Physicalism has no leg to stand on, right?
— Agent Smith

Some, such as myself, would agree with this statement. :smile: — javra

:up:

I guess my main point with that example of unicorns as existent thoughts was the absurdity of stipulating that there can be "existent physical things that are not physically real". — javra

My take on the reality of universals (and numbers, laws, principles and the like) is that they are only perceptible to reason, but they're the same for all who think. I suppose you can say mythological animals, like unicorns, and fictional characters, like Sherlock Holmes, are real in the sense that they're part of a shared culture, but they're fictional nonetheless. The Pythagoeran theorem is real in a way that they aren't, although spelling out why is obviously going to be tricky.

I have listened to the Gerson lecture a couple of times. Do you know of a link to a printed copy? — Paine

You'll find it here.

Is that a compromise, as Gerson would describe it? It seems to me that Aristotle's efforts to separate inquiries reflect an interest in avoiding putting matters in those terms of opposition. — Paine

Big question. My understanding is that Aristotle is seen as practical, empirical and scientific, and Plato the mystical dreamer. In the famous Raphael frieze Plato is pointing towards the heavens, Aristotle has his hand out in front, palm-down.

I think the fundamental disagreement is around the reality of ideas. The traditional story is that Plato believes that ideas are real and dwell in an actual Platonic realm, while Aristotle believes they are real only in the form in which they are embodied. To drill down to the intricacies of that debate, which has occupied generations of scholars, takes a lot of reading, but I think Lloyd Gerson is well regarded as a guide to that subject - one of his books is called Aristotle and Other Platonists which goes into it in depth. He points out that there are periods when the division is seen as fundamental, but also long periods in which the Platonist tradition believed that they were in basic agreement. But it's a deep and difficult argument.

If I touched a hot stove with my bare hand, I would know my subjective experience.

If I see someone touch a hot stove with their bare hand and instantly jump back exclaiming, I can understand what I have objectively observed, but I can never know what subjective experience that person may or may not have had. — RussellA

It is trivially true that you can only experience what you can experience, but your thoughts and attitudes can be directed at either yourself or at others - and that includes your own and other people's state of mind.

your thoughts and attitudes can be directed at either yourself or at others — SophistiCat

I agree that my thoughts can be directed at another person's mind, as my thoughts can be directed at the table in front of, but this is not the same as being able to subjectively experience another person's mind.

The whole problem of 'scientism' can be seen as treating human being as an object while simultaneously overlooking or denying the centrality of the subjective nature of perception. — Wayfarer

A point Husserl made well, and a great contribution to philosophy IMO.

There is the subjective pole of experience, which is the condition of consciousness, in other words, it must be conscious before any experience. Knowing-being, you could call it. I'm sure it is real even in primitive organisms but only the subject of rational analysis in man (also something Schopenhauer says). — Wayfarer

Yes to this. When I speak of other animal species' potential conscious experience and subjectivity, I am not saying it is equal to ours, obviously it's not. I am just saying biology gives us no reason to believe that other animals than Homo sapiens totally lack self-awareness. On the contrary, evolution theory tells us that changes come very gradually, that new species recycle much of what older species have or do, that true radical novelty is extremely rare in evolution.

So it is quite improbable biologically speaking that dogs, cats or chimpanzees be p-zombies. They are not that far from us, you can bet they have feelings too.

That is what I regard as the nature of 'being'. Notice the word - be-ing. It's a verb, denoting an act. (Somehow this strikes me as significant.) — Wayfarer

I am a big fan of Aristotle on this: being is an all-encompassing category and therefore, there can be no science of being. For any science needs to focus on a type of object to study. Granted that in phenomenology, being is not meant as the being of everything and nothing, but precisely focused on us, human beings. On how it feels to be a human at the world.

To study being in this sense is to study the human fate so to speak, aka our human existence and toil here on earth, phenomenologically.

That is still a very broad scope. The project of all philosophy I suppose.

My take on the reality of universals (and numbers, laws, principles and the like) is that they are only perceptible to reason, but they're the same for all who think. I suppose you can say mythological animals, like unicorns, and fictional characters, like Sherlock Holmes, are real in the sense that they're part of a shared culture, but they're fictional nonetheless. The Pythagoeran theorem is real in a way that they aren't, although spelling out why is obviously going to be tricky. — Wayfarer

I’ve mentioned this before … some long time ago. I’m myself operating with the notion of there being distinct forms of reality within the metaphysics I’ve been working on: intra-subjective reality in the plural (realities strictly located within an individual subject: e.g., the reality of one’s dreams: “that was a real dream I had an not a lie”); inter-subjective reality, also in the plural (e.g. languages and cultures, as well as religions, etc.); [now termed] equi-subjective reality, which is singular [poetically, “the uni-verse” where “verse” is taken to be equivalent to logos] (very much including physical objectivity, as well as at least some universals such as that of a circle: basically that set of actualities which affect and effect all subjects equally with or without their awareness … and, hence, this regardless of their intra-realities and inter-realties); and last but not least, ultra-subjective reality (a lot more cumbersome to succinctly express, but, in short, that which is considered to be ultimate reality … by all means in no way necessitating an Omnipotent Deity, it could just as well be Nirvana, or Brahman, or “the One” (or, for fairness, even absolute nonbeing … long spiel to clarify this last one … but, point being, there are conceivable alternatives to choose amongst)).

So, within this stipulated frame of mind, Sherlock Holmes will be an inter-real entity, but not an equi-real one. Pi and the Pythagorean theorem will be non-physical equi-real givens. I know all this is kind’a worthless without a full account of the philosophy. I’m working on it … but it’ll be years before I’m anywhere close to completion.

At any rate, my current terse thoughts on the matter. In short, I’m in agreement.

my main point with that example of unicorns as existent thoughts was the absurdity of stipulating that there can be "existent physical things that are not physically real". I'll stand by the absurdity of this till evidenced wrong. — javra

I agree that to try and categorize thoughts as 'physical' leads to seeming absurdities. This form of monism is simply a category error.

Logically speaking, if some things are deemed physical, then it follows that some other things are not to be deemed physical, or the terms 'physical' means everything and nothing...

If one says: "Everything is red" or "Everything is a triangle", or "Everything sucks", then the question arises: what do "red", "triangle" or "sucks" mean in these sentences? What work do they do?

the last sentence might imply to some that physicalism does offer a fully coherent view of the world. It doesn't. — javra

Good point.

Taking the thread to be about substance dualism (the idea that the mind is a different substance to the brain), the question is what can we ever know about the mind.

Perhaps Descartes should have said "I am my thoughts, therefore I am"

Descartes said "I think, therefore I am", prompting the question "what is the link between "I" and my thoughts ?"

There are two possibilities:

1) Either, there is an "I" that thinks, where the "I" has an existence independent of its thoughts, as computer hardware has an existence independent of its software
2) Or, the "I" is its thoughts, in that if there were no thoughts, then there would be no "I", where the word "is" means an identity, in the same way that "A is A"

Solution A) - There is an "I" that thinks
To be conscious is to be conscious of something, and that something must be external to whatever is being conscious, that something cannot be itself.
Similarly, a thought must be of something, and that thought must be external to whatever is having the thought, that thought cannot be itself.
The inevitable consequence is that, as I can never know the nature of another person's mind, and as my mind can never know itself, the nature of the mind will be forever unknown, meaning that we can never say whether dualism is true or not.

Solution B) - The "I" is its thoughts

I cannot be conscious of my own consciousness, and my thoughts cannot be about themselves. However, I can be conscious of some of my thoughts, where such thoughts are about something.

Suppose that "I" am the set of my thoughts. Then my mind also is the set of my thoughts. Therefore "I am my mind". The words "am" and "is" mean identity, in the same way that "A" is "A"

If I am the set of my thoughts, and thoughts must be about things, then it follows that "I" am the set of things that is being thought about.

In order to know the nature of the mind, where the mind is a set of thoughts about things, then I need to know the nature of the set of things being thought about.

As these things are external to the mind, then this allows the possibility that the mind could be understood by reference to that which is external to the mind, avoiding the problem of self-reference laid out in Solution A.

Summary
There is a possibility of understanding the mind if the "I" is its thoughts rather than there is an "I" that thinks.

Perhaps Descartes should have said: "I am my thoughts, therefore I am"

Not bad.

Except I am more than my thoughts. I am not only my thoughts.

Except I am more than my thoughts. I am not only my thoughts. — Mww

In contrast to such stance, it at least seems valid that I don't necessarily change whenever my thoughts change. As one example: I'm the same being I was any number of years ago, despite many of my thoughts having drastically changed over the years. To not mention changes in my body.

Which in a roundabout way brings to mind Descartes: if he knew he was because he thought and knew he thought because he doubted (per common interpretations of his philosophy, doubt proves thought proving the "I" as thinker), then: did he not know he was (i.e., existed - but not in the "stands out" sense) whenever he didn't doubt his own existence?

Else, assuming that the "I" is equivalent to its own thoughts + other attributes, was Descartes not the same person when he didn't try to doubt his own being?

(personal identity is quite the headache, at least for me)

In contrast to such stance...... — javra

Which stance are we talking about here? His, or mine? You quoted me, so supposing my stance, that we are not only our thoughts, your comment that we don’t necessarily change along with our thoughts, seems to support it, which isn’t in contrast to it.

So...I shall assume his, in which case, I agree, but only in the lesser sense, that we do not change along with our thoughts. But, as soon as we bring in time, we leave the lesser sense, and get down to the technical, greater, sense.
—————

Descartes: if he knew he was because he thought — javra

Gotta be careful here. Rene never said he knew anything; all he ever said was he doubts, and that necessarily. Makes no sense to say I know I doubt, while I am actually engaged in doubting.

“....I wasn’t meaning to deny that one must first know what thought, existence and certainty are, and know that it’s impossible for something to think while it doesn’t exist, and the like. But these are utterly simple notions, which don’t on their own give us knowledge of anything that exists...”
(P. P., 2. 10., 1647)

From that, we can say he never claimed knowledge of “I”, or mind as subject, even after having proved “I am” because his thoughts are indubitable. That a thing is necessary doesn’t tell us anything about what it is. Or, ontology claims are not epistemological claims. Descartes never said he knew he was merely because he couldn’t doubt his thoughts; his successors foisted that on him, without proper warrant.

On the other hand, one could fall back on “knowledge that”, in order to escape “knowledge of”. Like I said....gotta be careful.
————-

personal identity is quite the headache, at least for me — javra

Personal identity invokes conceptions of virtue, which involves reason, as do any conceptions. But reason is fallible, so.....there ya go.

Perhaps Descartes should have said: "I am my thoughts, therefore I am" — RussellA

As has been pointed out many times, Augustine anticipated Descartes:

But who will doubt that he lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts, he lives. If he doubts where his doubts come from, he remembers. If he doubts, he understands that he doubts. If he doubts, he wants to be certain. If he doubts, he thinks. If he doubts, he knows that he does not know. If he doubts, he judges that he ougth not rashly to give assent. So whoever acquires a doubt from any source ought not to doubt any of these things whose non-existence would mean that he could not entertain doubt about anything. — Augustine, On the Trinity 10.10.14 quoted in Richard Sorabji Self, 2006, p.219

To be conscious is to be conscious of something, and that something must be external to whatever is being conscious, that something cannot be itself. — RussellA

In Aristotelian philosophy the mind is united with the object of knowledge insofar as that object is intelligible. 'The mind, according to him, is potentially all things, in that it actually is the same as the object of thought when it thinks (402b15-16).2 The mind, by receiving form without its matter, can become that thing when it thinks. If the mind receives the form with matter, it would be all things in the literal sense. However, since it receives the form without matter, the way in which the thing exists in the mind is different from the way in which it exists outside the mind. Thus the mind is not all things in the literal sense.'

'In addition to sense knowledge, man has intellectual knowledge of boundless scope. He understands not merely this or that in the particular case, but being in general, and also nonbeing, one and many in general, whole, and part in general. He understands not merely this or that natural body, but matter and body in general, plant or animal in general, man or human nature in general. The proper object of the human intellect is indeed something in the material world, but this man knows by intellect as universal, that is, as abstracted from particulars. Thus the human being enjoys a higher degree of immateriality, by which s/he becomes and is, in an immaterial way, not merely a particular thing but a being universal and transcendent. Hence the human knower as intellective is immaterial, and the intellective power is anorganic or spiritual.'

This doesn't make science wrong but it surely challenges materialism.

That a thing is necessary doesn’t tell us anything about what it is. Or ontology claims are not epistemological claims — Mww

Perhaps the two kinds of claims are not only not similar but inversely proportional to some extent.

Descartes campaigned for a particular method of epistemology to be the benefactor of his establishment of the cogito. It seems safe to say that the responses to his claim go well beyond what he imagined.

Which stance are we talking about here? His, or mine? You quoted me, so supposing my stance, that we are not only our thoughts, your comment that we don’t necessarily change along with our thoughts, seems to support it, which isn’t in contrast to it. — Mww

My bad, I should have made myself more explicit: If my thoughts and other attributes can change without me changing along with them, then it seems reasonable to conclude that I am neither my thoughts nor my other attributes. But that - just as our language coincidentally has it - my thoughts and other attributes are things that belong, or else pertain, to me (rather than equating to me).

That I am not my thoughts and other attributes is a different perspective than the one you mentioned ... a perspective that to me holds at least some justification.

On the other hand, one could fall back on “knowledge that”, in order to escape “knowledge of”. Like I said....gotta be careful. — Mww

I was going more for knowledge by acquaintance ... as in, "I know what I saw". Still, point taken.

Hmmmm. “In the world” implies spatial location, and because experience is not in the world, I would go with “grounded by the world”. This removes the ambiguity of location ... — Mww

That doesn't seem right to me. I experienced the excitement of New York in New York. I had a memorable experience at the restaurant. I gained experience in my job at the supermarket. Getting stung by a wasp in the garden was a painful experience.

Are you using the term "experience" differently to all of those?

Ever wonder how it became “red flower in a vase”? How does something....anything.....get its characteristics? — Mww

Yes. Why is the sky blue? Why does the glass window have no color? We seek to understand by investigating the things we observe (which can also include the creatures doing the observing).

I can also think about the conceptual schemes within which those questions can be posed.

No, we have thoughts and feelings about representations of perceived objects in the world. It behooves the purely physicalist-minded, to remember 100% efficiency of energy transformation is absolutely impossible for human sensory apparatus. Because there is necessarily energy loss, that which is upstream from sensation can never be the same as what is downstream from it. If the latter is different in some way, it can no more than merely represent the former to some arbitrary degree.

That relieves us of invoking the tautological nonsense of saying things like, “there are no basketballs, ‘57 DeSoto’s.....and no “red flowers in a vase”.....in my head”. — Mww

But that assumes the process involves making "copies" of the objects (however imperfectly), as opposed to providing information about them. On a non-representationalist view, no copy is being made. Instead we are perceiving the original object (e.g., clearly in well-lit conditions, or unclearly if there's a fog about).

This is a conceptual, not an empirical point. We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak. It's not a representation of some further removed imperceptible and indeterminate object.

All that reduces to.....is it a red flower in a vase because it just is that, or, is it a red flower in a vase because we say it is just that. Personal preference? — Mww

Yes we have a say in what conceptual scheme we use. On a non-representationalist model, objects have natural characteristics that we can discover. Within that model, depending on the environmental conditions, we can be correct or mistaken about what those objects and characteristics are.

This is not dependent on representative realism. — Wayfarer

It's dependent on a representationalist conceptual scheme, for reasons I've given (I haven't been using the word "realism", which brings its own baggage to these discussions). But I'm curious whether you would agree with Mww's comment here:

No, we have thoughts and feelings about representations of perceived objects in the world. — Mww

Whereas B&H's position is that we experience the world (say, watching a sunset). The inclusion of "subjectively" and "representation" just is the homunculus looking at a theater screen. Remove those terms (and the conceptual scheme they represent) and no binding problem arises, since there's nothing to bind or synthesize. There's no binding of a sunset, it's already of one piece, so to speak.[*] — Andrew M

It’s the ‘oneness’ that is at issue. It is well established that there are different neural areas engaged in sensory experience; different parts or aspects of the brain deal with different streams of experience. That is not conjecture but fact, as I understand it. What can’t be accounted for is the neural system that unifies them. So you’re actually begging the question, you’re assuming the very point at issue.

We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak. — Andrew M

That is naive realism, is it not? Doesn’t that simply bypass the requirement for critical reflection on the nature of experience?

I'm curious whether you would agree with Mww's comment here: — Andrew M

As I think we’ve discussed already, if you say that an idea represents a thing, then there’s the question of how you compare the idea with the thing. On the other hand, words signify things - that is the whole point of speech isn’t it? ‘The sunset’ signifies a particular time of day, saying it I can quite easily mentally picture a sunset. I don’t think that is problematical. But there’s a lot of issues involved.

my thoughts and other attributes are things that belong, or else pertain, to me (rather than equating to me) — javra

I think that closer to the case, yes. I am the unity of all my representations. Something along those lines.

I was going more for knowledge by acquaintance — javra

Yes, another iteration of a Platonic dualism. His: knowledge of, knowledge that; Russell, knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description. Kant somewhere in between with knowledge a priori and knowledge a posteriori. It’s all good.

I am not only my thoughts — Mww

True. I may think about the apple on the table, and I may have feelings of hope, despair and sadness.

Replacing "I am my thoughts" by "I am my subjective experiences"
When I think, I have a subjective experience, and when I have a feeling, I also have a subjective experience. As a high temperature and a low temperature are not two different kinds of things but two instances of the same thing, ie temperature, perhaps thoughts and feelings are not two different kinds of things but both instances of the same thing, ie subjective experiences.

One problem with qualia is in its forcing a division between thoughts and feelings
Qualia have been described as individual instances of subjective conscious experience, the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, etc. Qualia, the feeling of an experience, is contrasted with a propositional attitude, the thought about an experience. Therefore, one characteristic of qualia is the separation of feeling from thought. If qualia exist, then the feelings of qualia stand in contrast to the thoughts of propositional attitudes, then feelings and thoughts are of different kinds. However, the existence of qualia is not universally accepted, in that it has been argued that the qualia is a superfluous concept, for example, @Banno, Daniel Dennett. Why say "I am experiencing the qualia of pain" rather than "I am experiencing pain". What does the word "qualia" add to my subjective experience.

Thoughts and feelings may be two aspects of the same thing - the subjective experience
Some argue that thought and feeling are two aspects of the same thing. For example, Galen Strawson wrote in 1994 in Mental Reality “Each sensory modality is an experiential modality, and thought experience (in which understanding-experience may be included) is an experiential modality to be reckoned alongside the other experiential modalities”

Summary
Perhaps I should improve my previous conclusion and replace "thought" by "subjective experience". Rather than say "I am my thoughts", I should perhaps say "I am my subjective experiences", where the word "am" means identity, in that "A is A"

As Descartes might have said "I am my subjective experiences, therefore I am"

and because experience is not in the world......
— Mww

That doesn't seem right to me. — Andrew M

Yet you’ve preface every one of those examples with “I”, the feeling of excitement, fond memory of the restaurant, more knowledge on the job. All of those belong to you alone, you said it yourself. So how can any of them be in the world if they are in you. If you’re right, I should go to that restaurant and experience your fondness for it. But it happened to be Thai and I hate Thai. So.....sorry, doesn’t work that way; when you get right down to critical examination there arise too many inconsistencies.

Are you using the term "experience" differently to all of those? — Andrew M

You betcha I am. Experience is an end in itself, a result, the finished product, in this case, of the employment of an individual, private, subjective human cognitive system, which is its means. That every single human that ever lives experiences things in the world is hardly sufficient reason to claim experiences are things in the world.

Still.....benefit of the doubt. When we both experience clouds, but I imagine a lion and you imagine a seagull in the same cloud formation......how do you explain those different experiences given from the exact same object? Rather than mandating a contradiction in the form of the same experience of the same cloud as both lion and seagull simultaneously, it is much more logical to say our simultaneously imagined experiences contradict each other, the cloud being merely its own single thing.
———-

On a non-representationalist view, no copy is being made. Instead we are perceiving the original object — Andrew M

The representationalist also perceives the object directly. All sensation is a direct affect of a particular object, or an assemblage of them. The impressions on sensibility are all direct perceptions. How could it be otherwise, and still make legitimate claims as to what the object is? How could a thing perceived as round legitimately be experienced as square? Or anything other than round? Can’t get it right in the end, by beginning with a wrong.

So we both perceive the original object directly. We both can say the impressions on our senses are given from a very real, very distinct, very “right there” object. If the representationalist makes copies of the object to pass on to the remainder of the system, what does the non-representationalist pass on to the same system? Even if he passes on mere information, doesn’t that still represent the perception? Otherwise he must pass on the red itself flower itself in itself a vase itself, which is quite absurd.

Put some instrument on a nerve bundle, say, for mere tactile reception. Wait for a mosquito bite. Do you really think a mosquito is going to show up on the instrument display? Nahhhh....you’ll see a graph, or a voltage reading, or some.....wait foooorr itttt.....representation of whatever object is affecting the skin. I suppose you could make the instrument such that it takes that information and makes a picture, but then, why bother when you’ve got a brain doing just that.
————-

This is a conceptual, not an empirical point. We're investigating what we perceive (i.e., can point at), and what we perceive is the object "as it is in itself", so to speak. — Andrew M

Yes, we’re investigating what we perceive. Yes, what we perceive is the object. That is the empirical point.

No, not as it is in itself. If it were as it is in itself, why are we involved? That is the conceptual point. “In-itself” means not in us. And by extension, not in any intelligence whatsoever. How else to explain the logically necessary objective reality of things before there were ever any intelligences to perceive them?

And herein lay the real problem. These days, there are so very many objects for which we are the empirical causality. For these we are wont to say we perceive them as they are in themselves, because we made them as they are in themselves. But this is an aberration, insofar as we still do not perceive the material constituency of the object, but only the final form the constituency is given.
————-

On a non-representationalist model, objects have natural characteristics that we can discover. — Andrew M

I get your point. Nevertheless, I would invite you to explain what you mean when you say “we discover”? What are we really doing when we discover? That objects display tendencies, or are imbued with qualities, is given, else we wouldn’t be able to perceive them, or know them as a particular thing, but that does nothing to address discovery, but only makes discovery possible because of those antecedent conditions. It follows that, with respect to that vase for instance, didn’t we already have to know, rather than discover, what form the vase must have, in order for it to be a water-holder?

The point being.....information or representation....you still gotta do something with it. Just calling it something doesn’t get us what we want.

Perhaps Descartes should have said: "I am my thoughts, therefore I am" — RussellA

Not bad. — Mww

———-

As Descartes might have said "I am my subjective experiences, therefore I am" — RussellA

Better.

You still have to prove that thoughts and feelings are equally experienced, in order to affirm that I am only my subjective experiences. The principle of identity cannot justify that which is comprised of two unequal things. Strawson gave the clue.

Descartes — Wayfarer

Descartes "cogito, ergo sum" uses thought to prove his existence.

I observe an apple, and think about it. I doubt the reality of the apple. I doubt the existence of the apple. Because I doubt the existence of the apple, there must be an "I" doing the doubting, proving the existence of an "I"

But also, I feel a pain. There is no doubt that I feel a pain. I don't doubt the reality of the pain. I don't doubt the existence of the pain. Because I feel a pain, there must be an "I" doing the feeling, proving the existence of an "I"

Descartes was obviously aware not only of thoughts but also of feelings, as he wrote "Nature also teaches me, by the sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I am not merely present in my body as a pilot in his ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit. If this were not so, I, who am nothing but a thinking thing, would not feel pain when the body was hurt, but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken."

I am curious why Descartes only used thought to prove existence, and not feeling, which would seem to be a more obvious route.

This doesn't make science wrong but it surely challenges materialism — Wayfarer

Materialism is the view that all facts about the human mind are causally dependent upon physical processes, and reducible to them.

Even if Aristotle's Direct Realism was true - the claim that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world - the causal path from object in the world to thought in the mind can still be explained within materialism.

Even if Aristotle's Theory of Universals was true - whereby universals are understood by the intellect as only existing where they are instantiated in objects or things - the intellectual processing of information into concepts, such as tables and governments, can still be explained within materialism.

I don't see how Aristotle's Direct Realism or Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism.

You still have to prove that thoughts and feelings are equally experienced, in order to affirm that I am only my subjective experiences. — Mww

I can have the subjective experience of thought, and can have the subjective experience of feeling. My subjective experiences can include both thoughts and feelings. To say "I am my subjective experiences" means that "I am my subjective experiences of thoughts and feelings".

There doesn't need to be identity between "my subjective thoughts" and "my subjective feelings". But there does need to an identity between "I" and "my subjective experiences"

As a hot temperature is not identical to a cold temperature but have something in common, ie, temperature, thought is not identical to feeling, but have something in common, ie, in that they are both subjective experiences.

The crucial aspect is that "I am my subjective experiences" rather than "I have subjective experiences". That is what I need to prove.

It is usually enough to say I am that which these two different things have in common.

Until it is asked what those two different things are, what makes these two things different. Then it is not enough to say they are those which are common in me, for no two things can be distinguished by something common to each.

Because I doubt the existence of the apple, there must be an "I" doing the doubting, proving the existence of an "I" — RussellA

That is a particular way of paraphrasing his argument. He never says 'there is an I', he says that in order to doubt, then a doubter must be. I think that is an apodictic certainty.

I don't see how Aristotle's Direct Realism or Aristotle's Theory of Universals challenge materialism. — RussellA

There's no analogy for universals in the physical world. A universal is an intelligible object, it exists only for a rational mind, but it is the same for any rational mind.

//actually D M Armstrong, a staunch materialist, did argue for the acceptance of universals, I must look into how he understood them.//

//answered my own question - the wiki entry has it thus 'In metaphysics, Armstrong defends the view that universals exist (although Platonic uninstantiated universals do not exist). Those universals match up with the fundamental particles that science tells us about. Armstrong describes his philosophy as a form of scientific realism.

....The ultimate ontology of universals would only be realised with the completion of physical science.'

Good luck with that :rofl:

Wu.

Even if Aristotle's Direct Realism was true - the claim that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world - the causal path from object in the world to thought in the mind can still be explained within materialism. — RussellA

The model was physical in so far as the beings being perceived acted upon sense organs capable of being acted upon. To that extent, it is similar to the 'letting the tree be a tree' model suggested by Andrew M. But why such a condition developed is yet to be explained by any of the models. Dualism is a way to separate elements. Its use sort of advertises its limitations.