three different kinds of belief noted above — creativesoul
It paves the way for anthropomorphism by virtue of claiming that language less creatures are capable of holding something to be true. They are not. — creativesoul
If I do have an agenda, here it is — javra
I uphold an evolutionary cline in the abilities of life. — javra
At the end of the day, though, I agree. And it's not high up on my list of priorities regarding beliefs/opinions that need to be maintained and justified. So it's known. — javra
Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno
"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with. — Banno
This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken. — Harry Hindu
I see more of a love of wisdom in modern psychology than in modern (especially analytical) philosophy. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Interesting as all of this belief talk is, it doesn't seem very important. More important to my mind (in the Facebook age) is the psychology of belief. — ZzzoneiroCosm
Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in? — creativesoul
↪creativesoul
Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about. — Janus
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul
Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language. — Janus
Might be unclear — javra
...but yet exhibit it in (for example) trust that caregivers will caregive as needed, this from the moment we first emerge into the worl — javra
A psychology of belief would look at why we hold the beliefs we hold, what are the psychological motivations, why do folks hold beliefs for which there is scant to no supporting evidence, why do we become so entrenched in our beliefs, why do we defend our beliefs so passionately, why do people who hold beliefs contrary to our own seem sometimes like total fucking morons and/or cocks. Especially fascinating is the psychology of mass belief: why large groups of people come to believe ridiculous things and in ridiculous people. From Gilgamesh to Trump. — ZzzoneiroCosm
I'm having trouble ferreting out the three kinds of belief. A numbered list would be clearer. — ZzzoneiroCosm
This:
It paves the way for anthropomorphism by virtue of claiming that language less creatures are capable of holding something to be true. They are not.
— creativesoul
--is a difficult position for me to accept since it appears to me that animals are capable of holding this and that to be true. But that's my taking issue with your position and not with your presentation. — ZzzoneiroCosm
The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality. — Janus
Is your disagreement with Banno only that you take him to be claiming that all beliefs are in propositional form, as opposed to claiming that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form? Because I imagine you would agree that all beliefs can be rendered in propositional form. If this is so, then I can't see what you two could be disagreeing about. — Janus
I later made the comment below, which I would be interested to hear your response to:
How can a language less creature, say a prehistoric mammal, have an attitude towards a proposition when propositions themselves are language constructs? The failure of what you argue is shown in it's inherent inability to make much sense of such language less belief. — creativesoul
Say a prehistoric animal is thirsty and remembers where it last drank. Then it starts moving in the direction of the water. Is it not expecting the water to be where it was last time? I would say expectation is a kind of propositional form, insofar as it is intentional (in the phenomenological sense of being of or about something) even in the absence of symbolic language. — Janus
The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.
The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.
I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here. — ZzzoneiroCosm
I wonder how the sound becomes meaningful to the cat on your view? — creativesoul
The cat believes the sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen.
The meaning of the sound of the electric can opener is what the cast holds to be true. He believes it means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. In that sense, you might say the sound of the electric can opener is a statement of meaning to the cat. But that's kind of an abuse of language.
I don't think we need to insert the notion of a statement here. — ZzzoneiroCosm
b.)an animal capable of holding something as such. — creativesoul
Do you hold to the conventional notion of proposition as what's common between two statements saying the same thing in two different languages(expressing the same proposition)? — creativesoul
The put into the form of part is obviously essential and possibly not what Banno wants to underscore: in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put a belief into the form of a propositional attitude. There's some agenda behind such a strange phraseology.
*I don't mean writing it down, just to be clear. In his human mind already rife with propositions he apprehends or imagines the cat's behavior in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm
I don't know why you're directing this at me when if you read Banno's quote, he said that ""P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition." You're saying that "P" is proposition and P is the state-of-affairs "P" is about, refers, or points to. If P is not the case, then "P" is false. That is what I said:The T-sentence is simply the minimal formulation of the correspondence notion of truth. "P" is the statement or proposition, 'iff' means 'if and only if', and P is the state of affairs or actuality. So "P" is true if and only if P. "It is raining" is true if and only if it is raining. It's very simple and totally commonsense; just our ordinary "correspondence" understanding of truth; where what we say is true if it corresponds to the described actuality. — Janus
Banno then replied with what I quoted in my post that you quoted. So no, Banno did not explain truth in the way you just did, which is how I've been explaining it as well. So Banno is not being honest.Right, so "P" is the proposition, and P is what the proposition points to. If what "P" points to is not the case, then "P" is false. If P is the case, then "P" is true. — Harry Hindu
Again, I need "propositional attitude" defined. — Harry Hindu
The objective here is to define beliefs — Harry Hindu
b.)an animal capable of holding something as such.
— creativesoul
I think here is the point of disagreement.
So the question seems to be: What is the psychology of "holding a belief"? Should the notion of holding a belief be included in an account of a cat's psychology?
Which makes me wonder if you think a dog can hold a belief. Or an ape. Is it a question of psychology? It seems it must be, if a human can hold a belief. It must be a difference of psyche. — ZzzoneiroCosm
The thing the cat is "holding to be true" is this: The sound of the electric can opener means there might be something tasty in the kitchen. How does a cat go about "holding it to be true"? Does he think about the can opener away from mealtime and in his mind practice the association of can opener to tasty treat to firm up or stabilize the association? Does he sometimes hear a noise similar to the can opener and perk up and "question" the noise to see if it was indeed the can opener? Can that be called holding a belief?
All of this is unknown and takes us far away from philosophy into the realm of animal psychology. — ZzzoneiroCosm
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