Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)

RogueAI

How does the relation "X is west of Y" exist in a universe with no minds? What's the ontological status of that relation?

Cuthbert

↪Olivier5

:flower:

Cuthbert

How does the relation "X is west of Y" exist in a universe with no minds? What's the ontological status of that relation — RogueAI

It's like this:

(1) Some X was west of some Y at time t
(2) At time t there were no minds

(1) is not logically inconsistent with (2). You can have both without self-contradiction.

I'm not sure exactly what you mean about 'ontological status' - unless you mean whether (1) and (2) are consistent. I think they are. As far as I can see, they are.

RussellA

I agree with @Olivier5 that the question is "do relations exist objectively "out there", and not just as ideas in our minds"

Using particle to also mean elementary particle.

Particles ontologically exist in the world
Materialists historically held that everything was matter, but we now know that not everything is matter in this historical sense, for example, forces such as gravity are physical but not material in the traditional sense. As the world exists, at least particles exist.

If relations ontologically existed in the world
If relations ontologically existed in the universe, then between any two particles in the universe there is a relationship that ontologically exists. For example, it follows that between a particular particle in the table in front of me and a particular particle somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy there is a real ontological relationship.

One could ask if the relationship between two particles is limited by the speed of light or is instantaneous across the universe.

Do relations ontologically exist in the world
Consider two particles A and B. Each particle A and B has an ontological existence.
The question is, does the relation AB between the particles A and B have its own ontological existence in addition to the ontological existence of each particle ?
The problem for an observer is in recognizing the ontological existence of the relation, in that a world with ontological relations between ontological particles would be indistinguishable from a world only consisting of ontological particles. What purpose do ontological relations serve ?

As the human observer uses their mind to add relationships between observed particles, the existence of relations ontologically existing in the world serves no purpose, and if they serve no purpose, by Occam's Razor, it should be assumed that they don't exist.

So the challenge is to prove that relations do exist "ontologically"................A chemist would answer yes to this question — Olivier5

I agree that the concept of the world implies interconnectivity between the elements of the world, but concepts exist in the mind, not the world. Elementary particles located in time and space are sufficient for a world to exist. A world with ontological relations between these particles would be indistinguishable from a world without ontological relations between these particles, meaning that ontological relations serve no purpose. And if they serve no purpose, why have them.

I agree there may be forces between particles, there may be forces between oxygen and hydrogen atoms, but forces are not the same thing as relations ontologically existing in the world.

relations do have ontological existence... Ryle and anyone who has written about category mistakes for the last 70 years — Cuthbert

Ryle's examples are based on examples whereby relations exist in the mind, not the world.
Ryle gave examples of category mistakes in The Concept of Mind 1949.
A visitor to Oxford upon viewing the colleges and library reportedly inquired "But where is the University".
There is the category 1 of "units of physical infrastructure", and category 2 of "institution"
The visitor made the mistake of presuming that the "University" was part of category 1 rather than category 2.

Category 1 includes those parts that physically exist in the world independent of the visitor - colleges, library, etc. Category 2 includes unseen relations between those physical parts - role in society, laws and regulations, etc

Ryle's examples make use of the fact that relations don't exist in the world but do exist in the mind, supporting the idea that relations don't have an ontological existence in the world.

Olivier5

If relations ontologically existed in the universe, then between any two particles in the universe there is a relationship that ontologically exists. — RussellA

See below.

Elementary particles located in time and space are sufficient for a world to exist. A world with ontological relations between these particles would be indistinguishable from a world without ontological relations between these particles, meaning that ontological relations serve no purpose. And if they serve no purpose, why have them. — RussellA

Do note that these particles exist in the same universe. Therefore they are already in a relation with one another, a spatial relation: they share the same space. Now you could say that this is a purely conceptual relation, not an ontic one. But if that is the case, then space does not exist ontologically.

For the world to exist, relations need to exist.

Wayfarer

If you treat a relation as a kind of object or thing then you will get dizzyingly confused - because it isn't. — Cuthbert

That's not what Russell is doing. He's saying that it is a relation. That's why he says it 'subsists', not 'exists'.

What kind of thing is a relation? Is it a physical object like a building? No. Then is it a mental construct like a perfect circle? No. But it must be one or the other. Why? It may be in a category of its own, separate from physical objects and also separate from mental constructs. The category in question may be 'relation' and it works in a way different from either. — Cuthbert

Correct! That is precisely the point of those passages I quoted from Russell:

Universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.

They're real, but they can only be discerned by a rational mind.

Ryle's examples make use of the fact that relations don't exist in the world but do exist in the mind, supporting the idea that relations don't have an ontological existence in the world. — RussellA

The problem with that is that all of us must have exactly the same idea in mind when we do arithmetics, and furthermore that the outcome of calculations utilising mathematics have exactly predictable consequences in the world. If you're an engineer building a bridge and you get your weight-bearing calculations wrong, then the bridge will collapse. And that's not something that happens 'in the mind'. So applied mathematics stymies that distinction between mind and world, because it straddles both. This is the subject of Eugene Wigner's famous paper, The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.

For the world to exist, relations need to exist. — Olivier5

So, I'm very interested in what sense they exist. I'm exploring the radical idea that universals are the elements of rational thought. They are only discernable to a rational mind, but they're not the property of any individual mind, being the same for all who think. What do you think? Stacks up?

Olivier5

I'm very interested in what sense they exist. I'm exploring the radical idea that universals are the elements of rational thought. They are only discernable to a rational mind, but they're not the property of any individual mind, being the same for all who think. — Wayfarer

I see a difference between relations and universals, though.

Wayfarer

↪Olivier5

Well maybe, but Russell gives the relationship of ‘being north of’ as an example of a universal.

RussellA

Do note that these particles exist in the same universe. Therefore they are already in a relation with one another, a spatial relation: they share the same space. Now you could say that this is a purely conceptual relation, not an ontic one. But if that is the case, then space does not exist ontologically. — Olivier5

I don't understand why there couldn't be a space that exists independently of any human observer within which there are particles that are, as you said, "entirely alone" (ignoring for the sake of the argument any forces between the particles).

Using an analogy, if there is a cat in a box, it does not follow that because the cat is entirely alone there is neither a cat nor a box.

Olivier5

Using an analogy, if there is a cat in a box, it does not follow that because the cat is entirely alone there is neither a cat nor a box. — RussellA

Okay, but if there's two cats in your box, they can keep each other company, play or fight one another. Right?

Now, if I were to put two cats in the same box and yet forbid them to have any relation with one another, would you find me logical? Wouldn't you wonder why I didn't put them in two different boxes, if I didn't want them to interact?

Likewise, two particles in the same universe can interact with one another, bounce against one another, attract or repulse one another, etc. etc.

If they cannot do so, in what sense are they in the same universe?

Olivier5

Russell gives the relationship of ‘being north of’ as an example of a universal. — Wayfarer

I'm afraid I've never given much thought to the issue of universals. The issue of relations is important to my systemic metaphysics, to the idea that a whole is more than the sum of its parts, etc. But I see no urgency in determining whether Pi is really really real or just a universal concept.

RussellA

two particles in the same universe can interact with one another — Olivier5

I agree that "two particles in the same universe can interact with one another". But as you said "So the challenge is to prove that relations do exist "ontologically". That is to say (I guess) that they exist objectively "out there", and not just as ideas in our minds."

Steve French argues against non-eliminativism, where non-eliminativism is the position that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, possibly because there are ontologically real relations between the elementary particles making up the whole.

I go back to Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations (SEP - Relations), which concluded that we should eliminate external relations from our ontology.

Either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, in which case it cannot relate them.
Or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them.
But for R to be related to a and b there must be not only R and the things it relates, but also a subsidiary relation R' to relate R to them
Now the same problem arises with regard to R'. It must be something to R and the things it related in order for R' to relate R to them and this requires a further subsidiary relation R'' between R', R, a and b.

This leads into an infinite regress, because the same reasoning applies to R' and to however many other subsidiary relations are subsequently introduced.

IE, particles will still interact even if relations are only spatial and not ontological.

Olivier5

↪RussellA

I personally use no fixed and universal ontology. I believe that such fixed and universal ontologies do not actually exist, and that if they existed they would be useless or even misleading. We use the concepts we need, period. And our needs are manifold. You can use one ontology one day and another one the next day. The sky ain't gona fall.

non-eliminativism is the position that the whole is more than the sum of its parts — RussellA

Why then, I'm a non-eliminativist by your definition. I strongly believe in structures.

Come to think of it, I hardly eliminate any philosophical concept, so the label fits. Too bad it's a double negative.

I don't see the advantage of eliminating space, or time, or relations, or matter, or qualia, or minds. The idea sounds self-mutilating to me, almost obscene... I'm much more interested in those things than in their elimination.

I go back to Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations (SEP - Relations), — RussellA

Before doing so, are you satisfied that Bradley himself existed ontologically? And if yes, what makes you so sure?

RussellA

Before doing so, are you satisfied that Bradley himself existed ontologically? And if yes, what makes you so sure? — Olivier5

Because Amazon sells his books.

Olivier5

Because Amazon sells his books. — RussellA

They sell tables too.

Harry Hindu

We have to show that relations exist. We already know (from above) that, if relations exist, then they have the special ontological kind of existence required - because everything that exists has that special kind of existence. But we don't yet know whether relations exist. — Cuthbert

We don't know that objects exist either. After all, we describe objects as the relationship of smaller objects, and those smaller objects as relations of even smaller objects. Every time we think we grasp an object we find that we're really grasping relations.

The Lego example is pretty contentious because you can recover an individual Lego from a block as opposed to say an atom which cannot, in principle, recovered from a molecule. — Ignoredreddituser

Can you "recover" an observer from the reality that it is part of?

What is necessary to answer these questions is a useful description of "observer" and it's relation with the rest of reality that it is part of. What is an observation or an awareness if not a relationship between observer and observed?

If observers are a part of the whole of reality then realism is the case, if not then solipsism is the case (observers are their reality, or observation is reality).

If solipsism is the case, then what is the point of this discussion? If realism is the case then observers stand in relation to the other objects/relations in reality. Observations would be the relationship between observer and objects. Observations would then would be about the observer and the observed, not just the observed.

Now consider how any brain processes sensory information compared to the other processes of the world. The brain takes time to process information, and the time it takes to process that info is relative to the process of change everywhere else. So how the brain perceives the world can be relative to how fast or slow everything else changes. Stable, slow changing processes would appear as fixed, unchanging objects, while faster processes would appear as processes, or relations of the objects themselves.

Think of how we perceive the three states of matter. Solid objects are composed of slow-moving, stable molecular interactions. Liquids are composed of faster and less stable molecular interactions, and gases even more so. Could it be that the quantified three states of matter are really more to do with how we perceive other processes relative to the frequency of how our brains process the information? This isn't to say that the interaction between molecules doesn't change, only that our compartmentalized view of these changes is a projection, kind of like digitizing an analog signal.

This would mean that the objects that we perceive are the result of our own subjective frequency of processing information relative to these frequency of change in the other processes that we are perceiving. This would mean that brains as objects don't really exist. Everything is process. This could explain why what we perceive appears differently to how we perceive (objects vs process).

How does the relation "X is west of Y" exist in a universe with no minds? What's the ontological status of that relation? — RogueAI

It exists as a spatial relation. Because brains are part of the reality they observe they exist in spatial and temporal relations to everything else like X and Y. Observations take time and exist in space relative to everything else. The amount of time and it's location in space is relative to everything else, so the way everything else appears would be skewed based on these relative aspects, as I described above. Observations is a stretching of those spatial-temporal relationships into the lengths of time and space that we observe.

RussellA

Amazon.........They sell tables too. — Olivier5

:smile: Very true, tables must exist if Amazon sells them. Forget the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
perhaps Amazon is where we will discover the answers to our deepest philosophical questions.

Olivier5

↪RussellA

Hey, you mentioned them first.

If relations do not exist, how could books exist?

Books are in first analysis physical objects like tables. If tables do not exist, how come physical books do?

Now if by "book" you mean the text, irrespective of its material support -- a text that you could download or find in various prints but it would still be the same text -- then I would point out that any text is made of sentences, themselves made of words, themselves made of letters. And yet, a text is more than an alphabet soup. A text is structured by spatial and other relations between its elements, and only the interaction between these elements conveys meaning.

Therefore if relations do not exist, texts do not exist either.

If texts and books do not exist, what is philosophy? Who is Bradley?

Thanks for that SEP article BTW. There's a quote in it, saying that one could accept relations in one's ontology "if the price is right". The point I am making is that the cost of NOT admitting relations as real far outstretches the cost of admitting them as real.

RussellA

Therefore if relations do not exist, texts do not exist either. — Olivier5

When I, as an observer, look at the page, I agree that the symbol "i" physically exists on the page and the symbol "f" physically exists on the page to the right of the symbol "i", in that they are spatially located.

Along the lines of Bradley, there is no information within the symbol "i" that there is a symbol "f" to the right of it. Similarly, there is no information within the symbol "f" that there is a symbol "i" to the left of it, and there is no information in the space between the "i" and the "f" that there is a "i" at one end and a "f" at the other end.

It follows that the meaning of the shape "if" does not exist in the world.

The shape "if" only has meaning in the mind of an observer, as only an observer can turn the relationship between the "i" and the "f" into a meaning.

IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not the world.

Olivier5

Along the lines of Bradley, there is no information within the symbol "i" that there is a symbol "f" to the right of it. Similarly, there is no information within the symbol "f" that there is a symbol "i" to the left of it, and there is no information in the space between the "i" and the "f" that there is a "i" at one end and a "f" at the other end.

It follows that the meaning of the shape "if" does not exist in the world. — RussellA

And yet it can be mechanically reproduced and even read by a computer and translated by it into the French 'si'.

Information technology is all about writing "IF" and "THEN" out there in the world, as any coder will tell you. And it makes the computer or device on which you write function.

That the letter f is positioned to the right of the letter i in "if" on the line (unless one is reading upside down of course) is an objective sine qua non to the word's functioning as "if". Otherwise it would be pronounced FI and it would mean nothing in English that I know of.

Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations (SEP - Relations), which concluded that we should eliminate external relations from our ontology.

Either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, in which case it cannot relate them.
Or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them.
But for R to be related to a and b there must be not only R and the things it relates, but also a subsidiary relation R' to relate R to them
Now the same problem arises with regard to R'. It must be something to R and the things it related in order for R' to relate R to them and this requires a further subsidiary relation R'' between R', R, a and b.

This leads into an infinite regress, because the same reasoning applies to R' and to however many other subsidiary relations are subsequently introduced. — RussellA

So we already know that this reasoning must be faulty, since there would be no possibility of any reasoning if it was true. It's a thesis that denies its own possibility. But where is the logical error?

My guess is that it's hiding in the phrase: "Either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, ...
Or, it is something to them..."

Now what does it mean "to be something to them"? Is there any clear meaning to this phrase in this context?

Like, if an apple is under an apple tree, is it something to the apple and the tree, that the apple is under the tree? What does that even mean? "To be something to someone" makes sense as in "to be among his preoccupations". But it doesn't makes sense when applied to a mindless thing.

The tree or the apple are obviously not expected to know something about their respective position, or to do something about it. So what is it to them? Nothing of course.

Still, their respective position remains an objective fact. And an important one too, especially if one is looking for apples. Like a monkey for instance, or a bird who likes apples. Do birds have minds? Yes, probably small ones. Do they eat fruits? Some of them do. That'd be why the position of various fruits respective to various tree species "is something to them." Birds care. Apples don't.

So there's some very suspect language game at the start of Bradley's argument. It looks to me that either he is projecting intentionality on mindless things, or he is just using sloppy language.

NOS4A2

↪Ignoredreddituser

The idea that objects are merely collections or aggregates arranged from other objects (particles, atoms, etc) hasn't born itself out, in my opinion. Arrangement assumes a creative force that at sometime or somewhere formed an object from other disparate and unconnected objects (like particles). But tables are built from pieces of other objects (trees, for example), and do not form, particle-by-particle, like Voltron.

We need to know what this creative force is in order to know that a table was arranged in such a manner.

Harry Hindu

IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not the world. — RussellA

Is not the mind part of the world?

Olivier5

IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not the world.
— RussellA

Is not the mind part of the world? — Harry Hindu

That'd be the last nail in the coffin of eliminativism, a most bizarre fancy... :-) Well done!

RussellA

Is not the mind part of the world? — Harry Hindu

Yes, I should have written: "relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world". I agree that the mind is part of the world, having evolved in synergy with the world, possibly over a period of 800 million years.

Steve French is misusing the term eliminativism (it seems to me).
Steve French relates eliminativism to objects in the world, such as tables. However, in philosophy, eliminativism is a theory about the nature of the mind, not about the nature of the external world.

IE, within his article he should have used the term reductionism when referring to tables.

Where do relations exist, if they do exist.
For me, there is a mysterious difference between the mind and "external world", in that, although I believe that relations don't have an ontological existence in the external world, I do believe that relations have an ontological existence in the mind.

As regards the mind of the observer, I know that I am conscious. I know that I have a unity of consciousness, in that what I perceive is a single experience. John Raymond Smythies described the binding problem as "How is the representation of information built up in the neural networks that there is one single object 'out there' and not a mere collection of separate shapes, colours and movements? I can only conclude, from my personal experience, that relations do have an ontological existence in my mind, such that when I perceive an apple, I perceive the whole apple and not just a set of disparate parts.

IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world.

Reductionism and eliminativism
Slightly back-tracking, I am reductionist as regards the "external world" and non-eliminativist as regards the mind. I feel that I can justify my belief in being a reductionist as regards the external world, but the binding problem is my only justification for my belief in non-eliminativism as regards the mind. My understanding of the unity of consciousness is as much as a goldfish's understanding of the allegories in The Old Man and The Sea.

IE, I would still argue that being a reductionist as regards the external world is a justified true belief.

How can the mind be part of the world
The question is how to equate being reductionist about the external world and non-eliminativist about the mind. My answer is panprotopsychism, in that a proto-consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the world. This allows the mind to be part of the world, as well as allowing monism whilst avoiding the problems of dualism. Using an analogy (not an explanation), as the property of movement cannot be observed in a single permanent magnet, but only in a system of permanent magnets alongside each other, the property of consciousness cannot be observed in the physicalism of the external world, but only in a system of neurons having a particular arrangement within the brain.

IE, still keeping within physicalism and monism, the mind as a system has properties, such as consciousness, not observable in its individual parts, analogous to the property of movement in a system of permanent magnets not being observable in an individual permanent magnet, one of several examples of the weak emergence of new properties.

RussellA

Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations..................So we already know that this reasoning must be faulty, since there would be no possibility of any reasoning if it was true — Olivier5

If Bradley is correct, and relations exist in the mind and not the external world, an observer of the apple and the tree will be aware of many relationships, such as - the apple is below the tree - the apple is smaller than the tree - the apple is more red than the tree - etc.
Given knowledge of these relationships, the observer will be able to exercise their powers of reasoning, for example - the apple is likely to have fallen from the tree - the apple has probably grown from the tree - the chemical composition of the apple as far as one can tell is different to that of the tree - etc.

Now what does it mean "to be something to them"? — Olivier5

It means that relation R relates a to b

The tree or the apple are obviously not expected to know something about their respective position — Olivier5

Of course, as trees and apples have no minds. But what is the case is that there is no information within the tree that relates it to the apple, and vice versa.

Still, their respective position remains an objective fact. — Olivier5

"Respective" is defined as "belonging or relating separately to each of two or more people or things". You are starting off with the premise that relationships in the external world are objective facts. Bradley is giving a justification as to why relationships in the external world are not objective facts.

It looks to me that either he is projecting intentionality on mindless thing — Olivier5

Bradley refers to things, not minds

Olivier5

If Bradley is correct, and relations exist in the mind and not the external world, an observer of the apple and the tree will be aware of many relationships, — RussellA

If relations exist in the mind and not the external world, is the mind a miracle?

RussellA

If relations exist in the mind and not the external world, is the mind a miracle? — Olivier5

A miracle may be defined as "an extraordinary and welcome event that is not explicable by natural or scientific laws and is therefore attributed to a divine agency"

For me, not a miracle, as I am sure that the mind is explicable by natural or scientific laws.

However, even if there was someone to explain it to me, my understanding would probably be no more than that of a penguin trying to understand the foreign exchange market.

Olivier5

For me, not a miracle, as I am sure that the mind is explicable by natural or scientific laws — RussellA

Well then, Bradley must be wrong. Because it would be a miracle if the human mind had relations and nothing else did.

Harry Hindu

That'd be the last nail in the coffin of eliminativism, a most bizarre fancy... :-) Well done! — Olivier5

Yes, I should have written: "relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world". I agree that the mind is part of the world, having evolved in synergy with the world, possibly over a period of 800 million years. — RussellA

I figured that is what you would respond with but other minds are just as external to mine as tables and and trees are. I don't like using terms like "external" and "internal" because it seems to divide the world into two (dualism) unnecessarily. We all know that the world has an effect on the mind and the mind affects the world.

Steve French is misusing the term eliminativism (it seems to me).
Steve French relates eliminativism to objects in the world, such as tables. However, in philosophy, eliminativism is a theory about the nature of the mind, not about the nature of the external world. — RussellA

Not neccessarily.
"In principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an eliminativist with regard to that type of thing. Thus, there have been a number of eliminativists about different aspects of human nature in the history of philosophy. For example, hard determinists like Holbach (1770) are eliminativists with regard to free will because they claim there is no dimension of human psychology that corresponds to our commonsense notion of freedom. Similarly, by denying that there is an ego or persisting subject of experience, Hume (1739) was arguably an eliminativist about the self. Reductive materialists can be viewed as eliminativists with respect to an immaterial soul."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/#BriHis

Where do relations exist, if they do exist.
For me, there is a mysterious difference between the mind and "external world", in that, although I believe that relations don't have an ontological existence in the external world, I do believe that relations have an ontological existence in the mind. — RussellA

Then it seems that if the relations in our mind don't represent the world as it is then our understanding of the world is radically wrong.

If current conditions are not related to past conditions or to future conditions then causation (a type of relation) is false so all of our reasons for believing things would be wrong. There would be no justification for anything and the basis for ethics and politics would be false. There would be no ontological existence to perception as a relation between perceiver and perceived. In denying that relations have an ontological existence then you are implying that solipsism is the case.

Mind is a relationship that apprehends other relationships. In rejecting dualistic notions of reality, I believe that minds and everything else are the same type of thing, which I identify as relationships, processes, or information. I'm a kind of process philosopher.

How is the "internal" contents of ypur mind different than the internal contents of say, your stomach?

As regards the mind of the observer, I know that I am conscious. I know that I have a unity of consciousness, in that what I perceive is a single experience. John Raymond Smythies described the binding problem as "How is the representation of information built up in the neural networks that there is one single object 'out there' and not a mere collection of separate shapes, colours and movements? I can only conclude, from my personal experience, that relations do have an ontological existence in my mind, such that when I perceive an apple, I perceive the whole apple and not just a set of disparate parts.

IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world. — RussellA

Visually, you only perceive one side of the apple. In visual perception, the world appears located relative to the eyes, but we know the world is not located relative to the eyes. The 'single object' of experience, as you put it, is an information model of the world relative to the body that incorporates data from all senses at once. This produces a kind of fault-tolerance where the data from one sense is used to confirm the data reported by another sense. Your friend that you are next to and talking to, visually, audibly, and tactilely appear in the same location. You can perceive the whole apple tactilely, but not visually. The shape of the apple tactilely (you can feel all sides of the apple even though you can't see all sides of the apple) coincides with the shape of the apple visually in rotating the apple around to view all the sides.

Reductionism and eliminativism
Slightly back-tracking, I am reductionist as regards the "external world" and non-eliminativist as regards the mind. I feel that I can justify my belief in being a reductionist as regards the external world, but the binding problem is my only justification for my belief in non-eliminativism as regards the mind. My understanding of the unity of consciousness is as much as a goldfish's understanding of the allegories in The Old Man and The Sea.

IE, I would still argue that being a reductionist as regards the external world is a justified true belief. — RussellA

This is a problem because other minds are external to yours.

How can the mind be part of the world
The question is how to equate being reductionist about the external world and non-eliminativist about the mind. My answer is panprotopsychism, in that a proto-consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the world. This allows the mind to be part of the world, as well as allowing monism whilst avoiding the problems of dualism. Using an analogy (not an explanation), as the property of movement cannot be observed in a single permanent magnet, but only in a system of permanent magnets alongside each other, the property of consciousness cannot be observed in the physicalism of the external world, but only in a system of neurons having a particular arrangement within the brain.

IE, still keeping within physicalism and monism, the mind as a system has properties, such as consciousness, not observable in its individual parts, analogous to the property of movement in a system of permanent magnets not being observable in an individual permanent magnet, one of several examples of the weak emergence of new properties. — RussellA

Thinking of consciousness as a type of working memory where the dynamic states of the world can be represented. Without working memory, the world would appear as static images, like photographs vs. videos.

I don't know what a proto-consciousness would be like. I prefer to use the terms, "information" or "relations" as identifying the fundamental nature of reality. In asserting that proto-consciousness is fundamental in the world, and that relations only exist in the mind, are you not admitting that relations exist in the external world?

SophistiCat

I’ve been teaching myself metaphysics, it’s been pretty challenging since I don’t really have anyway to get feedback. I was wondering if you guys have an ideas how to reply to an argument Steven French makes below. It seems like a combination of the grounding problem and overdetermination to me, but I’m not sure if I’m on the right track or how to reply to it. Everything below is an excerpt from his paper. — Ignoredreddituser

What is the paper? If you want to discuss it, please cite it for the benefit of everyone else, because it is difficult to comment on an out-of-context excerpt. And to make it clear that you citing someone, use the quote function. Select the text and click the talk bubble icon on top of the post box or put quote tags around it:

[quote] ... [/quote]

Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)

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