How does the relation "X is west of Y" exist in a universe with no minds? What's the ontological status of that relation — RogueAI
So the challenge is to prove that relations do exist "ontologically"................A chemist would answer yes to this question — Olivier5
relations do have ontological existence... Ryle and anyone who has written about category mistakes for the last 70 years — Cuthbert
If relations ontologically existed in the universe, then between any two particles in the universe there is a relationship that ontologically exists. — RussellA
Elementary particles located in time and space are sufficient for a world to exist. A world with ontological relations between these particles would be indistinguishable from a world without ontological relations between these particles, meaning that ontological relations serve no purpose. And if they serve no purpose, why have them. — RussellA
If you treat a relation as a kind of object or thing then you will get dizzyingly confused - because it isn't. — Cuthbert
What kind of thing is a relation? Is it a physical object like a building? No. Then is it a mental construct like a perfect circle? No. But it must be one or the other. Why? It may be in a category of its own, separate from physical objects and also separate from mental constructs. The category in question may be 'relation' and it works in a way different from either. — Cuthbert
Universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
Ryle's examples make use of the fact that relations don't exist in the world but do exist in the mind, supporting the idea that relations don't have an ontological existence in the world. — RussellA
For the world to exist, relations need to exist. — Olivier5
I'm very interested in what sense they exist. I'm exploring the radical idea that universals are the elements of rational thought. They are only discernable to a rational mind, but they're not the property of any individual mind, being the same for all who think. — Wayfarer
Do note that these particles exist in the same universe. Therefore they are already in a relation with one another, a spatial relation: they share the same space. Now you could say that this is a purely conceptual relation, not an ontic one. But if that is the case, then space does not exist ontologically. — Olivier5
Using an analogy, if there is a cat in a box, it does not follow that because the cat is entirely alone there is neither a cat nor a box. — RussellA
Russell gives the relationship of ‘being north of’ as an example of a universal. — Wayfarer
two particles in the same universe can interact with one another — Olivier5
non-eliminativism is the position that the whole is more than the sum of its parts — RussellA
I go back to Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations (SEP - Relations), — RussellA
We have to show that relations exist. We already know (from above) that, if relations exist, then they have the special ontological kind of existence required - because everything that exists has that special kind of existence. But we don't yet know whether relations exist. — Cuthbert
Can you "recover" an observer from the reality that it is part of?The Lego example is pretty contentious because you can recover an individual Lego from a block as opposed to say an atom which cannot, in principle, recovered from a molecule. — Ignoredreddituser
It exists as a spatial relation. Because brains are part of the reality they observe they exist in spatial and temporal relations to everything else like X and Y. Observations take time and exist in space relative to everything else. The amount of time and it's location in space is relative to everything else, so the way everything else appears would be skewed based on these relative aspects, as I described above. Observations is a stretching of those spatial-temporal relationships into the lengths of time and space that we observe.How does the relation "X is west of Y" exist in a universe with no minds? What's the ontological status of that relation? — RogueAI
Therefore if relations do not exist, texts do not exist either. — Olivier5
Along the lines of Bradley, there is no information within the symbol "i" that there is a symbol "f" to the right of it. Similarly, there is no information within the symbol "f" that there is a symbol "i" to the left of it, and there is no information in the space between the "i" and the "f" that there is a "i" at one end and a "f" at the other end.
It follows that the meaning of the shape "if" does not exist in the world. — RussellA
Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations (SEP - Relations), which concluded that we should eliminate external relations from our ontology.
Either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, in which case it cannot relate them.
Or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them.
But for R to be related to a and b there must be not only R and the things it relates, but also a subsidiary relation R' to relate R to them
Now the same problem arises with regard to R'. It must be something to R and the things it related in order for R' to relate R to them and this requires a further subsidiary relation R'' between R', R, a and b.
This leads into an infinite regress, because the same reasoning applies to R' and to however many other subsidiary relations are subsequently introduced. — RussellA
IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not the world. — RussellA
IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not the world.
— RussellA
Is not the mind part of the world? — Harry Hindu
Is not the mind part of the world? — Harry Hindu
Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations..................So we already know that this reasoning must be faulty, since there would be no possibility of any reasoning if it was true — Olivier5
Now what does it mean "to be something to them"? — Olivier5
The tree or the apple are obviously not expected to know something about their respective position — Olivier5
Still, their respective position remains an objective fact. — Olivier5
It looks to me that either he is projecting intentionality on mindless thing — Olivier5
If relations exist in the mind and not the external world, is the mind a miracle? — Olivier5
That'd be the last nail in the coffin of eliminativism, a most bizarre fancy... :-) Well done! — Olivier5
I figured that is what you would respond with but other minds are just as external to mine as tables and and trees are. I don't like using terms like "external" and "internal" because it seems to divide the world into two (dualism) unnecessarily. We all know that the world has an effect on the mind and the mind affects the world.Yes, I should have written: "relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world". I agree that the mind is part of the world, having evolved in synergy with the world, possibly over a period of 800 million years. — RussellA
Not neccessarily.Steve French is misusing the term eliminativism (it seems to me).
Steve French relates eliminativism to objects in the world, such as tables. However, in philosophy, eliminativism is a theory about the nature of the mind, not about the nature of the external world. — RussellA
Then it seems that if the relations in our mind don't represent the world as it is then our understanding of the world is radically wrong.Where do relations exist, if they do exist.
For me, there is a mysterious difference between the mind and "external world", in that, although I believe that relations don't have an ontological existence in the external world, I do believe that relations have an ontological existence in the mind. — RussellA
Visually, you only perceive one side of the apple. In visual perception, the world appears located relative to the eyes, but we know the world is not located relative to the eyes. The 'single object' of experience, as you put it, is an information model of the world relative to the body that incorporates data from all senses at once. This produces a kind of fault-tolerance where the data from one sense is used to confirm the data reported by another sense. Your friend that you are next to and talking to, visually, audibly, and tactilely appear in the same location. You can perceive the whole apple tactilely, but not visually. The shape of the apple tactilely (you can feel all sides of the apple even though you can't see all sides of the apple) coincides with the shape of the apple visually in rotating the apple around to view all the sides.As regards the mind of the observer, I know that I am conscious. I know that I have a unity of consciousness, in that what I perceive is a single experience. John Raymond Smythies described the binding problem as "How is the representation of information built up in the neural networks that there is one single object 'out there' and not a mere collection of separate shapes, colours and movements? I can only conclude, from my personal experience, that relations do have an ontological existence in my mind, such that when I perceive an apple, I perceive the whole apple and not just a set of disparate parts.
IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world. — RussellA
This is a problem because other minds are external to yours.Reductionism and eliminativism
Slightly back-tracking, I am reductionist as regards the "external world" and non-eliminativist as regards the mind. I feel that I can justify my belief in being a reductionist as regards the external world, but the binding problem is my only justification for my belief in non-eliminativism as regards the mind. My understanding of the unity of consciousness is as much as a goldfish's understanding of the allegories in The Old Man and The Sea.
IE, I would still argue that being a reductionist as regards the external world is a justified true belief. — RussellA
Thinking of consciousness as a type of working memory where the dynamic states of the world can be represented. Without working memory, the world would appear as static images, like photographs vs. videos.How can the mind be part of the world
The question is how to equate being reductionist about the external world and non-eliminativist about the mind. My answer is panprotopsychism, in that a proto-consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the world. This allows the mind to be part of the world, as well as allowing monism whilst avoiding the problems of dualism. Using an analogy (not an explanation), as the property of movement cannot be observed in a single permanent magnet, but only in a system of permanent magnets alongside each other, the property of consciousness cannot be observed in the physicalism of the external world, but only in a system of neurons having a particular arrangement within the brain.
IE, still keeping within physicalism and monism, the mind as a system has properties, such as consciousness, not observable in its individual parts, analogous to the property of movement in a system of permanent magnets not being observable in an individual permanent magnet, one of several examples of the weak emergence of new properties. — RussellA
I’ve been teaching myself metaphysics, it’s been pretty challenging since I don’t really have anyway to get feedback. I was wondering if you guys have an ideas how to reply to an argument Steven French makes below. It seems like a combination of the grounding problem and overdetermination to me, but I’m not sure if I’m on the right track or how to reply to it. Everything below is an excerpt from his paper. — Ignoredreddituser
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