As I understand it, hinge propositions are not immutable:

But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the
moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the
moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.

(OC 108)

Within "our system" at that time, it was not doubted that no one has ever been on the moon. Today we doubt that proposition. We regard it as false.

Within "our system" at that time, it was not doubted that no one has ever been on the moon. Today we doubt that proposition. We regard it as false. — Fooloso4

But that is a claim within a system. It is the claim
that can be true or false, not the system. Within a changed system, the claim becomes false. It is like Kuhnian paradigm shifts. Paradigms are not themselves true or false, only the particular facts they make intelligible.

Just as you don't change the rules of chess when playing a chess game, in the similar manner, when you ask if we can know anything, you try to doubt everything but the "game" you are playing presupposes certainty. You have made a wrong move. This is just one application of hinge propositions in solving psuedo philosophical problems — Eskander

Yes, it's why subjectivism and relativism are self-destructing concepts. Such a group of assertions have to be made from the perspective of reality, using a real language, made by real people, to communicate in the real world, about real concepts, formulated from real data, that the real brain gathered, from the real world. Here's a hinge position: Reality is begging the question, but requires the question to be begged for humans to notice that its invalidity doesn't care about human logic. Act accordingly.

Moving on from the 2 examples, do you agree with Wittgenstein on this concept ? — Eskander

So, look. Fundamentally, Wittgenstein is observing something that is the result of emotionally valenced coherence of integrated concepts, built around positions imparted to the human in a young age by his/her parents/community. These kinds of structures we build in our minds are not really open for argumentation, established by it, or displaced by it, irrespective of how salient the assertion, or logically valid, that doesn't mean anything to these kinds of positions. The positions have been used to navigate the world around them and have been endlessly reinforced throught the neural reward circuitry for years. You ain't yeetin that; people will build entirely new rules for reality for themselves, to accomodate and continue building coherence around their views, before they do such a thing. The only remedy is the active elevation of logic, reason, facts, evidence, data, falsifiability, and skepticism as values through executive action. Which, sure as I'm typing to you, ain't gonna happen.

But that is a claim within a system. It is the claim
that can be true or false, not the system. — Joshs

Do you take the claim to be a hinge proposition?

If we consider the shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric universe it seems to me that the geocentric system was false.

hinge's, in the language-game of being a hinge (think of Moore's propositions), isn't a proposition in the normal sense. However, there are language-games, deductive and inductive logic, where the hinge, can be used as a normal proposition. — Sam26

So you want your propositional cake and to eat it...

Perhaps this is an anti-realist bent on Wittgenstein. Reject antirealism and the bits fall into place easily.

There is a difference between being true and being known or believed true. Hinge propositions can then be true yet unjustified.

If we consider the shift from a geocentric to a heliocentric universe it seems to me that the geocentric system was false. — Fooloso4

Not according to Kuhn, whose model of paradigm shifts was purportedly strongly influenced by Wittgenstein.

Are you claiming that we can understand a hinge proposition better by looking at Kuhn's paradigms? It seems to me that compounds the problem of interpreting one thinker by introducing the problem of interpreting another.

Are you claiming that we can understand a hinge proposition better by looking at Kuhn's paradigms? It seems to me that compounds the problem of interpreting one thinker by introducing the problem of interpreting another. — Fooloso4

Well, one would have to be familiar enough with the work of both thinkers in order to confidently make, or follow,
such comparisons. But I do think that the concept of scientific change as aesthetic rather than one of falsifiability that Kuhn offers is useful for understanding Wittgenstein’s idea of hinge propositions.

There is a difference between being true and being known or believed true. Hinge propositions can then be true yet unjustified. — Banno

:up:

@Sam26 I can see nothing in On Certainty to support the contention that Wittgenstein thought there were propositions that did not have a truth value.

The nearest is the text around §197-208, in which the truth of some propositions is found in our acting in certain ways.

What you have demonstrated is that your idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. When he says:

The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
(OC 166)

it does not follow that hinge propositions are mistaken, but that:

This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
(OC 152) — Fooloso4

That's the problem, the axis itself (the proposed hinge proposition) is not fixed, so it revolves around something else, another "hinge", and so on. If we say that any belief, statement, or attitude, which has others hinged on it, is a hinge proposition, then everything becomes a hinge. And if we say that only things that are somehow fixed because they are beyond doubt, are hinge propositions, then nothing is a hinge.

So in reality the idea is just nonsense, there's simply varying degrees of fixedity, doubt, significance, etc., in relation to all beliefs, statements, and so on, and it makes no sense to think that some have a special significance as a "hinge proposition". We might say that some have more significance than others, for various reasons, but each and every one has its own special significance particular to itself, and this negates the generalized special significance of "hinge proposition".

93. The propositions presenting what Moore 'knows' are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth.—Once more I can speak of myself here instead of speaking of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told.—Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. — Witt, On Certainty

My take, which will probably just be a terrible rehash of Moyal-Sharrock:

I think it needs to be kept in mind that Wittgenstein is talking about empirical propositions, which are traditionally considered to be contingently true (or false). Hinge propositions, however, have the special status of being empirical statements that are quasi-necessarily true. W likens them to mathematical statements (e.g. see §340). Hinge propositions are beyond doubt, beyond truth (see §94 above), beyond justification, and non-epistemic.

I say "quasi-necessarily true", because they are treated as necessarily true and beyond true (beyond doubt) only when they form part of the background assumptions that we do not usually consider consciously and that we use (consciously or not) "as a rule of testing" (§98). When these same empirical propositions are instead consciously considered and used as "something to test by experience" (§98), then they revert to being normal, contingent, empirical statements that lie within the scope of epistemology, knowledge, doubt, truth and justification.

87. Can't an assertoric sentence, which was capable of functioning as an hypothesis, also be used as a foundation for research and action? I.e. can't it simply be isolated from doubt, though not according to any explicit rule? It simply gets assumed as a truism, never called in question, perhaps not even ever formulated.

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.

98. But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet; this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.

100. The truths which Moore says he knows, are such as, roughly speaking, all of us know, if he knows them. — Witt, On Certainty

I think it needs to be kept in mind that Wittgenstein is talking about empirical propositions, which are traditionally considered to be contingently true (or false). Hinge propositions, however, have the special status of being empirical statements that are quasi-necessarily true. W likens them to mathematical statements (e.g. see §340). Hinge propositions are beyond doubt, beyond truth (see §94 above), beyond justification, and non-epistemic.

I say "quasi-necessarily true", because they are treated as necessarily true and beyond true (beyond doubt) only when they form part of the background assumptions that we do not usually consider consciously and that we use (consciously or not) as a rule of testing (§98). When these same empirical propositions are instead consciously considered and used as "something to test by experience" (§98), then they revert to being normal, contingent, empirical statements that lie within the scope of epistemology, knowledge, doubt, truth and justification. — Luke

We actually agree on something here Luke. But how we both interpret this is bound to differ. I see what you describe here as clear evidence that there is no reality to what is called "hinge propositions".

From what you say, it is evident that the same thing can be described both as a hinge proposition, and not a hinge proposition, depending on how you look at it. This indicates that "hinge proposition" is a feature of how we look at things, the observer's attitude. It is not a feature of the thing being looked at, and called a "hinge proposition", it is a feature of the attitude which looks at the thing. Therefore there is no objective reality, or truth, to any statement of "X is a hinge proposition". Such a judgement is always, necessarily, a subjective judgement because what makes something a hinge proposition or not, is the attitude of the subject who makes that judgement.

Therefore there is no objective reality, or truth, to any statement of "X is a hinge proposition". Such a judgement is always, necessarily, a subjective judgement because what makes something a hinge proposition or not, is the attitude of the subject who makes that judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is there an objective reality or truth to what falls within the purview of a hinge proposition? Is there an objective reality or truth to the facts that are defined with a Kuhnian paradigm, a feature of the thing being looked at?

Hinge propositions are... beyond truth (see §94 above), — Luke

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false. — Witt, On Certainty

§94 is about one's picture of the world, not propositions. That picture is the background against which propositions can be seen to be true or false. That picture shows hinge propositions to be true. Or better, as becomes clear in other sections, our actions mkae the truth of the proposition.

"Here is a hand" is like "the bishop stays on it's own colour". It is inherent to the game we are playing; denying it voids the game. "Here is a hand" and "the bishop stays on it's own colour" are both true.

Truth is not like justification, belief, or knowledge. The latter are relations: Jim justified P; Jim believed P; Jim knew that P. Truth is not relational: P is true. Or P is false.

Antirealism denies this, resulting in the problematic notion of propositions without truth values.

So deny antirealism and solve the problem.

I am confused here. I thought some of what Wittgenstein was resisting was the utility Moore put in placing some propositions outside of what could be doubted. Moore's intent seems to be denying 'antirealism.' Section 94 seems to be saying: not so fast, if the measuring stick I have been given can only be used under certain conditions, its use tells me jack about those conditions in the way Moore says they do.

Is there an objective reality or truth to what falls within the purview of a hinge proposition? Is there an objective reality or truth to the facts that are defined with a Kuhnian paradigm, a feature of the thing being looked at? — Joshs

I'd answer both those questions with no. And I agree with your relating Kuhn to Wittgenstein, I think Kuhn most likely built on Wittgenstein's idea. And what Kuhn demonstrates is that this notion, that a hinge proposition is somehow excluded from doubt, is a false idea. Doubt of the so-called hinge proposition is a requirement for the paradigm shift.

But if the so-called hinge proposition is not excluded from doubt by its nature, it must be excluded from doubt for some other reason, such as its usefulness. Then it would only hold the status of "hinge proposition" to those who find it useful. Those who doubt it would just consider it to be a proposition which may or not be true, like any other proposition. So the supposed "hinge proposition" really has no special place, unlike the self-evident truth which is supposed to have a special place. The so-called hinge proposition is just an ordinary proposition which has proven itself to be extraordinarily useful. Most likely it has been found to serve a multitude of purposes.

Ok, I'm not sure what is confusing. SO I read both Moore and Wittgenstein as realist - that is, as differentiating between something being true and something being known, believed or justified as being true.

I am aware that there are antirealist readings of Wittgenstein, with which i disagree.

There is I think a reading of Wittgenstein such that all propositions have truth value, including hinge propositions. On Certainty is incomplete, of course, and so no finished argument to that end is present. But roughly speaking, the activities of a form of life are such that there are things that are taken to be true in order for those activities to occur. These form the "hinge" of action for the form of life. "Here is a hand" sets up the form of life in which there are hands, tables, trees and so on.

I am unsure how the element of 'truth value' fits into this work. I have no idea what an "antirealist" reading of Wittgenstein might look like.

But the work shows Wittgenstein questioning Moore's confidence in the use of certain propositions. That is not presented as an argument against him or what should be accepted as a set of facts. From that point of view, Moore wants to have done with a set of issues that Wittgenstein is not ready to close the door upon.

But the work shows Wittgenstein questioning Moore's confidence in the use of certain propositions. That is not presented as an argument against him or what should be accepted as a set of facts. From that point of view, Moore wants to have done with a set of issues that Wittgenstein is not ready to close the door upon. — Paine

Yes.

§94 is about one's picture of the world, not propositions. — Banno

The picture can be expressed in propositional form:

95. The propositions describing this world-picture ...

In the not too distant past that picture expressed as a proposition would have included a statement along the lines that we cannot not step into a machine and fly from one place to another. That picture of the world, where such a thing is not possible is no longer true.

The picture can be expressed in propositional form: — Fooloso4

Yes.

In the not too distant past that picture expressed as a proposition would have included a statement along the lines that we cannot not step into a machine and fly from one place to another. That picture of the world, where such a thing is not possible is no longer true. — Fooloso4

Yes.

§94 is about one's picture of the world, not propositions. That picture is the background against which propositions can be seen to be true or false. That picture shows hinge propositions to be true. Or better, as becomes clear in other sections, our actions mkae the truth of the proposition. — Banno

As Moyal-Sharrock writes, from the article that @Sam26 posted here:

Yet the clear message of On Certainty is precisely that knowledge does not have to be at the basis of knowledge. For Wittgenstein, underpinning knowledge are not default justified propositions that must be susceptible of justification on demand but nonpropositional certainties – certainties 'in action' or ways of acting – that can be verbally rendered for heuristic purposes and whose conceptual analysis uncovers their function as unjustifiable rules of grammar. So that basic certainties stand to nonbasic beliefs, not as propositional beliefs stand to other propositional beliefs, but as rules of grammar stand to propositional beliefs. Hence the absence of propositionality as regards them.

This also demonstrates that not all empirical statements can be hinge propositions. Hinge propositions are only those that function as "unjustifiable rules of grammar". A statement like "my truck weighs 2800 pounds" is something that is verifiable but not something that everyone acts like they know with certainty. Maybe a statement like "most people cannot lift a truck over their head" would be closer to a hinge proposition, as it goes without saying.

not all empirical statements can be hinge propositions. — Luke

Yes.

Hinge propositions are only those that function as "unjustifiable rules of grammar". — Luke

Roughly. Might post more on that later.

Maybe a statement like "most people cannot lift a truck over their head" would be closer to a hinge proposition, as it goes without saying. — Luke

Yes.

The picture can be expressed in propositional form: — Fooloso4

The problem with expressing the picture in the propositional form, is the gap between the particular and the universal. A picture is always a particular, and the propositional form always employs universals. So for instance, "this is a hand" employs the universal "hand" to describe the particular image, which is the picture.

So the issue is, how does that gap between the particular (picture), and the universal (proposition) get bridged. What validates the use of this universal "hand", to refer to this particular image? This is the difficult problem in philosophy of mind, and epistemology, we cannot simply assume 'we call it a hand therefore it is a hand', because "hand" must involve criteria to make it epistemically useful.

If the senses receive particular images, and the mind employs universals in understanding the particular images, and there is a gap, a categorical difference between a particular and a universal, then how do we know whether the mind is mistaken in its application of universals? And, because the philosophical mind is naturally led into this skepticism concerning the application of universals, requesting criteria, the use of the universal ("hand") must be justified. This is what we know as 'proving a theory' (that it is correct to call the thing in the image, a hand, must be demonstrated).

As for "hinge propositions", the idea that there are propositions which may be excluded from that request for criteria and justification, is itself unjustifiable. And, as we see from Joshs' example of Kuhn's paradigm shifts, the so called hinge propositions actually do get subjected to the skeptic's doubt, sometimes with substantial effect.

As for "hinge propositions", the idea that there are propositions which may be excluded from that request for criteria and justification, is itself unjustifiable. And, as we see from Joshs' example of Kuhn's paradigm shifts, the so called hinge propositions actually do get subjected to the skeptic's doubt, sometimes with substantial effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's actually a good paper on it here: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330091267_Hinges_Disagreements_and_Arguments_Rationally_Believing_Hinge_Propositions_and_Arguing_across_Deep_Disagreements

It's really not the beat-all that Wittgenstein thought it was, nor is it particular useful to look at hinge propositions as propositions that somehow negate the rationality of the mind. Hinge propositions are specifically the propositions that have enough coherence within the mind's perception of a given subject to warrant a conclusion predicated on the minimal information necessary to do so. It is the mind's way of building conceptual understandings of points of reality to be used in thought and to inform behavior. But, the idea that they cannot be challenged or put under rational scrutiny is bizarre. Every single proposition, not matter how coherent, is sibject to valid argumentation and scrutiny. The paper I sent you is excellent on this subject.

Nota bene: Also, remember that Wittgenstein was a mystic and was not really in touch with reality. Logic and language is exactly the place anti-materialists like to hide to try to justify their views in non-reality.

Also, remember that Wittgenstein was a mystic and was not really in touch with reality. Logic and language is exactly the place anti-materialists like to hide to try to justify their views in non-reality — Garrett Travers

You’ll have to do better than that. Plenty of researchers within psychology and related sciences have adopted a Wittgensteinian approach, including the idea of hinge propositions, or, as I have argued, the related concept of paradigms. I appreciate that you’re wedded to a 300 year old framework of rationality, but others have moved beyond it. Of course, you could continue your philosophy career at the Claremont Institute. They’ll
love your ideas there.

You’ll have to do better than that. Plenty of researchers within psychology and related sciences have adopted a Wittgensteinian approach, including the idea of hinge propositions, or, as I have argued, the related concept of paradigms. I appreciate that you’re wedded to a 300 year old framework of rationality, but others have moved beyond it. Of course, you could continue your philosophy career at the Claremont Institute. They’ll
love your ideas there. — Joshs

An argument ad populum is a fallacy. The Wittgensteinian approach being adopted by researchers in psychology is irrelevant, especially when you provide nothing to review from the field. You'll have to do better than that. I see also that the paper I sent, which thoroughly disassembles this odd idea of hinge propositions being "unapproachable," has not been addressed. Care to have a look? It's certainly not something you'll be finding in cognitive neuroscience, not in the manner Wittgenstein asserts anyway. And those moving on from rationality can go live in make-believe land as they wish, have at it.

I see that you are wedded to a 2000 year old tradition of mysticism, within which Wittgenstein and Kant share intellectual lineage with eachother, and which is imbedded in the not so philosophical domains of Western philosophical history, and I appreciate it. But, I'm going to need you to actually address assertions that I make if you're going to respond to me, and I request that you not insult me again for having standards that are superior to Wittgenstein's make-believe ones. Oddly, the only thing he has done with hinge propositions, a proposition itself hinged on the belief in the realm of god, is verify that the human has evolved a brain that produces concepts and value structures (paradigms) through sensory data abstractions from reality to help better perceive that reality within which he/she is suspended. Hinge propositions are an argument for rationality, although unintentionally so. I recommend Daniel Dennett on the subject of consciousness, relevant to this discussion as a start. Real paradigm shifter, that one.

The Wittgensteinian approach being adopted by researchers in psychology is irrelevant, especially when you provide nothing to review from the field. — Garrett Travers

You should probably familiarize yourself with those arguments, since they are becoming more and more
prevalent.

Hinge propositions are an argument for rationality, although unintentionally so. I recommend Daniel Dennett on the subject of consciousness, relevant to this discussion as a start. Real paradigm shifter, that one. — Garrett Travers

Dennett is a good example of someone who has been strongly influenced by Wittgenstein. I dont think his view of rationality is what you think it is. Certainly it isnt compatible with your direct realism.

I request that you not insult me again for having standards that are superior to Wittgenstein's make-believe ones. — Garrett Travers

I’m not trying to insult you , just get you to realize that dismissing out of hand the ideas of a thinker like Wittgenstein as ‘mystical’ and ‘out of touch with reality’ shows not just a complete lack of familiarity with his work but a poor grasp of where cognitive psychology and cognitivr neuroscience is heading.

I see also that the paper I sent, which thoroughly disassembles this odd idea of hinge propositions being "unapproachable," has not been addressed. Care to have a look? — Garrett Travers

I took a look at Siegel’s argument. I love how he tries to critique Popper by holding onto the ideas that a critical rationalism can be self-reflexive. Anyone familiar
with the era from Descartes through Leibnitz won’t have any trouble with Siegel’s assertions. But his approach to the rational simply doesnt grasp how it is that the rational is embedded with a frame of interpretation that gets turned on its head when paradigms shift. You can’t turn that gestalt shift into a rational formula. There is no meta-position from which to do so.

Think of an empirical theory as being like one of those optical illusions where you can either see the young woman or the old woman but not both at the same time. A gestalt shift is required to make one or the other appear. Now think of the individual facts comprising the body of an empirical theory as akin to the points within the picture. Notice that as one shifts from the old woman to the young woman, the role that all of the features of the picture play change their meaning. What was a line in one image becomes something else in the other image.

In the same way, when a paradigm undergoes a gestalt shift , all of the subordinate facts it contains change their meaning in the new paradigm. The choice of which paradigm to pick becomes one of aesthetic and pragmatic preference rather than ‘rationality’ since each paradigm is describing different facts. That doesn’t mean a kind of progress isn’t possible , just that this progress is a linear accumulation of knowledge.