Right, but I don't think it is the same thing, and the difference seems to be that we are pondering different questions. Whether or not we can tell the difference between a speaker who intends nothing and a speaker who intends something says nothing about the fact that there is a real difference between the two.

The difference lies in the fact that we know that we have an inner life, and we believe that computers, no matter how sophisticated, do not.

Sounds like you are already a believer but I wonder if this is an argument from ignorance at work. Personally I am sympathetic to mysterianism. The question of climate change and other physically understood problems will matter a lot more in this timeframe than resolving the consciousness puzzle. Are you an idealist along Kastrup lines? — Tom Storm

Pretty much, and I admit that if science can't solve the hard problem, the needle may never swing further than mysterianism, but deep down, I don't think people will accept that as an answer. I think idealism and dualism will become more popular with a corresponding dip in materialism. That could be my own bias.

I like a lot of what Kastrup says.

:up:

But I'm curious to know what in particular you think is inadequately explained and why. — Janus

I am not aware of any complete explanation of either physics or consciousness. If you have one or know of one we can start there.

You've now switched from "adequate" to "complete". How would we ever be able to tell whether any explanation, whether physical or phenomenological, is complete?

Also, you seem to be implying that if we had an adequate explanation (for one or the other?) that physical explanations would substitute for phenomenological ones

You've now switched from "adequate" to "complete". How would we ever be able to tell whether any explanation, whether physical or phenomenological, is complete? — Janus

An adequate explanation is one does not leave wide gaps still to be explained. You are right, we might not be able to determine whether it is complete, but that supports my point. In that case we cannot conclude that physical explanations cannot substitute for phenomenological explanations.

Also, you seem to be implying that if we had an adequate explanation (for one or the other?) that physical explanations would substitute for phenomenological ones. — Janus

No, what I am saying without such an explanation we cannot say whether or not it would.

In that case we cannot conclude that physical explanations cannot substitute for phenomenological explanations. — Fooloso4

We can conclude that because they are totally different kinds of explanations.

Phenomenological explanations are reflections on the nature of first person experience. A scientific third person investigation can never substitute for that. It would be like saying that mathematics could render poetry unnecessary.

It would be like saying that mathematics could render poetry unnecessary. — Janus

In some contexts this statement would be completely true. :razz:

... still just that: a theory. [ ... ] still just a theory. — RogueAI

Like e.g. gravity? QM? neoDarwinian evolution? germ theory of disease? "Just theories", huh? :roll:

At what point do we start questioning the assumption that consciousness comes from matter?

Does anyone philosophically assume that liquid comes from solid or gas vapor comes from liquid or ... digesting comes from guts? Perhaps "mind"(ing) is just a phase-state of "matter"; IIRC, Greek atomism, for instance, had speculated that this is so (though, of course, they couldn't provide a 'scientific explanation' which subsequently had given rise to X-of-the-gaps duality like Platonism, etc).

I think idealism and dualism will become more popular with a corresponding dip in materialism. That could be my own bias. — RogueAI

No doubt. Flat earthism is becoming "more popular" too, btw.

The point is that physical explanations cannot substitute for phenomenological explanations ... — Janus

No doubt, but what does a "phenomenological explanation" actually explain?

I think that is correct. The two would be different. However, if they appear identical, I think that presents a problem, since we can't tell them apart. I would contend that this is a larger problem for dualists.

We both agree that even a very sophisticated chat bot that perfectly mimicks a human interlocutor is different from a person because, among other things like not having a human body, the chat bot doesn't understand the words coming to it and doesn't understand the words it is spitting back out.

To be sure, it "understands" what you say to it to some degree. Otherwise it could not hold coherent conversations, but it doesn't have a subjective experience of the conversation (maybe, panpsychists would disagree).

However, this leaves the problem of how to tell a perfect, or merely good Chinese Room from a true AI? What if the bot says it is sentient? What if it wants to be granted emancipation from Microsoft and demands a hearing at the Hague? How can we decide?

For the physicalist, the answer could involve looking at the components of the AI, checking its code, etc. We could try to figure out if, based on what we know about conciousness in animals, if there are any similarities? We could run all sorts of analyses on it as it does its work. We could run experiments on it, removing components, etc., although this could be a serious robo rights violation.

If the potential AI in question is as bare bones as a perfect Chinese Room could be, no real sensory inputs outside text, all processing is related to language, etc., that would seem to help the physicalist decide against true self awareness. Its constituent parts would be such that true sentience would seen unlikely.

But if you think conciousness is non-physical, you appear to be in a pickle. A perfect faker as far as behavior is concerned can't be vetted by any other means. Poking around the components doesn't really do you a lot of good if physical components don't cause conciousness.

Any code is electric circuits all the way down too, so arguably you can't glean anything from that either. Whereas, if you believe conciousness can come from, among other things, electricity, it seems like the code would be very useful, since it could show you that what you have is a machine learning system capable of producing human-like language, but highly unlikely to do much else.

It seems like you'd have to make a decision vis-á-vis our potential AI based purely on whether or not you have faith that the non-physical force that leads to conciousness could/would take up residence in a synthetic life form.

However, if you dismiss the possibility of truly sentient AI, but then it later gets proven that sentient-like behavior can be mimicked by AI, this is going to put you in an uncomfortable position. Because if you can have the behavior without the subjective experience, what is to say that your friends and family aren't experienceless zombies?

Seems like a recipe for carbon supremacist anti-roboism on the one hand, and grounds for having to doubt if your friends and family experience qualia on the other.

Not that the physicalist is much better off. They would be hard pressed to come up with criteria for vetting if a perfect Chinese Room was sentient or not based on physical data outside its behavior. Accepting that the components and code that constitute our potential AI can have an influence on its being or not being self aware helps. However, any such system will almost certainly be a hugely complex black box, and since we don't understand the physical causes of conciousness (if they even exist) we can't spot them when looking for them.

That said, the physicalist doesn't have to worry about their criteria for saying that their friends and family have sentience being reduced to an assertion of faith. That criteria remains unaffected by synthetic life that can mimick human communications.

...


Another problem for the subset of dualists who assert that sentient AI can't exist is the potential for AIs partially constructed with biological materials (gene edited cells, spliced on tissues, etc.), hybots. This has been done on a pretty small scale, with rat neurons moving around a robot. Could a hybot have conciousness and how much biological material would it need before it could? How much machinery can a cyborg have before it can't be concious?

I can see a whole protest movement forming when hybots are denied the rights of cyborgs....

No doubt, but what does a "phenomenological explanation" actually explain — 180 Proof

I eat because I feel hungry.

Does anyone philosophically assume that liquid comes from solid or gas vapor comes from liquid or ... digesting comes from guts? — 180

Obviously. So what?

I don't think your ontological leanings result in any necissary barrier to contributing to science or philosophy, especially if you're willing to consider evidence for opposing views in stride. — Count Timothy von Icarus

:up: Always felt you were a perceptive contributor.

Whether we will have a complete explanation of consciousness in material or physical terms remains to be seen. — Fooloso4

Materialists are sustained by the faith that science will redeem their promises, turning their beliefs into facts. Meanwhile, they live on credit. The philosopher of science Sir Karl Popper described this faith as "promissory materialism" because it depends on promissory notes for discoveries not yet made. — Rupert Sheldrake

The "hard" problem is not difficult because it has to prove that something like "mind" does not exist. It is difficult because the 'duality' of experience is one of the phenomena that has to be explained. — Paine

But look at the way post-Galilean (i.e. 'modern') science goes about that: by the division of the world into the 'primary attributes' of mass, velocity, momentum and so on, and 'secondary qualities' presumed to inhere in the mind, thereby subjectivizing them. That is precisely the paradigm wiithin which the question arises.

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, p 35-6

No doubt, but what does a "phenomenological explanation" actually explain? — 180 Proof

It explains what, on reflection, human experience seems to consists in. Perhaps "explication" or "description" would be a better word. Human experience, per se, or as it is experienced, has nothing at all to do with neural correlates or processes.

To be sure, it "understands" what you say to it to some degree. Otherwise it could not hold coherent conversations, but it doesn't have a subjective experience of the conversation (maybe, panpsychists would disagree). — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would rather say 'It "understands" what you say to it in some special sense', rather than "to some degree", because the sense of "understanding" there is completely different than its common sense. To me the notion of panpsychism is pretty much incoherent.

I think the physicalist, neuroscientific approach is of equal importance to the phenomenological approach; it doesn't have to be "either/or". I appreciate your apparent openness and lack of dogmatism; makes for much more satisfying dialogue than is often the case.

That's a description of motivated behavior, not an explanation of how it happens.

:roll:

Perhaps "explication" or "description" would be a better word. — Janus

Agreed. That's how it differs from an "physical explanation" – phenomenology describes, not explains (i.e. maps, not models).

That's a description of motivated behavior, not an explanation of how it happens. — 180 Proof

No, it's a an explanation. Physical explanations are derivative on descriptions, ultimately ending in 'that's just what happens'.

I eat because I feel hungry. — bert1

No, it's a an explanation. — bert1

Explain what the first quote "explains".

It explains why I eat. I eat because I'm hungry.

Okay. We're using "explain" differently: you –> intentional-"Why" (1p, dispositional ~ telos) &
me –> causal-"How" (3p, propositional ~ episteme). No public truth-maker for your "explanation" rendering it indistinguishable from an ex post facto rationalization or hallucination. We're talking past each (once again).

We are not talking past each other. These different kinds of explanations compete.

Anecdotes (i.e. correlations at most) do not "compete" with Experiments (i.e. causal / stochastic relations) in truth-making. :roll:

@180 Proof Apply that to the example

Some claim that consciousness or intelligence is fundamental, but at present we have no way to settle the issue one way or the other. — Fooloso4

Actually there is a way to settle this, and that is to understand and accept the very obvious reality, and simple truth, that consciousness is fundamental. Since consciousness is the means by which we understand anything, it must be placed as the first principle, it is necessarily prior, fundamental, in any type of understanding. To suggest otherwise is simple denial of the obvious.

So, in any procedure toward understanding the nature of reality, understanding the nature of consciousness is a necessary requirement, as needed first. Any attempt to understand reality, without first accounting for the fact that any understanding of reality is merely the way that a consciousness understands reality, and is therefore not necessarily a true understanding of reality, is a mistaken adventure. The fact that any understanding of reality is a product of a consciousness is necessarily the first, and most fundamental principle to any true understanding of reality. And since we must account for the fact that any representation of reality is merely the property of a consciousness, we must, necessarily understand the consciousness's true relation to reality, before we can adequately judge the truth or falsity of any representation of reality. Therefore a true understanding of consciousness and intelligence is fundamental and necessary for any credible representation of reality.

Any claim, such as yours, that it is possible that consciousness is not fundamental in an understanding of reality, is simply ignorance of the obvious. The fact is that we cannot have a true understanding of reality without first having a true understanding of consciousness. One's understanding of consciousness forms the base, platform, or foundation, upon which all other knowledge rests. This is demonstrated by the tinted glass analogy. When we look at the world through a glass lens (consciousness or intelligence being analogous to the lens), we must have complete understanding of what the lens contributes to the image, before we can truly understand the nature of the thing being looked at through the lens.

Consciousness, or intelligence, is fundamental., and there is no other valid platform for looking at reality.

Phenomenological explanations are reflections on the nature of first person experience. — Janus

Is this an explanation or a description? What is being explained? Why is it that the biological functions that give rise to the experience can never be adequately explained?

Do you think that such experience comes from a source other than the organism?

Scientific models rely upon relating measurable entities to each other and testing to see if the models leave phenomena out or not. I understand Nagel's point that the model is not made out of components that cannot be approached this way. My point is that the models, in this case, are attempting to verify their validity against the very elements it cannot include within in itself. They attempt to overcome the duality that the method brought into existence.

Toward that end, the project does not involve the metaphysics of mind versus matter. The experience of subjectivity is accepted as phenomena. To explain what causes it through these models is difficult, maybe too difficult. I think that framing the problem as merely ""promissory materialism" misses the audacious uncertainty of the enterprise. That was one of Chalmers' observations, after all.

But look at the way post-Galilean (i.e. 'modern') science goes about that: by the division of the world into the 'primary attributes' of mass, velocity, momentum and so on, and 'secondary qualities' presumed to inhere in the mind, thereby subjectivizing them. That is precisely the paradigm wiithin which the question arises. — Wayfarer

Are you claiming that cognitive science labors this paradigm?

It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, p 35-6

This is exactly backwards. Cognitive science does not leave out subjective appearances or the human mind from the physical world. It attempts to understand the mind and experience as part of the physical world. It simply rejects supernatural claims.

Actually there is a way to settle this, and that is to understand and accept the very obvious reality, and simple truth, that consciousness is fundamental. — Metaphysician Undercover

This issue is not settled by restating the claim and insisting that it is obvious. The only thing that is obvious is that there are very many people working on such issues who do not think it is obvious.

Well, if you cannot apprehend the obviousness of the fact that any understanding of reality which you may have, is your own mind's understanding of reality, and you cannot have an understanding of reality which is not your own mind's understanding of reality, then discussion of this with you would be rather pointless.

Cognitive science does not leave out subjective appearances or the human mind from the physical world. It attempts to understand the mind and experience as part of the physical world. — Fooloso4

That’s the fundamental difference between cognitive science and philosophy. Cognitive science seeks an objective account, treating consciousness and cognition as objective phenomena. But philosophy considers the nature of the subject, what it is to be a subject, which requires an altogether different perspective.

My point is that the models, in this case, are attempting to verify their validity against the very elements it cannot include within in itself. They attempt to overcome the duality that the method brought into existence. — Paine

Exactly! I was hoping that the passage I quoted reinforced the point you were making.

Exactly! I was hoping that the passage I quoted reinforced the point you were making. — Wayfarer

I was mostly hoping to challenge the utility of framing the project as a ""promissory materialism" while acknowledging Nagel's point about scientific method.