There is curved space - a type of geometry, and there is spacetime curvature, a way to interpret general relativity.

Empty space doesn't bend, IMO. :chin: — jgill

It doesn't bend unless there is a mass to bend it. I see this, but of course, space bending at all is an issue for the aforementioned reasons. And obviously, I think the science is fine, I mean, I am not arguing about that.

It [empty space] doesn't bend unless there is a mass to bend it — Constance

No. What "bends" is spacetime, which does not have the Euclidean metric in R^4. The Euclidean metric is how we normally measure spacial dimensions. We need Kenosha Kid (PhD physics) to return and explain this stuff. :chin:

So to deal with Parmenides and Heraclitus, we need to

1. Posit two levels of reality (universal and particular). Heraclitean change occurs in particulars while the Paremindean universals (forms/ideas) don't undergo change or remain constant.

2. Decide which, the universals or the particulars, is to be deemed real. Once we do that it's either Parmenides or Heraclitus but definitely not both.

Am I understanding you correctly?

From your questions it doesn't seem to me you've (charitably) read what I actually wrote.

No. What "bends" is spacetime, which does not have the Euclidean metric in R^4. The Euclidean metric is how we normally measure spacial dimensions. — jgill

No. What bends is space. This is accompanied with the bending of time. Time even is an maginary, giving flat spacetime a pseudo Euclidean metric. The bending of time simply means that clocks run with different paces over bend space.

And obviously, I think the science is fine, I mean, I am not arguing about that. — Constance

Not sure what you are arguing. We can bend space like a stick. If you rotate a heavy object, space is bend in the direction of rotation. Frame dragging.

I think that goes to show that you and I think too differently about the world for this to be a fruitful discussion. — T Clark

Thinking differently about the world is the most fertile ground for a fruitful discussion.

If logic qua logic can produce nonsense like this, then as a system of understanding the world, it is more than suspect. It is "wrong". — Constance

Language is more metaphor than logic

I have always been mystified that adding one-half plus one-quarter plus one-eighth plus one-sixteenth etc adds up to one, in that adding together an infinite number of things results in a finite thing.

I can explain this paradox by understanding that relations are foundational to the logic we use, in that 5 plus 8 equals 13, etc, yet relations, as illustrated by FH Bradley, have no ontological existence in the world.

It is therefore hardly surprising then that paradoxes will arrive when comparing two things that are fundamentally different, ie, our logic and the world.

But I do not at present see any way around any of these — Constance

We must be remember that when paradoxes do arrive, that this will be an inevitable consequence of the nature of logic, rather than indicative of anything strange happening in the world.

The fact that logic will inevitably lead to paradox explains why metaphor is such an important part of language, so much so, that a case may be made that "language is metaphor".

No. What "bends" is spacetime, which does not have the Euclidean metric in R^4. The Euclidean metric is how we normally measure spacial dimensions. We need Kenosha Kid (PhD physics) to return and explain this stuff. :chin: — jgill

No, it's not the physics. It is the apriori impossibility of space bending. Space presupposes space, and you can't have something as its own presupposition unless it is an absolute of some kind. Space doesn't bend; things bend IN space.

No. What "bends" is spacetime, — jgill

Yes, and??

Not sure what you are arguing. We can bend space like a stick. If you rotate a heavy object, space is bend in the direction of rotation. Frame dragging. — EugeneW

Then you have an issue with intuition and I cannot help you there. Someone argued that causality was debatable because Bertrand Russell wrote a paper saying so. Russell was actually waying we can't make sense of causality, but he was not contradicting the basic intuition that a spontaneous cause is impossible. I wonder how this went with him. Does he understand that a spontaneous cause is apodictically impossible. I wonder this regarding your thoughts: do you not see that space cannot bend, not because Einstein was wrong, but because the c0oncept is nonsense.

Space probably IS just a metaphor in this context. Physicists are not talking about actual bending anymore than they are talking about actual strings in string theory. Bending is simply a term borrowed to describe the effect witnessed observing gravitational pull. It LOOKS like bending when looking at a geometrical presentation of gravity's strength vis a vis mass and distance. We have all seen the images of the warping of space around amass like a planet.

But it does further illustrate the point that when we face the world, we impose a familiar image or idea to assimilate it. We invent problems like God and evil, arrows and the like defying logic, and the rest. Space bending
.At any rate, shouldn't you be walking a dog somewhere? I imagine it suits you.

.At any rate, shouldn't you be walking a dog somewhere? I imagine it suits you. — Constance

Sorry about that. My back is not well, nor my disposition as a result.

I have always been mystified that adding one-half plus one-quarter plus one-eighth plus one-sixteenth etc adds up to one, in that adding together an infinite number of things results in a finite thing.

I can explain this paradox by understanding that relations are foundational to the logic we use, in that 5 plus 8 equals 13, etc, yet relations, as illustrated by FH Bradley, have no ontological existence in the world.

It is therefore hardly surprising then that paradoxes will arrive when comparing two things that are fundamentally different, ie, our logic and the world. — RussellA

The surprise I have in mind is usually just ignored. Paradoxes like Zeno's should be telling us that geometry and reality are very different, and geometry is just an expression of intuitive logical thinking. The surprise is that structural contradictions indicates not just that logic is quirky in the world that is not logical, but that this illogical world is altogether not logic. And so our thoughts about it do not "represent" it.
What do they do? They solve problems in time. Dicing up the world into particulars, what reason does, among other things, does not hand us the world; it does give us a means to manage and deal with the world, but the world altogether is not logical; it is alogical, apart from logic, qualitatively different, and language is mostly self referential, as are logical proofs. So when a scientist tells you the planet Jupiter has a mass and a trajectory round the sun, and is a distance D at time T, and so on, what is s/he talking about? It is about relations WE have with that planet, not the thing out there.

Does language have an ontological dimension at all? Yes and no. If you ask an ontological question, and don't simply ignore it, then answers can get interesting. The point is that, if you will, we don't really live in "the world" when it comes to knowledge claims. We live in epistemology. The world before us apart from this is utterly metaphysical.

We must be remember that when paradoxes do arrive, that this will be an inevitable consequence of the nature of logic, rather than indicative of anything strange happening in the world.

The fact that logic will inevitably lead to paradox explains why metaphor is such an important part of language, so much so, that a case may be made that "language is metaphor". — RussellA

Strange happening in the world? Not the way to word it. The world is not strange, which is a borrowed term from familiar strange things, life's ironies. No, this is far more egregious. Intelligibility itself is completely Other than "the world" (as it is being considered here). You and I and everyone else are NOT the logical categories we are fit into when we talk and write.

Does he understand that a spontaneous cause is apodictically impossible. I wonder this regarding your thoughts: do you not see that space cannot bend, not because Einstein was wrong, but because the c0oncept is nonsense — Constance

Spontaneous cause is possible. Read about the Norton dome. I don't see why it is nonsense. You can bend space with a stick in it even! If the universe grows older, a stick in it will get torn apart by expanding space. I would agree if you said you can't cut space in pieces.

But it does further illustrate the point that when we face the world, we impose a familiar image or idea to assimilate it. We invent problems like God and evil, arrows and the like defying logic, and the rest. Space bending — Constance

The world shows itself as it is. We dont invent things to assimilate this. Gods, good and evil, bent space, they are real things. Bent space is made visible by the the masses in it.

The surprise I have in mind is usually just ignored. Paradoxes like Zeno's should be telling us that geometry and reality are very different, and geometry is just an expression of intuitive logical thinking. The surprise is that structural contradictions indicates not just that logic is quirky in the world that is not logical, but that this illogical world is altogether not logic. And so our thoughts about it do not "represent" it. — Constance

Our thought about reality resonate with reality. Reality projects itself into our brain constantly if we walk around in it. Via the senses. They constantly receive update about the actual state and our brain creates an image while we walk. Space is part of that image. It's the sauce between material objects in which they and we, our bodies, move. It can even be thought as made up of stuff, hidden variables and virtual particles.

Dicing up the world into particulars, what reason does, among other things, does not hand us the world; it does give us a means to manage and deal with the world, but the world altogether is not logical; it is alogical, apart from logic, qualitatively different, and language is mostly self referential, as are logical proofs. So when a scientist tells you the planet Jupiter has a mass and a trajectory round the sun, and is a distance D at time T, and so on, what is s/he talking about? It is about relations WE have with that planet, not the thing out there. — Constance

Is this what you had in mind?If so, I agree completely.


“Now, an intra-ontology of embodiment has momentous implications for how we conceive knowledge. In the framework of a standard ontology, we strive to acquire
knowledge about what is given out there, and this non-committal knowledge can be encoded intellectually. But in the framework of an intra-ontology, non-committal knowledge appears as a non-sense. According to a Merleau-Pontian phenomenologist, knowledge affects the two sides that arise from the self-splitting of what there is (namely of embodied experience). In other terms, knowledge of something arises concomitantly with a mutation of ourselves qua knowers. And this mutation of ourselves qua knowers manifests as a mutation of (our) experience that cannot be encoded intellectually, since the very processes and conclusions of the intellect depend on it.

Such intra-ontological pattern of knowledge is universal. It may look superfluous or contrived in the field of a classical science of nature, where the objectification of a
limited set of appearances is so complete that everything happens as if the objects of knowledge were completely separate from the act of knowing. But it becomes unavoidable in many other situations where this separation is in principle unattainable, such as the human sciences or quantum mechanics.

This is why Varela considered that a purely intellectual operation (“a change in our understanding” about some object) is not enough to solve the mind-body problem, and even less the “hard problem” of the origin of phenomenal consciousness, namely of lived experience. For these problems are archetypal cases in which the inseparability between subject and object of knowledge is impossible to ignore. What is needed to overcome them, according to the lesson of the intra-ontological view of knowledge, is nothing less than “a change in experience (being)” (Varela 1976: 67). Addressing properly the problem of lived experience is tantamount to undergo a change in experience.”(Michel Bitbol)

Spontaneous cause is possible. Read about the Norton dome. I don't see why it is nonsense. You can bend space with a stick in it even! If the universe grows older, a stick in it will get torn apart by expanding space. I would agree if you said you can't cut space in pieces. — EugeneW

An entirely abstract concept, along the lines of showing how the speed of light can be exceeded given that two beams of light whose paths converge when directed toward each other askew, and the point at which the they merge moves along the line of convergence at a rate faster than the velocities of each. This is not far afield from Russell, really, for when we conceive of a thing, we wind up in a explanatory system, leaving off the thing to be explained entirely. We make discursive castles in the air, which rather goes to the point that explanatory matrices of any kind never do explain "the world" conceived as an "actuality" (and double inverted commas are the inevitable consequence of this kind of talk). The world stands apart from this. Of course, what about eidetic ontology? Are ideas real? Yes and no.

The world shows itself as it is. We dont invent things to assimilate this. Gods, good and evil, bent space, they are real things. Bent space is made visible by the the masses in it. — EugeneW

That is an interesting statement. I wonder what it means. The world shows itself as it is? I actually agree with this, but surely you don't mean when we speak of the world, we have revealed the way the world "shows itself"?

An entirely abstract concept, along the lines of showing how the speed of light can be exceeded given that two beams of light whose paths converge when directed toward each other askew, and the point at which the they merge moves along the line of convergence at a rate faster than the velocities of each — Constance

Not sure why you bring this up. Isn't it clear that the point of light projected by a rotating laser on the inside of a huge sphere doesnt actually travel at all?

when we speak of the world, we have revealed the way the world "shows itself"? — Constance

We havent revealed the way it shows itself. But what is revealed gives you information. The particle physicist sees different aspects of reality (and even here different things are seen as where some see massless quarks and leptons as fundamental point particles interacting with s Higgs field to give them mass I see massless geometrical, nonpointlike interacting triplets of preons) as the nuclear physicist, who sees different things than the molecular biologist, etc.

I see massless geometrical, nonpointlike interacting triplets of preons — EugeneW

As well as reaching out and bending space to your will. Your grasp of nothing is exceptional :cool:

when we speak of the world, we have revealed the way the world "shows itself"?
— Constance

We havent revealed the way it shows itself. But what is revealed gives you information. — EugeneW

Does science passively give knowledge and information about a world outside of the knower , or is it an activity that makes changes in the world and then gauges it’s predictions in terms of the responses of the world to its interventions? Isnt there a fundamental circularity in science? For instance, a theory is usually tested by
means of instruments described and interpreted by means of this very theory. Another level of circularity is that an ‘anomaly' (threatening to falsify the theory) can only be expressed in terms of this theory.
In other words truth as consistency rather than truth as correspondence?

science — Joshs

Hypotheses are always about coherency. They are never proven true. One selects, according to some predefined criteria, the true best hypothesis.

Hypotheses are always about coherency. They are never proven true. One selects, according to some predefined criteria, the true best hypothesis. — Agent Smith

Is the following consistent with your understanding of coherence?

“…the real criteria of validation of scientific descrip­tions cannot be their correspondence with the process ‘in itself’, but another criterion that a recent current of the philosophy of scientific experimentation has termed ‘enlarged consistency’ or ‘performative consistency’.27 Performative consistency consists of an agreement
among (a) the theories, (b) the construction of devices and the under­standing of their functioning, (c) the theoretical guidance of measure­ments, and (d) the results (Pickering, 1995). More simply, performative consistency may be limited to an agreement between the perceptive interpretation of an image and the result of actions guided by perception. Let’s consider an example of this kind, discussed by Hacking (1983): the interpretation of images coming from a fluores­cent microscope (or X rays). Does one need to ascertain ‘correspon­dence’ of these interpreted images with ‘the real object itself’ in order to consider them as valid? Not at all. On the one hand the comparison of the image with ‘the object itself’ is impossible (at the very most can we compare several images coming from different types of micro­scopes). And on the other hand, the researcher can do completely without such a comparison in practice.

Instead of comparing, he con­tents himself with acting under the supposition that the image is cor­rect, and with insuring that the result of the action, controlled by a new image of the same microscope, is in conformity with what the initial image permitted him to foresee. In sum the criterion of validity of the image limits itself to an enlarged consistency between the image, the interventions that it makes possible to guide, and another image of the same type that highlights the consequences of these interventions.
Validation relies on a form of consistency and not on ‘correspon­dence’ (Shanon, 1984). True, when performative coherence has been reached and stabilized in some given scientific field, it is tempting to believe that this reveals a correspondence between a theory and its external object. Such a shortcut may help, as a provisional incentive to use the said theory as a guide for action. But it should not be endowed with any ontological significance.( Michel Bitbol)

More or less, yes.

“Now, an intra-ontology of embodiment has momentous implications for how we conceive knowledge. In the framework of a standard ontology, we strive to acquire
knowledge about what is given out there, and this non-committal knowledge can be encoded intellectually. But in the framework of an intra-ontology, non-committal knowledge appears as a non-sense. According to a Merleau-Pontian phenomenologist, knowledge affects the two sides that arise from the self-splitting of what there is (namely of embodied experience). In other terms, knowledge of something arises concomitantly with a mutation of ourselves qua knowers. And this mutation of ourselves qua knowers manifests as a mutation of (our) experience that cannot be encoded intellectually, since the very processes and conclusions of the intellect depend on it.

Such intra-ontological pattern of knowledge is universal. It may look superfluous or contrived in the field of a classical science of nature, where the objectification of a
limited set of appearances is so complete that everything happens as if the objects of knowledge were completely separate from the act of knowing. But it becomes unavoidable in many other situations where this separation is in principle unattainable, such as the human sciences or quantum mechanics.

This is why Varela considered that a purely intellectual operation (“a change in our understanding” about some object) is not enough to solve the mind-body problem, and even less the “hard problem” of the origin of phenomenal consciousness, namely of lived experience. For these problems are archetypal cases in which the inseparability between subject and object of knowledge is impossible to ignore. What is needed to overcome them, according to the lesson of the intra-ontological view of knowledge, is nothing less than “a change in experience (being)” (Varela 1976: 67). Addressing properly the problem of lived experience is tantamount to undergo a change in experience.”(Michel Bitbol) — Joshs

intraontology. Is this another name for hermeneutics? Or intentionality? But the idea seems clear enough, bluntly put, you look at it and your gaze is part and parcel of the object observed. I go further than this, though fully aware that few will go with me. I like to take the very popular "high-flying thought" that says what we receive and give out in our sciences is what is there independently of our perceptual contribution, and proceed with this assumption to see how far epistemology can be taken. And, as predicted, it instantly turns against itself: Rorty stated, "no one has ever been able to explain how anything out there to can get in here (pointing to his head)." The analytic philosopher Rorty of course talks as if there is no problem with this (as I read through parts of his Mirror of Nature); but all of this, he insists, in the light of "truth is made, not discovered." He just thinks like Wittgenstein that there is no point is trying to speak about the unspeakable, for there is no unspeakable to speak of. I like the way Slovaj Zizek put it: it is like a software program that has no mountains in the distance of it visual setting. It is not that there is anything IN the program that does not show up, if one were in the program. It would be an absence the presence of which would neither fill a void nor redeem or anything else, for any "void" is just a mistake fashioned out of what we already have. I think Rorty thinks like this. So there is no merging, no intraontology, for this would imply the merging of two things, speaking roughly, when there are no two things. A fabricated metaphysics of two. Or: for there to be a synthesis, there has to be two identifiables on each side, but this cannot be shown, for neither side makes a appearance.
I

So there is no merging, no intraontology, for this would imply the merging of two things, speaking roughly, when there are no two things. A fabricated metaphysics of two. Or: for there to be a synthesis, there has to be two identifiables on each side, but this cannot be shown, for neither side makes a appearance — Constance

Let’s be clear about the “two things” intraontology is talking about. It is the noetic and the noematic , the subjective and objective poles of experience. They are not separable, don’t appear individually and thus don’t form a synthesis or merger. But without these poles there could be no differential ,and without a differential there could be no time.

The perceived duality lies with a mistake, and the mistake is time. — Constance

Which philosophers are you getting this from? Marion? Henry?

Not sure why you bring this up. Isn't it clear that the point of light projected by a rotating laser on the inside of a huge sphere doesnt actually travel at all? — EugeneW

Whenever you find yourself concluding something like a spontaneous effect or a contradiction built into the structure of logic, then you are going to find the assumption that this must be cleared up somehow. A true paradox is never allowed to stand. The law of causality is absolutely coercive to the understanding regardless of any and all to the contrary. (Just try it). This is NOT to say, that as a law, it is perfectly conceived, free of elucidative possibilities or, as I believe, not something else entirely. I think it is something else entirely because this is world is foundationally metaphysical (notwithstanding what I say elsewhere. In fact, I do not believe in foundational dualities of any kind. The perceived duality lies with a mistake, and the mistake is time. I do know how this sounds, but I believe it comes to this).

In other words truth as consistency rather than truth as correspondence? — Joshs

Both. And truth as really being there. The mental and physical world are dependent on each other. Structures in the physical world engrave themselves in our brain and the brainstructures inform the physical world. We can perceive all levels of strucure as we, our bodies, move in the physical world and we actively (experiments) or passively give shape to the world and have all right to call our perception objective. Like I wrote before, a particle physicist sees indivisible pointlike massless quarks and leptons, while I perceive triplets of geometric nonpointlike massless preons gaining mass by interaction. I could, as I read somewhere, imagine that these particles are green dragons avoiding detection but I dont. I prefer the view that they are love and hate particles, charged with a mystical load to repulse or attract (the three basic charges in physics, exactly the right ones). Experiment has to decide which one is true, but some things are obvious a priori.

The analytic philosopher Rorty of course talks as if there is no problem with this (as I read through parts of his Mirror of Nature); but all of this, he insists, in the light of "truth is made, not discovered." He just thinks like Wittgenstein that there is no point is trying to speak about the unspeakable, for there is no unspeakable to speak of. — Constance

I think so. Rorty's neo-pragmatism is postmodernism and less mystical that Witty. Rorty's anti-foundationalist project seems primarily (and I only have general understanding of his work) to be opposed to what he sees are remnants of Greek philosophy - notions of idealism and absolute truth 'out there'. In Rorty's view humans are able to justify claims but can say nothing about Truth.