You have not provided any support for this claim. — Paine

As I said, I provided the support in an in depth way in the other thread, and outlined it in my last post. That book is clearly inconsistent with works of Aristotle which are well known to have been produced by him. And, since it is also known that the books under the title "Metaphysics" were teachings collected together in Aristotle's school, many years after his death The conclusion that this particular section was not actually his work is justified, in that way.

Regardless though, the point is that this section of "Metaphysics" is inconsistent with other parts of Aristotle's work. This could be a feature of a changing mind of the writer, like we find in Plato. So Plato's works are carefully ordered chronologically, and his thoughts are divided into distinct periods. In the case of Aristotle, we'd have to put that section of "Metaphysics" near the beginning of the order, because we see how he produces arguments to refute those ideas. He would not conclude this after refuting it, but he might propose it prior to refuting it. This is similar to the way that Plato produces arguments which refute the theory of participation, so the dialogues which support participation are presented as earlier. Instead, though, that book Lambda is placed at the end of "Metaphysics", as if it's Aristotle's final conclusion. As I showed in the other thread, and outlined in my last post, he actually moves to refute it those ideas.

In a separate comment, I will list all the places I know of where Aristotle alludes to a separate, independent intellect. I don't have time to run them all down until can get back to my books next week. — Paine

Yes, I remember you brought up a number of mentions of an independent intellect. I agree that with respect to "the intellect" there is obvious inconsistency in Aristotle. And this is an issue which has always been a problem. It is very evident in the Scholastics, manifesting as the division between the active intellect and the passive intellect. The desire to have as a principle, a separate, independent intellect, led to the notion of a complete separation between active and passive intellect. This allows that the active intellect might be free from the influence of the passive matter (potential), allowing the intellect the capacity to know all things.

This is a clear problem, because what Aquinas presents, is that the human intellect is deficient, being dependent on the material body. So Aquinas proposes that the intellect might only adequately know things like God, after separation from the body.

But a completely separate, active intellect appears to be impossible by Aristotle's principles. This is because the intellect in each of its capacities, the capacity to know, prior to learning, and the capacity to act, posterior to learning, are all properly described as potentials. This led Aquinas to assume a potential which is not properly material, to account for the desire to portray a separate, active intellect, unbound by matter.

I do not accept this resolution, because it introduces two distinct types of "potential", and distinctions of type are formal. This distinction of types of potential would put fundamental forms as inherent within matter, instead of allowing for the reality of true separate Forms. But if we allow for true separate Forms, as Aquinas surely wanted to do, with God and the angels, then these Forms (form being actual) cannot be a sort of intellect, because intellect is fundamentally a potential.

The need to conclude separate Forms is produced by the cosmological argument, BK.9 of "Metaphysics". The separate Forms account for the actuality which is necessarily prior to potential, in the absolute sense. If we adhere to what Aristotle discusses in Bk 1, Ch.3 of "De Anima", we see that the separate Forms must be truly immaterial, and cannot be described in material representations like eternal circular motions. Further, the thinking on thinking representation is said to be improper as well, because it does not accurately represent thinking. And, it is later shown how thinking as the act of an intellect is fundamentally a potential, therefore it cannot be used to represent a pure, independent actuality.

So here we find the fundamental inconsistency of Neo-Platonism, specifically Plotinus. We see "the One" as the first, and most fundamental principle. But the One is supposed to be both pure, absolute potential, as well as the first cause, from which all proceeds. But pure, absolute potential cannot be a cause, because it lacks any actuality, as explained in "Metaphysics" Bk.9, the cosmological argument. This argument by Aristotle effectively refutes both materialism (having matter as the first principle), and Pythagorean Idealism (having ideas as the first principle), by classifying both as potential. "Matter" may then be understood as an idea, and ideas are potential. This leaves the aspect of reality which is supposed to correspond to "matter" as something unintelligible, and opens the door to matter based mysticism. Neo-Platonism mistakenly adhered to principles of Pythagorean Idealism which had been refuted by Plato and Aristotle, in a bid to ward off material mysticism.

But I will restate the problem I had with your comment the first time around. You are using a certain set of texts to establish your interpretation of what Aristotle means to say. On the basis of that, you declare Aristotle is not consistent with his own principles when he refers to an active, separate intellect. Whatever explanation might be put forward for the conflict of principles, it is always logically possible that the inconsistency belongs to your interpretation. — Paine

Actually, I refer to a wide variety of material, as indicated above. Chiefly, Aquinas provide a very good presentation of these interpretive problems, because they had become exposed by the Scholastics. Appollodorus accused me of reading Plato through Aristotle, and Aristotle through Aquinas, instead of interpreting the person directly. The problem being that Appollo took this as a fault, when really these are the people who put much effort into solving the puzzles put forward by the philosophers before themselves. So it doesn't work, as a criticism, to accuse me of an idiosyncratic interpretation, and also accuse me of reading one philosopher through the mind of another, as Appollo did.

Outside of its description in Book Lamba, it should be noted that many of the other books of the Metaphysics try to see how and if the introduction of composite beings relate to the method in the Categories. There is much scholarly debate on these topics and disagreement about which statements are consistent with other statements. The statement in Book Lambda: "the soul is the first substance" is a part of that conversation even if you dismiss the rest of the book as Neo-Platonists propaganda. — Paine

The fundamental issue of the "Metaphysics" is, I would say, what Aristotle lays out around BK 3, I think. The question is why is a thing what it is. He dismisses often cited question of why is there something rather than nothing, as unanswerable, and therefore misleading, so he proceeds to the more relevant question of why is any particular thing, the thing which it is. Primary substance according to "Categories" is an individual, a particular, and now, the particular must have an identity by the law of identity.

He points to the following logical argument. A thing must be the thing which it is, by the law of identity. And, when a thing comes into being, it must necessarily come into being as the thing which it is or else a thing could be other than the thing which it is, in violation of the law of identity. It is impossible that the self-same thing could be two distinct things at the same time. Therefore we can conclude that the form of the thing, as "what the thing is" is temporally prior to the existence of the material thing, as the cause of the thing being what it is, rather than something else, when the thing comes into existence. Otherwise a thing would be a random collection of parts, but it is not, it has an orderly form. When taken in the absolute sense, as the cosmological argument (Bk 9), we see that there must be an immaterial Form, prior to all material existence.

Around BK 6, Aristotle questions where the form of the thing comes from. He distinguishes between natural things and artificial things, and provides an in depth description of artificial things. The form of the thing comes from the soul of the artist. This is important, because we see that the form, of what the thing will be, when the thing comes into existence, does not inhere within the matter itself, but comes from some other source. Then he leads us toward the conclusion that there is a very similar situation in natural things. So we must assume separate independent Forms, according to the principle that the form does not come from within the matter.

The issue you point to. "the soul is the first substance", needs clarification. Primary substance is a particular individual, which by Aristotle is a composition of matter and form (hylomorphism). The soul, by "De Anima", is a form, the first form of a body having life potential in it, so we can understand it in the sense of an independent Form, described above, being the cause for the material body coming into being as the body which it is, rather than something else. But it's doubtful whether it is correct to call such a Form a substance, because it doesn't fit into Aristotle's definition of "substance" in "Categories", either in the primary or secondary sense.

When that possibility is not taken seriously the whole of the text or texts may be distorted in order to accomodate an interpretation. That is just bad hermeneutic practice. I follow the advise of those who say that when there is an apparent contradiction look to see if it is or can be reconciled based on further consideration and closer examination. — Fooloso4

More often than not, what is the case is that the inconsistency gets overlooked, it goes undetected by the readers, because each reader interprets in one's own way, ignoring the parts which don't really make sense. However, it manifests later in discrepancies between various interpretations. The inconsistencies in Plato produced discrepancies between Neo-Platonism and Aristotle, for example. And the inconsistencies in Aristotle manifest in the problems which the Scholastics confronted.

So the bad hermeneutic practice is actually the opposite of what you say it is. To attribute the appearance of inconsistency to a deficiency in the skill of the reader, rather than to a deficiency in the skill of the writer is the wrong approach. This is because inconsistency in philosophy is common and pervasive due to the complicated, complex, and unexplored subject matter. Philosophy ventures into the unknown. If we assume the the appearance of inconsistency is a deficiency in reading skills, when the inconsistency is real, and within the material, due to a deficient understanding of the writer, we will either get bogged down in our attempts to understand, never being able to understand inconsistent material, or we'll have to ignore relevant material, and then we'll get bogged down in discussing who's interpretation is the correct one.

Therefore the appropriate procedure is to proceed with a healthy respect for the likelihood of inconsistency in the material, and with a mind open to the reality that the writer most likely did not have a complete understanding of the material. Remember, what is being sought is the truth concerning the subject, not the truth as to what so and so said about the subject. This leaves us in a position to accept whatever an author says, which appears to be consistent with the truth, and reject whatever one says which appears to be inconsistent with the truth. Looking for the truth as to what so and so said will be a fruitless effort because the reality of ambiguity renders this as an impossible ideal.

If we assume the the appearance of inconsistency is a deficiency in reading skills, when the inconsistency is real, and within the material, due to a deficient understanding of the writer ... — Metaphysician Undercover

The problem is that you wildly overestimate your reading skills. Although there may be cases where an inconsistency is real, you are all too quick to declare inconsistencies where the real problem is evidently a deficient understanding on the part of the reader. Modesty and humility are hermeneutic virtues.

So Plato's works are carefully ordered chronologically, and his thoughts are divided into distinct periods. — Metaphysician Undercover

The chronology of when the dialogue were written is not the same as the chronology of when the dialogues are set to have taken place. Parmenides is a "late dialogue" but it takes place when Socrates was young. The chronology of events raises serious questions about dividing Plato's work into distinct periods. Why would he situate what is supposed to be a late development, his criticism of the the theory of forms, at the beginning of Socrates' philosophical education?

The problem is that you wildly overestimate your reading skills. Although there may be cases where an inconsistency is real, you are all too quick to declare inconsistencies where the real problem is evidently a deficient understanding on the part of the reader. — Fooloso4

There' a saying, 'better safe than sorry'. It's safer to say that conclusions cannot be drawn, due to inconsistency, then to assume consistency and draw a false conclusion. We ought to approach all philosophy with the skeptical attitude that inconsistency is possible, and be very alert to recognize it when we see it. As I described above, in philosophy it's far more likely that a declaration of no inconsistency is the sign of a deficient understanding, than a declaration of inconsistency. As I explained, it's a feature of the subject matter.

See, you misrepresent my position. The person who does not see the possibility of inconsistency projects one's own principles into the reading, forcing an understanding based on that. The person who sees inconsistency is not forcing an understanding, and maintaining an open mind. The latter is the appropriate method of philosophy.

The chronology of when the dialogue were written is not the same as the chronology of when the dialogues are set to have taken place. Parmenides is a "late dialogue" but it takes place when Socrates was young. The chronology of events raises serious questions about dividing Plato's work into distinct periods. Why would he situate what is supposed to be a late development, his criticism of the the theory of forms, at the beginning of Socrates' philosophical education? — Fooloso4

I can't understand this. Are you asking why Plato wrote about the young Socrates' fascination with the theory of forms, later in Plato's lifetime? Isn't there numerous dialogues concerning the young Socrates' fascination with the theory of forms, right from the beginning of Plato's writing? Can you make the point clearer? I don't see it.

It's safer to say that conclusions cannot be drawn, due to inconsistency, then to assume consistency and draw a false conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Saying that conclusions cannot be drawn is not the same things as what you do when you draw conclusions about Metaphysics Book Lamba.

You draw a conclusion when you say:

This leaves us in a position to accept whatever an author says, which appears to be consistent with the truth, and reject whatever one says which appears to be inconsistent with the truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

What may appear to you to be an inconsistency may not be. But rather than any further attempt to understand or even leave it open as problematic you have concluded that it should be rejected.

There is a clear inconsistency in saying a) conclusions cannot be drawn and b) concluding that what the author says should be rejected.

The person who does not see the possibility of inconsistency — Metaphysician Undercover

I have claimed no such thing. What I am saying is that we should not be too quick in deciding there is an inconsistency that a philosopher like Plato is unaware of.

I can't understand this. — Metaphysician Undercover

You say that there are distinct periods in Plato's development. Does he change his mind about Forms?If so, in what way?

What could the trio Socrates, Plato, and Aristotel have against sophists?

My guesstimate:

Sophists' goal: How to win arguments! Nobly/ignobly doesn't matter!

Philosophers' goal: How to find truths! Nobly!

Ignoble methods of winning in an argument: Fallacies part of the toolkit or should I say arsenal?

Noble methods of doing the same: Fallacies, a big no-no!

That's just the tip of the ice berg, there's (probably) more!

Wanna win the war? Give me one sophist, just one. Oh, there's Krishna! We're in luck, fellas!

But rather than any further attempt to understand or even leave it open as problematic you have concluded that it should be rejected. — Fooloso4

Yes, if it is unintelligible to one's own mode of interpretation, it ought to be rejected for that reason.

What may appear to you to be an inconsistency may not be. But rather than any further attempt to understand or even leave it open as problematic you have concluded that it should be rejected. — Fooloso4

"Consistent with the truth" is a judgement made by an individual subject. If this is not the judgement then we really ought to reject the proposition.

What I am saying is that we should not be too quick in deciding there is an inconsistency that a philosopher like Plato is unaware of. — Fooloso4

I see no justification for this claim. If I interpret some things as inconsistent, why should I believe they are really consistent? That makes no sense at all.

You say that there are distinct periods in Plato's development. Does he change his mind about Forms?If so, in what way? — Fooloso4

I don't think there are "distinct periods", just a progression. And yes, he clearly changes his mind about Forms, he comes to reject the theory of participation

Yes, if it is unintelligible to one's own mode of interpretation, it ought to be rejected for that reason. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is it possible that one is wrong? That one's own mode of interpretation in this case misses or misunderstands something? If so then rejecting what is read as inconsistent is itself inconsistent.

Consistent with the truth" is a judgement made by an individual subject. If this is not the judgement then we really ought to reject the proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is the judgment of the individual subject always consistent with the truth? If it is not then it is inconsistent to say in this case that we really ought to reject the proposition.

I don't think there are "distinct periods" — Metaphysician Undercover

So Plato's works are carefully ordered chronologically, and his thoughts are divided into distinct periods. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a clear inconsistency here. A contradiction. First you say there are distinct periods then you don't think there are distinct periods. Are you saying that there are distinct periods but you don't think there are?

What you say contains several inconsistencies. It should be rejected.

Is it possible that one is wrong? — Fooloso4

I don't see how this would be possible. How could a person be wrong, in one's judgement that they cannot understand something. This would mean that the person really understands something which they think they do not.

That one's own mode of interpretation in this case misses or misunderstands something? If so then rejecting what is read as inconsistent is itself inconsistent. — Fooloso4

It's not a matter of rejecting what is read, it's a matter of recognizing inconsistencies within what is read, which makes it impossible to understand it. So the interpreter never claims to understand what is written, because this is impossible, as it is interpreted as inconsistent and therefore impossible to understand. Therefore the initial assumption which the reader makes is that the material is misunderstood.

You are misrepresenting it as a claim of understanding. But this cannot be the case, because the person interprets the material as inconsistent, which renders understanding as impossible. This is why we move to secondary sources. So for instance, when Plato is interpreted as inconsistent with respect to the theory of participation, one might move on to Neo-Platonists and Aristotle, to aid in the process of trying to understand Plato.

The point being that it is not a matter of claiming to understand the material, then rejecting it because it is understood as inconsistent, it is a matter of recognizing that you cannot understand the material, so you move to secondary sources for assistance. Then, when the secondary sources offer conflicting interpretations, you have grounds for a judgement of ambiguity or inconsistency. The primary source then needs to be revisited, with a new attempt to understand, before that judgement is made. Nothing can be rejected simply on the basis of inconsistency, because one or the other of the two inconsistent parts may be acceptable.

Is the judgment of the individual subject always consistent with the truth? If it is not then it is inconsistent to say in this case that we really ought to reject the proposition. — Fooloso4

I really don't see that you have a point here. When a person judges a proposition as inconsistent with truth, this is grounds for the person to reject it, forcing the ought by implication, false therefore reject. The fact that the person might make a mistake, does not negate the judgement, nor the ought implied by the judgement. If the person is worried about mistake, and is skeptical, then the judgement is suspended. If the person is not skeptical, then the judgment is made, and the ought is implied, and whether or not the person is wrong in that judgement is irrelevant because the ought is forced by the judgement, not by anything else.

There is a clear inconsistency here. A contradiction. First you say there are distinct periods then you don't think there are distinct periods. Are you saying that there are distinct periods but you don't think there are?

What you say contains several inconsistencies. It should be rejected. — Fooloso4

I really can't grasp what you are saying. "His thoughts are divided into distinct periods", indicates an artificial act of division, so that the divisions produce distinct periods, which have become conventional. Think about the way that the day is divided into morning and afternoon. So, I told you that I don't believe that there are real distinct periods, I believe there is just a progression, which has been divided into distinct periods for pragmatic purposes, convenience. Likewise, I think that the passing of time is just a progression which has been divided into distinct periods, for convenience.

How could a person be wrong, in one's judgement that they cannot understand something. — Metaphysician Undercover

But your claim is not that you don't understand but that what you are reading is inconsistent. If you do not understand there is still the possibility that someday you will. But you think you understand well enough to reject what you have read, Again, you are not being consistent.

It's not a matter of rejecting what is read — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet you say it is:

If this is not the judgement then we really ought to reject the proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

More inconsistency.

When a person judges a proposition as inconsistent with truth, this is grounds for the person to reject it ... — Metaphysician Undercover

In that case you are no longer talking about one's judgment that they cannot understand but that one understands well enough to reject it. It may still be the case that a person still does not understand.

The fact that the person might make a mistake, does not negate the judgement, — Metaphysician Undercover

It means that the judgment was wrong.

"His thoughts are divided into distinct periods", indicates an artificial act of division, so that the divisions produce distinct periods, which have become conventional. Think about the way that the day is divided into morning and afternoon. — Metaphysician Undercover

The question is: what significance and conclusion do you draw from the conclusion that some dialogues are placed in the early period, some in the middle, and some in the late period?

The answer/solution to defending against sophistry (in my opinion) are better media technologies. As another way of looking at this, imagine that there is an Internet Browser plugin, add-on and/or extension that could automatically collate references to/from/for any given statement, in an effort to help you determine its truthiness. That's the kind of approach to combating sophistry that would get my attention at the very least.

But your claim is not that you don't understand but that what you are reading is inconsistent. — Fooloso4

Yes, that's because I've gone through the further stage I've describe, reference to secondary sources. This justifies my claim. What I could not understand in my primary readings, it turns out that I could not understand it because of inconsistencies.

In that case you are no longer talking about one's judgment that they cannot understand but that one understands well enough to reject it. It may still be the case that a person still does not understand. — Fooloso4

Again, this is the secondary stage, which is justified by secondary sources.

It means that the judgment was wrong. — Fooloso4

No, that's clearly false. The possibility that one's judgement is wrong does not mean that the judgement is wrong. If the only way to justify a judgement was to exclude all possibility of mistake, then judgement would be unjustifiable.

More inconsistency. — Fooloso4

I don't think so, there's simply a clear lack of effort to understand, on your part, and a refusal to recognize the part between (reference to secondary sources), which separates statement A from statement B. Furthermore, you are comparing a statement about the whole, (not rejecting what has been read), with a statement about a part (rejecting a proposition). The first applies to an inability to understand what has been read, and the second to an understanding developed through further analysis.

For example, suppose there's a logical argument which consists of two premises which appear to be acceptable, and a conclusion. The conclusion however, appears to be wrong for some reason, outlandish, absurd, or totally inconsistent with observation. This is how Aristotle described sophistry, as using logic to produce an absurd conclusion. Take Zeno's paradoxes for an example of such sophistry.

Now, we ought not simply reject the whole thing, just because we do not like the conclusion. But, we cannot accept it because the conclusion is clearly wrong. So, we need to analyze the premises individually, along with the logical process applied, to see what the problem is. These are the puzzles of philosophy which I referred to earlier.

What Aristotle noticed, is that strict adherence to the law of excluded middle as a logical principle, by sophists, could produce absurd conclusions. He demonstrated that the reason for this is that "becoming" is of a completely different category from the logical category of "being and not being". Plato revealed this issue in numerous dialogues. So if an act of becoming, a movement for example, is described in a premise as states of being and not being, there is really an incompatibility between the thing being described, and the description. Therefore we ought to reject such premises as false. So for example, in relation to Zeno's paradoxes, if a movement (an act of becoming), is described as being at point A at one time, and being at point B at a later time (states of being), we ought to reject those premises as false. The movement is what happens between point A and point B, and it is categorical different from being at point A and being at point B, as "becoming" is categorically different from "being and not being". The law of excluded middle would incline us to believe that it must be either being or not being, thereby denying the possibility of becoming.

The question is: what significance and conclusion do you draw from the conclusion that some dialogues are placed in the early period, some in the middle, and some in the late period? — Fooloso4

When there is an inconsistency in a philosopher's material, between what is stated at an earlier time, and what is stated at a later time, we can accept that the later is more representative of what the philosopher believed as the truth. And when the philosopher has much material like Plato, we can usually find within the middle part, the arguments by which the earlier statements are refuted, and which ultimately support the later statements.

In the case of Bk Lambda, of Aristotle's "Metaphysics", which Paine refers to, this book has been placed at the end of "Metaphysics", which is supposed to be after his "Physics". So we get the illusion that this book expresses Aristotle's final decisions, his most developed thought. However, in reality we find the ideas and arguments expressed in Aristotle's other books, which actually refute these proposals of Lambda. Therefore we ought to conclude that this book should really be placed at the beginning of Aristotle's work, as the beliefs of a young Aristotle, which he later refuted, or the more likely conclusion, as I explained to Paine, that it is not really Aristotle's writing.

You have convinced me of one thing: what you say should be rejected because it is inconsistent. But according to you, you are in good company:

... inconsistency in philosophy is common and pervasive ... — Metaphysician Undercover

You have convinced me of one thing: what you say should be rejected because it is inconsistent. But according to you, you are in good company: — Fooloso4

The problem is that you have clearly not followed what I said, so you have simply convinced yourself through some sort of bias or prejudice. I clearly said that the whole of what the person said is not to be rejected, only specific propositions, which are judged to be inconsistent with truth, are to be rejected.

If I have given you two contradicting propositions, by what principle other than ad hominem, do you reject them both?

Although this topic is on subject that most of us know what it is all about and there's no much more to talk about --it's an almost "dead" subject-- I wanted to see if there's something new that maybe could revive it!
Well, you brought up something that triggered my interest: that "sophistry is a big problem in the modern world". Unfortunately though I got somehow frustrated because I didn't even see where is the problem. Not a single example ...

Well, since I'm here ...

Some might say that hitler was especially skilled when it came to sophistry. — Average

I don't know if Hitler indulged in sophistry. This little matters. But one of the things he said was "If you tell a big enough lie and tell it frequently enough, it will be believed". It sounds like a confession, most probably not indented. But this is what he did and this is what a lot of politicians were always and still are doing, esp. when people have lost their hopes for a better tomorrow. You lay a hand to someone who is getting drawn in the water, he grasps it, because he would grasp whatever hand is extended to rescue him, and then you drawn him yourself by pushing him deeper into the water. And this is most probably what Hitler did, but most probably not on purpose. He was just insane. Anyway, False promises and lies do not consist "sophistry".

I want to be skilled in the art sophistical refutation. — Average

If you can be more specific, and esp. give me a couple of examples, I could maybe help you! :smile:

False promises and lies do not consist "sophistry". — Alkis Piskas

How would you define sophistry?

How would you define sophistry? — Average

Use of clever but false arguments --apparently plausible reasoning--, especially with the intention of deceiving.
The term "sophistry" is a modern version of what in Greek antiquity was called "sophism", an activity or movement that was disapproved by many.

The ending -stry has been inherited from the French "erie", which is mainly used for professional and commercial activities. Indeed, sophists in antiquity were paid for teaching, among other things, rhetoric, another activity involving the deceiving of people, which has survived well until our days and is used mainly by lawyers and polititians.

If the goal in both cases is deception then I don't really see the difference.

If the goal in both cases is deception then I don't really see the difference. — Average

Didn't you ask me how do I defined sophistry? Well, this is what I did.
If the end result of both a "lie" and a "sophistry" is deception, this does not mean that there's no difference between them! (In fact, a big one.)

If the end result of both a "lie" and a "sophistry" is deception, this does not mean that there's no difference between them! (In fact, a big one.) — Alkis Piskas

Please explain the difference.

Please explain the difference. — Average

I already did. I shouldn't. A bad habit of mine. My effort is often ignored and, more importantly, I encourage people avoiding looking up words to see for themselves. (In this case, "lie" and "sophistry".)

The answer/solution to defending against sophistry (in my opinion) are better media technologies. As another way of looking at this, imagine that there is an Internet Browser plugin, add-on and/or extension that could automatically collate references to/from/for any given statement, in an effort to help you determine its truthiness. That's the kind of approach to combating sophistry that would get my attention at the very least. — Bret Bernhoft

The issue isn't always truth, it's intention and deception. The content of a sophist and a truth teller will often look much the same.

Understood. But there are technologies that can help users discern intention and deception. Those are the kinds of solutions I'm interested in.

But there are technologies that can help users discern intention and deception. Those are the kinds of solutions I'm interested in. — Bret Bernhoft

Interesting. I wonder how. Apologies for misunderstanding.

The desire to have as a principle, a separate, independent intellect, led to the notion of a complete separation between active and passive intellect. This allows that the active intellect might be free from the influence of the passive matter (potential), allowing the intellect the capacity to know all things. — Metaphysician Undercover

The active intellect, in so far as it exists separately from the composite beings who are able to think because of it, are not experiencing this aspect of the principle:

Thus thought and contemplation decay because something else within is destroyed, while thought itself is unaffected, But thinking (dianoiesthai), and loving or hating are not affectations of that, but for the individual which has it, in so far as it does. Hence when this too is destroyed we neither remember nor love; for these did not belong to that, but to the composite thing which has perished. — De Anima, 408b 18, translated Ackrill

And:

In separation it is just what it is, and this alone is immortal and eternal. (But we do not remember because this is unaffected, whereas the passive intellect is perishable, and without this thinks nothing. — ibid, 430a 18

The difference between the active principle and the sort of knowing that composite beings do is collapsed again when you say:

But a completely separate, active intellect appears to be impossible by Aristotle's principles. This is because the intellect in each of its capacities, the capacity to know, prior to learning, and the capacity to act, posterior to learning, are all properly described as potentials. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only the composite beings have a capacity to learn, act, or remember. In regard to 'potentials" that is what caused Aristotle to object to his predecessors:

The view we have just been examining, in company with most theories about the soul, involves the following absurdity: they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it. Yet such explanation can scarcely be omitted; for some community of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the one moves and the other is moved; interaction always implies a special nature in the two inter-agents. — ibid, 407b14-21

These observations move me to ask for you to provide textual references for the following statement:

And, it is later shown how thinking as the act of an intellect is fundamentally a potential, therefore it cannot be used to represent a pure, independent actuality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Thus thought and contemplation decay because something else within is destroyed, while thought itself is unaffected, — De Anima, 408b 18, translated Ackrill

This idea, I cannot accept. The idea that when a person becomes old, and mentally incapacitated, suffering dementia or something like that, the person is still fully capable of "thought", and it's just something else that decays, I believe is completely refuted by evidence. We'd have to really distort the meaning of "thought" to support such a position.

What happens in Aquinas' principles, from what I remember, is that the human intellect is fully united with the material body, and is dependent on the body. Because of this dependency the human intellect is left deficient, and incapable of properly grasping the independent Forms, God and the angels. So Aquinas says that the soul of man is incapable of completely knowing God, so long as it is united with the body. It is implied therefore that the soul can completely know God after being freed from the body.

However, we can see a problem arising from this, in relation to knowledge and the intellect. The human intellect necessarily has a body, and "knowledge" is a property attributed to the human intellect, as is "thought" above. So if we disunite the soul from the body, then whatever union the soul is allowed to have with the independent Forms at that time, it is improper to refer to that union with those terms. "knowledge" and "intellect". It would not be a case of the soul "knowing" the independent forms because "knowing" is what the human intellect does, and the human intellect is dependent on a body. "Knowledge" being something which is fundamentally flawed, as fallible.

These observations move me to ask for you to provide textual references for the following statement: — Paine

I believe I produced this in the other thread. Read thoroughly \De Anima Bk 3 Ch 4.

"The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassable, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object." 429a 15. "Therefore...mind...can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity." 429a 18-23.
Then:
"Once the mind has become each set of its possible objects, as a man of science has, when this phrase is used of a man who is actually a man of science, (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the one which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; the mind too is then able to think itself." 429b 5-10

The mind is shown to be fundamentally potential, therefore we can conclude that we're barking up the wrong tree if we think that we can proceed toward demonstrating that the mind could be an independent actuality.

There's a number of complex and difficult issues right here in this chapter. First, the mind being impassable, yet capable of receiving forms. This I believe is what allowed Aquinas to say that the passive intellect is some type of potential which is not matter. I believe that in reality we ought to reject this qualification "impassable", and allow the simple solution, that the material aspect of the human mind is what receives forms.

Another issue, which is much more difficult, and complex, not having been well explored, that I know of, is the way that different potencies relate to each other. Obliquely, we can see the foundation for a sort of hierarchy of potencies or capacities here, and this is consistent with Aristotle's powers of the soul, where the posterior potential is dependent on the prior potential. The mind must first receive forms, learn, and in this sense it has the capacity to become something. Prior to this, it is not any particular thing, but the potential to be many things (matter?). After learning, when the person has knowledge, the mind is described as the potential to act in numerous different possible ways ("able to exercise the power on his own initiative"). The capacity attributed to the posterior potential is dependent on the actualization of the prior potential.

So the potential to learn exists in a certain relation with the potential to act, which is a temporal relation. Learning is prior to acting. And what we can see, is that even though the actualization of a potential, (the capacity to learn is actualized), this actualized potential remains a potential still, in relation to the posterior thing, which is acting. So even though the base potential has been actualized (learning), it remains a potential in relation to the next actualization (acting).

Pathetic

This idea, I cannot accept. The idea that when a person becomes old, and mentally incapacitated, suffering dementia or something like that, the person is still fully capable of "thought", and it's just something else that decays, I believe is completely refuted by evidence. We'd have to really distort the meaning of "thought" to support such a position. — Metaphysician Undercover

This does not reflect Aristotle's thinking. Only some combined beings are capable of thought. The capacity is directly related to the condition of the body. This is made clear in the passage preceding the one I quoted:

The intellect seems to be born in us as a kind of substance and not to be destroyed. For it would be destroyed if at all by the feebleness of old age, while as things are, what happens is similar to what happens in the case of the sense-organs. For if an old man acquired an eye of a certain kind, he would see as well as even a young man. Hence old age is not due to the soul's being affected in a certain way, but this happening to that which the soul is in, as in the case of drunkenness and disease. — ibid, 408b 18, emphasis mine

I believe that in reality we ought to reject this qualification "impassable", and allow the simple solution, that the material aspect of the human mind is what receives forms. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here again, it is important to follow distinctions Aristotle makes between the soul as a principle that animates all life from the experience of combined beings. Aristotle states at the beginning of the book that only combined beings can be affected:

There is also the problem of whether the affections (πάθη) of the soul are all common also to that which has it or whether any are peculiar to the soul itself; for it is necessary to deal with this, though it is not easy. It appears that in most cases the soul is not affected, nor does it act (ποιεῖν) apart from the body, e.g., in being angry, being confident, wanting, and in all perceiving. although noein (νοεῖν, thinking, understanding, nous-activity) looks most like being peculiar to the soul. But if this too is a form of imagination or does not exist apart from (μὴ ἄνευ) imagination, it would not be possible even for this to be (εἶναι, einai) apart from the body. — ibid, 403a3-7, Greek terms included by Eugene T. Gendlin

Book 3, chapter 4 follows the discussion of imagination in chapter 3 and begins the argument of how the intellect can be seen as a potential in relation to what makes it actual. The last paragraph of chapter 4 says:

Now, being affected in virtue of something common has been discussed before---to the effect that the intellect is in a way potentially the objects of thought, although it is actually nothing before it thinks; potentially in the same way as there is writing on a tablet on which nothing actually written exists; that is what happens in the case of the intellect. And it is itself an object of thought, just as its objects are. For, in the case of those things which have no matter, that which thinks and that which is thought are the same; for contemplative knowledge and that which is known in that way are the same. The reason why it does not always think we must consider. In those things which have matter each of the objects of thought is present potentially. Hence, they will not have intellect in them (for intellect is a potentiality for being such things without their matter}, while it can be thought in it. — ibid, 429b29

The following chapters demonstrate how admitting in 431a8 that the 'soul never thinks without an image" is not admitting that the intellect is a "form of imagination" as described at the beginning of the book.

This does not reflect Aristotle's thinking. Only some combined beings are capable of thought. The capacity is directly related to the condition of the body. This is made clear in the passage preceding the one I quoted: — Paine

That's exactly the point I am making. The capacity to think is directly related to the material body. Therefore it is a mistake to represent that capacity (the intellect), as something which can exist independently of the material body.

The intellect seems to be born in us as a kind of substance and not to be destroyed. — ibid, 408b 18, emphasis mine

When the word "seems" is used, one must be aware that this is an idea which is being expressed as something to be doubted. It appears you are not distinguishing between the use of "intellect" at the beginning of the passage, and "soul" at the end of the passage. The two are very distinct in Aristotle, and statements about one cannot be used as a conclusion about the other.

Here again, it is important to follow distinctions Aristotle makes between the soul as a principle that animates all life from the experience of combined beings. Aristotle states at the beginning of the book that only combined beings can be affected: — Paine

I don't understand your use of "combined beings". It doesn't appear Aristotelian to me. Is this supposed to be like the Plato's notion of body and soul? If so, it is mistaken to represent Aristotle in this way, because he breaks down this ancient notion. For Aristotle, each individual thing, alive or inanimate, consists of matter and form, the living being has a special type of form, "soul".

Therefore the distinction you make "only combined beings can be affected", appears completely unsupported. Notice in your quote he talks about specific affections which are peculiar to the soul. He does not make the more general statement that affection is something unique to the soul. Of course in his physics he talks about all material substance as capable of change, matter being the potential for change.

Book 3, chapter 4 follows the discussion of imagination in chapter 3 and begins the argument of how the intellect can be seen as a potential in relation to what makes it actual. The last paragraph of chapter 4 says: — Paine

There is a very real problem with saying that the intellect "is actually nothing before it thinks". You ought to be able to see this clearly. Before it thinks, the intellect must have the capacity to think. And this is a very specific capacity, it's not the capacity to be warm or cold, the capacity of self-nourishment, the capacity to move, or anything like that, it is the specified capacity, to think. Therefore the thing which has the capacity to think, the intellect, must very clearly be something actual, prior to thinking, in order to have this specific capacity. So when we say that the intellect is "actually nothing" before it thinks, this must be qualified by a very specific set of possibilities,. It is actually nothing, in relation to that specific set of possibilities.

The following chapters demonstrate how admitting in 431a8 that the 'soul never thinks without an image" is not admitting that the intellect is a "form of imagination" as described at the beginning of the book. — Paine

I don't see what you're alluding to.

I don't understand your use of "combined beings". It doesn't appear Aristotelian to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read Chapter 8 of Book Zeta of the Metaphysics for the briefest account of the "hylomorphism" that Aristotle uses throughout his works on natural beings. The chapter should be read as a whole to understand its parts but here is the decisive sentence regarding this discussion:

So, it is evident from what has been said that what is called "a form" or "a substance" is not generated, but what is generated is the composite which is named according to that form, and that there is matter in everything that is generated, and in the latter one part is this and another that. — Metaphysics, 1033b 15, translated by H.G. Apostle

I'm fully aware of hylomorphism, as is evident in my last post. All things are "combined beings". So I don't understand your usage, as if "combined beings" refers to a special class of beings.