I only assert that subjectivity does, and that is all I mean by 'consciousness'. — bert1

Subjectivity is not a mental property. It is a quality we observe in thinking agents because their conscious thoughts are the product of emotions(experiences) reasoned in to feelings and what they mean to them.
Subjectivity is an evaluation term on how people reason and experiences things differently.
It can not exist without biological thinking agents comparing their differences in their experiences
Consciousness doesn't mean subjectivity.
Consciousness is our ability to be conscious of environmental and organic stimuli and produce thoughts with content. Subjective is an abstract concept that described the differences between experiences of different agents.....This is an equivocation fallacy.

Abstract concepts do not exist...they are descriptive labels we use on processes.
This is bad language mode and it is common with claims about consciousness being a "thing" not a process or a property of a process.

Sure, but I don't think that proves anything about panpsychism. Could you spell it out? — bert1

that is not a meaningful argument. in fact its a fallacy (from ignorance.)
We don't accept a claim and wait from others to falsify it
That is not reasonable and most importantly that type of claims are not part of Philosophy.
Philosophy starts with our epistemology and projects it in the metaphysical realm by using facts and reason. The result must be something that is epistemically robust, inductive and able to expand our understanding.
Assuming something that you have the burden to prove offers nothing of the above.
Again I have to repeat my self. The Philosophical Method is an exercise in frustration, not the pursuit of happiness.
We don't pick answers that ease our epistemic and existential anxieties and brag for the inability of science and logic to falsify it.
Unfalsifiability is a problem for that claim...not for logic science or philosophy.

Regarding the other functions you mention, I am interested if you think these could happen without any subjectivity. Could a complex entity, a cybernetic brain or something, could do all these things, but without actually experiencing anything? — bert1

The difference between human brain and other "brains" (computers) is that computers work with algorithms. Inputs inform the algorithm and the algorithm provides "decisions".
In the case of human brain it processes emotion and meaning. A stimuli produces an emotion or affection and our brain(based on previous inputs(experiences),biological setup i.e. homeostasis or our biological hardware i.e. taste buds brain receptors , production of hormones etc) reasons them in to feeling and what they mean for the organism. So you need to understand that "subjectivity" is inevitable because no second human being shares the same experiences or biological setup or biological hardware .
You might like spicy food but my numerous taste buds don't share the same opinion with you.
Subjectivity is NOT something magical.
Now can cybernetic brains display a quality of subjectivity. Sure, even if the algorithm is the same, small differences in the "training" session of inputs or differences in its hardware can produce different "presences" in the "decision process".

As Searle asked of me when criticising panpsychism, — bert1

Have you discussed this with John Searle??

Only very briefly! He was a guest speaker on the predecessor to this forum, and I asked him a question.

What would qualify as a 'solid reason'? — bert1

We must possess data that at the very least suggest the possibility of objects (animate/inanimate) having souls.

We can't let our imagination get the better of us; plus, we haven't yet proved the existence of souls in humans, our best bet at doing so. If you couldn't prove charcoal is carbon, what hope is there for you with diamonds.

Very good question. If you take modern biological definitions, then it would very much appear so, yes. But if you mean by 'life' (as some do) a centre of experience, then I think the answer is 'no'. — bert1

What's the rationale for that distinction then?

there are no intermediate states between x not being conscious at all, and x being conscious. — bert1

I've been giving this some thought, and realised that there are such states, they are exemplified by the research I referred to. The mouse senses the faint moving line, without seeing it. The mechanisms responsible for conscious experience are operating, but below the threshold where consciousness begins. We can see this from the outside. It's in the nature of consciousness that a gradual onset would be difficult for the "user" to detect.

You might also consider your own present experience. If your attention is drawn to it, you will become aware for example of the pressure of your chair against your body, or the position of your tongue in your mouth. But what about all those things while you're not attending to them? There's a shading in and out of consciousness there.

Again when certain types of anaesthetic are administered we can see a gradual diminution in neuronal activity, corresponding to a greying out of conscious experience.

Again, consider the gradual development of the nervous system in a foetus.

______________________________________


A bacterium swimming up a chemical gradient is an entity, with what we might call unconscious purpose, unconscious intentionality (its swimming motion is related to the chemical), unconscious sensing.

Before x can be conscious, there has to be an unconscious x.

Again when certain types of anaesthetic are administered we can see a gradual diminution in neuronal activity, corresponding to a greying out of conscious experience. — Daemon

Either the awareness is there or it is not. Consciousness is also present in a dampened state. It is like numbers, a number is either zero or not zero. There is nothing in between.

Either the awareness is there or it is not. Consciousness is also present in a dampened state. It is like numbers, a number is either zero or not zero. There is nothing in between. — SolarWind

Zero is not a number; it’s a limit.

There’s a distinction between unconscious and non-conscious that is all about potential. Unconscious retains the potential for consciousness, even when empirical evidence is insufficient; Non-conscious doesn’t have that potential.

Zero is not a number; it’s a limit. — Possibility

If I have nothing in my wallet, then there are zero dollars. That's not a limit, that's a fact.

If one has no consciousness, then the objective time runs infinitely fast opposite the subjective time (like divide by zero), one is "beamed" directly to the awakening, i.e. one has felt no subjective time in between. If one feels something, then one also feels subjective time.

I like to compare consciousness with superconductivity. At a certain constellation the electric resistance suddenly jumps to zero, the conductivity accordingly to infinite.

However, there is ordinary conductivity in place in the material before the superconductivity switches in. Which is similar to the position @Possibility describes with consciousness. The potential for superconductivity is there.

The potential for superconductivity is there. — Daemon

There is no contradiction between potential and jump point. The potential for superconductivity results from the material, below a certain temperature superconductivity suddenly occurs.

If I have nothing in my wallet, then there are zero dollars. That's not a limit, that's a fact. — SolarWind

And the fact is you do NOT have a number of dollars. You have reached the limit of your wallet’s potential for dollars, its lowest value. The potential exists - you have the wallet: an empty set defined by its limits.

There are two ways to describe a lack of consciousness: with the wallet, or without it. With the wallet, a capacity or potential for dollars exists (unconscious). Without it, there is no indication of potential (non-conscious).

But what you’re looking for here is evidence of consciousness, not what consciousness is. Consciousness is the value/potential, the number. The evidence is the dollars or the wallet, without which the number is just a number.

Two sets of questions arise. Firstly, what does a wallet look like, and how is it constructed? Secondly, once we have a wallet, how do we get dollars to fill it?

There is no contradiction between possibility and jump point. The possibility for superconductivity results from the material, below a certain temperature superconductivity suddenly occurs. — SolarWind

Sounds like potential to me.

The idea I'm contemplating is that the "suddenness" of the onset of conscious experience may be due to the nature of conscious experience, rather than to the sudden crossing of some threshold. Cases like blindsight, where a person is able to avoid obstacles they claim to be entirely unable to see, may be relevant here.

The idea I'm contemplating is that the "suddenness" of the onset of conscious experience may be due to the nature of conscious experience, rather than to the sudden crossing of some threshold. — Daemon

The assumption that something is conscious or not is based solely on the idea of being an entity. You can probably imagine yourself to be another human being, maybe a dog, but not a stone.

There is no conception of being half an X.

Some panpsychists are motivated by idealism. Timothy Sprigge is one of these. If you think of Berkeley, but take out the role God plays in maintaining the existence of the external world of ideas, and substitute panpsychism - everything exists in a vast web of mutually perceiving and mutually defining subjects, then I think that is close to Sprigge's view. — Daemon

This is an interesting problem. I’ll call it The Problem of Perspective. It’s akin to the idea of a View from Nowhere. In an odd way, perhaps even Platonic notions of progressive understanding (noesis) was trying to solve it. That is to say, a worm, a termite, a pig, and a human all have a perspective. No perspective would seem privileged as to evaluating truth. Yet a worm can’t discern electromagnetism, nor scientific insights, mechanical theory etc., but humans can. But there is not supposed to be a Great Chain of Being. Yet humans at least act as though we have a privileged perspective to being close to what is “really going on”, more than other animals at least. Now take away humans, take away animals. We get a view from nowhere. Here is true metaphysics. What then exists in the view from nowhere? If you’re imagining a world as perceived and inferenced and synthesized by humans you would be mistaken. What is a non-perspective world? In what way can we talk of it intelligibly? Planets planeting? Particles particling? What does that even mean when there’s no perspective?

Do you ever wonder why inanimate matter obey the laws of nature to a tee.

As per Laozi, simplifying Taoism, we're supposed to emulate the nonliving: go with the flow ( :heart: ); only dead fish go with the flow, one remarked.

The point then is to die or act dead, let the chips fall where they may (wu wei, actionless action). Momma nature knows best! Trust in her experience (4.5 billion years), have faith in her wisdom (she is the Tao, mother of the myriad things).

I follow (human) laws when I understand them perfectly. Understanding requires consciousness!

As per Laozi, simplifying Taoism, we're supposed to emulate the nonliving: go with the flow ( :heart: ); only dead fish go with the flow, one remarked.

The point then is to die or act dead, let the chips fall where they may (wu wei, actionless action). Momma nature knows best! Trust in her experience (4.5 billion years), have faith in her wisdom (she is the Tao, mother of the myriad things). — Agent Smith

Just to clarify, wu wei is to act as if dead - to deliberately and consciously align our ideas and logic with that of the universe, striving to understand and be aware of the energy that flows through it all, ourselves included. Laozi is not advocating a blind faith here, but a fully conscious one.

Just to clarify, wu wei is to act as if dead - to deliberately and consciously align our ideas and logic with that of the universe, striving to understand and be aware of the energy that flows through it all, ourselves included. Laozi is not advocating a blind faith here, but a fully conscious one — Possibility

:up:

-No no, all theories of consciousness need to be a narrative of FACTS and a description of observable mechanisms. — Nickolasgaspar

But that's to prejudice the debate. That everything must be a mechanism is itself a theory.

Panpsychism only makes unflasifiable declarations.

Unfalsifiable by an empirical experiment, perhaps, but there are other ways to falsify claims. It's true that it's not a typical scientific hypothesis.

It doesn't describe how conscious states arise and how they gain their mental content.

It would be odd to expect it to. The idea that conscious states arise is emergentism. Panpsychism is typically a denial of emergentism.

How and why mental content is what it is, and what entities have what content and why, these are still open and difficult questions, and I agree panpsychists have not really got many good answers to these yet. I think various functionalist theories could be re-purposed to this end, perhaps.

Its in direct conflict with the establish Scientific Paradigm. Advanced properties are the product of structures with complex structures.

Panpsychists generally do not think consciousness is an advanced property, it's a primitive, simple property, of the kind that could be fundamental.

IT's also in conflict with the null hypothesis. The rejection of correlations between A(existence) and b(ghost of consciousness) until significant observations falsify that rejection should be your default position.

What should be the default position is an interesting question. Arguments could be made either way it seems to me. Panpsychism is ontologically simpler than emergentism, for example. Emergentism says there are two kinds of system in nature: conscious systems and unconscious ones. Panpsychists usually say there is just one, conscious.

Karl Popper's Demarcation principle. The problem is not that it is wrong, its not Even wrong! It can not be falsified, verified or tested. IT can not be used to produce accurate predictions or to use its principles in technical applications.

Some versions of panpsychism do make predictions, but not empirically testable ones. The difficulty is that there is no objective test for the presence of consciousness in systems other than our own self. I know I'm conscious. But I can't empirically verify that you are, or that my friend is. I think you probably are, but that is based on philosophical reasoning, not on empirical investigation. If you are saying that philosophy is not science, I agree with you.

Now ..its just theology in a really vague suit.

It's not theology

Are you denying degrees of consciousness? — Nickolasgaspar

Yes.

So you have never being asleep? light sleep, heavy sleep, sleep with dreams,sleep with environmental stimuli intruding in your dream,nightmare, sleepwalking, drunk, intoxicated,under anesthesia, brain injury(I hope not) concision, head ache, tooth ache, memory issues,Defuse thinking, focus thinking,preoccupied, terribly tired etc et.all those states that affect and even limit the quality of our ability to be conscious of our thoughts,mental abilities and environment. — Nickolasgaspar

These are gradations in what we are conscious of. They are not gradations between being conscious of nothing at all, and being conscious of something.

Subjectivity is not a mental property. It is a quality we observe in thinking agents because their conscious thoughts are the product of emotions(experiences) reasoned in to feelings and what they mean to them.
Subjectivity is an evaluation term on how people reason and experiences things differently.
It can not exist without biological thinking agents comparing their differences in their experiences
Consciousness doesn't mean subjectivity.
Consciousness is our ability to be conscious of environmental and organic stimuli and produce thoughts with content. Subjective is an abstract concept that described the differences between experiences of different agents.....This is an equivocation fallacy.

Abstract concepts do not exist...they are descriptive labels we use on processes.
This is bad language mode and it is common with claims about consciousness being a "thing" not a process or a property of a process. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, I probably shouldn't have used the word 'subjectivity' as it has confused the issue.

Consciousness is our ability to be conscious of environmental and organic stimuli and produce thoughts with content.

Here you have used the word 'conscious' in your definition of 'consciousness'. You could means several different things, and I'm not sure which one.

Assuming something that you have the burden to prove offers nothing of the above. — Nickolasgaspar

Panpsychism is a conclusion, not an assumption. Consider:

Either panpsychism, emergentism or eliminativism
Not emergentism
Not eliminativism
Therefore, panpsychism.

That's a valid argument. It might be unsound (one or more promises might be false), but that's another conversation. Panpsychism is the conclusion, not an assumption.

The difference between human brain and other "brains" (computers) is that computers work with algorithms. Inputs inform the algorithm and the algorithm provides "decisions".
In the case of human brain it processes emotion and meaning. A stimuli produces an emotion or affection and our brain(based on previous inputs(experiences),biological setup i.e. homeostasis or our biological hardware i.e. taste buds brain receptors , production of hormones etc) reasons them in to feeling and what they mean for the organism. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, thanks. Why can't all that happen without there being an emotion, meaning or feeling?

What's the rationale for that distinction then? — Daemon

I don't know, you'd have to ask a biologist I guess. Prescientific concepts of life might well have included an element of consciousness. But at some point, like got redefined in terms of reproductive ability, taking things from the environment and exploiting them, adapting, responding to stimuli (I'm talking out of my arse here, I don't actually know what the latest biological definition of life is) and that sort of thing. Things you can objectively look for anyway. Presumably this was satisfactory to demarcate the bits of the world they were interested in.

The mechanisms responsible for conscious experience are operating, but below the threshold where consciousness begins. We can see this from the outside. It's in the nature of consciousness that a gradual onset would be difficult for the "user" to detect. — Daemon

That's interesting. You are still using the concept pf a threshold though, which suggests a sharp dividing line to me. If the user is not conscious of the gradual onset of consciousness, then it's not a gradual onset is it? It's when they do become conscious of it, that they are conscious of it. Does that moment of realisation happen suddenly?

Again when certain types of anaesthetic are administered we can see a gradual diminution in neuronal activity, corresponding to a greying out of conscious experience. — Daemon

Sure, I agree there is a greying out. It's the transition from they faintest of greys to nothing at all I'm interested in. The faintest of greys is still a state of consciousness, no? There's an experience going on.

Before x can be conscious, there has to be an unconscious x. — Daemon

That's the emergentist view. My view could perhaps be: before x can be conscious, there has to be a conscious p, q and r.

Either the awareness is there or it is not. Consciousness is also present in a dampened state. It is like numbers, a number is either zero or not zero. There is nothing in between. — SolarWind

Yes, that's how it seems to me. Dampened consciousness is still consciousness.