wellbeing can work as a tentative foundation — Tom Storm

I think that morality has more than one aspect and we often conflate them. My personal relations with others do not generally get modulated by any consideration of the greatest increase in well-being. I act toward others in a manner I think is virtuous (or at least I strive to). It's about the kind of person I am, not the outcome.

The problem, however, is that governments (and other institutions) are not persons and so have no virtue in and of themselves. Individual government officials can be virtuous, but government policy cannot. So I see a need there for foreseeable consequences to be considered and in that case, perhaps a loose idea of 'well-being' might make a good foundation on which to base one's arguments.

We still face the problem of underdetermination though. Most people already know the power of 'well-being' as a metric for consequentialist arguments, so most will already formulate their arguments using it. As such, the main problem of deciding between them remains undented by such an attack.

-"In what storyline do you think I'm someone who doesn't know that? I presume none (you may imagine a young child has joined, but a simple check of my vocabulary should eliminate that possibility). So simply telling me stuff I clearly already know doesn't constitute an argument.'
-So why do you use them as an argument against well being when by putting limits in their pleasures we expand their well being and ours.

How do you measure well-being? — Isaac

There are specific metrics like
1.our biological drives to survive( belong to a group,), to flourish(ensure safety) and to procreate.
1.our biological urges Address our biological need, Seek non destructive pleasure and avoid pain/suffering
3.Behavior fueled by our mirror neurons that enable sympathy and empathy
those are some of the most essential.

You keep dismissing things (pleasure, desires...) but you've not replaced those with anything. If well-being is your key metric it needs a clear definition, no? — Isaac

-I don't dismiss them. The problem with them is that they can be destructive and they need to be managed. Many rules of our society help us keep them under control while you can not see that. Its the sweet spot that allows us to avoid destruction and maximize our well being through our pleasures.

I think you have summarised nicely the shortfalls in the wellbeing argument. I have generally taken the view that for secular morality, wellbeing can work as a tentative foundation - subject to ongoing clarifications and refinements - which for me is an improvement on debating the putative will of gods which humans can't agree on. It's definitely flawed or incomplete, but I'm not aware of anything better for now. — Tom Storm

-The shortalls he summarised have being debunked. MAybe you can point out which ones in your opinion still fly.

I don't disagree that the framework is "under construction" with huge holes but the excuses I hear for not accepting well being as the auxiliary principle of the system are disconnected from reality.
i.e. Well being doesn't have a destructive side, while uncontrolled pleasure can easily lead to destruction.(diminished well being).

I agree but I guess Hanover might ask you on what basis ought one to care for these values? The adoption of 'wellbeing' as a criterion of value is adopting a presupposition, is it not? — Tom Storm

If he asked why one ought to care about human life I would take the question as argumentative since it seems he does care. If he meant why those who don't care should there is no argument that would persuade them. That others do care may be a presupposition, but to care is not. That we ought to maximize well being may be a presupposition, but one's own well being is not. Well being is not a criterion of value but rather stems from the value of human life.

[Added: By maximizing well being I do not mean that everything we do ought to be done to maximize well being or that in every situation the goal is to maximize well being, but that if we care then we want what is best for those whom we care for.]

It seems to me that rape is wrong because there is harm done, and, moreover, we agree that there is harm done. If there was no harm, then there would be no wrong committed.

On a given subject, is one particular moral view objectively right and the others are wrong, regardless of what people believe? Or are people's beliefs and views central in the creation of morality itself, and thus morality is subjectively dependant on those beliefs and views. — PhilosophyRunner

My own belief is that there is an objectivity to what is immoral. This doesn't mean that it's always easy to discern, but for the most part we can see the harm done if we lie, steal, or murder.

Thanks everyone for the replies. It is possible that I am using terms loosely as I have not spent long studying formal philosophy. In order to try to explain myself as clearly as possible, let me give a thought experiment.

Anne and I are the only two remaining humans in the universe. We have a house and enough water but are short of food.

I tell Anne "Let us kill and eat our Dog."
She tells me "no that is immoral, I would rather starve instead"

From what I understand, these are the different ways of analysing that situation.

Case 1
God/Religion decrees that it is right/wrong to kill the dog. As God/religion has an infinitely superior morality to us, it is right/wrong to kill the Dog. Alternatively morality itself comes from God/religion, so we should always follow what God/religion says

If we disagree, we are simply wrong about the matter, due to our ignorance or flaws.

Case 2
There is natural fact of the matter that it is right/wrong to kill the dog, We may not know the answer, but there is an objectively correct answer, whether or not we know it.

Case 3
Each of us has our own morality, and both are right for themselves. So for me it is moral to kill the Dog, and for Anne it is immoral. We are both correct.

Case 4
Morality is whatever consensus can be achieve by the society. We talk between us and decide that it is right/wrong to kill the dog. Whatever we collectively decide is right/wrong, is objectively right/wrong in our society.

Case 5
Morality is derived from higher state objective laws. Such laws include:
-Maximise happiness
-Minimise suffering
-Treat people as an end in themselves and not as the means to your ends.

From those higher state objective laws, we can derive whether it is morally right/wrong to kill the dog. There is an objective fact of the matter based on the above laws, whether we are able to derive it or not.

Case 6
Morality is whatever rules and norms a society implements. Whatever is decided is then factually what was decided.

Each case may have variants, such as asking what a perfectly rational human what they would think, rather than asking a human what they think. Of course this brings up the question of what exactly is a perfectly rational human - does such a person even conceptually exist?

Some of the cases which suggest an objective morality, still leave open how we can know of that objective morality, and how we can be confident of our knowledge is in fact the correct knowledge.

Out of those options I outline above, the concept of morality that currently sits best with me is Case 4. I'm not sure if that would technically be cultural relativism, or not - perhaps someone will elucidate on that.

In addition to the above clarification from myself, these are some of my specific responses to specific posts:

That is an interesting video. It suggests that even babies have a concept of right and wrong. I haven't seen the full study referenced in that video, but I imagine more babies selected the "nice" puppet that the "bad" puppet? I.e it was not 100% or 0%?

Let's say 80% of the babies selected the "nice" puppet and 20% the "bad" puppet. Here are three competing senses of morality:

a) 80% of babies were objectively right. 20% were objectively (and factually) wrong.

b) 80% of babies had one sense of morality, 20% had a different sense. None of there morally was wrong, they are entitled to their own sense of morality.

c) 80% of babies had one sense of morality, 20% had a different sense. None of there morally was wrong. however if the babies were to form a baby society, then in that society the 80% of babies will be morally right and the 20% morally wrong.

I get what you are suggesting, but the problem I have with is this. You are making an observation of nature, and of humans in nature. From this you say that humans want to preserve their family, and even animals do. I agree with you.

However how can we go from that to whether people should want to preserve their family? How do you go from the observation, to the "should" or "ought." If you looked around and say someone who didn't want t preserve their family, then you could either say:

1) I have observed a moral rule that you must want to preserve your family. You don't want to preserve your family, so you are objectively wrong
2) I have observed a moral rule that you must want to preserve your family. You don't want to preserve your family, so I have to change by moral rule to include my new observations of you.

Take the analogy of physics laws (my area). I observe that force applied on an object is proportional to it's mass multiplied by it's acceleration. People have observed that since newton, and it is one of the laws of motion he suggested. This has very accurately and reliably been shown to be true. I'm pretty confident in it. I can use it to make predictions.

However I cannot use it to say how nature should or ought to behave.

If tomorrow I woke up and found that my pen does not follow my Newton's laws of motion, then I can't chastise my pen for not following the correct law. In fact the opposite is true, I need to modify my understanding to include the new observed behaviour.

Certainly not an uncommon assertion. Would you class secular humanism as foundational? — Tom Storm

These are the affirmations of the secular humanist: https://secularhumanism.org/what-is-secular-humanism/affirmations-of-humanism/

I don't think these beliefs are foundational, but I think the foundation from which they flow is that humans are of some special status worthy of considering all of these matters and treating humans differently from all other things in the universe. We don't bother with secular rock-ism, secular porcupine-sim, or secular notebook-ism, but we focus only on those issues that affect humans and, for some reason, elevate them above all else and arrive at a moral system filled with all sorts of affirmations of how they ought be treated. We call this secular humanism.

To claim the secular humanist's beliefs about humans are foundational is to claim something special about humans, but they deny humans have any. If humans have no degree of magic in their constitution, then we'd need to treat human beings like the pool balls that they are.

So, either (1) admit that humans are special and worthy of special treatment and make that your foundation, or (2) deny that and stop with trying to create special rules for these ordinary physical entities. If you choose (1), you're not a secular humanist as they define themselves and you've not avoided any of the problems levied against the theist. If you choose (2), you're not a secular humanist, but some sort of nihilist, which is exactly what the theist expected to be the result.

The theist asserts human's special treatment arises from their being created in God's image and possessing part of a divine essence (soul). If a secular humanist were to accept #1 (and they don't according to what I've read), I might concede their views were foundational, but I'd also think they might be theistic.

That is an interesting video. It suggests that even babies have a concept of right and wrong. I haven't seen the full study referenced in that video, but I imagine more babies selected the "nice" puppet that the "bad" puppet? I.e it was not 100% or 0%? — PhilosophyRunner

@Isaac posted this link:

The relevant chapter of the Handbook of moral development is also available online here

https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/f/1145/files/2017/10/Wynn-Bloom-Moral-Handbook-Chapter-2013-14pwpor.pdf — Isaac

I haven't read it yet, but I'm going to.

I have not spent long studying formal philosophy. — PhilosophyRunner

Most of us here are amateurs. Many of us have not read much philosophy. I started a thread about how you don't have to read philosophy to be a philosopher. You don't need to apologize.

Let's say 80% of the babies selected the "nice" puppet and 20% the "bad" puppet. Here are three competing senses of morality: — PhilosophyRunner

The babies didn't really make moral judgements at all. They acted based on their preferences. I think that's true of all of us. I think what we call moral judgements are rationalizations we come up with to justify our feelings and actions.

the back bone of the modern Judiciary system — Nickolasgaspar

I think our morality is different, and should be different, from laws and rules imposed by authorities.

Instead most of you visit ideas that they are either tautologies or factually wrong (based on modern knowledge) or metaphysical at best. — Nickolasgaspar

I think all formal moral philosophy is metaphysics.

How is "This moral view is objectively right" different to "this moral view is right"? What does "objectively" add? — Banno

It introduces the dichotomy objective vs. merely personal/subjective.

"You may think you look good in that dress, but you're not being objective."

Not knowing what is morally demanded of us is something that causes most moral creatures occasional distress, and we do resort to others and our own reflections to try to figure it out, meaning we must be accepting there is some objective standard for what that moral reality is. — Hanover

This goes too far.

By relying on others to clarify moral questions, we're only assuming that someone else might know better than we do, or, at most, that someone else knows better than we do.


I propose that the idea of objective morality has to do with
1. confusing power for authority,
or
2. a justification of particular actions that is intended to protect one's tribe or one's ego.

In short, the concept of objective morality has the function of one person or group of persons having or presuming to have power over other people.

The babies didn't really make moral judgements at all. They acted based on their preferences. I think that's true of all of us. I think what we call moral judgements are rationalizations we come up with to justify our feelings and actions.

I agree. In which case there can't be an absolute objective morality - one where I say you are objectively morally wrong in any instance.

So I suggest there are two kinds of morality:

- The moral valuation individuals perform, than is based on the individual preference.
- The aggregate of the above in a society that allows a society to set up norms that help it function

My claim is that there is no objective morality beyond the above two, and the above two are entirely dependent on the subjective value (or preference as you said) of the people in question.

Existentialists would say that accepting a creed as one's moral guide is an act of bad faith.

Faith as bad faith. Go figure. — Banno

Find an existentialist who
1. has not renounced his existentialism or otherwise moved away from it,
2. has not died by all acounts prematurely (so that the point of how long they would stick to their existentialism is moot).

Because if the past record of existentialists is anything to go by, they either ditched it eventually, or died relatively young.

By relying on others to clarify moral questions, we're only assuming that someone else might know better than we do, or, at most, that someone else knows better than we do. — baker

Obviously only you are responsible for you own decision, but relying upon others to assist in figuring out moral questions only means your conscientious.

It remains that the choice of creed is yours. It remains that you cannot just dump your moral responsibility on to god /.../

Your systems have a gapping hole in them. — Banno

Again, it remains that you have to choose your creed. Unless you rely on your creed to decide your creed for you... — Banno

Only for the desperate prospective adult convert.

Don't forget that most religious people didn't choose their religion, but were born and raised into it. It's become part of their sense of self, part of their sense of right and wrong by default. They internalized it before their ability to think criticially has developed. Your above objection does not apply to these people.

It only applies to the undecided, the "seekers", who are a minority, and in reference to religion, an aberration. So they're not a relevant population as far as religion goes. Even if they are the ones who experience the moral and other doubts most intensely.

I objected to your saying

Not knowing what is morally demanded of us is something that causes most moral creatures occasional distress, and we do resort to others and our own reflections to try to figure it out, meaning we must be accepting there is some objective standard for what that moral reality is. — Hanover

because it goes too far.

The same way a theist demonstrates the existence of his diety. He doesn't. Such is a foundational faith statement, from which all sorts of conclusions derive.

I'd submit without that faith foundation, nihilism and amoralism results.

You've got to have faith in something I suppose. — Hanover

Not necessarily faith, but a goal (although, arguably, this can involve faith). By pursuing a goal, nihilism and amoralism are not options anymore. Because by pursuing a goal, a person's actions are directed toward that goal, meaning that the wandering, confusion, inconsistency etc. associated with nihilism and amoralism are eliminated or at least minimized.

My point isn't what you think it is. It is about lying. Kant says you don't lie to anyone just to achieve a consequentialist greater good. Maybe I should have said Kant would recommend you tell the Russian troops where the Ukrainian women are hiding because lying is wrong. — Tom Storm

Talk about rigidity.
The point is not to lie. You seem to think the point is to have the conversation on the other person's terms.

So religious doctrine with regard to morality is to act as a past record of what people had found out about it.

Now. Why do we need a past record of what people had found out about it? Why not a current one? There are more people alive now than have ever been, so more people now should be directly in touch with god than have ever been.

Keeping a past record seems little more than archiving. If we want to know what's moral according to divine rule we'd be statistically better off consulting the current crop of religious cults than the written record of the previous crop. — Isaac

That would be religious moral historicism. But that's not the point of religious doctrine. Religious doctrines tend to claim to be "timeless", "not bound by time", "for all times" (also for all places).
The point of refering to religious doctrine as a source or justification of morality is that only religious doctrine has the potential to provide the metaphyiscal framework needed for an action to be judged as moral or otherwise.

The point is there are more people alive now than have ever been. So if some small portion of humanity are open to enlightenment or divine revelation, then what those people are saying about morality right now is a better guide than what a far smaller group said about it in the past.

In other words, why are you privileging ancient people's access to god (which they then wrote down) over modern people's access to god. — Isaac

There's thousands of cultists, gurus, prophets and Messiahs right now. You (or Wayfarer) may not personally like what any of them have to say, but that doesn't make it hard to see how morality from divine revelation could work without religious doctrine. On the contrary, it's easy to see how, we just need to ask one of thousands of cultists, gurus, prophets and Messiahs we have with us right now what's morally right and what's immoral. — Isaac

And when we compare those new accounts to the more traditional, older ones, we find the newer ones usually wanting.

But for this comparison to make sense, one actually has to study both the old and the new. If you, for example, study the Pali suttas on the one hand, and what some modern mainstream Buddhist teachers are saying on the other, it's clear as day that the latter are inferior. The difference is as evident as the one between hot pizza and cold pizza. But to see that difference, you just need to do the homework yourself, summaries done by other people don't work.

Talk about rigidity.
The point is not to lie. You seem to think the point is to have the conversation on the other person's terms. — baker

No, I'm pointing to the fact that truth telling can kill people. If we ignore potential consequences we are a fools.

It's simply that an item that does not appear in the assumptions of an argument cannot appear in the conclusion. Hence a series of assumptions or observations about how things are cannot lead to the conclusion that things ought be.

Seems you are using "biological urge" in much the way I might use "desire".

Not necessarily faith, but a goal (although, arguably, this can involve faith). By pursuing a goal, nihilism and amoralism are not options anymore. Because by pursuing a goal, a person's actions are directed toward that goal, meaning that the wandering, confusion, inconsistency etc. associated with nihilism and amoralism are eliminated or at least minimized. — baker

The cure for all existential doubt and for all the distress that might befall the philosophically oriented is to not be philosophical, but to be superficial. That is, ignorance is bliss. So, if you wish to cure your wandering and confusion by refusing to look behind the fact that the goal you're pursuing actually has no meaning, I guess you could temporarily deceive yourself into thinking you had real purpose and that would get you through the day.

It's about the kind of person I am, not the outcome. — Isaac

I concure. Moral decisions cannot be decided in an algorithmic fashion - they are far too complex. Just as no rule can accomodate the definition of "game", and of "morality", no rules could cover the all possible situations we migth call "moral".

So, either (1) admit that humans are special and worthy of special treatment and make that your foundation, or (2) deny that and stop with trying to create special rules for these ordinary physical entities. If you choose (1), you're not a secular humanist as they define themselves and you've not avoided any of the problems levied against the theist. If you choose (2), you're not a secular humanist, but some sort of nihilist, which is exactly what the theist expected to be the result. — Hanover

Why do you think many secular humanists are concerned about human rights and work hard to help others and improve human life? Do you think these impulses are the remnants of theism?

The problem, however, is that governments (and other institutions) are not persons and so have no virtue in and of themselves. Individual government officials can be virtuous, but government policy cannot. So I see a need there for foreseeable consequences to be considered and in that case, perhaps a loose idea of 'well-being' might make a good foundation on which to base one's arguments. — Isaac

Agree. I think wellbeing's chief function is as a foundation for social policy and law.