Sorry, did not understand that. Why does metaphysics have to be about science? — Jackson

Is there any metaphysics that does not offer a grounding of the sciences, if not explicitly then implicitly?

Anything can be not good for anyone. Can you say any source that is good for you and shows that what I said is wrong? — Angelo Cannata

I asked you to name a book or article you read that is doing metaphysics in a way you do not approve.
Let us look at some examples.

Along history metaphysics was criticized by historicists, because, by trying to understand how things are, it looses sight of the fact that things, rather than being, are becoming (Heraclitus). — Angelo Cannata

I think we need to shake the traditional views of Parmenides and Heraclitus. This "being versus becoming" is a false one. Why should we presume that "being" means something opposed to "becoming"? This essentially equates being to permanence.

Beings exist. Beings change. Change -- becoming -- itself is a being. Not a "physical object," of course, but a process. Processes exist. Change exists. Thus, change is "in" being as much as permanence is "in" being.

It's a false dichotomy. Heraclitus and Parmenides are saying the same thing. Here I agree with Heidegger.

Is there any metaphysics that does not offer a grounding of the sciences? — Joshs

I was not aware metaphysics had to be about grounding science. Not a definition I would abide by.

I think we need to shake the traditional views of Parmenides and Heraclitus. This "being versus becoming" is a false one. Why should we presume that "being" means something opposed to "becoming"? This essentially equates being to permanence.

Beings exist. Beings change. Change -- becoming -- itself is a being. Not a "physical object," of course, but a process. Processes exist. Change exists. Thus, change is "in" being as much as permanence is "in" being. — Xtrix

Agree with that. Many confuse metaphysics with theology.

Many scholars say Aristotle did not name his text "Metaphysics." Or that it simply referred to what he wrote after the Physics.
In the Metaphysics Aristotle describes the project as "first philosophy." Or, analysis of basic concepts. — Jackson

Yes, I’ve heard that. Given that the meaning of the term varies depending on which approaches in philosophy you favor, maybe the question here should be what would you like the definition of metaphysics to be.

I was not aware metaphysics had to be about grounding science. Not a definition I would abide by. — Jackson

As a postmodernist, I tend to think of metaphysics as synonymous with worldview, and worldviews are inclusive frames that address all aspects of culture , from the sciences to the arts to ethics and politics. What do you understand metaphysics to be?

My own understanding is that it addresses the question, What kind of thing is the world?
Does the universe have a beginning? Did it come from somewhere?
Metaphysics overlaps with epistemology--and aesthetics--so the clear delineation is not useful to make.

As a postmodernist, I tend to think of metaphysics as synonymous with worldview, and worldviews are inclusive frames that address all aspects of culture , from the r winces to the arts to ethics and politics. — Joshs

The positivists obsessed with telling us what we're not supposed to be able to think about. That legacy is still with us, though receding.

To be clear, I don't think metaphysics is about referring to how the world really is, but what we say about the world.

If you consider change as a kind of being, I think this is not really consistent, because, if you really want to be consistent with a perspective based on change, you must consider change also about your idea of change. In other words, if I say “everything changes”, I must admit that this very statement and its meaning must be included in the set of things subject to change.
If you think about change as a way of being, then you are assuming that, along the change, being remains being. But, if it remains being, then you are excluding it from change, you are excluding your statement from the field of things that change.
Heidegger was able to include change in the category of being because he actually modified the meaning of being: being in Heidegger is not absolute, but conditioned by time, by the human condition.
In this context, the meaning of “being” is itself exposed to change. This way Heidegger forced the meaning of “being” to something that actually means human condition, subject to time and death. In this context we cannot say that change is an expression of being, because being itself hasn’t any stable meaning. In other words, Heidegger wanted to keep his philosophy in the terminology of being, and the price for this was to force the meaning of being to something subject to the human condition. This forced him to have nothing to say at a certain point. I think that after Heidegger no other philosophers have reached the high level of his philosophy so far, but I think also that we can do better, we can take his research to better levels.

For example, physicalists insist they are not making a metaphysical claim, but they are. If everything is physical, then nothing is non-physical. Okay, that explains nothing.
So, if I thought about my grandmother the other day, they'd say that is a physical process. To which I'd say, so what?

If all my thoughts are physical, that only accounts for necessary conditions. But the principle of sufficient reason says, why did you think about your grandmother rather than something else.

My own understanding is that it addresses the question, What kind of thing is the world?
Does the universe have a beginning? Did it come from somewhere?
Metaphysics overlaps with epistemology--and aesthetics--so the clear delineation is not useful to make — Jackson

This sounds to me more like meta-science , a questioning approach that takes for granted the main methodological assumptions operating within the sciences of its day. It seekes only to organize , categorize and clarify within a given set of overarching normative conventions. This is different from what the major continental philosophers throughout history have done, which is overturn these accepted assumptions. For instance, the shift from hypothetical inductive to deductive method as we move from Bacon to Popper. In order to embrace this definition of metaphysics one has to first recognize that there is no fixed definition of what science does or how it does it. There are instead assumptions scientists share with the rest of their culture that informs what they think they are doing.

This sounds to me more like meta-science , a questioning approach that takes for granted the main methodological assumptions operating within the sciences of its day. It seekes only to organize , categorize and clarify within a given set of overarching normative conventions. This is different from what the major continental philosophers throughout history have done, which is overturn these accepted assumptions. For instance, the shift from hypothetical inductive to deductive method as we move from Bacon to Popper. In order to embrace this definition of metaphysics one has to first recognize that there is no fixed definition of what science does or how it does it. — Joshs

I guess. Science actually means very little to me in terms of how I live and what I believe.
And I have a undergraduate degree in math and read about quantum physics and cosmology. Interesting, but does not itself tell me much about the world.

I have a undergraduate degree in math and read about quantum physics and cosmology. Interesting, but does not itself tell me much about the world. — Jackson

What does tell you about the world?

Leibniz criticized mechanism in science and Newton's absolutes of time and space. Now, Leibniz did no
experiments to prove it, yet he is confirmed by Einstein. This, to me, means that science is just a how things are explained, not what they are.

What does tell you about the world? — Joshs

Almost anything. I know there is a physical world. I hardly think that explains reality.

I know there is a physical world. I hardly think that explains reality. — Jackson

But do you think positing non-physical stuff will help?

For example, there are readers of Hegel who call it the non-metaphysical interpretation. That is, making consistent with their idea of Kantianism. Then, there became a metaphysical school of Hegel to counter that.

But do you think positing non-physical stuff will help? — bongo fury

Even Bertrand Russell admitted that the very definition of matter was incoherent.

I think it is obvious that metaphysics has different meanings in different times and different authors. As a consequence, the question in the title of the thread “What is metaphysics?” has not much meaning. How do you think to deal with the plurality of positions about the question?

Even Bertrand Russell admitted that the very definition of matter was incoherent. — Jackson

I don't think he meant to posit the existence of non-physical stuff. Do you?

I don't think he meant to posit the existence of non-physical stuff. Do you? — bongo fury

I did not say there is non-physical stuff. I said the very concept of the physical is incoherent.

Briefly this is Russell's way of saying that science does not even define what physicality is:

"All that physics gives us is certain equations giving abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it is that changes, and what it changes from and to—as to this, physics is silent. (Russell 1959: 18)"

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/russellian-monism/

If you consider change as a kind of being — Angelo Cannata

Ask yourself this: is change a "thing" of any kind? I'd say "Yes, of course -- it's at least a concept, a word, etc." So it is a being -- it is "something." It has existence. It "is."

This is, as far as I can tell, not very controversial.

What would be the alternative? Is change nothing?

I think this is not really consistent, because, if you really want to be consistent with a perspective based on change, you must consider change also about your idea of change. In other words, if I say “everything changes”, I must admit that this very statement and its meaning must be included in the set of things subject to change. — Angelo Cannata

I don't see how this is relevant. I'm not denying that things change, nor did I say anything about a "perspective of change." The only point was that change -- whatever it is -- is, at bottom, "something." It's not nothing. Whether a physical process or a word or a thought or concept or an abstraction, it's something. Thus, it's a being.

The sentence "everything changes" is itself subject to change -- so what?

If you think about change as a way of being, then you are assuming that, along the change, being remains being. But, if it remains being, then you are excluding it from change, you are excluding your statement from the field of things that change. — Angelo Cannata

I didn't say change was a "way of being," I said that it was a being. "Being remains being," or "being is excluded from change" is, again, equating "being" with permanence. That's exactly what I'm arguing against. Being is not permanence and it is not change. Being is not "a" being at all.

So I'm not excluding being from change, and I'm not equating being with change.

Heidegger was able to include change in the category of being because he actually modified the meaning of being: being in Heidegger is not absolute, but conditioned by time, by the human condition. — Angelo Cannata

I wouldn't put it that way. To say being is "conditioned by time" is meaningless to me. Rather, my understanding of Heidegger is this: human beings are temporal beings, and when they interpret being they do so with time as their standpoint. They interpret being in terms of time. Hence why the distinction between "being and becoming" is so ancient. Change itself assumes time. No time, no change.

This way Heidegger forced the meaning of “being” to something that actually means human condition, subject to time and death. In this context we cannot say that change is an expression of being, because being itself hasn’t any stable meaning. — Angelo Cannata

Again, I don't agree with your formulation. The meaning of being as "something that actually means the human condition" doesn't ring true to me, except in the sense that it can be interpreted as what I said above -- that humans interpret being (and beings) in terms of time, because (at least in Heidegger's analysis) we "are" time (or, in his vocabulary, "temporality").

Regardless, being doesn't have a stable meaning -- true. There are many meanings and interpretations. But the same is true for change. The point, though, that change is "something" -- which is all I'm claiming -- and is thus a thing, and thus a being, etc., seems fairly obvious.

I think it is obvious that metaphysics has different meanings in different times and different authors. As a consequence, the question in the title of the thread “What is metaphysics?” has not much meaning. How do you think to deal with the plurality of positions about the question? — Angelo Cannata

Why I started this thread, to have a discussion.

My recommendation: read Heidegger's "Introduction to Metaphysics."

My recommendation: read Heidegger's "Introduction to Metaphysics." — Xtrix

I read it. I also read Being and Time cover to cover in grad school. Quite familiar.

If you consider “being” as "something”, but not permanent, how are you able to give it a name, which is, the word “being”? It seems to me that we can use names only if we consider that something remains unchanged over time. For example, if what I call “sky” today is a “horse” tomorrow, it is completely impossible to me to give it a name, I cannot even figure what I am thinking about. But you call it “being”, which means that, in this something that you call “being”, something remains the same over time, so that today and tomorrow you can still call it “being”. This seems to me that actually you are not conceiving “being” as something really completely changing, really not permanent.

If you consider “being” as "something”, but not permanent, how are you able to give it a name, which is, the word “being”? It seems to me that we can use names only if we consider that something remains unchanged over time. For example, if what I call “sky” today is a “horse” tomorrow, it is completely impossible to me to give it a name, I cannot even figure what I am thinking about. But you call it “being”, which means that, in this something that you call “being”, something remains the same over time, so that today and tomorrow you can still call it “being”. This seems to me that actually you are not conceiving “being” as something really completely changing, really not permanent. — Angelo Cannata

Ontology comes from the Greek, ontos. When Aristotle is translated as talking about being, or beings, he really just means, "things." Nothing fancy, just things, ontos.

Briefly this is Russell's way of saying that science does not even define what physicality is: — Jackson

Sure. A physicalist has no objection to that. Metaphysics as the philosophy of physics.

But your example was

If all my thoughts are physical, — Jackson

Which appears to argue for the non-physics of mind.